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"It is astonishing what language can do. With a few syllables it can express an incal¬
culable number of thought, so that even a thought grasped by a terrestrial being for
the very first time can be put into a form of words which will be understood by some¬
one to whom the thought is entirely new. This would be impossible, were we not
able to distinguish parts in the thoughts corresponding to the parts of a sentence, so
that the structure of the sentence serves as the image of the structure of the thoughts."
(Frege, 1923)
"A struggle for life is constantly going on amongst the words and grammatical forms
in each language. The better, the shorter, the easier forms are constantly gaining the
upper hand, and they owe their success to their own inherent virtue." (Darwin, 1871,
p. 91)
"Humans and chimpanzees are nevertheless very similar in their proteins, on the
average, but vastly different in the sizes of their brains and their ability to write books
about each other." (Lewontin, 1998, p. 117)
Abstract
The origins of human language, with its extraordinarily complex structure and multitude of func¬
tions, remains among the most challenging problems for evolutionary biology and the cognitive
sciences. Although many will agree progress on this issue would have important consequences
for linguistic theory, many remain sceptical about whether the topic is amenable to rigorous, sci¬
entific research at all. Complementing recent developments toward better empirical validation,
this thesis explores how formal models from both linguistics and evolutionary biology can help
to constrain the many theories and scenarios in this field.
I first review a number of foundational mathematical models from three branches of evolu¬
tionary biology - population genetics, evolutionary game theory and social evolution theory - and
discuss the relation between them. This discussion yields a list of ten requirements on evolution¬
ary scenarios for language, and highlights the assumptions implicit in the various formalisms. I
then look in more details at one specific step-by-step scenario, proposed by Ray Jackendoff, and
consider the linguistic formalisms that could be used to characterise the evolutionary transitions
from one stage to the next. I conclude from this review that the main challenges in evolutionary
linguistics are to explain how three major linguistic innovations - combinatorial phonology, com¬
positional semantics and hierarchical phrase-structure - could have spread through a population
where they are initially rare.
In the second part of the thesis, I critically evaluate some existing formal models of each of
these major transitions and present three novel alternatives. In an abstract model of the evolution
of speech sounds (viewed as trajectories through an acoustic space), I show that combinatorial
phonology is a solution for robustness against noise and the only evolutionary stable strategy
(ESS). In a model of the evolution of simple lexicons in a noisy environment, I show that the
optimal lexicon uses a structured mapping from meanings to sounds, providing a rudimentary
compositional semantics. Lexicons with this property are also ESS's. Finally, in a model of
the evolution and acquisition of context-free grammars, I evaluate the conditions under which
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hierarchical phrase-structure will be favoured by natural selection, or will be the outcome of a
process of cultural evolution.
In the last chapter of the thesis, I discuss the implications of these models for the debates
in linguistics on innateness and learnability, and on the nature of language universals. A mainly
negative point to make is that formal leamability results cannot be used as evidence for an innate,
language-specific specialisation for language. A positive point is that with the evolutionary mod¬
els of language, we can begin to understand how universal properties and tendencies in natural
languages can result from the intricate interaction between innate learning biases and a process of
cultural evolution over many generations.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1.1 Why Study the Evolution of Language?
Language evolution is a booming field, there can be no doubt about it. Christiansen & Kirby
(2003c) counted 94 published papers per year in the period 1990-2002 in the on-line database
"ISI Web of Science". Science, Nature and other high-profile journals publish many papers per
year on the topic. There is a biennial conference, which had its fifth edition in March 2004,
numerous workshops, and a book-series by Oxford University Press. Each year, collections of
academic papers on language evolution are published (Hurford, Studdert-Kennedy & Knight,
1998; Knight, Hurford & Studdert-Kennedy, 2000; Briscoe, 2002b; Wray, 2002; Cangelosi &
Parisi, 2002; Christiansen & Kirby, 2003a; Tallerman, 2004), as well as numerous popular science
articles and books. There are funding opportunities earmarked for language evolution research,
specialised research groups, and a large number of university courses.
This surge in interest followed - coincidence or not - the publication of the most cited1 paper
from the field, Steven Pinker and Paul Bloom's position paper Natural Language and Natural
Selection (1990), and Pinker's bestselling popular science book The language instinct (1994)
expanding the argument from that paper. Pinker and Bloom argued that there is every reason to
believe the human "language instinct" originates in a process of classical, Darwinian evolution,
and their argument apparently hit a chord.
It is not difficult to understand why so many researchers are interested in the origins of lan¬
guage. After all, language is a defining characteristic of our own species, and a sine qua non for
human society, religion, culture, technology and, indeed, science. Its origins are fascinating in
1 ISI Web of Science lists 257 citing articles, more than any other citation hit in language evolution I know about;
the on-line Language Evolution and Computation Bibliography and Resources (Wang, 2004) has 79 citing papers in
its database, more than any of the other 757 papers in the database.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
their own right and, moreover, a better understanding of language origins is likely to have ma¬
jor implications for theories of the nature, use and acquisition of language and, perhaps, for the
study of animal communication. Pinker & Bloom (1990) argued that human language's unique
features can be understood as having evolved for the purpose of conveying an unbounded number
of messages over a limited, linear channel.
However, Pinker and Bloom's paper - although important in countering an anti-evolutionary
stance of many linguists at the time - is a peculiar paper to be at the heart of the field. The paper
does not present a real theory, other than the proposal that we should think about language as
an "adaptation". Crucial components of evolutionary explanations - the variation available for
evolution, the intermediate steps, the selection pressures moving our ancestors from one stage to
the next - are missing. Rather, as evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin (1990) points out, the
paper adopts an argument that is most popular with critics of the theory of Natural Selection: the
Argument from Design. Because language is too complex to have arisen as a side-effect, Pinker &
Bloom argue, there are no coherent alternatives to a classical Darwinian explanation. Except for a
sketchy survey of factors that could have played a role - information sharing, sexual selection, the
Baldwin effect - the paper does not even start with providing a candidate evolutionary scenario.
Many others in the field have presented more substantive theories of language evolution. How¬
ever, in the hundreds of papers that have appeared since 1990, no real consensus has emerged
about the fundamental questions of the field. Christiansen & Kirby (2003b), in a review of con¬
sensus and controversies, list only methodological issues as points of emerging consensus: the
need for interdisciplinary research, the need for formal modelling and the need to investigate
possible precursors of the language faculty in non-human animals and prelinguistic hominids.
Controversies, in contrast, abound. Researchers in language evolution are sharply critical of each
other's work. Almost all chapters in the recent collection edited by Christiansen & Kirby (2003a)
start with criticising fundamental misunderstandings and omissions in the field as a whole. For
instance:
• Newmeyer (2003) complains about the limited involvement of linguists and linguistic the¬
ory in theorising about language origins;
• Bickerton (2003b) agrees, but adds that ignorance of linguistics is a special case "of a much
more widespread tendency [...]. All too often, a writer whose home is in one or other of [the
relevant] disciplines will make a proposal that is unacceptable in terms of one or more of the
other relevant disciplines". Bickerton is particularly concerned about the lack of interest in
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the evolution of complex syntax, and in relating linguistic innovations with major cultural
changes in hominid evolution;
• Lieberman (2003), on the other hand, complains about the lack of interest in the articulatory
and acoustic constraints on reaching the very high rate of information transfer in human
speech. With Hauser & Fitch (2003), Lieberman argues for more focus on comparative
data;
• Dunbar (2003) complains about lack of attention for social function of language;
• Komarova & Nowak (2003) identify two popular misconceptions: the view of language as
a undecomposable unit, and the idea that language evolved from scratch when the human
lineage diverged from the chimpanzee lineage some 5 million years ago.
If scholars within the language evolution field are critical of each other, the criticism of the
field - and more broadly of the whole Darwinian approach to explaining human cognition and be¬
haviour - from researchers outside language evolution can be withering. Linguist Noam Chomsky
(quoted in Pinker & Bloom, 1990) writes:
"It is perfectly safe to attribute this development [of innate mental structure] to "nat¬
ural selection", so long as we realize that there is no substance to this assertion, that
it amounts to nothing more than a belief that there is some naturalistic explanation
for these phenomena." (Chomsky, 1972, p.97).
Chomsky (2002), 30 years later, made similar remarks. Evolutionary biologist Richard Lewon-
tin is even less respectful:
"Finally, I must say that the best lesson our readers can learn is to give up the childish
notion that everything that is interesting about nature can be understood. History, and
evolution is a form ofhistory, simply does not leave sufficient traces, especially when
it is the forces that are at issue. Form and even behavior may leave fossil remains, but
forces like natural selection do not. It might be interesting to know how cognition
(whatever that is) arose and spread and changed, but we cannot know. Tough luck."
(Lewontin, 1998, p. 130)
Are Chomsky, Lewontin and other critics overly pessimistic about the feasibility of thorough,
scientific investigation of language origins? Perhaps not; it could be that there really is a paucity
of data, and that ultimately there will be multiple scenarios of the evolutionary history of language
that are coherent and consistent with the empirical facts. However, I believe these critics are pre¬
mature with their assessment. Evolutionary biology has, from the days of the "modern synthesis"
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(Fisher, 1930; Wright, 1931; Haldane, 1932; Dobzhansky, 1937), used two main sources of em¬
pirical evidence - genetic and comparative - and made extensive use of mathematical modelling.
For language, genetic studies have only recently started to play a role (Lai, Fisher, Hurst, Vargha-
Khadem & Monaco, 2001). Comparative claims have been central to language evolution research,
but so far often based on surprisingly little solid empirical research (as Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch,
2002, argue). Mathematical - and computational - modelling of both the biological and cultural
evolution of language has only recently started to be seriously undertaken (Grafen, 1990; Kirby,
2002b).
1.2 How to Study the Evolution of Language
Language evolution is of course not the only field where it is difficult to find empirical evidence:
in cosmology, general relativity, paleontology, origins of life and many other fields researchers
have struggled to find ways to test the coherence of their theories, and to test the sometimes very
indirect predictions that follow from them. The solution in these fields has not been to abandon the
interesting questions, but to formalise the theories, and to work out testable consequences, even if
it requires many intermediate steps. For the evolution of language this requires the development of
complete and formal scenarios that explain the evolution of the unique features of human language
(which are testable in modern humans) from a plausible precursor state in the human lineage that
is not unique in nature (and hence, open to empirical investigation through comparative research).
Only when we have precise scenarios of the evolution of language and worked out ways to
test empirically the plausibility of one scenario against another, can we conclude - if that turns
out to be the case - that there are too many alternative scenarios consistent with the available
data. In my view, we have certainly not reached this stage yet. In this thesis I work out a number
of formal requirements for theories of language evolution, and argue that existing models and
theories - including models presented in this thesis - do not yet meet all requirements. The thesis
is complementary to interesting work arguing that much more empirical data can and should be
gathered, and reporting results from such studies (Hauser, 1996; Hauser et al, 2002; Fitch &
Hauser, 2004).
Of course, many other researchers have emphasised the need for scenarios of language evo¬
lution to be (i) testable (for instance, Lieberman, 1984), (ii) complete (for instance Botha, 2003;
Bickerton, 2003b) and (iii) formal (for instance, Batali, 1998; Steels, 1997; Nowak et al., 2002).
Of those features, formalisation is perhaps most controversial, at least in the way this has been
worked out in current models. Derek Bickerton, for instance, has been vocal in his criticism of
the oversimplifications in mathematical and computational models (e.g. Bickerton, 2003b). There
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are two responses to such criticism, formulated nicely by Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981) and
Batali (1998). The first emphasises the precision that comes with formal models:
"Our position, however, is that a mathematical theory is always more precise than a
verbal one, in that it must spell out precisely the variables and parameters involved,
and the relations between them. Theories couched in nonmathematical language
may confound interactions and gloss over subtle differences in meaning. They avoid
the charge of oversimplification at the expense of ambiguity." (Cavalli-Sforza &
Feldman, 1981, p. vi).
The second response emphasises the heuristic value of formal models, that helps the re¬
searcher to explore consequences of a set of assumptions that might me overlooked in verbal
theorising:
"Mathematical and computational models provide a way to explore alternative ac¬
counts of the emergence of systems of communication. If the consequences of a
model are consistent with expectations based on intuitions or speculation, they might
obtain a small measure of support. But more interestingly (and, as it happens, more
often), the consequences of a model may deviate from expectations. In working
out the reasons for the differences, one can potentially develop a richer set of intu¬
itions. Models are thus valuable to the degree that they explicitly illustrate the con¬
sequences of the set of assumptions they embody. This may be even more important
than whether those assumptions are correct." (Batali, 1998, p.406).
Both the precision and the exploration aspect of formal modelling will play a role in this
thesis.
1.3 Related Approaches
The goal of this thesis is to contribute to formal, testable and complete scenarios of the evolution
of human language. One can identify at least three research traditions with similar goals.
The first is the work of Luc Steels (since 1995) and his students and colleagues at the Free
University Brussels and the Sony Computer Science Laboratory in Paris (Steels, 1995, 1998;
Steels, Kaplan, Mclntyre & Van Looveren, 2002; de Boer, 1999; De Jong, 2000; Kaplan, 2000;
Vogt, 2000; Belpaeme, 2001; De Beule, Van Looveren & Zuidema, 2002; Oudeyer, 2003). This
work is based on the conviction that very little about human language is innate, language-specific
and shaped by natural selection. Rather, language - with all its complex features - is the result
of the cultural negotiation of a communication system between agents with the communicative
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intentions and the cognitive, perceptual and motor abilities of humans. Much emphasis is put
on the biophysical constraints of "embodiment", and the spontaneous emergence of structure in
"self-organisation". The methodology is described as "understanding by building" (Pfeifer &
Scheier, 1999). In this work researchers try to simulate in as much detail as technically possible
the emergence of the features of natural language semantics, phonology, pragmatics and syntax.
The ultimate goal of this line of research is the simulation of the birth of a complete language in
a population of talking robots.
The approach I will take in this thesis differs in two important ways from the research in
this tradition. The first difference is methodological: I will not try to simulate reality but rather
try to design simple models, that deliberately abstract out those aspects of reality that are seen
as non-essential for the phenomenon under study. I believe the value of modelling is to aid
understanding, and that "to substitute an ill-understood model of the world for the ill-understood
world is not progress" (Boyd & Richerson, 1985, p.25). The second difference is about the role
of Natural Selection, as will be emphasised several times in this thesis. I share the belief of Steels
and colleagues that "cultural evolution" and "self-organisation" play a crucial role in creating the
structure of languages. However, I see a complementary role for natural selection in tinkering
with the parameters of self-organising processes2.
The second tradition is the work of Martin Nowak (since 1999) and co-workers (Nowak &
Krakauer, 1999; Nowak, Krakauer & Dress, 1999; Plotkin & Nowak, 2000; Nowak, Plotkin &
Jansen, 2000; Trapa & Nowak, 2000; Nowak, Komarova & Niyogi, 2001; Komarova & Nowak,
2001; Komarova, Niyogi & Nowak, 2001; Nowak, Komarova & Niyogi, 2002; Mitchener &
Nowak, 2002; Komarova & Nowak, 2003). These authors present mathematical models - some
very simple, some rather complex - to clarify the major steps in the evolution of language: dis¬
crete repertoires of speech sounds, word formation, sentence formation, Universal Grammar. The
similarity in ambition to the work in this thesis manifests itself even in the choice of titles, such
as Major transitions in language evolution (Plotkin & Nowak, 2001) and Evolutionary biology of
language (Nowak, 2000). The major differences are technical, as will become clear from the quite
detailed critique of some of these models in chapters 4, 5 and 6. A recurring theme is that these
models keep the representation of language very abstract, whereas I will - using more concrete
representations of language and simulation models - argue that the assumed sets of strategies
available for evolution are often unrealistic.
2De Boer (p.c.) and Oudeyer (2003) do express similar views.
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The third tradition is the work of Jim Hurford (since 1989), Simon Kirby (since 1994) and
John Batali (since 1994) and their students (Hurford, 1989; Batali, 1994; Kirby, 1994; Oliphant
& Batali, 1996; Kirby & Hurford, 1997; Yamauchi, 2001; Smith, 2003b; Brighton, 2003; Smith,
2003a). These models cover a range of topics, in particular the biological evolution of lexi¬
cal learning, the cultural evolution of syntax and the "learning guided evolution" of syntax (the
Baldwin effect). The focus is on detailed analysis of specific simulation models, with a shift
from evolutionary game-theoretic models in 1989 to mainly cultural evolution models later3. The
models I will present differ from this tradition in that they focus much more on the role of natural
selection, and on a complete scenario that includes the evolution of phonology.
1.4 Plan of the Thesis
In this thesis I will discuss theories, models and results from fields ranging from population
genetics to comparative linguistics. In the interest of readability, I will avoid as much as possible
the technical jargon from particular fields, limit mathematical details to a fairly basic level, and
provide wherever I can a summary in words of given equations, or the intuition behind a given
formalism or simulation.
In chapter 21 will review foundational models from evolutionary biology, to arrive at a list of
formal criteria for evolutionary scenarios. These criteria, and some of the terminology introduced,
will play a role in the rest of the thesis in evaluating existing work and designing new models.
In chapter 3 I introduce a gradual scenario for the evolution of language proposed by Jack-
endoff (1999, 2002). Although by no means uncontroversial, this scenario is an example of the
kind of complete scenarios I have in mind. I introduce a number of formalisms to characterise the
various stages in the scenario, and list three transitions that need further investigation.
In chapter 4 I study the first of these transitions, the evolution of combinatorial phonology.
I will use the requirements from chapter 2 to critically evaluate existing models. I then present
a new model of the evolution of this fundamental feature of speech, where speech signals are
modelled as trajectories through an acoustic space. The model uses a hill-climbing heuristic to
minimise confusion probabilities, and I will consider both optimal configurations and "evolution¬
ary stable states".
Chapter 5 is very similarly structured, but considers the evolution of compositional seman¬
tics. I evaluate existing models and present a new model that is also based on a hill-climbing
heuristic and uses a matrix representation for describing the mapping from meanings to signals. I
show that in both the optimal configurations and the evolutionary stable states similar meanings
3Kirby & Hurford (1997) and Smith (2003b) combine biological and cultural evolution.
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will be expressed by similar signals, and discuss the relevance for the evolution of composition-
ality.
Chapter 6 considers the most difficult topic, the evolution of recursive, hierarchical phrase-
structure. I review some existing approaches that are based on mathematically convenient sim¬
plifications. I argue that these simplifications wrongly exclude the effects of cultural evolution. I
illustrate these points with a new model of the learning and cultural evolution of phrase-structure,
and consider the requirements for a model of the biological evolution of learning strategies for
phrase-structure.
Finally, in chapter 7 I discuss the implications of the models in this thesis for the debate
between empiricists and nativists, and for the status of language universals. Moreover, I will argue
that the formal requirements from evolutionary theory and linguistics do constrain scenarios of the
evolution of language. The search for the first formal, complete, coherent and testable scenario is
still open, but some steps towards such a scenario were taken.
Chapter 2
The evolutionary biology of language
What are the requirements for scenarios of the biological evolu¬
tion of language? In this chapter I survey a number of simple
but fundamental models from population genetics, evolutionary
game-theory and social evolution theory. This review yields a
list of required elements ofevolutionary explanations in general,
and of explanations for language and communication in particu¬
lar.
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2.1 Introduction
There are two distinct ways in which the study of evolution and the study of natural language
overlap. First, they overlap in the search for an evolutionary explanation for why humans, and
humans alone, are capable of acquiring and using natural languages. Second, the process of
evolution in biology and the historical process of language change bear many similarities, and
these parallels have played a role in the development of theories in both fields since the time of
Darwin. I will throughout this thesis refer to these issues as the biological evolution of language
(or "the language faculty") and the cultural evolution of language(s) respectively.
Both issues have received a great deal of attention in recent years, leading to a plethora of
theories and models (Hurford etal., 1998; Christiansen & Kirby, 2003a). Many proposals involve
a single mechanism or factor responsible for the emergence of modem natural languages. In some
cases, extensive scenarios for the evolution of language are proposed. Although this enormous
body of work contains a great number of interesting ideas and findings, there are also a number
methodological problems. First, it is extremely difficult to relate separate proposals to each other,
because of a lack of consensus on terminology and basic assumptions. Second, it is extremely
difficult to evaluate the internal consistency and empirical validity of proposed theories, because
of a lack of formal rigor.
In some ways this situation is reminiscent of the state of the whole field of evolutionary bi¬
ology before the establishment of theoretical population genetics by Fisher, Wright, Haldane and
others in the 1920s and 30s. Their mathematical models, and the subsequent informal "modem
synthesis", convinced biologists of the central role of natural selection in evolution. Confusion
remained about the units of selection, but with the settling of the group selection debate by May-
nard Smith (1964) and Williams (1966) a relative consensus emerged about the minimum require¬
ments for evolutionary explanations, as well as a common vocabulary in which disagreements can
be phrased. In the interdisciplinary field of language evolution, this clarity is yet lacking. In this
chapter, I will review some simple mathematical models from evolutionary biology, and evaluate
how they can be applied to both the biological and the cultural evolution of language.
I will start with some classical results from population genetics, about the way gene frequen¬
cies in a population change as a result of mutation and selection, and then discuss the case for
viewing natural selection as optimisation, as well as the problems with this view. This opti¬
misation view then provides a natural bridge to evolutionary game theory, where the targets of
optimisation shift because the opponents in the game evolve as well. Finally, extensions to social
evolution models that deal with kin selection, will lead us to the issue of levels of selection, and
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clarify the relation of cultural evolution models - with the dynamics happening at the level of
cultural replicators - to evolutionary biology generally.
2.2 Adaptation for Language
When chimpanzees, our closest living relatives, are taught human language, they acquire several
hundreds of signals (Gardner & Gardner, 1969; Savage-Rumbaugh et aI., 1986). They fail, how¬
ever, to produce speech sounds themselves, to acquire the many tens of thousands of words in
natural languages, and to grasp the use of even the most basic rules of grammar (Terrace, 1979).
Human infants, in contrast, acquire their native language rapidly. They produce speech sounds
and comprehend simple words before the age of 1, produce their first words soon after their first
birthday and the first grammatical constructions before their second birthday (Tomasello & Bates,
2001).
Why? Clearly there is something special about humans that makes them extra-ordinarily apt
to acquire and use natural languages. Among other things, the anatomy of the vocal tract, the
control mechanism in the brain for complex articulation and the cognitive ability to analyse and
produce hierarchically structured sentences appear to be qualitatively different in humans than
in other apes. But not only humans are special; there is also something special about natural
languages that makes them extra-ordinarily apt to be acquired and used by humans.
How did this tight fit come about? One possibility is that the human capacity for language
has emerged purely as a side-effect of the many changes in anatomy and cognition that occurred
in the hominid lineage. The tight fit itself, in such a scenario, doesn't need to be accidental,
because a cultural evolution scenario predicts that language will adapt to the peculiar biophysical
and cognitive features of humans that themselves have evolved for other reasons.
Although this possibility cannot be dismissed, from a biological point of view it does not
appear very likely. Humans spend around 3 hours a day or over 20% of their awake time talking
(Dunbar, 1998, and references therein), verbal abilities play a significant role in social status
and, it seems, in both the reproductive success of individuals and the success of our species as
a whole. Such a salient characteristic of any organism would require a Darwinian, evolutionary
explanation. Hence, although the side-effect option is a possibility, it can only be the conclusion
of an elaborate investigation, and not serve as null hypothesis. In chapter 6 I will argue that
although language as a whole might be considered a biological adaptation, many specifics about
language (language universals) are better understood as the outcome of cultural evolution. In this
view, the complex results of cultural evolution and social learning have had indirect consequences
for biological evolution.
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If we want to investigate specific hypotheses on adaptations for language, what form should
such hypotheses take? The early formal models in population genetics are a useful starting point.
But first, it should be clear that any statement about biological evolution is a statement about how
genes mutate and spread in a population through random drift and selection. That statement in no
way reflects the form of genetic determinism or naivety about "language genes" that have made
some evolutionary linguists wary to talk about genes at all. But if properties of language are to
be explained by some biological endowment, which in turn is to be explained as an adaptation
for language, then we need to be explicit and postulate a series of altered genes that influence the
ability for language. Such genes can have many additional non-linguistic effects (an illustrative
example is the recently discovered FOXP2 gene, that, when mutated, causes a range of problems
in language processing as well as in sequencing orofacial movements, Lai et aI. 2001). We can
phrase this requirement1 as follows:
Criterion 1 (Heritability) Evolutionary explanations for the origins ofa trait need to postulate
genetic changes requiredfor that trait.
2.3 Evolution as Gene Frequency Change
A formal model of evolution as gene frequency change can be built-up in the following way.
Consider first that in humans, as in almost all multicellular organisms, every individual inherits
two sets of genes, one from the father and one from the mother. If there is to be any change,
we need to consider at least two different variants, alleles, for each gene locus, and monitor the
increase in frequency of one allele at the expense of the other. In figure 2.1 the Mendelian model
of inheritance of two alleles - A and a at a single locus - is depicted. Adults (top row) have
a genome that is of any of the three possible types AA, Aa or aa (Aa and aA are equivalent).
These adults produce sperm and egg-cells (second row) with just a single copy of the gene under
consideration. In sexual reproduction, a sperm-cell and an egg-cell fuse, and grow out to a new
individual (third row). Evolution, in this simple scheme, concerns the change in frequencies of
the genotypes AA, Aa or aa, or the change in frequencies of the alleles A and a.
The Hardy-Weinberg model (developed independently by British mathematician Godfrey
Harold Hardy, 1908 and German physician Wilhelm Weinberg, 1908; see Crow, 1999) describes
the gene frequencies if there is no mutation or selection. Consider the frequencies of the three
'Of course, one can sensibly study the evolution of traits for which the genetic component has not been identified.
The point here is to emphasise that biological evolution implies genetic changes. The "requirements" in this chapter
concern the ultimate evolutionary explanation for a trait; of course, not every evolutionary model study will be able to
meet all requirements, and neither will the studies presented later in this thesis.
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AA Aa aa
aa
p' = p2 + pq = p q' = q2 + pq = q
Figure 2.1: Mendel's model of inheritance, and the Hardy-Weinberg model of allele and genome
frequencies under Mendelian inheritance with no selection nor drift.
genotypes (top row) at any particular point in time, and call these frequencies D, H and R. The
frequencies of the alleles A and a in the sperm and egg-cells are simply:
frequency of A : p = D + —H
frequency of a : q = R+—H, (2.1)
because individuals with genotype AA or aa will always pass on an A or a respectively to their
sperm and egg-cells, but individuals with genotype Aa only half of the time.
Under a number simplifying assumptions (including random mating and meiosis, an infinite
population and no sex differences at the relevant locus), the frequencies of the three genotypes
in the offspring are simply D' — p2, H' = 2pq and R' = q2, because you need two ^4's or a's
to make an ,4,4 or aa respectively, and you need an A from either the father or the mother and
an a from the other parent to make an Aa. When this offspring then starts producing sperm- and
egg-cells, the frequencies of the alleles A and a are:
new frequency of A : p' — D' + ^H' = p2 + pq
new frequency of a : q' = R1 + -H' — q2 + pq. (2.2)
Hardy and Weinberg's simple but fundamental observation is that because p+ q = 1 (the total
frequency of all alleles must be 1, and thus q — 1 — p), it follows that p and q are constant under
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this model of inheritance:
p' = p2 + pq = p2 + p(l - p) — p2 + p - p2 = p. (2.3)
This result shows that under Mendelian inheritance existing variation in gene frequencies is main¬
tained. This is in contrast with "blending inheritance" (the assumed model of inheritance before
the rediscovery of Mendel's laws around 1900), where a child's trait values are the average of the
parents' and variation quickly dissipates over time. The result played a crucial role in reconciling
Mendelian genetics with Darwinian evolutionary theory, because it showed that under reasonably
low mutation rates enough variation can be built up for natural selection to operate (Fisher, 1930,
chapter 1).
The Hardy-Weinberg model can be extended in a straightforward manner to include the effects
of selection. Natural selection, in Darwin's theory, is the consequence of differences in survival
rates to the age of reproduction and the differences in reproductive success. These effects can be
summarised with a fitness coefficient for each of the possible genotypes, which gives the expected
number of offspring. A high coefficient vjaa means that individuals of genotype AA live long
and reproduce successfully, such that their genes are well represented in the next generation. In
terms of the equations, this just requires weighting the contributions of parents of each genotype
with the relevant fitness coefficient:
(this term is needed to account for changes in population size due to reproduction and selection).
Equation (2.4) gives us a first handle on the requirements for evolutionary innovation, and,
hence, evolutionary explanations. First of all, natural selection operates on genotypic and pheno-
typic variation. Second, natural selection favours fitter genes and individuals over less fit ones.
Both the variation and the fitness differences need to be made explicit:
Criterion 2 (Strategy set) Evolutionary explanations need to postulate a set of possible geno¬
types and phenotypes, as well as the mutations that can move an organism from one genotype-
phenotype to another.
,
_ P2WAA + PqWAa
W
(2.4)
where w is the average fitness and given by:
w = p2wAA + 2pqwAa + q2waa (2.5)
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Criterion 3 (Payoff function) Evolutionary explanations need to postulate a function that re¬
lates the possible genotypes-phenotypes in a given environment (that may include other evolving
individuals) to fitness.
If we are interested in a specific biological innovation - that is, a mutation - that was relevant
for learning or using language, we need to consider the situations before and after that mutation.
In the simplest case, a is the preexisting gene that is initially shared by the whole population, and
A is the mutated version of a that has arisen in a single individual. Hence, initially q ~ 1 and
p « 0. If A is to play a role in an evolutionary scenario, we need to establish that allele A did
start to spread in the population (as sketched in figure 2.2); in other words, that p increases. We
can formulate this requirement as follows:
Criterion 4 (Invasibility) Innovations in an evolutionary scenario need to be able to invade a
population; that is, an innovation should spread in a population where it is extremely rare.
If we know all fitness coefficients, it is straightforward to work out what happens to the
frequency of the new mutation. As it turns out A will spread if WAa > waa, and it will get
fixed (p — 1) if waa > WAa- In other words, the fitness of the new gene must be greater than that
of the old one, and the new gene must, to some extent, be dominant over the old one such that
its effects are noticed in individuals that inherit copies of both genes from each of the parents. In
fact, the difference in fitness between the two variants must be significant, at least large enough
for the new gene not to get lost by chance fluctuations (Fisher, 1922) and to get established after
a reasonable number of generations (Haldane, 1932). Note that these results depend on some
strong assumptions, including an infinite population with randomly interacting individuals. In
small populations with non-random interactions different dynamics can occur.
Figure 2.2: The spread of new genes in a population
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2.4 Evolution as Optimisation
Since Darwin (1859), the notion of "adaptation" has played a major role in evolutionary think¬
ing. His work offered a coherent framework to study the traits of organisms in terms of their
function for survival and reproduction. Even before the mechanisms of genetic inheritance were
unravelled, Darwin thus transformed biology from a descriptive to an explanatory science. In the
early 1920s the "founding fathers" of population genetics - Fisher, Wright and Haldane - worked
out what happens to a single new gene when it appears in a population. But do the dynamics
described by equation (2.4) constitute "adaptation"? In other words, does the predicted change in
gene frequencies also mean the population will get better adapted to its environment, i.e. improve
its average fitness?
Both Fisher and Wright set out to work out a more general result. I will discuss Fisher's "fun¬
damental theorem of natural selection" (Fisher, 1930) in section 2.8. Here I will follow Wright's
analysis of the average fitness in a population, in particular Roughgarden's (1979) version of
these equations. Most mathematical details are in appendix A, but it is useful to look at a couple
of Wright's equations. First, it is convenient to look at the change in the frequency p at every
timestep. This is, using equation (2.4), given by:
Ap — p' — p
P^WAA + PqWAa ,0
= = P (2.6)
W
This equation can, with a bit of algebra (see equations (A.4) and (A.5) in appendix A), be rewritten
as follows:
PQ
Ap = — (p {wAA - wAa) - q (waa - wAa)) (2.7)
w
This equation tells us nothing new; it is essentially equation (2.4) in a different form. How¬
ever, the new form will prove useful when we have worked out the next equation. We are inter¬
ested in what happens to the average fitness when the frequency (p) of the innovation changes.
Mathematically, that question directly translates into the derivative of w with respect to p. The
expression for average fitness is given in equation (2.5). Its derivative, if we assume the fitness
coefficients are independent of p and q (that is, no frequency-dependence) turns out to be (as is
worked out in equation (A.2) and (A.3) of appendix A):
^ = 2 {p(wAA - wAa) - q(waa - wAa)) (2.8)dp
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When we note that equations (2.7) and (2.8) are very similar, it is clear that we can replace a
large part of (2.7) with half of (2.8), and get:
This is a fundamental result for evolutionary biology. The equation says that the change in the
frequency of a new gene, will be in the direction of the derivative of fitness with respect to that
gene's frequency. That means that only if the average fitness increases with increasing p, will the
new gene spread. Moreover, the spread will be fastest at intermediate frequencies (high variance)
and low average fitness. In other words, evolution - under the assumption mentioned - will act to
optimise the average fitness in the population: it will lead to adaptation.
However, the mathematical derivation of this intuitive result also tells us about its limitations.
First of all, evolution is shortsighted. We saw a simple example at the end of the previous section:
if WAa < waa (there is "heterozygous disadvantage"), then the new allele A will not spread
in the population, even though at fixation it might improve the mean fitness in the population.
Second, evolution needs (heritable) variation. If pq = 0, nothing will change. Thirdly, the
equation is only valid if the fitness coefficients are independent of p and q. That is, whatever
the traits are that allele A influences, the usefulness of the innovation should not depend on how
many others in the population share it. This condition is obviously violated in the evolution of
communication, because the usefulness of a signal will always depend on the presence of others
that can perceive and understand it. Fourthly, the original Hardy-Weinberg model brought quite
a lot of assumptions, including the independence of the single locus we looked at from other
loci, random mating, discrete generations and infinite populations. Some of the consequences of
relaxing these and the frequency independence assumptions will be evaluated in the next section.
Finally, as Fisher (1930) emphasised, these calculations deal only with the direct effects of
natural selection. They predict the direction of change, but it is unwarranted to conclude that the
average fitness in a population will increase. Environmental conditions might have changed in
the mean time and, even if the environment is constant, all individuals in the population are better
adapted to it such that competition is fiercer. These effects - not modelled by Wright and Fisher's
equations - were collectively labelled "deterioration of the environment" by Fisher.
In addition to these quantitative results, Wright made a much more qualitative contribution
relating evolution and optimisation. In a paper without any mathematics (Wright, 1932) he in¬
troduced an extremely influential metaphor: the adaptive landscape. The adaptive landscape is
a landscape of 3 or more dimensions, with the plane (or hyperplane) representing the space of
(2.9)
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possible genotypes, and the height of every point representing fitness (see figure 2.3). On such a
landscape, a population is a collection of points. Mutations correspond to steps in the landscape;
selection corresponds to the selective removal of individuals that are lower down. The process of
evolution involves the population to climb up-hill, following a local gradient to a local peak.
I will discuss some problems with the concept below. However, the adaptive landscape rep¬
resentation in this form does illustrate Darwin's (1859) insight that for a process of continuing
evolution, we need a path of ever increasing fitness from the hypothesised initial point in geno¬
type space to the end result. (In finite populations, stochastic drift can bridge fitness barriers in the
adaptive landscape, but only if they are relatively shallow.) For complex traits, such as language,
it seems reasonable to postulate a series of many genetic changes. Wright's metaphor highlights
the fact that each of these changes needs to confer an adaptive advantage:
Criterion 5 (Fit intermediates) Explanations for complex traits, that involve a series of genetic
changes, need to show a path offit intermediates, from the hypothesised initial state to the desired
end state.
This requirement is important, but it might not be as problematic as it looks at first sight. First,
although evolution will generally lead uphill, there is some room for random processes as well.
Wright used the adaptive landscape metaphor to explain the effects of increases or decreases of the
rate of mutation and the strength of selection. He also discussed at some length the effects of small
population sizes, where inbreeding will lead to the non-selective process of genetic drift: random
deviations from the locally optimal genotype due to accumulation of mutations and a lack of
variation for selection to operate on. Wright's shifting balance theory (or at least one version of it)
argues that the additional variation inherent in subdivided and inbreeding populations could help
the population as a whole bridge fitness barriers. Although the shifting balance theory has little
empirical support (Coyne, Barton & Turelli, 2000), the basic idea that, under some conditions,
genetic drift could help bridge a fitness barrier remains.
Second, one of the basic tenets of evolutionary biology is that all life originates from the
same source. If that is true, all complex traits of all organisms are connected through paths of
fit intermediates. Thus, if we wonder if there is a path on the adaptive landscape through which
humans could evolve wings, the answer must be yes. Humans, bats and birds have a common
ancestor, so there must be at least one series of environments (including other species) that would
yield a path that leads from humans back to the common ancestor with bats, and again forward to
modern bats (ignoring some difficulties such as frequency-dependent fitness).
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(a) Wright's graph of the adaptive landscape
(b) A computer-generated 3d adaptive landscape
Figure 2.3: The adaptive landscape of fitness as a function of genotype. The graphs illustrate hypo¬
thetical examples in which two genes have a continuous range of effects. Real organisms have, in
contrast, a discrete set of possible genotypes involving many more than two genes. Thus, muta¬
tions can take them in very many directions. This high dimensionality makes it more likely that
there is some path uphill to the "adaptive peak" (see Provine (1986), chapter 9). (a) is a graph
from Wright (1932). The original caption is: "Diagrammatic representation of the field of gene
combinations in two dimensions instead of many thousands. Dotted lines represent contours with
respect to adaptiveness." (b) is taken from Barton & Zuidema (2003).
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Third, intuitions about getting stuck in local peaks based on the three-dimensional represen¬
tation as in figure 2.3 must be treated with care. There are, in fact, a great number of problems
with the concept (Provine, 1986, in his biography of Wright, gives a thoughtful critique). First of
all, as Wright indicated, an actual genome consists of many (tens of) thousands of genes. Hence,
the adaptive landscape has tens of thousands of dimensions, rather than just 3. That makes a
big difference, because whereas local peaks seem extremely likely in 3 dimensions, they are in
fact increasingly less likely with more and more dimensions. But, perhaps more importantly, the
genotype space in Wright's graph is continuous, whereas the genotypes of actual organisms are
discrete. Wright's landscapes, as drawn here, can in fact never be constructed for a real example.
Wright and others have looked at other versions of the adaptive landscape that are, in con¬
trast, rigorously defined. One approach is to choose the gene frequencies and population average
fitness as axes. A population, in this representation, is then a single point in the landscape. The
advantage of this representation is that it ties in nicely with the mathematical model of equa¬
tion (2.9). However, the disadvantage is that in such a landscape one cannot visualise the effects
of selection, mutation, genetic drift and subdivision of the population, which was the whole point
of introducing the metaphor.
Alternatively, one can choose to use phenotypic, continuous traits against individual fitness
as the axes of the landscape. The disadvantage of this approach is that mutations, which define
what a genotype's "neighbours" are, are of course defined genotypically. Therefore, the random
variation that builds up by mutation, will not generally be centred around a single population
mean in phenotypic space. In cases where very little is known about the genetics anyway, such
as language, that might not really matter, but, as we will see, there the landscape cannot be
constructed anyway because of frequency dependence.
Nevertheless, the view of evolution as optimisation yields a powerful approach for deriving
predictions about an evolving system, or for understanding an evolved system as adapted for
a specific purpose. Parker & Maynard Smith (1990) present a methodology for evolutionary
reasoning based on this view which they call "optimality theory"2. They first emphasise that every
evolutionary study must start with identifying a clear biological question. Step 2 is to identify a
set of strategies that are available for evolution to choose from. Step 3 is to identify a pay¬
off function, which evolution is supposed to optimise, and to show that the observed biological
phenomenon tends towards the optimum. Step 4 is to relate pay-off, which is an indirect measure
for fitness, to actual fitness. Finally, step 5 is to derive predictions and test them empirically.
2Parker & Maynard Smith's (1990) Optimality Theory is completely unrelated to Optimality Theory (Prince &
Smolensky, 2004) in linguistics.
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This scheme provides a coherent framework for thinking about the evolution of language, and
it is essentially the approach I have taken in this chapter and the rest of the thesis, although I have
and will put some extra emphasis on specific implications of the approach relevant for language
evolution. Note however, that the mathematical models discussed so-far concerned changes in
gene frequencies, whereas Optimality Theory and language evolution research are concerned
with phenotypic traits that typically involve many, often unknown genes. I will first discuss some
limitations of the optimality view that apply even when we look at traits controlled by a single
gene, and then discuss the more difficult issue of going from single-gene models to the evolution
of complex phenotypic, traits such as language.
2.5 Limits to Optimality
"Natural selection tends only to make each organic being as perfect as, or slightly
more perfect than, the other inhabitants of the same country with which it comes into
competition. And we see that this is the standard ofperfection attained under nature"
(Darwin, 1872, p 163; quoted in Provine 1986, p209).
As Darwin was well aware, the fact that evolution can be understood as optimisation does not
imply that the features of organisms are optimal or perfectly adapted to their environment. The
most obvious evidence for the existence of limits to optimality, are the many examples of indige¬
nous species that are rapidly driven to extinction after humans introduced a foreign competing
species. There is a whole tradition of listing the limitations of natural selection (e.g. Dawkins,
1982; Barton & Partridge, 2000). These can be roughly classified in four classes: (i) biophysi¬
cal and genetic constraints, (ii) the speed of evolution, (iii) mutational load and (iv) fluctuating
fitness.
With regard to biophysical constraints, it is clear that all of the complexities of biological
organisms need to grow out of a single cell. Throughout its development, an organism needs
to maintain its metabolism, to selectively take up chemicals from its environment and to au¬
tonomously build-up all of its complex features. That process of biological pattern formation is
constrained by what is possible at all with the materials available in a biotic environment, by what
can be coded for by genes, and by which possibilities are reachable for evolution. It is obvious
that these constraints are at work, given for instance the limitations in speed of both a prey and
a predator trying to outrun each other. It is also obvious, however, that these limitations have
not prevented evolution from building exquisitely complex and well-adapted organs such as, for
instance, the human ear (see chapter 3, section 3).
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Population and molecular genetics make some specific predictions on genetic constraints.
Natural selection can often not optimise all different phenotypic traits independently from each
other, because of the following features of genes:
• A single gene typically has an effect on many different phenotypic traits (pleiotropy);
• The effect of a gene on a trait depends on the presence or absence of other genes (epistasis);
• Genes are physically linked to each other in a chromosome (linkage).
The little that is known about human genetics relevant for language (e.g. Lai et al, 2001)
suggests, unsurprisingly, that all these general observations hold for language as well. The general
observation have played a role in a debate about whether or not the Baldwin effect - where initial
learnt traits are "assimilated" by genetic evolution - is likely to have played a role in the evolution
of complex language (Hinton & Nowlan, 1987; Briscoe, 2000b; Yamauchi, 2001; Briscoe, 2003)
Nevertheless, it seems too little is known about human genetics to inform specific models of the
evolution of language, so they will not play a role in the rest of this thesis.
Most of these biophysical and genetic constraints are reflected in the choice of the strategy
set, which contains all strategies/trait values that are available to evolution, and excludes those
that cannot be instantiated. The physical linkage between genes, however, is - in the long term
- not one of these hard constraints on what can evolve, because recombination will eventually
break the linkage such that one gene can occur without the other. Linkage does constrain how fast
things can evolve, which is also crucial for the course of evolution.
More generally, the speed of evolution is constrained by the available genetic variation at
every step (including effects from linkage) and the strength of selection. Considerations about
evolutionary time should be included in evolutionary explanations:
Criterion 6 (Sufficient time) Evolutionary explanations need to establish that there has been
enough time forfavourable alleles to get established in the population.
Evolution needs variation to operate on, and mutation is the source of this variation. However,
because mutation is indiscriminate and random, it will also constantly create individuals that are
worse than average, or even unviable. This is called mutational load. In the adaptive landscape
metaphor, whereas selection will push a population to the top of an adaptive peak, mutation will
pull the population down-hill. The dynamic equilibrium is called mutation-selection balance.
For specific cases, such as the evolution of RNA molecules, the constraints on optimisation posed
by mutational load can be worked out. For the case of language, again too little is known of its
genetic basis to derive any specific limitations. However, since a series of formal models of the
cultural transmission of language have been proposed (Nowak etal., 2001; Komarova etal., 2001;
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Mitchener & Nowak, 2002) that are based on the concept of mutational load, it is worth looking
in a bit more detail at how this concept has been formalised.
Eigen (1971) and colleagues generalised the Fisher-Wright equations for evolution with muta¬
tion and selection at a single locus, to dynamics with an arbitrary number of loci. Using notation
loosely based on Maynard Smith & Szathmary (1995) and Nowak et al. (2001), we can write
Eigen's equation as follows:
where i and j are indices for all the M distinct possible genotypes. AXi stands for the changes of
the frequencies of all genotypes i (hence, the expression (2.10) defines a system of equations, all
the same form and one for each possible i). Xi is the frequency of genotype i and in, its fitness.
Qji is the probability that a given child will have genotype i if her parent has genotype j. Hence,
Q is an extremely large matrix of size M x M that describes the effects of mutation. Finally, w is
the average fitness in the population; the last term ensures that the effects of selection are relative
to the population average fitness.
Eigen looked at a very specific choice of parameters. Suppose that there is a single genotype
with a high fitness, and all other genotypes have the same, low fitness. That is, the adaptive
landscape is flat, except for a single high peak. Now suppose there is a constant probability p
of mutation per gene, and no cross-over. The probability q that an individual (here: an RNA-
molecule) when it reproduces produces identical offspring is now:
where I is the genome length, q is called the "copying fidelity". With a bit of algebra one can
work out where the mutation-selection balance is for different mutation probabilities, and thus
different copying fidelities. Eigen's exciting result is that there is a precise value of q where
the mutation-selection balance suddenly drops to vanishingly small quantities of each possible
genotype. That is, if the mutation probability is above a threshold value - the error threshold -
selection ceases to play any role, and individuals have essentially random genotypes:
Criterion 7 (Mutational load) Evolutionary explanations need to postulate a mutation rate high
enough to generate the variation needed, but low enough to not sufferfrom an extreme mutational
load (to cross the error threshold).
M
(2.10)
Q = (1 - M) (2.11)
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A final category of limits on optimality comes from fluctuating fitness, that is, from the fact
that the fitness regime of organisms is constantly changing. First of all, there are temporal fluc¬
tuations in the environmental conditions on many different timescales, both regular and irregular:
from the day and night cycle to climate changes. Similarly, there are geographic differences, such
that migrating organisms might find themselves in very different habitats. Organisms adapted to
one set of conditions, are not necessarily adapted to other conditions. A language that evolved for
communication between hunter-gatherers on the savannah, is not necessarily adaptive in a modern
city environment.
But perhaps more interesting is the situation where the fitness regime of a particular species
changes due to evolutionary changes of the species itself (frequency dependent selection) or of
any of the other species it interacts with (co-evolution). The evolution of language and commu¬
nication is frequency-dependent, because linguistic innovations are unlikely to pay off if there is
no one to talk to. The fitness coefficients in language evolution are therefore not constants, as in
equation (2.8), but will depend on the frequencies of the different alleles in the population. Evo¬
lutionary game theory is the general framework for addressing frequency-dependent selection,
and will be discussed in the next section. Because natural languages are transmitted culturally,
there can also be a process of cultural evolution, such that we can perhaps sensibly speak about
the coevolution of language and the brain (Deacon, 1997; similar ideas were explored earlier in
e.g. Christiansen, 1994;Kirby, 1994). This will be explored a bit further in section 2.10 in general
terms, and with a specific model of the learning and evolution of grammar in chapter 6.
A related phenomenon is sexual selection, where selection is not on the ability to survive to
reproductive age or the ability to reproduce per se, but on the ability to beat rivals of the same sex
in the competition for a mate, or on the ability to persuade potential sexual partners to choose one
as a mate (Darwin, 1859, p.94). Here, the fitness of a given genotype (defining e.g. a male trait) is
not fixed, but also dependent on the frequency of all the possible genotypes (regulating e.g. female
preferences) in the population. Exotic, maladaptive traits that are due to sexual selection, such
as the ornate peacock-tale or the violent and sometimes lethal love darts in hermaphrodite snails,
are nice examples of the suboptimal traits that can result from frequency dependent selection. In
the evolution of speech, sexual selection seems to have played a role in shaping the secondary
sexual traits, such as the lower pitch in human male voices, which results from larger larynx and
vocal folds, and a change in formant frequencies at puberty, which makes males appear larger and
results from a second descent of the larynx. More controversial are ideas about the role of sexual
selection in the evolution of the first descent of the larynx (that happens in both males and females
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in the first few months after birth, Lieberman, 1984; Hauser & Fitch, 2003), and in the evolution
of complex syntax (Pinker & Bloom, 1990).
2.6 Phenotypic Evolution
We have seen that evolution can be understood as a process of optimisation, but under a range of
constraints and with continuously shifting targets. The constraints and trade-offs are all crucial
elements of adaptive explanations. In fact, without such constraints, the notion of "adaptation"
would be meaningless: without constraints and trade-offs, only almighty beings would exist. The
more precise we can be about constraints and trade-offs, including about genetic details, the more
convincing demonstrations of optimality within these constraints are as evolutionary explanations.
However, even without a complete understanding of the genetic constraints, we can make progress
in understanding evolution at the phenotypic level, by incorporating likely constraints in formal
models and deriving testable predictions.
As an example of the structure of such optimality arguments, consider the evolution of hearing
and suppose that it can be described with a single variable: the threshold value 9 for signal
detection. Presumably, the benefit is maximal when this 9 approaches 0 (assuming the brain can
select and process the information it needs), and the benefit approaches 0 when 9 is infinitely
large. The cost of an infinitely small 9 is infinitely big, however, because biophysical constraints
dictate that infinitely small 9 requires infinitely large ears. With very large 9 we could do away
with ears all together and have a cost approaching 0. When we subtract the cost from the benefit,
we get the payoff function. If the cost and benefit function adequately describe the selection
pressures and constraints, we expect the evolutionary dynamics to lead to the optimum of the
payoff function, shown qualitatively in figure 2.4. Now, if we could find a combination of benefit
and cost functions, and empirical observations of 9 in nature that match the predicted optimum,
that would constitute strong evidence for either the hypothesis that 9 evolved for the function
described by the payoff function, or - if we are already confident of the adaptive function - that
the hypothesised constraints, described by the cost function, were the right ones.
Can we make a similar analysis of the evolution of key features of natural language? That
is, can we identify the payoff function and its optimum under relevant constraints and show that
natural language corresponds to that optimum? Unfortunately, we know relatively little about
the biophysical and genetic constraints, the relevant mutations in the evolution of language and
the neural implementation of our linguistic abilities. It is therefore difficult to make precise what
strategy set was available for evolution. The best examples of trade-offs in language are probably
in the physical properties of speech. Liljencrants and Lindblom's (1972) demonstration that the
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Figure 2.4: Evolutionary optimisation under biophysical constraints. The graph sketches the bene¬
fits (top curve) and costs (bottom curve) for a continuous range of detection thresholds 6 (x-axis)
in the evolution of hearing. An extremely low threshold (left end) is very useful, but also very
costly; an extremely high threshold (right end) is very cheap, but not of much use. The optimum
of the payoff function (middle curve) is therefore at an intermediate value of 9.
vowel systems in human language appear to be optimised for reliable recognition under noisy
conditions and under constraints on perception and articulation, is suggestive (see chapter 4).
Lieberman (1984) has argued that the human larynx has descended deeper down the throat in order
to allow more flexibility of the articulatory organs. This allows us to make many different speech
sounds, at the expense of an increased propensity to choke. Although controversial (Hauser &
Fitch, 2003), this theory on the evolution of language does illustrate the role of evolutionary
trade-offs that result from the physiological constraints in speech production.
For other components of human language, such as its semantics or syntax, it is extremely
difficult to derive biophysical constraints. What sort of grammars can or cannot be encoded by
genes and implemented in neuronal tissue? The only solid results relevant to this question, suggest
that quite a variety of networks of interacting cells are Turing equivalent. That is, they can - if
sufficiently large, given sufficient time and properly initialised and interpreted - compute any
computable function (Siegelmann & Sontag, 1991; Wolfram, 2002). This is not to say that any
grammar can be easily encoded by genes or acquired by a neural net; but without better models
of the neural implementation of language, we cannot start to make sensible assumptions about
the actual architectural constraints on natural language syntax that were at work during human
evolution. This is how I interpret Chomsky's well-known reservations about the feasibility of
scientific explanations of the evolution of language, such as expressed in this famous quote:
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"We know very little about what happens when 1010 neurons are crammed into some¬
thing the size of a basketball, with further conditions imposed by the specific manner
in which this system developed over time. It would be a serious error to suppose
that all properties, or the interesting properties of the structures that evolved, can be
'explained' in terms of natural selection." (Chomsky, 1975, p.59).
However, it would be overly pessimistic to conclude - as Chomsky seems to do - that we
can therefore not say anything sensible about how language evolved. There are two categories of
constraints in language evolution that can be made precise. First of all, we have good "mentalist"
models of syntax that describe its fundamental computational properties, and the computational
constraints that any implementation will face. For instance, we know there exist constructions in
natural languages that cannot be modelled by weaker formalisms (in terms of the extended Chom¬
sky Hierarchy) than (mildly) context-sensitive rewriting grammars (Joshi et al., 1991); we know
that the whole class of context-sensitive rewriting grammars is not identifiable in the limit from
positive samples alone (Gold, 1967); and we know that grammars of that type have a worst-case
time-complexity of 0(n5) in parsing (Barton & Berwick, 1987). Such computational constraints
on representation, learning and processing, and the formalisms they are expressed in, allow us to
at least make a start with testing the internal consistency of an evolutionary scenario, and with
formulating a sensible strategy set for evolution. Formalisms that we can use to describe key fea¬
tures of human language and to derive computational constraints are discussed in the next chapter
(3).
Second, there are constraints that follow from the social, communicative function of lan¬
guage. Humans use natural language to communicate with others, on the average for many hours
a day per person. This requires a shared code, such that both speakers and hearers understand the
meanings of utterances. Moreover, it requires the willingness of the speaker to give away infor¬
mation and, at least in general, to be truthful, as well as a willingness from the hearer to listen and
interpret the message received. These issues can be addressed in the framework of evolutionary
game theory, which will be discussed next.
2.7 Evolutionary Game Theory
The evolutionary history of human language can be viewed as a process of phenotypic optimisa¬
tion, under (largely unknown) biophysical and cognitive constraints that determined which com¬
munication systems were possible at all, and in a social-communicative context that determined
which systems were better than others, but that continuously shifted the evolutionary targets be¬
cause the frequency of a linguistic trait in the population influences its usefulness.
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The formal framework to describe the consequences of multiple agents optimising their own
payoff in a social context is the Theory of Games. Game theory conceptualises the interaction
between agents, the "players", as a game where all players choose from a set of available strate¬
gies. Crucially, the outcome of a game for each player, its payoff, depends on the strategies of
other players. Unlike the example in figure 2.4, where payoff is a function of the player's own
strategy alone (the trait value, 9), in game theory the payoff is a function of both the player's
strategy and the strategies played by other players.
The following example is derived from Maynard Smith & Price (1973). Imagine a conflict be¬
tween two birds competing for a single food source, each with the choice between three strategies:
"dove" (retreat immediately if the other player is aggressive), "hawk" (always be aggressive) and
"prober" (start off aggressive, but share the food source peacefully if the other player does not
give up, but does not escalate either, and continue aggressively if the other player does give up).
If the value of the food source is b = 10, and the expected cost of an escalated fight c = 100, the
possible payoffs for player 1, given her and player 2's decisions, are given in figure 2.5(a). For
2 players and a small number of discrete strategies, this can be conveniently summarised with a
payoffmatrix, as in figure 2.5(b).
(a) extensive representation
.. player 2's strategy
player 1 's strategy J, Dove Hawk Prober
Dove 5 0 5
Hawk 10 -100 -100
Prober 10 -100 5
(b) payoff matrix player 1
Figure 2.5: Extensive and matrix representations of games
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We can postulate a decision mechanism for each player, and study how the outcome of the
game changes with players adapting their strategies based on what the other players do. The
dynamics of such games, with all players making their own decisions, are often extremely difficult
to describe. Often, however, it is possible to derive the conditions under which a game is stable.
In non-cooperative game-theory - where "selfish" players each try to optimise their own payoff
- the crucial concept is that of a Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950)3. This equilibrium is defined as
the situation where no player can increase her payoff by unilaterally changing her strategy. Thus,
for any n-tuple of pure strategies (one for each player) the Nash equilibrium requires that each
player's strategy maximises her expected payoff against all other n — 1 strategies.
The Nash Equilibrium plays a major role in modem economic theory, as rational players
are assumed to maximise their payoff, and games will therefore typically evolve toward a Nash
equilibrium. Other branches of economic game theory make different assumptions on what is
optimised, and sometimes use different stability concepts. For instance, cooperative game-theory
- where players are assumed to try to optimise the average payoff of all players in the game
- uses the concept of "Pareto optimum", where no player can increase her payoff without de¬
creasing the payoff of another player. In the theory of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 1969),
the consequences of limitations in knowledge are investigated, where players are not necessarily
maximising, but rather satisficing their payoffs.
In evolutionary biology (after some pioneering work by R.C. Lewontin and W.D. Hamilton,
as is discussed in Maynard Smith, 1982) the use of game theory took off with the work of May-
nard Smith & Price (1973) and Maynard Smith (1982). Maynard Smith & Price introduced the
concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in an analysis of the evolutionary advantages
of "limited war" strategies in animal conflicts, such as the prober strategy introduced above. An
ESS is a strategy that cannot be invaded by any other strategy, because all other strategies get
either a lower payoff when playing against the ESS, or if their payoff is equal, they get a lower
payoff when playing against themselves. That is, if F(i,j) gives the payoff for a player playing
strategy i against an opponent playing strategy j, then i is an ESS if for every strategy j either
F(i,i) > F(i,j) or F(i,i) = F(i,j) > F(j,j). Every ESS also defines a Nash Equilibrium, but
the stability criterion is stricter, because it implies that every alternative strategy will be selected
against if it occurs at small but non-zero frequency in the population.
In the example of figure 2.5, we can see that the dove-strategy is not an ESS, because the
hawk-strategy has a higher payoff when playing against it. In a populations of doves, the hawk
'Grafen (2003) attributes the discovery of the Nash equilibrium to William Waldegrave, 1713, and refers to A. Hald
(1990), "A History of Probability and Statistics and Their Applications before 1750", New York: Wiley Interscience.
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strategy thus enjoys an initial selective advantage and will increase in frequency. The hawk-
strategy is not an ESS either. A population consisting of just hawks can in turn be invaded by
the dove-strategy, which has a higher payoff in a population of hawks, or by the prober-strategy,
which has equal payoff against hawk but a higher payoff against itself. Only the prober strategy,
in the present simple model, is an ESS: both doves and hawks fare worse than the prober in a
population of probers4.
If we exclude the prober-strategy from the strategy set, the resulting hawk-dove game has no
ESS, i.e. a population of individuals all playing one pure strategy, can be invaded by the other
strategy. In such games there might still be a stable distribution of phenotype frequencies in a
population - called an Evolutionarily Stable State. In such a situation, there are distinct, geneti¬
cally different players in the population ("polymorphism"), and this polymorphism is maintained
by selection. Interestingly, such a stable distribution with p doves and I — p hawks is equivalent
to a population where each individual plays the dove-strategy with probability p and the hawk-
strategy with probability 1 — p. If such mixed strategies are included in the strategy set (that is,
allowed according to the hypothesised constraints), it is an ESS5 and there is no polymorphism
maintained.
The techniques and formalisms from evolutionary game theory immediately lead to some
fundamental observations on the evolution of communication. Consider the evolution of an alarm
call system similar to the calls that, for instance, ground squirrels (Sherman, 1977) or vervet-
monkeys (Seyfarth et al., 1980) use to inform conspecifics of the presence of predators. If we
focus on just two signals, 1 and 2, and just two types of predators, aerial (E, e.g. eagles) and
terrestrial predators (L, e.g. leopards), we can postulate the following strategy set:
Sender A: send 1 when observing E; send 2 when observing L.
strategies B: send 2 when observing E\ send 1 when observing L.
C: never send anything.
Receiver A': act as if observing E when hearing 1; act as if observing L when hearing 2.
strategies B': act as if observing E when hearing 2; act as if observing L when hearing 1.
C': ignore all received calls.
4In the original paper (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973), this game was introduced with "dove" labeled "mouse" and
"prober" labeled "prober-retaliator". Incidentally, an unfortunate choice of parameters resulted in there being in fact
no ESS at all, even though a fourth strategy "retaliator" was erroneously identified as such.
5Grafen (1979) points out that mixed strategy ESS's and pure strategy evolutionary stable states are not equivalent
in kin selection models.
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In the case of alarm calls, the payoffs for sender and receiver are very different. The sender
will suffer a cost, because by calling she alerts the predator of her presence and location. Evidence
of the existence of a real cost in nature comes from the fact that alarm calls typically have very
high pitch, which makes it more difficult for predators to locate the caller (Maynard Smith, 1982).
The payoff matrix for the sender will therefore have all negative entries (parameter c) for strategies
A and B, and (by definition) 0 for strategy C.
The receiver, on the other hand, will profit from a call if and only if she correctly interprets
it. That benefit is quantified with parameter b. If the actual predator is a leopard, acting as if an
eagle is observed can be a costly mistake: monkeys flee into the bushes to escape from an eagle
attack, but that is in fact exactly where leopards hide (Seyfarth & Cheney, 1997). The cost of
mis-interpretation is quantified as parameter m. If the receiver ignores all calls, her payoff is 0
(again, by definition). The payoff matrices in this simple example will thus look as in figure 2.6.
receiver strategy receiver strategy
sender strategy j A' B' C' sender strategy | A! B' C'
A —c —c —c A +b -m 0
B —c —c —c B —m +b 0
C 0 0 0 C 0 0 0
(a) sender's payoff (b) receiver's payoff
Figure 2.6: Payoff matrices in a simple alarm call system
It is clear that neither A nor B can be the stable strategy for the speaker; if the cost of calling,
c, is non-negligible, the strategy of not communicating at all, C, is always optimal. In explain¬
ing the evolution of communication, we thus face a problem of cooperation: if the benefits of
communication are for the hearer, the sender has no incentive to give away her information, or
even put herself at risk. Dawkins & Krebs (1978) pointed out this problem with what they call the
"classical ethological" view on animal communication, which takes communication as existing
for the benefit of the group. Dawkins and Krebs have therefore suggested that communication
should be understood as a form of manipulation, with the benefits of successful manipulation
with the sender.
Others (e.g. Maynard Smith, 1965; Sherman, 1977; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1983) have
argued that "altruistic" communication can evolve through kin selection. However, the appropri¬
ateness of kin selection for human language - where communication is typically with non-kin -
has been called into question (Dessalles, 1998). Dessalles has instead argued for a form of "re¬
ciprocal altruism", where there is a real benefit for the sender, because it is rewarded with status
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in the population. Fitch (2004) reviews his and other arguments, but concludes that they are not
convincing. He posits the "mother tongue" hypothesis - that human language developed primar¬
ily in a context of kin communication - as one of a number of factors that shaped human language
in its evolution, and calls for further exploration of the role of kin selection in language evolution.
In many circumstances, for instance sexual signaling, the problem is not so much in the will¬
ingness to send signals, because the senders benefit, but in the honesty of the signals. A large
amount of work on the evolution of animal and human communication has been concerned with
this problem, leading to what is now called "honest signaling theory" (the handicap principle,
Zahavi, 1975, 1977; Grafen, 1990). Hence, the problem of cooperation is pervasive in work on
the evolution of communication, although its instantiations differ with different assumptions on
the costs and benefits of communication, for both sender and receiver. Although the problem of
cooperation is a consequence of careful considerations of payoff, strategy sets and invasibility, I
will, because of its importance, add it as a separate point to the list of requirements of evolutionary
explanations:
Criterion 8 (Problem of cooperation) Evolutionary explanations of the evolution of language
need to address the problem ofcooperation, and demonstrate that senders will be willing to send
honest signals, and that hearers will be willing to receive and believe the signal.
Even if we find a scenario where successful communication is in the interest of both the
speaker and the hearer, there is another problem that arises from the frequency-dependence of
language evolution. We could call this the problem of coordination. If we ignore the non-
cooperative strategies C and C', how does a population of players coordinate their behaviours
such that they play either A and A!, or B and B"l That is, how do they agree on a shared
code? This problem seems particularly difficult when we consider a series of innovations, as
in Jackendoff's (2002) scenario of the evolution of human language (chapter 3). Each of these
innovations needs to confer a fitness advantage if it is to spread the population, but it is difficult
to see how a genuine innovation can be advantageous to the individual if it is not shared by the
rest of the population (Zuidema & Hogeweg, 2000; Zuidema & de Boer, 2003, see appendix C of
this thesis).
Lewis (1969) showed that only "perfect" communication systems are "separating equilibria",
which, if the role of "rationality" of the players is replaced by natural selection, corresponds to
evolutionary stable states (Skyrms, 1996; Trapa & Nowak, 2000; van Rooij, 2004). Models in
this tradition make the following assumptions:
• There is no cost to communication;
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• The interests of sender and receiver are perfectly aligned;
• There is a discrete set of signals and a discrete set of meanings, and the number of signals
equals the number of meanings;
• All meanings are equally frequent and valuable;
• Every "perfect" mapping from meanings to signals is equally good (which implies that
meanings have no relation to each other, signals have no relation to each other, and mean¬
ings have no natural relation to signals);
• The meaning-signal associations are innate and inherited from parent to child.
It is easy to see why perfect communication systems are the only ESS's under these assump¬
tions: if a communication system is sub-optimal, there must be synonymy: multiple signals are
used for the same meaning. For the sender, however, it is always best to express a meaning m with
the single signal s that has the highest chance of being understood, i.e. to avoid synonymy. The
alternative signal(s) will thus not be used to express m anymore, and becomes available (through
drift) for meanings that cannot be expressed yet. Hence, only "perfect" systems are stable against
selection and drift.
It is clear, however, that all of these assumptions are violated in reality. Signals do have a
cost, interests are not perfectly aligned, meanings and signals are not discrete, symbolic entities,
but have similarity relations with themselves and each other, and, at least in human language,
meaning-signal mappings are learnt and not innate. The problem of coordination thus remains a
major open issue in the evolution of language, which we can add to the list of requirements:
Criterion 9 (Problem of coordination) Explanations for the evolution of language need to deal
with the problem of coordination, that is, show how, after each innovation, a shared code can be
established and maintained.
Much of the work on the evolution of language can be seen as dealing with this problem. A
number of models, for instance, relax the innateness assumption above, and study, in computer
simulations, the evolutionary success of a number of different strategies in word learning (Hur-
ford, 1989; Oliphant, 1999; Smith, 2004). The payoff function in Hurford's model is the expected
success in communication between a sender and a receiver (i.e. the game is cooperative; both
sender and receiver benefit from success). Sender behaviour is characterised by a probabilistic
mapping from a set of M meanings to a set of F signals; receiver behaviour by a probabilistic
mapping from the signals to the meanings.
Hurford was interested in how these functions were learnt, and in the evolution of differ¬
ent learning strategies. The strategy set Hurford considered consisted of three strategies, termed
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imitator (that imitates the observed average sending and receiving behaviour in the population),
calculator (that estimates the best send and receive functions based on observations of the popu¬
lation's receive and send behaviour respectively) and Saussurean learner (that chooses the same
receive function as the calculator, but derives the send function from that receive function rather
than from the receiving behaviour in the population). Hurford showed that Saussurean learners
outcompete the other two learning strategies. These results were extended by Oliphant & Batali
(1996), Oliphant (1999) and Smith (2004), among others. From these studies it emerged that
learning strategies can evolve that give rise to "perfect" communication systems in a population.
The model I will study in chapter 5 and related work (e.g. Nowak & Krakauer, 1999), does
not model such explicit learning rules, but does relax some of the other assumptions mentioned.
I report results where the number of signals is larger than the number of meanings, where there
is noise on signals, where some meanings are more valuable than others and where there are
similarity relations between meanings and between signals. More work is needed to study whether
these results hold when learning is modelled explicitly. An encouraging result in this respect is
due to Calvin Harley (1981). He studies the evolution of learning rules and showed that evolution
will favour rules that learn the evolutionary stable strategy. Hence, results on Evolutionary Stable
Strategies in innate communication systems, in principle carry over to situations where the same
strategies are acquired in a learning process (Maynard Smith, 1982, chapter 4).
2.8 Levels of Selection
I have discussed some basic concepts from population genetics, which describes the change in
frequencies of genes, and from evolutionary game theory, which describes the invasion and re¬
placement of phenotypic strategies of individuals. The two approaches are obviously related,
because the fitnesses of genes are dependent on the phenotypes they code for, and a strategy will
only replace another strategy if all the genes necessary for that strategy are selected for and get
established in a population. But the description of the evolutionary process in population genetics
and evolutionary game theory are set at entirely different levels.
In Dawkins' (Dawkins, 1976) terminology, genes are replicators: they are the bits of informa¬
tion that get copied and transmitted - more or less intact - to the next generation. Individuals are
vehicles (Dawkins, 1976) or reproducers (Szathmary, 1999). In sexual species, such as humans,
a child is radically different from any one parent, because she inherits only 50% of the genes.
Individuals, therefore, are not replicators, even though they are the obvious level of description
when we talk about fitnesses and strategies.
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If replicators and reproducers were the same objects, evolutionary dynamics would be rel¬
atively easy to describe. But in general, especially in sexual species, they are not. Genes are
"packaged" - contained within the structured genome of an individual that lives within a struc¬
tured population. That packaging makes the fate of a specific gene depend on the other genes it
is associated with (genes that occur together more often or less often than would be expected on
the basis of their frequencies alone, are said to be in linkage disequilibrium). If a gene a happens
to be associated with a gene b that is under strong positive selection, gene a will increase in fre¬
quency even though it does not itself contribute to the fitness of its carrier ("genetic hitch-hiking",
Hill & Robertson, 1966; Maynard Smith & Haigh, 1974). To predict the fate of a specific gene,
we therefore need to know the statistical associations with other genes.
To make things even more complicated, not just the gene frequencies change; also the asso¬
ciations themselves change in evolution. The physical linkage between genes on a chromosome
tends to keep these genes together, but recombination breaks up these associations; sexual selec¬
tion generates associations between for instance, the preferences of the females and the selected
traits of the males; finally, epistasis also generates linkage equilibrium, because if genes are much
better in combination than they are apart, natural selection itself will make the combination more
frequent than expected by chance. Barton & Turelli (1991) and Kirkpatrick, Johnson & Barton
(2002) have developed a mathematical framework to describe the dynamics of such multi-locus
evolution; however, they take fitnesses as given and do not yet provide a bridge to the fitness
concept in phenotypic models.
Hence, the relation between gene frequency change and adaptation at the level of the individ¬
ual (such as language) is not at all trivial. The problem with the gene as the level of description
is that we don't know the relevant fitness coefficients, because our knowledge of life, death and
reproduction is almost entirely specified at the level of the individual. But the problem with the
individual as level of description, is that we are not necessarily justified in assuming that natural
selection corresponds to optimisation. Do the results from game-theoretic analyses translate to
fitness coefficients of the genes that underlie the strategies? How do we relate the fitness coef¬
ficients, and the fundamental results about evolution as optimisation by Fisher and Wright, to
adaptation on the level of individuals? Grafen (2003), in a discussion of Fisher's "fundamental
theorem of natural selection" (Fisher, 1930) observes that (too) few researchers in evolution worry
about these issues:
"the theorem was fundamental in 1930 because it isolated the adaptive engine in
evolution and made an extraordinary link between gene frequencies and adaptive
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change. It really did show how Darwinian natural selection worked simply and con¬
sistently and persistently amid the maelstrom of complexities ofpopulation genetics.
The theorem is just as important today for that reason. This is not popularly realised
by biologists because most take for granted an informal sense that natural selection
leads to organisms maximizing their fitness, but they do not ask how that sense can
be justified." (Grafen, 2003, p.327)
Grafen lists three assumptions that are made in the original version of Fisher's theorem, and
apply equally to Wright's equations discussed in section 2.4:
• It assumes the fitnesses of genes are frequency independent. That is, the fitness of a given
genotype is not dependent on which other genotypes are present and at which frequencies in
the population. Consequences of frequency dependence are studied in evolutionary game-
theory (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1982).
• It assumes that all individuals interact with all other individuals with equal probability.
That is, it assumes the fitness of a given genotype is not dependent on the genotypes which
are potentially correlated with it. Consequences of such correlations are studied in social
evolution theory (Hamilton, 1964a,b; Frank, 1998).
• It assumes fitnesses are fixed; Grafen himself has worked on the consequences of natural
selection under uncertainty.
For the purposes of this chapter, it would take too far to investigate the contributions of Grafen
and others to relate population genetics and evolutionary game theory. However, a few important
implications for language evolution research from the discussion so-far are worth making ex¬
plicit. First, a "strategy" in a game-theoretic analysis will typically be coded for by many genes
(pleiotropy). So if alleles aq, 0.2 ... an at loci 1 to n are needed for an evolutionarily stable strat¬
egy A, we need each of these alleles to represent a step in the right direction. In technical terms,
we need additive genetic variance-, Maynard Smith (1982) argues that additive genetic variance is
common in nature, and that this is therefore a reasonable assumption to make in game-theoretic
analyses. We need to be aware, however, that we ignore all the phenomena of multi-locus evolu¬
tion in game-theoretic analyses of language.
Criterion 10 (Levels of selection) Explanations for the evolution of language need to relate se¬
lection at the level of individuals or groups to changes in gene frequencies. That is, they need to
specify and relate the assumed levels ofdescription for selection and heritability.
2.9. SOCIAL EVOLUTION & KIN SELECTION 37
Second, an important (methodological) observation is that there is no single best level of
description; researchers make a heuristic choice about the level at which they will describe the
evolutionary dynamics. Every model will only be an approximation, and it depends on the phe¬
nomenon of interest at which level the evolutionary process is most adequately described. Below,
I will briefly discuss kin selection, and show, using the Price equation, why for the phenomena of
social evolution the population structure is a crucial level of description that is left out in standard
game-theoretic models.
2.9 Social Evolution & Kin Selection
The techniques from social evolution theory will not play much of a role in this thesis, and I will
therefore keep the discussion brief. One fundamental equation, the Price equation (Price, 1970),
is useful, however, to highlight a silent assumption in game theory models, and to illustrate the
issue of multiple levels of selection. The Price equation is easily derived; I will follow here Frank
(1998) and Andy Gardner (p.c.). Like Wright's equation (2.9), it can be interpreted as describing
the change in the frequency of a gene, but more generally it describes the change in the value of
any trait 2.
Price introduces his equation as follows:
"Gene frequency change is the basic event in biological evolution. The following
equation [...], which gives frequency change under selection from one generation to
the next for a single gene or for any linear function of any number of genes at any
number of loci, holds for any sort of dominance or epistasis, for sexual or asexual
reproduction, for random or nonrandom mating, for diploid, haploid or polyploid
species, and even for imaginary species with more than two sexes" (Price, 1970,
We are interested in the change in frequency of a specific trait z in the population between the
present (z) and the next generation (z'). If we divide up the population in M units q\... qm (these
units are, for instance, individuals or groups, depending on the level of selection the equation is
meant to describe), and we know their fitnesses uq ... wm and trait values z\ ... zm, then the
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Multiplying both sides of this equation with w, and rearranging gives:
wAz = y qiWiZi + y QiWiAzi -wz
i i
= y, qjWjZi - w z + qjWjAzj (2.13)
i i
Cov[iu,,z] E[wAz]
As indicated, the terms in equation (2.13) correspond, by definition, to the covariance between
fitness and trait value, and expected value6. Hence, the process of evolution can be elegantly
summarised in the Price equation, as follows:
The Price equation partitions the process of evolution into a term that describes the effects of
selection (traits that are associated strongly with fitness will be selected for most effectively), and
a term that describes the effects of (biased) transmission (the index i is the index of the parent;
hence Azj describes the change in the trait value - from a particular parent to all its offspring -
regardless of selection).
Observe that the transmission term in the Price equation looks very similar to the left-hand
side of that equation. This fact allows us to relate different levels of selection. As an illustration,
I will here derive Hamilton's (Hamilton, 1964a,b) famous result on kin selection, which says that
an altruistic trait can evolve if the benefit b times the relatedness r is larger than the cost c:
The derivation using the Price equation highlights the correct interpretation of relatedness
and suggests applications for language evolution. The derivation concerns the evolution of an
altruistic trait, such as the alarm calls discussed in the previous section. For simplicity, assume
an individual either does or does not have this trait. We indicate this with the variable z, that is,
z = 1 or z = 0. We can ask: under which circumstances will this trait evolve?
6The covariance between two variables x and y is defined as Co\{xi,yi) = jj S<li ((x> — ®)(t/« — V)) —
xy — xy, i.e. the product of the means minus the mean of the products. Expected value of a variable x is defined as
E(x) ~ Sili P(x — xi)xi< i.e. the sum of all possible values weighted by the probability of each value. Covariance
is the most obvious way of measuring a departure from statistical independence. If x and y vary independently from
each other, then E(xy) = E(x)E(y), and the covariance is 0.
wAz = Cov[u;, z] + E[wAz]
selection transmission
(2.14)
br > c. (2.15)
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Consider a population, subdivided (at random) in N groups G\... G^, each of size M indi¬
viduals. In each group Gi, individuals benefit from the amount of altruism in that group, labelled
as Zi\ the total benefit is bzi. The jth individual in that group, however, also suffers a cost from
being altruistic, indicated with c; the cost is thus czij. The fitness of the jth individual in the iXh
group is now given by:
Wij = a + bzi - cz^, (2.16)
where a is a baseline fitness (not dependent on the presence or absence of the altruistic trait). The
fitness of the fth group is given by:
Wi = a + (b — c)zi. (2.17)
Hence, an individual's fitness (her relative contribution to the total offspring of the group)
depends on the amount of altruism received and the amount of altruism given. Obviously, if the
cost c of being altruistic is larger than 0, it is always best for an individual to be selfish. The
group's fitness7 (the relative contribution of this group's offspring in the total offspring of the
whole population) depends on the total amount of altruism given. If the cost c of altruism is lower
than the benefit b, it is always best for the group if all individuals are altruistic.
The evolutionary process within each group i can be described with a Price equation, as in
equation (2.14). If we assume there is no transmission bias, the equation simplifies to:
Wij A.ztj — uy AZ{ — Covj \tu-ij, Zij ]. (2.18)
The evolutionary process at the level of the whole population is also described with a Price
equation, where the transmission term concerns the within-group dynamics of equation (2.18):
WiAzi = Covi[wi,Zi] + Ei[wiAzi]
= CoVi[wi,Zi\ +Ei[CoVj[wij,Zij]]. (2.19)
The covariance in above equation can be replaced by a regression and variance term, because
(by definition) Cov(x, y) = (3(x, y)Var(j/). This gives the following equation:
WiAzi = (3(wi, Zi)Vari[zi} + Ei\J3(wij, Zjj)Varj[zy]]. (2.20)
7Note that, although parent groups are of fixed size M, some groups produce more offspring than others.
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These regression terms (3 can be read off directly from equations (2.16) and (2.17), because
they correspond to the slope of the fitness functions, i.e. /3(w,, z{) = b - c and /3(ujjy, z,y) = — c.
Substituting these values into equation (2.20) and rearranging gives:
where Vartotaj is the total variance. This establishes a derivation of Hamilton's rule from the
Price equation, because the average relatedness between two individuals in a population, equals
benefits of trait z, weighted with the relatedness within a group, are larger than the costs, i.e.
rb > c, then Az will be positive, i.e. evolution will favour the trait even if it harms the individual.
It is important to note that Hamilton's rule is widely misinterpreted. As this derivation shows,
the relatedness term r is not the fraction of genes two individuals share (identity by descent),
as is commonly assumed (e.g. Okasha, 2003). Rather, it is a statistical association between the
trait of interest in one individual and the trait in the individual she interacts with. Therefore, the
relatedness between two individuals can even be negative. This simply means that the individuals
are less related to each other than to a random third individual in the population (Hamilton, 1970).
If the association is high enough, altruistic traits can be favoured by natural selection8. That is,
if (for whatever reason) altruists are surrounded by other altruists, they benefit more from the
altruism received than from the altruism offered (and conversely, if it is low enough, natural
selection can favour spite - behaviours that harm both the actor and the recipient; Hamilton,
1970; Gardner & West, 2004).
8Darwin already understood the essence of kin selection when he wrote: ""[...] selection may be applied to the
family, as well as to the individual, and may thus gain the desired end. Thus, a well-flavoured vegetable is cooked, and
the individual is destroyed; but the horticulturist sows seeds of the same stock, and confidently expects to get nearly
the same variety; breeders of cattle wish the flesh and fat to be well marbled together; the animal has been slaughtered,
but the breeder goes with confidence to the same family. [...] Thus I believe it has been with social insects: a slight
modification of structure, or instinct, correlated with the sterile condition of certain members of the community, has
been advantageous to the community: consequently the fertile males and females of the community flourished, and
transmitted to their fertile offspring a tendency to produce sterile members having the same modification." (Darwin,
1859, p.258-259)
w~i/Nz~i = (b - c)VaTi[zi\ + Ei[-cVarj[zij}}
= (6 - c)Varj[zj] - c£j [Vary [z^y]]
= War; [zi ] - c (Varj [z, ] + Ei [Vary [z;y ] ])
= 6Vari[zi] - cVartota]
(2.21)
the between group variance as a proportion of the total variance. That is, r = • If the
total
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Interactions within kin-groups (and kin recognition) are an important mechanism for this
association to arise (hence the Maynard Smith's term "kin selection"), but not the only one. Sub¬
division of a population in groups is another mechanism (such "group selection" is thus a form
of kin selection). Hamilton himself suggested a third mechanism, that of "green beards". If the
same gene complex that codes for an altruistic trait, also codes for an external marker (i.e. a
green beard), altruists can choose to interact preferentially with each other. This is of interest
for language evolution, because language itself could be such a green beard, if individuals with a
linguistic innovation can recognise each other based on features in their language. Finally, recip¬
rocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), where players remember the interaction history with other players
and play altruistically only against players that have been altruistic in the past, can be understood
in the same framework.
Kin selection seems the most promising solution for the problem of cooperation that I intro¬
duced in section 2.7. It would certainly be worthwhile to study formal models of kin selection,
that take into account the details of human communication. In this thesis, however, I will no fur¬
ther address kin selection or the problem of cooperation. Instead, I will assume the willingness to
cooperate exists in modeled populations, and focus on the problem of coordination.
2.10 Cultural Evolution
Dawkins (1976) emphasised that the principle of natural selection is not restricted to genes or
individuals (as Fisher, Wright, Haldane, Price, Hamilton and others were well aware). In every
situation where one can identify replicators, heritable variation and natural selection, a process
of adaptation can take place. For instance, cultural inventions (or "memes", Dawkins, 1976) -
religion, technology, fashion or indeed words and grammatical rules - undergo evolution if there
are mechanisms for cultural transmission and cultural selection.
Since Dawkin's book, many wildly speculative theories have been launched under the head¬
ing "memetics", which have given this new field a bad reputation. Nevertheless, the basic idea is
sound and open to serious investigation (Mesoudi et a/., 2004). For a start, all mathematical mod¬
els and requirements discussed in this chapter apply, mutatis mutandis, to cultural evolution as
well. The idea of viewing historical language change as a form of evolution is particularly attrac¬
tive because, on the one hand, it makes the extensive mathematical toolkit of evolutionary biology
available to linguistics, and on the other hand, is presents evolutionists with an enormous body of
new data. In chapter 7 I will briefly come back to some possible implications for linguistics and
biology.
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We need formal models of the cultural evolution of language, in which we can deal with all
the constraints on evolutionary models that I listed in this chapter. Although many authors have
noted the parallels between biological evolution and language change, including Darwin (1871,
p.91), only recently have people starting to study the cultural evolution of language in such a
formal framework. Some relevant mathematical models are those of Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman
(1981), Niyogi (2002) and Yang (2000). These authors look at the competition between two or
more languages, with no qualitative differences between languages. Simulation models such as
those of Kirby (1998) and Batali (2002) look at more open-ended systems, with more explicit
formalisms for grammar and learning.
One problem is that is not so easy to decide on the appropriate units of selection. For instance,
Kirby (2000) described the dynamics in his simulation model (which will be discussed in detail
in chapters 5 and 6) with context-free grammar rules as replicators under selection for more
reliable replication. In later papers, however, he argued that the analogy between biological and
cultural evolution in this case breaks down (Kirby, 2002b). This is because the grammatical rules
are induced from observable language, whereas in biological evolution genes are inherited, with
no feedback from phenotype to genotype (other than through the effects of selection). This is
known as the "central dogma of molecular biology". This observation is correct, of course, but
it does not mean we cannot describe the dynamics in models such as Kirby's using the tools
from evolutionary biology. The effects of induction in language change are a form of "directed
mutation", and can be included, for instance, in the Price Equation in the transmission term. More
work is needed to work this out with concrete examples; chapter 6 will attempt to make a small
contribution to this end.
2.11 Conclusions
In this chapter I have discussed a variety of models from population genetics, evolutionary game-
theory and social evolution theory. I have used these models to make a list of requirements for
evolutionary scenarios of the biological and cultural evolution of language. These requirements
correspond to the following questions we should ask when confronted with a scenario for the
biological or cultural evolution of language:
• What are the units of inheritance the scenario assumes? Genes? Memes?
• What is the scope of variation in these genes or memes? That is, what is the assumed set of
possible traits/strategies available for evolution?
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• What are the selection pressures? That is, what is the assumed payoff for each of these
possible traits in each possible context?
• For every innovation in the scenario, will it indeed be favoured by selection when extremely
rare? If not, is there a non-negligible chance it could get established by stochastic effects,
or get frequent enough to be favoured by selection?
• Does the assumed series of changes in the scenario indeed constitute a path of ever-increasing
fitness? That is, is there a path of fit intermediates from start to finish?
• How much time will each of the innovations take to get established?
• Is there for every transition sufficient variation, but not too much?
• How does the scenario explain that speakers maintain the willingness to speak honestly,
and that hearers continue to listen and believe the information received? That is, how does
it solve the problem of cooperation?
• How does the scenario explain that speakers and hearers, after every innovation, agree
on which signals refer to which meanings? That is, how does it solve the problem of
coordination?
• How does the scenario relate dynamics at different levels of description - genes, strategies,
individuals, groups, languages?
With these questions in mind, the next chapter will discuss a possible scenario for the evo¬
lution of language, proposed by linguist Ray Jackendoff (2002). I will identify the transitions in




The major stages in the evolution of language
What are the "design principles" ofhuman language that need to
be explained? In this chapter I will discuss Jackendoff's scenario
for the evolution of language, and argue that the transitions be¬
tween stages are the crucial challenges for evolutionary biology.
I will review a number of formalisms for meaning, sound and
the mapping between them, and describe and evaluate the dif¬
ferences between each of Jackendoff's stages in terms of these
formalisms. I conclude from this discussion that the transitions
to combinatorial phonology, compositional semantics and hier¬
archical phrase-structure can be formally characterised. Mod¬
elling these transitions is a major challenge for language evolu¬
tion modelling.
45
46 CHAPTER 3. THE MAJOR STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE
3.1 Introduction
Human languages are unique communication systems in nature because of their enormous expres¬
siveness and flexibility. They accomplish this by using combinatorial principles in phonology,
morphology, syntax and semantics (Chomsky, 1955; Studdert-Kennedy, 1998; Jackendoff, 2002),
which impose important requirements on the cognitive abilities of language users. Explaining the
origins of the structure of language and the human capacity for learning and using it, are challeng¬
ing and controversial problems for linguistics, cognitive science and evolutionary biology. Major
disagreements concentrate on whether or not this capacity has been subject to natural selection or
not, whether it evolved in a single, in few or in many steps, and whether articulation, perception
or cognitive processing formed the crucial bottleneck (see Christiansen & Kirby, 2003a, for a
representative overview of current positions).
Jackendoff (2002) has laid out a scenario for the various stages in the evolution of human
language from primate-like communication. Unlike many other theories, Jackendoff's scenario
assumes many such intermediate stages, as summarised in figure 3.1. Jackendoff's proposal is
useful for structuring the discussion in this thesis for a number of reasons:
• Jackendoff's scenario is a gradualist account, with many intermediate steps. Scenarios
proposed by other scholars can be seen as variants of Jackendoff's, where two or more of
the stages Jackendoff proposes are collapsed into one. Jackendoff's scenario can thus be
seen as a generalisation of many other scenarios.
• It grounds the scenario for the evolution of language in a testable theory of how modern
humans acquire, represent and process language. Although Jackendoff's account is not very
formal, his partitioning of the problem is useful for identifying the relevant formalisms from
modem linguistics and applying them to issues in language evolution.
Jackendoff hypothesises that modem languages still contain elements that correspond to the
type of elements that characterised earlier stages in the evolution of human language. For instance,
he views the compound noun construction in English as a fossil of an earlier stage where strings
are concatenated to express a compound meaning, but without recursive phrase-structure. Thus,
the meaning of compounds like "dog house" and "house dog" is deducible (but not completely
specified) from the meaning of the component words and the order in which they are put.
Although an incremental, step-by-step scenario is a crucial component of an evolutionary
theory, Jackendoff's scenario does not address the other crucial component: the transitions from
each stage to the next. Jackendoff admits: "I will not inquire as to the details of how increased
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1. Use of symbols in a non-situation-specific fashion
/
2. Use of an open, unlimited
class of symbols
I
3. Development of a phono¬
logical combinatorial sys¬
tem to enlarge open, unlim¬
ited class of symbols (pos¬
sibly syllables first, then
phonemes)
4. Concatenation of symbols
1
5. Use of symbol position to





7. Symbols that explicitly










10. System of grammatical
functions to convey semantic
relations
/
Figure 3.1: Incremental evolutionary steps in Jackendoff's scenario for the evolution of human
language (from Jackendoff 2002). Independ steps appear side by side; dependencies among steps
are indicated vertically.
expressive power came to spread through a population [...]. nor how the genome and the morpho¬
genesis of the brain accomplished these changes. Accepted practice in evolutionary psychology
[...] generally finds it convenient to ignore these problems; I see no need at the moment to hold
myself to a higher standard than the rest of the field." (Jackendoff 2002, p. 237)
Presumably, all transitions have greatly increased the number of distinct "signs" (signal-
meaning pairs) that can be expressed, transmitted, memorised and leamt. However, that ob¬
servation in itself is not sufficient. As I have argued in the previous chapter, good evolutionary
explanations must specify the selection pressures that lead from one stage to the next (the payoff
function), and the variation that natural selection can act upon (the strategy set). Understanding
how innovations can spread in a population is the essence of any evolutionary explanation, and,
crucially, a better end-result is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the spread of
innovations.
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In the following I will briefly sketch each of the stages that Jackendoff proposes, and relate his
proposal to those of some other researchers. I will then introduce some formalisms for meaning,
sound and the mapping between the two (including formalisms for syntax). The goal of this
chapter is to find out how to describe the similarities and differences between Jackendoff's stages,
and to identify the transitions that can be formally characterised. In the other chapters of this thesis
I will then address possible solutions to the more difficult problems of how to get from one stage
to the next.
3.2 Jackendoff's Scenario
The starting point of Jackendoff's scenario is pre-existing primate conceptual structure - that is,
the kind of cognitive abilities that modern primatology has found in other great apes. The first
innovation is the use of symbols in a non-situation specific fashion. Jackendoff recognises that
for instance chimpanzees have a sophisticated conceptual apparatus, that is adequate to deal with
navigation, problem-solving and complex social interaction. But he believes that primates are in¬
capable of symbolic vocalisation, that is, of referring to objects, properties, or events independent
from the present situation. Deacon (1997), Donald (1991) and others have argued that the use of
symbols is the crucial biological innovation that has made modern human language possible.
A second innovation is the ability to use and acquire an open, unlimited class of symbols.
Whereas primate call systems contain a few dozen different calls at most (as far as we know)
and language-trained apes can be taught at most several hundred symbols, humans know tens
of thousands of different words. An open class of symbols must be learnt rather than be innate;
Oliphant (1999) and others have argued that a learnt vocabulary was a crucial step in the evolution
of language.
To keep such large numbers of symbols distinct in perception, memory and articulation, a third
innovation has been crucial: a generative, combinatoral phonological system. All human lan¬
guages are combinatorial, in that the many basic meaningful units (words, morphemes) are built
up from a relatively small repertoire of basic speech sounds (phonemes, syllables). Jackendoff
endorses the view that the syllable is the basic unit of combination. The evolution of combina¬
torial phonology is seen by a number of researchers as the crucial innovation in the evolution of
language (Lindblom, MacNeilage & Studdert-Kennedy, 1984; Studdert-Kennedy, 1998).
Jackendoff's fourth innovation is the concatenation of symbols to build larger utterances.
He imagines concatenations of symbols analogous to "Fred apple", which might refer to any
of a number of connections between Fred and apples. Although simple concatenation does not
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fully specify the intended meaning, it is nevertheless, Jackendoff argues, more useful than single
symbols in isolation.
The fifth innovation, however, using linear position to signal semantic relations, does in¬
troduce a systematic compositionality. In this stage of the scenario, simple principles such as
"agent first", "focus last" and "grouping" could structure utterances analogous to "dog brown eat
mouse", such that it is clear that the brownness applies to the dog, the dog eats and the mouse
is being eaten. In the terminology of Hurford (2000), the route from holistic to compositional
language in this scenario is "synthetic", because compounds are synthesised from pre-existing
meaningful signals (rather than that pre-existing holistic signals are re-analysed as being built-up
from component parts).
Jackendoff sees the fourth and fifth innovations as independent from the second and third, and
he does not decide which should come first (see figure 3.1). Together, they constitute something
similar to the (single) intermediate stage of "protolanguage" in the scenario of (Bickerton, 1990)
and others, and to pidgin (the limited language spoken by adults with different native languages,
Bickerton, 1990) and to "Basic Variety" (the limited language acquired by adult second language
learners, Klein & Perdue, 1997).
The sixth innovation is the invention of hierarchical phrase-structure. Phrase-structure has
been recognised since Chomsky (1955, 1957) as a crucial design feature of human language.
Jackendoff argues that phrase-structure allows the principles of word order, as emerged in stage
5, to be elaborated into principles of phrase order. Hence, from stage 6 a systematic relation has
existed between sentences like "dog chase mouse", where "dog" and "mouse" are single word
noun phrases, and the similarly structured but more elaborate "big dog with floppy ears and long
scraggly tail chase little frightened mouse".
The seventh innovation is a vocabulary for relational concepts, introducing words analogous
to up, on, behind, before, after, often, because, however and so forth. These words all describe
relations between different phrases in a sentence, and thus require phrase structure, Jackendoff
argues, but not yet syntactic categories. Jackendoff imagines that the phrase order and use of
relational words are still completely guided by semantically defined notions. That is, there are no
subjects, objects, nouns, verbs or mechanisms for case, agreement or long-distance dependencies.
There are just semantic categories such as agent, patient, objects and actions.
Grammatical categories are the eighth innovation, creating syntactic notions such as "sub¬
ject" that are correlated but not equal to the semantic notion of agent (as for instance in the
passive construction), or even a syntactic notion like "sentence" which makes that "a storm last
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night" cannot stand on its own, whereas "There was a storm last night", with dummy subject
there, can. The final two innovations, inflectional morphology and grammatical functions (in
no particular order) complete the extensive toolkit that modem languages make use of. This list
of gradual innovations is consistent with the gradualist approach championed by Pinker & Bloom
(1990) and others.
In summary, Jackendoff breaks down linguistic competence into a number of different skills,
and proposes a gradual scenario in which new skills are added to the existing system, each step
increasing the expressivity of the language used. The first innovation, of symbol use, is about the
sort of meanings early hominids had available for communication. The third, about combinatorial
phonology, is about the kind of sounds they could produce and perceive. All the other innovations,
from an open, leamt vocabulary and the concatenation of symbols to inflectional morphology,
are about the way meanings are mapped onto sound and vice versa. In the next sections I will
discuss some observations about and formalisms for the meaning, sound and meaning-sound
mappings in animal and human communication. Where possible I will evaluate - in terms of
those formalisms - whether Jackendoff's stages indeed capture the relevant innovations in the
evolution of language. But as it turns out, it is often not straightforward to adapt the formalisms
developed for describing modem, human languages to a different use, that is, to describing the
differences between modem human communication and that of other species.
3.3 Modelling Meaning
Animals and humans categorise their environment, and use calls, words or grammatical sentences
to express aspects of that environment. Typically, the same utterances are used on many different
occasions to express common features. It is therefore reasonable to postulate an "internal state",
a representation in the brain, that mediates between perceptual and motor abilities, memory, and
linguistic forms. I will call these representations "meanings". Modelling the meaning of natural
language utterances is difficult, because we have only very indirect access to the representations
in the brain and, crucially, much of that indirect access is modulated through language (Hurford,
2003). The common framework for modelling meaning (that is, for formal semantics), is that of
symbolic logic. Many different logics exists, with different levels of expressive power as well as
different computational properties.
According to Jackendoff and others, the kind of meanings available for communication to
modern humans are qualitatively different from those available to other primates, including our
prelinguistic ancestors. Jackendoff believes that the "use of symbols" was the first major inno¬
vation; other researchers have argued that a "theory of mind" was a crucial innovation (Dunbar,
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1998). It would be very useful if we could characterise such conceptual differences in formal
terms, using the apparatus of formal semantics (that was developed with other purposes in mind).
In the following I will briefly sketch a well-known hierarchy of logics (Chierchia & McConnell-
Ginet, 1990; Gamut, 1991) - propositional, predicate and modal logic - to see if it can be used
for such purposes.
Any discussion of logic, must start with propositional logic (or "Boolean algebra"), which
provides a number of operators (such as negation logical AND 'A', logical OR 'V', im¬
plication 'i—>' and bi-implication '<->') and inference rules that one can use to derive new true
statements from other true statements (statements that can be true or false are called "proposi¬
tions"). For instance, we can define the symbol p as denoting the statement "Socrates is a man",
and q as denoting "Socrates is mortal". In propositional logic, the inference that q follows from
p can then be described with the rule p t—> q. Using this rule, someone who is unsure whether
Socrates is a real man or an imaginary figure (that is, the truth value of p), needs only confirmation
that he is a man (p is true) to also infer that he is mortal (q is true).
Crucially, propositional logic does not have access to information "inside" a proposition.
Thus, when we add r: "Aristotle is a man", we have no way of generalising from Socrates' fate to
Aristotle's and derive that "Aristotle is mortal". Predicate logic does capture this generalisation,
by introducing the notions of "predicates", "arguments" and "quantifiers" (such as the universal
quantifier 'V': "for all", and the existential quantifier '3': "there is"). Hence, we can introduce the
terms s for Socrates, and o for Aristotle, and the predicates H for being human, and M for being
mortal. The fates of both wise men can now be inferred from two facts H(s) and H(a), and just
one general inference rule Vx (H (x) i—» M (x)), which is interpreted as "All men are mortal."
That is, predicate logic can describe (and productively use) similarities between propositions that
propositional logic has no access to.
Predicate logic is a powerful formal system that is used to model a good part of the semantics
of natural languages as well as many other reasoning tasks in artificial intelligence. However,
natural languages do contain many words and constructions with meanings that are difficult to
model in predicate logic, such as modal constructions ("can", "may", "must", "perhaps", "cer¬
tain"), tense ("I will survive") and intentionality ("I think that I am", where the content of the
thought need not be true for the act of thinking it to be true).
It might appear that by introducing the right variables and predicates, predicate logic would
be able to deal with such expressions. For instance, Kirby (2002a) uses (higher order) predicate
logic notation for expressions such as believes(pete,knows(gavin, hates(pete,heather))) for "Pete
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believes that Gavin knows that he hates Heather". Similarly, in the "flat" notation used by Batali
(2002) and De Beule, Van Looveren & Zuidema (2002, see appendix C of this thesis) and ad¬
vocated by Hurford (2003), we could introduce variables for events or situations, and predicates
that define properties of these events such as necessary, likely or possible. John will always love
Mary" is then represented as something like:
Be (loves(e, x, y),john(x), mary(y), always(e)).
Such abuse of predicate logic notation might be useful for evolutionary simulations where the
semantics is not really relevant. However, for characterising representational abilities it is not a
real solution because it does not suggest a systematic way to evaluate the truth of expressions.
David Lewis (1972, quoted in Abbott, 1999) makes this point as follows in a critique of the
semantic representation of Katz & Postal (1964) which he calls "Markerese":
we can know the Markerese translation of an English sentence without knowing the
first thing about the meaning of the English sentence: namely, the conditions un¬
der which it would be true. Semantics with no treatment of truth conditions is not
semantics (Lewis, 1972, p. 169).
That is, semantics is not complete without a model that provides a way to evaluate logic ex¬
pressions, in such a way that there is a systematic relationship between different usages of the
same entities and predicates1. That is, a model for the expressions in Kirby (2002a), as discussed
above, needs to recognise that the Peter that believes is the same person as the person that is
known to hate. In predicate logic we can of course define a model that treats believesthatgavin-
knowsthatpetehatesheather(x) as a single predicate that might be true for Peter. But such a model
would not do justice to the intended structure of the expression, that is, it would not capture the
relation between the statements "Pete hates Heather" and "Gavin knows that Pete hates Heather".
For such constructions, modal logic provides a more satisfactory framework. A modal logic
postulates a set of "possible worlds", each of which has its own set of facts and rules of inference
(expressible as, for instance, a predicate logic). For instance, yesterday, today and tomorrow can
be seen as three possible worlds. The statement "it rains" can have different truth values in each of
them. Some statements, however, are true for all worlds (such as "if it rains, the streets are wet").
A modal logic, as a minimum, contains the modal operators for necessity and possibility 'O',
and a model of the possible worlds. If R denotes "it rains", and W "the streets are wet", then the
' In fact, many semanticists now go further and argue that semantics is not complete without a procedure to evaluate
the expression (Woods, 1968).
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statement n(i? h-> W) says "if it rains, the streets are always wet". That statement is true today,
if R W is true in all worlds that the possible world model gives us access to (in this case, all
other worlds, i.e. yesterday and tomorrow).
In particular, a variant of modal logic termed intensional predicate logic (IPL) allows us to
model the meaning of expressions that describe the content of thoughts, assertions, statements
etc. In such a treatment, the beliefs of a person form a possible world, with its own truths. Many
problems remain, both internal to IPL (such as the so-called problem of omniscience) and with its
relation to natural language constructs (such as so-called donkey-conditionals). For the present
purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that there in this hierarchy of logics, more powerful
representations like IPL are able to model relations between statements that less powerful repre¬
sentations cannot.
It would be attractive if we could relate these different logics to the assumed differences
between the conceptual structures available for communication to modern humans, and those
available to their prelinguistic ancestors and modem higher primates. For instance, Jackendoff
joins other cognitive scientists in claiming that symbol use is the first major innovation. He does
however make clear that he does not believe apes have no symbolic thought:
I take it as established by decades ofprimate research [references omitted] that chim¬
panzees have a combinatorial system of conceptual structure in place [...]. (Jackend¬
off, 2002, p. 238)
The crucial difference, for Jackendoff, is the use of symbolic vocalisations:
[Even] single-symbol utterances in young children go beyond primate calls in impor¬
tant respects that are crucial in the evolution of language. Perhaps the most important
difference is the non-situation-specificity of human words. The word kitty may be
uttered by a baby to draw attention to a cat, to inquire about the whereabouts of a
cat, to summon the cat, to remark that something resembles a cat, and so forth. Other
primates' calls do not have this property. A food call is used when food is discovered
(or imminently anticipated) but not to suggest that food be sought. A leopard alarm
call can report the sighting of a leopard, but cannot be used to ask ifanyone has seen
a leopard lately [references omitted], (Jackendoff, 2002, p. 239)
Can we express this intuitive difference between humans and other primates as a difference
in representational capacity similar to the difference between propositional and predicate logic?
We can, of course, conjecture that humans have words for predicates and other words for objects
(the arguments of those predicates), which can thus be used in all situations where the conceptual
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system uses that predicate or that object. Primates, on the other hand, can only vocalise com¬
plete propositions, even though they, as Jackendoff states, do have a "combinatorial system of
conceptual structure".
The problem with such a proposal is that it is not clear a priori what constitutes a predicate
or an object, and thus what constitutes situation-specificity in formal terms. How can we be sure
that the word kitty in an infant's one-word stage does not mean a complete proposition such as
"There is a kitty involved"? How do we know the child does not simply categorise situations as
those that involve kitties, and those that do not, much like a monkey that categorises situations as
those that require running into a tree and those that do not? If so, the difference is categorisation,
not representational ability. The fact that two different animal species - with different anatomy,
and evolved for different habitats - categorise the world differently is no surprise, of course.
Conversely, how can we be sure that the meaning of a primate alarm call for leopards is
not the predicate "being a leopard"? The point here is that with regard to "meanings available
for communication" the difference between propositional and predicate logic only shows itself
through the rules of combination, that is, through the generalisations they allow. Of course, it is
likely that there is something special about the way humans categorise their environment which
was crucial for the evolution of language. But the tools of formal semantics do not appear to be
useful for characterising that difference.
That leaves us with the conclusion that in terms of formal semantics, use of symbols, Jack¬
endoff's first innovation cannot be recognised (or perhaps even exist) independent from the fourth
innovation (concatenation of symbols). In this thesis, I will therefore not address this transition.
Perhaps the distinction between predicate and modal logic will prove more useful for character¬
ising the difference between human and non-human thought. A debate exists about whether great
apes have thoughts about the thoughts of others, that is, have a theory of mind (Heyes, 1998).
Such embedded meanings cannot be modelled with predicate logic. An interesting question is
whether the ability for embedded meanings (J think that she heard that he said...) is a prerequisite
for hierarchical phrase-structure (Dunbar, 1998; Worden, 1998). However, because it plays no
role in Jackendoff's scenario, this question will not be addressed in this thesis either.
3.4 Modelling Sound
The mechanisms of sound production and perception in primate and human communication are
fortunately more amenable to empirical observation, and there is therefore more of a consensus
about the fundamental principles. Sounds are patterns of vibrations, travelling through air from
a source (i.e. the speaker) to the hearer. A sound can be represented with a graph that shows the
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movements of a membrane (i.e. in a microphone), and hence the variation in sound pressure over
time. This graph is referred to as the waveform.
For some artificially generated sounds, such as the tone generated by a tuning-fork, the wave¬
form is a simple, easily interpreted, periodic pattern. For natural calls and utterances, however,
the waveform is typically a complex mesh of aperiodic and periodic vibrations of many different
frequencies. The analysis of these complex sounds is greatly facilitated by a technique called
Fourier Analysis. In Fourier Analysis, the observed waveform is decomposed into (infinitely)
many sine-waves of different frequencies, each with a particular amplitude, such that when all
these sine-waves are added together the original signal is recovered. A graph that shows for a
range of frequencies the amplitude of the corresponding sine-waves is called the frequency spec¬
trum.
For both the production and the perception of sounds, the frequency spectrum has a natural
interpretation. Sound production, both in humans (as worked out by Johannes Mueller in 19th
century; see Coren et al., 1979/1994) and many other mammals (Hauser & Fitch, 2003) can be
seen as a two-staged process with a vibration source and subsequent filtering (the source-filter
model, Chiba & Kajiyama, 1958; Fant, 1960; Titze, 1994). The vibrations are produced by the air
flow from the lungs passing the larynx. This sound then propagates through the throat, mouth and
nose (the vocal tract), where specific frequencies are reinforced through resonance. The dominant
frequency of the source is called the fundamental frequency, while resonance frequencies are
termed formants. Formants can be modified by changing the shape of the vocal tract (opening
and closing the jaw, moving the tongue, etc.), thus creating the elementary sounds of a language
or call system. In the frequency spectrum, formants show up as distinct peaks in the distribution.
The frequency spectrum also maps in an important way on sound perception. When a sound¬
wave reaches the ear, it sets in motion a cascade of vibrations of the eardrum, hammer, anvil &
stirrup, oval window and finally the endolymph fluid in the cochlea. These vibrations cause
mechanical waves to travel through the cochlea's fluid. Because of the special shape of the
cochlea, the travelling waves reach their maxima at different places along the cochlea's mem¬
brane (the "basilar membrane") for each different sound frequency (von Bekesy, 1960; Coren
et al., 1979/1994). These differences in wave-form are then translated into different neural acti¬
vation patterns in the organ of Corti. This way, the mammalian auditory system decomposes an
incoming sound-wave in its component frequencies, not unlike the Fourier Analysis performed
by phoneticians.
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The frequency spectrum is thus a representation of speech sounds that is meaningful for
analysing both production and perception. However, the frequency spectrum representation ab¬
stracts out the time dimension. Temporal changes in the frequency distribution are crucial for
encoding and decoding information into sound in both human and animal communication. A va¬
riety of representations of such changes have been developed, including cascade diagrams (where
frequency distributions are measured in a number of intervals, and plotted with a small vertical
transposition for every subsequent interval) and spectrograms (where frequencies above a specific
threshold value are plotted against time). In chapter 4 I will represent such temporal changes as
a (discretised) trajectory through an acoustic space (where the coordinates of each point on the
trajectory are for instance the peaks in the frequency distribution - the formants - of each small
time interval in the waveform).
On the articulatory side, changes in the frequency distribution correspond to movements of
articulators in the vocal tract. For example, by abruptly closing the vocal tract and releasing
again, an existing sonorous sound is interrupted and a burst of noise is produced (containing
many frequencies at low amplitude). In human speech, such movements are perceived as stop
consonants (plosives): /p,b,t,d,k,g/, depending on where in the vocal tract the stream of air is
interrupted. Similarly, fricatives (e.g. /f,v,s,z/), approximants (/l,r,j,w,h/) and nasal consonants
(e.g. /m,nI) are produced by complete or partial blockage, and quick or delayed release. Finally,
diphtongs (such as /ei/ in bait) are produced by a shift in the harmonic quality of the vocal tract
without an intermediate consonant.
From a comparative perspective, the basic principles of sound perception and production (at
least at the level of physiology of articulators) appear to be very similar across humans and other
mammals. In contradiction to the "speech is special" hypothesis (Liberman et al., 1967), recent
evidence points at the conclusion that human speech perception is not fundamentally different
from non-speech and non-human perception (Hauser & Fitch, 2003; Hauser, 2001). The fact that
humans are extra-ordinarily good at perceiving speech sounds appears to be better explained by
the observation that, unlike many animal communication systems, human language phonology
is learnt and imitated (Nottebohm, 1976; Studdert-Kennedy, 1983); in the cultural transmission
from one generation to the next, languages themselves have evolved to exploit the peaks in per¬
formance of the human auditory (and articulatory) systems. I will come back to this point in
chapter 7.
However, when analysing the temporal structure of a repertoire of signals, a crucial difference
between human and non-human primate communication is noted: human speech is combinato-
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rial, that is, the basic meaningful units in human language (words, morphemes) can be analysed
as combinations of segments from a small set of basic speech sounds. Semantic animal commu¬
nication (in the sense of Seyfarth et ai., 1980), in contrast, seems to be holistic, that is, the basic
meaningful units (calls) cannot generally be decomposed in segments that are reused in other
calls. There is some controversy about what the basic segments of human speech are (phonemes,
syllables or articulatory gestures), and there are many examples of combinatorial songs in pri¬
mates, birds, and cetaceans (that are used as sexual display, or for identification; see chapter 4).
To my knowledge, no quantitative comparison of the degree of re-use in human and non-human
sounds exists. Nevertheless, the intuition that human language exploits this mechanism to an
unparallelled degree is widely shared and uncontroversial. This is the third innovation in Jack-
endoff's list.
At this point it is important to make a distinction between "E-language", the externally ob¬
servable utterances, and "I-language", the system internal to the language user that underlies the
E-language. Combinatoriality in the I-language can be characterised by defining the basic units
and the rules of combination; combinatoriality in the E-language is best characterised by giving
a combinatorial I-language that could underlie it. However, the fact that an outside observer can
analyse a set of signals as combinatorial, does not necessarily imply that the language user actu¬
ally exploits that combinatorial potential. Hence, a repertoire of sounds might superficially look
combinatorial, but in fact not be productively combinatorial2. For instance, if we accept that the
syllable, and not the phoneme, is the unit of productive combination in human speech, then the
I-language is characterised by a set of syllables and the rules of combining them. Phonemes, in
such a view, are patterns in the E-language that look as if there is a combinatorial system under¬
lying it; they are only superficially combinatorial. This distinction is relevant for the evolution of
language, because a superficially combinatorial stage might precede and facilitate the evolution
of productive combination (as will be explored in chapter 4 and 5).
Note that for characterising the difference combinatorial and holistic phonology, the basic
tools and formalisms from linguistic phonology do not seem to be of much use. In chapter 4
I will describe signals as continuous trajectories through an abstract acoustic space (borrowing
a concept from phonetics). In this representation I can model both holistic and combinatorial
signals; for the distinction I will rely on visual inspection of the corresponding graphs.
2Jackendoff (2002), as do many other linguists, makes the same type of distinction between productive and semi-
productive morphology, but he does not generalise this distinction to the other combinatorial systems in language, nor
does he discuss its relevance for evolution.
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The evolutionary origins of combinatorial phonology are still a largely open question. A
widely shared intuition is that the way to encode a maximum of information in a given time¬
frame such that it can be reliably recovered under noisy conditions, is by means of a digital code.
Hence, phonemic coding could be the result of selection for perceptual distinctiveness. However,
this argument has, to my knowledge, never been worked out decisively for human speech (see
chapter 4 for a critique of existing formal models, such as the one of Nowak & Krakauer, 1999,
and for an alternative proposal).
Alternatively, combinatorial coding could be the result of articulatory constraints. Studdert-
Kennedy (1998, 2000) has argued that speech sounds are in fact difficult to produce, and that there
is a hierarchy of difficulty of producing speech sounds. This hierarchy is revealed in development.
For instance, children master syllables like "ba" much earlier than syllables like "through". The
reason is that through requires a large number of carefully coordinated articulatory movements
(gestures). Studdert-Kennedy speculates that the ability to produce such complex sounds is a
relatively recent evolutionary innovation, and that the inherent difficulty makes the re-use of motor
programs unavoidable. Hence, the combinatorial nature of speech follows from the difficulty of
production and the large repertoire of words in human languages.
Consistent with Studdert-Kennedy's scenario is the neurological evidence discussed by Dea¬
con (1997, 2000) that he believes shows intense selection for "the coupling of precisely timed
phonation with rapid articulatory movements of tongue, lips and jaw.":
Speech, and particularly singing abilities, clearly demonstrate unprecedented fore-
brain control of the human larynx. In this regard, we are not just divergent from
other mammals but also from all other vertebrates — perhaps the only one with sig¬
nificant forebrain control of laryngeal muscles. This is evidence ofprolonged intense
selection favoring increased vocal abilities in our ancestors. (Deacon, 2000, p.283)
If Studdert-Kennedy and Deacon are right, Jackendoff's third innovation is characterised by
radical changes in articulatory motor control. Nevertheless, this innovation is driven by the need
for a large repertoire of perceptually distinct signals, albeit under stringent articulatory constraints.
It is possible, as Studdert-Kennedy suggests, that the articulatory constraints already impose a
form of combinatorial phonology. In chapter 4, however, I will not make that assumption and
instead study its evolution as the result of selection for perceptual distinctiveness alone.
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3.5 Modelling Simple Sound-Meaning Mappings
The other transitions in Jackendoff's scenario (nrs. 2 and 4-10 in figure 3.1) all concern the way
meanings are mapped on signals. Most existing formalisms in linguistics already assume the in¬
novations that Jackendoff proposes: word order, compositionality, phrase-structure, grammatical
categories. They are therefore not of much use in characterising the early transitions. Here I
will first develop a simple formalism that describes meaning to form mappings without any as¬
sumptions or learning or combination; from that basis I will try to characterise the innovations
proposed.
Given a set of relevant meanings to express, and a set of distinctive signals (i.e sounds, or
"forms") that can be produced and perceived, we can describe a communication system as a
(probabilistic) mapping from meanings to signals (in production), and from signals to meanings
(in interpretation). These mappings can be represented with matrices. Hence, we have a produc¬
tion matrix S and an interpretation matrix R. S gives for every meaning rn and every signal /,
the probability that the individual chooses / to convey m. Conversely, R gives for every signal /
and meaning m, the probability that / will be interpreted as m. If there are M different meanings
and F different signals, then S is a M x F matrix, and R a F x M matrix. Variants of this
notation are used by Hurford (1989); Oliphant & Batali (1996) and other researchers.
Many different S and R matrices are possible. How can we measure the quality of specific
combinations? Or, in biological terms, how can we calculate the payoff (a fitness contribution)
of specific S and R matrices? An important component of such a payoff function is whether
speakers and hearers agree on which signals have which meanings. However, in many cases
the similarities between signals also need to be taken into account (because more similar signals
are more easily confused), as well as the similarities between meanings (because slightly wrong
interpretations are often better than totally wrong ones).
The consequences of such similarities can be modelled with a confusion matrix U (of dimen¬
sion F x F), which gives for each possible signal the probability that it is perceived correctly or
as any of the other signals, and with a value matrix V (of dimension M x M), which gives for
every intended meaning the payoff of each of the possible interpretations. Typically, U and V
will have relatively high values on the diagonal (the correct signals and interpretations).
Together, these four matrices can describe the most important aspects of a communication
system: which signals are used for which meanings by hearers and by speakers, how likely it is
that signals get confused in the transmission, and what the consequences of a particular successful
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or unsuccessful interpretation are. This notation is a generalisation of the notation in Nowak &
Krakauer (1999), and was introduced in Zuidema & Westermann (2003, see appendix C).
A hypothetical example, loosely based on the celebrated study of vervet monkey alarm calls
(Seyfarth et a/., 1980; Seyfarth & Cheney, 1997), will make the use of this formalism clear3.
Imagine an alarm call system of a monkey species for three different types of predators: from
the air (eagles), from the ground (leopards) and from the trees (snakes). Imagine further that the
monkeys are capable of producing a number (say 5) of different signals that range on one axis
(e.g. pitch, from high to low) and that these are more easily confused if they are closer together.
Thus, the confusion matrix U might look like the left matrix in figure 3.2.
/ received signal \
sent signal J. 16kHz 8kHz 4kHz 2kHz 1 kHz / interpretations \
16kHz 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 intentions I eagle snake leopard
8kHz 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 V = eagle 0.9 0.2 0.1
4kHz 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.0 snake o On O CO 0.5
2kHz 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.2 V leopard O i—> o to 0.9
V 1 kHz 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.7
Figure 3.2: Confusion and value matrices for the monkeys in the example, describing the noise in
signalling and the value of intention-interpretation pairs in their environment.
Further, although it is obviously best to interpret a signal correctly, if one makes a mistake,
typically not every mistake is equally bad. For example, if a leopard alarm is given, the leopard
response (run into a tree) is best, but a snake response (search surrounding area) is better than an
eagle response (run into a bush, where leopards typically hide) (Seyfarth & Cheney, 1997). Thus
the value matrix V might look somewhat like the right matrix in figure 3.2.
/ interpretation \
( sent signal \ received signal j. eagle snake leopard
intention J. 16kHz 8kHz 4kHz 2kHz 1kHz 16kHz 1.0 0.0 0.0
eagle 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 R = 8kHz 1.0 0.0 0.0
snake 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 4kHz 0.0 1.0 0.0
V leopard 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 / 2kHz
\ 1 kHz op o o o
o
o
Figure 3.3: Production and interpretation matrices for the monkeys in the example, describing which
signals they use for which meanings.
Now, assume a speaker i with her Sl as the left matrix in fig. 3.3, and a hearer j with his R7
as the right matrix in that figure. What will happen in the communication between i and jl One
possibility is that (i) the speaker sees an eagle, (ii) she sends out the 16kHz signal, (iii) the hearer
3The actual alarm calls of vervet monkeys are very different from the ones I use in this example. For instance, eagle
alarm calls are low-pitched rather than high-pitched, and all three types of alarm calls have a temporal structure. The
example here is just to illustrate the use of the formalism.
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indeed perceives this as a 16kHz signal and (iv) he correctly interprets this signal as "eagle". The
contribution to the expected payoff is:
Ps (16kHz sent | eagle observed) x
F\j(l6kHz perceived | 16kHz sent) x
Pr (eagle interpreted | 16kHz perceived) x
V(eagle interpreted, eagle observed)) = 1 x .7 x 1 x .9 = 0.63. (3.1)
Another possibility, with probability 0.2, is that the hearer misperceives the signal as a 8kHz
signal, but with probability 1 still interprets it correctly. We can thus work out all possible scenar¬
ios and find that the expected payoff Wij of the interaction between i and j, given the constraints
on communications as in U and V in fig. 3.2, is: w^ = .7 x .9 + .2 x .9 + .1 x .2 + .2 x .5 +
.6 x .9 + .2 x .5 + .1 x .2 + .2 x .9 + .7 x .9 = 2.4.
More generally, such calculation can be expressed by one simple expression for the expected
payoff of communication between a speaker i with production matrix S ' and a hearer j with
interpretation matrix R3 (Zuidema & Westermann, 2003):
= V • (S* x (U x RJ)) • (3-2)
In this formula, "x" represents the usual matrix multiplication and represents dot-multiplication
(the sum of all multiplications of corresponding elements in both matrices; the result of dot-
multiplication is not a matrix, but a scalar).
In this simple example, the matrices U and V are very small, and reflect only a 1-dimensional
topology in both signal and meaning space. The matrices S and R are set by hand to arbitrarily
chosen values. In contrast, in the simulations of chapter 5 I will consider larger and more complex
choices for U and V, and I will use a hill-climbing algorithm to find the appropriate (near-)
optimal settings for S and R.
Note that the S and R matrix describe the production and interpretation behaviour of an
individual (the E-language), but they do not necessarily model the mechanism that individuals
use to map meaning onto signals and vice versa (the I-language). The values can even be chosen
such that an individual's S matrix is incompatible with her own R matrix, that is, that she cannot
understand her own utterances. More realistic, perhaps, is to assume an underlying lexicon of
(bi-directional) associations between meanings and signals (Steels, 1995; Komarova & Niyogi,
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2004). Such associations can be modelled with an association matrix A. S and R are then
functions of A, such that for instance, an element in S is 1 if the corresponding element in A
is the highest in its row, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, an element R can be set to 1 only if the
corresponding element in A is the highest in its column.
Jackendoff's second innovation - an open, unlimited class of symbols - can be viewed as the
evolution of a learning procedure to set the values of the elements in S and R or A. Assume
that the set of possible relevant meanings and the set of possible signals are determined by an
individual's habitat and anatomy and can be defined a priori. An innate, closed call system then
corresponds to settings of the elements of the matrices that are not dependent on input and show
no variation; conversely, a learnt, open call system corresponds to settings that do depend on
environmental input and vary with varying inputs. Innate calls appear to be the norm in primate
communication. For instance, Seyfarth & Cheney (1997) argue that, although there might be
social learning of response behaviour (interpretation), the production of calls in most primates
must be considered innate.
Human language, in contrast, clearly is an open system, where the meanings of words are
not naturally given, but rather emerge as conventions in a population of language users (Lewis,
1969; Gamut, 1991). Conventions are negotiated in a population, by individuals learning from
(and adapting to) each other. Different learning strategies lead to different languages, and have
different consequences for the biological fitness of individuals in a population, as is studied by
(Hurford, 1989) and others. The main results from these studies is that (i) a stable communication
system can emerge in a population where everybody learns from everybody else, without a need
for central control (Steels, 1995); (ii) the best "response language" is not necessarily the same as
the current language in the population (Hurford, 1989; Komarova & Niyogi, 2004), and (iii) Saus-
surean learners (where S matrices are modelled after R matrices) and synonymy and homonymy
avoiders outcompete other learning strategies (Hurford, 1989; Oliphant & Batali, 1996; Smith,
2004).
These studies are interesting, but do not really address Jackendoff's transition from a closed,
innate vocabulary to an open, learnt vocabulary. The selective advantages of such a transition - to
what biologists call "phenotypic plasticity" - depend on the constraints on the innate system, the
properties of the environment and the accuracy of the learning mechanism. If a learnt vocabulary
can contain more signals than an innate vocabulary - as Jackendoff asserts - that must be because
of biological constraints preventing the innate system to be as large. Moreover, a learnt vocabulary
can be easily extended to include a word for a new concept, but whether or not this confers
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an advantage depends on how often such new relevant concepts appear. These are interesting
issues, but it is difficult to tell what reasonable assumptions are. Oliphant (1999) argues quite
convincingly that the computational demands of learning are unlikely to have been the limiting
factor in this transition; rather, he argues, the difficulties to identify what meaning a signal is
meant to convey explain why learnt communication systems are so rare in nature.
In conclusion, I agree with Jackendoff (2002), Oliphant (1999) and many others that the
emergence of an open class of symbols is an important transition in the evolution of language.
Moreover, I believe it can be formalised using the matrix notation introduced above. Many models
that use such a formulation in one form or another have been studied. In this thesis, however, I
will not address this problem. In chapter 5 I will study a model where I simply assume that every
learning step will increase an agent's ability to communicate with others (i.e. they optimise their S
and R matrices), and focus on the effects of different U and V matrices. As we will see, specific
choices for these matrices have consequences for the evolution of both combinatorial phonology
and compositional semantics.
3.6 Modelling Compositionality
The matrices discussed above can describe, for each particular meaning, which signals are asso¬
ciated with it or vice versa. However, they cannot make explicit any regularity in the mapping
from meanings to signals. In both non-human and human communication such systematic rela¬
tions between meanings and signals exist. For instance, in most species high pitch sounds are
associated with danger, and low pitch sounds with aggression. In vervet-monkey calls, there are
clear similarities between the calls used in social interactions, which are all very different from
the alarm calls (Seyfarth & Cheney, 1997). In human language, on the level of words, there is
some evidence - albeit controversial - that similar words tend to refer to similar objects, actions
or situations, and that humans generalise such patterns to nonsense words (Hinton et al., 1995).
Uncontroversially, on the level of morphosyntax it is clear that similar sentences mean similar
things, that is, the mapping from meanings to signals is compositional.
We can describe the systematicities in the meaning-signal mappings as the preservation of
topology between meaning space and signal space, that is, meanings that are close are expressed
with signals that are close. In the S, R and A matrices, such "topology preservation" might
be noticeable as a non-random pattern if both the meaning and signals axes are ordered. We
can be more precise, however, by systematically comparing each pair of associations. Brighton
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(2002) proposes using the correlation ("Pearson's r") between the distance between each pair of
meanings and the distance between the corresponding signals:
r = correlation (D (m, m') , D (S'fm], 5[m'])) , (3.3)
where 5[m] gives the most likely signal used to express m according to S, D(m,m') gives the
distance between two meanings m and m', and D(f, /') between two signals / and /'. Although
only a correlate of compositionality, such a measure can reveal a tendency for related meanings
to be expressed with related signals. Hence, expressed in this formalism, Jackendoff's fourth
and fifth innovation (concatenation and compositionality) correspond to a high values of r in
equation (3.3).
We can go further, however, and explicitly model the way in which combinations of signs
form more complex signs. The common way to deal systematically with the meanings of combi¬
nations of lexical entries, is Church's lambda calculus (see e.g. Gamut, 1991, for a discussion).
Semantic descriptions, such as discussed in section 3.3 should be extended with the possibility to
include lambda (A) terms. Lambda terms can be seen as listing the variables that still need to be
substituted; they disappear when a complete semantic description is reached. Formally, a lambda
term in front of an expression turns that expression into a function that maps an argument onto a
new expression where that argument has found its proper place. For instance, we can model the
semantics of the verb walks as XxW(x) and apply it to an argument j (for John) to yield W(j)
(for John walks). Similarly, the following is the semantic description for approaches in the "flat
notation" of De Beule et al. (2002):
XxXy(x | (approach z) (agent z x) (patient z y)) (3.4)
When applied to the following semantic description
p | (circle p) (3.5)
the resulting description is as follows:
Xy(p | (approach z) (agent z p) (patient z y) (circle p)) (3.6)
That is, the variable x in (3.4) is replaced by the head of (3.5), and the Xx is removed. (3.6)
means something like "the circle approaches y", where y still needs to be filled in. (3.6) can in
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turn be applied to, for instance, the description of a block, yielding a description that would mean
"The circle approaches the block".
The lambda calculus gives a mechanical procedure to derive the semantic expression that
results from applying a function to an argument. A word (or phrase) corresponding to the function
is said to dominate a word corresponding to the argument. Hence, if we model the compositional
semantics of "John walks" with a function AxW(x) and an argument j, then we have assumed
that walks dominates John.
In modern languages, this dominance structure is, to a large extent, determined by princi¬
ples of word order and morphological marking. Thus, if we model the semantics of the transitive
verb hates in "George hates broccoli" as Xy\xH(x, y) (i.e. as a function with two arguments), the
principles of word order need to guarantee that hates dominates broccoli, and hates broccoli dom¬
inates George. In the fourth and fifth stage of Jackendoff's scenario there is no phrase-structure or
morphological marking, so the dominance structure is largely underdetermined. The word order
principles of "agent first", "focus last" and "grouping" that Jackendoff proposes, constrain the
structural ambiguity that arises from this underdeterminacy.
In conclusion, we have with equation (3.3) a provisional measure of compositionality in the
E-language. Moreover, we can characterise compositionality in the I-language by identifying the
units and rules of combination. In chapter 5 I will study the transition to compositional semantics
using the former, and argue that the compositionality in the I-language can more easily evolve if
some form of compositionality in the E-language has already been established for other reasons.
3.7 Modelling Hierarchical Phrase Structure
One of the defining characteristics of human language is that sentences exhibit phrase-structure,
and the ability to represent phrase-structure has, since Chomsky (1957), been the one of the most
important criteria in judging the adequacy of linguistic formalisms. Rewriting grammars, such as
proposed by Chomsky, remain the archetype formalism for describing syntax. I will first introduce
this formalism in some detail, and then define phrase-structure in terms of it.
Rewriting grammars are specified by four sets: the terminal symbols, the nonterminal sym¬
bols, the production rules and the start symbols. Terminal symbols (V)) are in a sense the atoms
of a language without further syntactic structure (e.g., the words or morphemes of a language)
but possibly also complete idioms or frozen expressions. Nonterminal symbols (Vnt) are vari¬
ables that stand for constituents of a sentence, and can correspond to anything from the syntactic
category of a word (or morpheme) to a whole sentence. Production rules (R) specify which
nonterminal symbols can be replaced by which terminal or non-terminal symbols in the process
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S NP VP (1) Art i--> the | a (6ab)
NP i-» Art N (2) N t—-> cat | dog (7ah)
N i—> N SP (3) V f—-> chases \ admires (8ab)
VP i-> V NP (4) S H-> the cat fears the dog (9)




The cat admires the dog
(b)
Figure 3.4: An example context-free grammar for a fragment of English, with a termi¬
nal alphabet Vj = {the, a, dog, chases, admires, that} and a non-terminal alphabet Vnt =
{S,NP, VP, Art, N, V}. Production of a sentence ("derivation") always starts with the symbol
S and proceeds by replacing symbols matching the left-hand side of some rule, with the string
at the right-hand side of that rule. "Parsing" means searching the sequence of rewriting steps
that would produce the sentence with a given grammar. Rules 1—4 are "combinatorial"; rule 5
is "recursive". The grammar can generate infinitely many sentences such as "the cat chases the
dog" or "a dog admires a cat that chases a dog that admires a cat" etc. Rule 6-8 constitute what
is traditionally described as the lexicon, and can be represented in the same formalism. Rule 9
and 10 illustrate a "lexical", non-combinatorial and much less efficient strategy for generating
sentences. Context-free grammars are considered to be not quite sufficiently powerful to describe
natural languages. The formalism can be extended in several ways. For instance, it can be ex¬
tended to attribute in a systematic way meanings to words and sentences; the resulting system is
"compositional".
of deriving a sentence, starting with a start-symbol (S). If the production rules are of the form
ol i—> lu where the lefthand-side is a nonterminal symbol (a € Vnt), and the righthand-side is any
(non-null) string of terminals and nonterminals, the grammar is said to be context-free (because
the context in which a occurs is not relevant for the applicability of the rule). Figure 3.4 gives an
example context-free rewriting grammar for a fragment of English.
Chomsky (1957) showed that more restricted versions of this formalism such as finite-state
grammars or their probabilistic version, Markov processes, are unable to describe the long-range
dependencies that are observed in natural languages. English, for instance, requires agreement
between the number of a subject and the number of the verb, such as in example 3.7(a), but not
3.7(b). But English also allows the insertion of one or more prepositional phrases such as "that
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chases the dog" as a modifier of the subject, such as in examples 3.7(c, d). Hence, the distance be¬
tween "the cat" and "admires" can -in principle- be arbitrarily long, and the dependency between
them cannot be described in terms of transition probabilities between words.
(3.7) a. The cat admires the dog.
b. * The cat admire the dog4.
c. The cat that chases the dog admires the dog.
d. The cat that chases the dog that admires the cat admires the dog.
Crucially, adequate formalisms for natural language need to represent phrase-structure, that
is, they need to recognise that "the cat", "the cat that chases the dog" and "the cat that chases
the dog that admires the cat" all have the same role in their respective sentences. Moreover,
phrase-structure is hierarchical; the first "the dog" in example 3.7(c) is a noun phrase that is a
component of the whole subject noun phrase. The hierarchical phrase-structure of a sentence can
be visualised as a tree, as is exemplified in figure 3.4(b). Phrase-structure can be viewed as the
necessary intermediate representation in mapping complex sounds ("phonological form", PF, in
Chomsky's terminology) to complex meanings ("logical form", LF). It specifies both the word
order ("linear precedence") and the dominance structure ("immediate dominance").
Context-free grammars can represent hierarchical phrase-structure. Starting with a start sym¬
bol, one can iteratively apply the production rules by replacing an occurrence of the left-hand side
of a rule by the right-hand side. The phrase-structure of figure 3.4(b) can be derived as follows:
where tor gives the result of applying rule r to a tree t (I here assume it is applied to the
left-most nonterminal in tree t, which ensures that there is a single derivation for each unique
phrase-structure tree).
Parsing refers to a search procedure for finding the phrase-structure and corresponding deriva¬
tion for a given sentence and a given grammar. For the purposes of this chapter it is sufficient to
note that parsing is a non-trivial problem. Naive, exhaustive, bottom-up search algorithms have
a time complexity that is exponential in the number of words in a sentence; with some clever
book-keeping to avoid redundant work, the time complexity can be reduced to 0(n3), which is
still a significant limitation for real-world applications and for cognitive realism. Such problems
4The asterix indicates, in line with linguistic convention, that this sentence is ungrammatical.
S o 1 o 2 o 6a o 7a o 4 o 86 o 6a o 76 = "the cat admires the dog", (3.8)
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are, in Chomsky's view, part of the domain of performance, and not of major concern for theorists
of language competence.
Context-free grammars are a powerful formalism, but Chomsky (1957) argued (for the wrong
reasons, it emerged later) that they are not powerful enough to model certain phenomena in lan¬
guage. Chomsky's examples are the following:
(3.9) a. the scene of the movie was in Chicago
b. the scene of the play was in Chicago
c. the scene of the movie and of the play was in Chicago
(3.10) a. the scene of the movie was in Chicago
b. the scene that I wrote was in Chicago
c. * the scene of the movie and that I wrote was in Chicago
Chomsky argued that the rule to describe the proper use of "and" (coordination), as in exam¬
ple 3.9(c) but not 3.10(c), requires itself knowledge of the phrase-structure. That is, the "and" rule
is a meta-rule that uses the phrase structure of 3.9(a) and (b) to decide that (c) is possible because
"the movie" and "the play" are of the same type, and, conversely, uses the phrase-structure of
3.10(a) and (b) to decide that (c) is not possible. Such meta-rules were termed transformations
and were used not only for coordination, but for many other common linguistic constructions such
as questions (wh-movement), gapping, passives and topicalization.
With his discussion of finite-state grammars, context-free grammars and transformations,
Chomsky discovered a fundamental hierarchy of grammars that is now termed the Chomsky Hier¬
archy (see table 3.1). This prompted a long (and still continuing) debate on where to locate human
language on the hierarchy. Already in the 1960s it was realised that the original transformational
grammars, which are context-sensitive, were too powerful, because they made necessary a long
list of rather ad-hoc constraints and exceptions to exclude obviously ungrammatical sentences
(for instance, the "coordinate structure" constraint and the "across the board exception" in Ross,
1967). In the 1970s and 1980s efforts were made to find a formalism that could do away with
tranformations, but would still be sufficiently powerful to deal with phenomena like coordina¬
tion, wh-movement and gapping. Solutions, such as GPSG, essentially work by systematically
increasing the number of non-terminals enormously (that is, they give with slashes or indices the
non-terminals an internal structure).
There seems to be a relative consensus now that the necessary level of generative power is
slightly more than context-free, a level now termed "mildly context-sensitive" (Joshi et al., 1991).
The additional power over context-free grammars is needed for relatively rare constructions such
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Definition 1 (Chomsky hierarchy) A grammar G = (P,S, Vni, Vje)
;.y classified according to the following restrictions on the form of
rewriting rules ofP:
1. A grammar is of TYPE 3 (the "right-linear" or "regular
grammars ") if every rule is of the form A h—> bC or A i—> b,
where A,C G Vnt, and b G Vt* or b = A (the "empty" char¬
acter).
2. A grammar is of TYPE 2 (the "context-free grammars") if
every rule is of the form A i—> u>, where A G Vnt, and w G
(vnt u vtey.
3. A grammar is of TYPE 1 (the "context-sensitive grammars")
ifevery rule is oftheform vAw t—> vzw, where z is any combi¬
nation of terminal or non-terminal symbols: z G (Vnt U Vte)*
and z f= X. In addition, a single rule S i—> A is allowed if S
does not appear at any right-hand side of the rules.
4. Any rewriting grammar, without restrictions, is of TYPE 0.
This classification constitutes a strict hierarchy of languages. Hence,
if is the set of all languages of type i, then the following is true:
£3C£2C£ICA). (3.11)
Table 3.1: The Chomsky Hierarchy
as the crossed-dependencies in the Dutch example 3.12(a). Examples (b) and (c) show the transla¬
tion in English and German. Different fonts are used to show the different types of dependencies:
crossing in dependencies in Dutch, local dependencies in English, center-embedding in German.
(3.12) a. Gilligan beweert dat Kelly Campbell B lair het publiek zag helpen bedriegen.
b. Gilligan claims that Kelly saw Campbell help Blair deceive the public.
c. Gilligan behaupte dass Kelly Campbell Blair das Publikum belugen helfen
sah.
Given a formal definition of complexity in terms of the Chomsky Hierarchy, and a consensus
about where modern human language should be situated, it is perhaps natural to try to describe
the evolution of language as a climb of that hierarchy. In such a scenario, selection for increased
computational power removed one by one the computational constraints for dealing with the full
complexity of modern language. An explicit example of such a scenario is Hashimoto & Ikegami
(1996), but it is implicit in many other accounts (e.g. Fitch & Hauser, 2004).
However, there are a number of problems with such an attempt. First, we have to be very
careful with what we mean with phrases like "at least context-free power", "human language
syntax is mildly-context sensitive" or "where human language is situated on the Chomsky Hi¬
erarchy". The classes of formal languages on the Chomsky Hierarchy are subsets of each other
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(equation (3.11)). Chomsky's (1957) analysis that finite state grammars are insufficient, and sub¬
sequent analysis that context-free grammars are also insufficient, suggests that natural languages
are in that subset of the context-sensitive languages that cannot be modelled with a finite-state
grammar or context-free grammars (that is, in the complement of the context-sensitive in the
context-free languages). Most context-sensitive languages, however, have very little in common
with natural languages; natural languages are thus constrained in many ways (e.g. semantics,
learnability) that have nothing to do with the Chomsky Hierarchy.
Second, it would be wrong to assume that complexity in terms of the Chomsky Hierarchy is
actually hard to get. Just a few neurons connected in specific way can generate temporal patterns
that are of type 1 or 0 in the Chomsky Hierarchy (i.e. that can only be described with context-
sensitive or Turing complete grammars). Like natural language, such patterns would justify the
label "at least context-sensitive", even though they are not likely to be interesting from the point of
view of encoding information. In short, the classes of the Chomsky Hierarchy divide up the space
of formal grammars in a way that is not particularily relevant for the evolution of language. That
is, it is possible that most of the evolutionary developments of natural language grammar occurred
within one and the same class on the Chomsky Hierarchy. Moreover, even if a class boundary was
crossed, formalisation in terms of the Chomsky Hierarchy and architectural constraints offers no
insights about the causes for crossing it.
Are there ways to divide up the space of formal grammars that do suggest an incremental, evo¬
lutionary path to the complexity of modem language? A starting point for answering that difficult
question might be a precise model of how natural language is leamt. In chapter 6 I will discuss
a learning algorithm for natural language grammar. I will argue that - before we can usefully
propose an incremental pathway for the evolution of syntax (including Jackendoff's remaining
innovations of grammatical categories, inflectional morphology and grammatical functions) - we
need to recognise the fact that language learning is a peculiar learning problem. Languages are
transmitted culturally, and can therefore lead to a form of cultural evolution. As we will see in
these chapters, the incremental evolution of the human capacity for language can only be under¬
stood as a co-evolution of languages and the brain (Deacon, 1997).
3.8 Conclusions
Humans show in their communication system a number of "design features" that distinguish us
from non-human primates and, by assumption, from our pre-linguistic ancestors. Jackendoff's list
of innovations in the evolution of languages provides a useful framework to address the origins
of these design features. Jackendoff's account can, however, be improved in a number of ways.
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First, I have argued that although a scenario with successive stages is an important ingredi¬
ent of an evolutionary explanation, Jackendoff does not address the important other ingredient:
how did the transitions happen? Evolutionary explanations require a plausible account of how
innovations spread in the population.
Second, although Jackendoff makes liberal use of diagrams, trees and logic formulae, his
account is not precise enough to be implemented in formal models. In this chapter I have tried
to sketch the formal tools we need to describe evolutionary innovations in meanings, sounds
and the mapping between them. From that discussion it has become clear that Jackendoff's first
innovation, the use of symbols, cannot be precisely defined. In contrast, combinatorial phonology,
compositional semantics and hierarchical phrase-structure can be precisely characterised. These
innovations will be the topics of the next three chapters.
Third, Jackendoff's evolutionary scenario does not make a distinction between the structure
of the language as observed from 'outside' (E-language), and the structure of the representations
used in an individual's brain (I-language). As we have seen in the discussion of this chapter,
it is possible for a language to show the hallmarks of combinatorial phonology, compositional
syntax and perhaps phrase-structure, without the language user being able to actively exploit it.
In the chapters 4 and 5, I will explore how that observation can be a solution to the problem of




A fundamental, universal property of human language is that its
phonology is combinatorial. That is, one can identify a set of
basic, distinct units (phonemes, syllables) that can be produc¬
tively combined in many different ways. In this chapter, I re¬
view a number of theories and models that have been developed
to explain the evolutionary transition from holistic to combina¬
torial signal systems, but find that in all problematic linguistic
assumptions are made, or crucial components of evolutionary
explanations are omitted. I present a novel model to investi¬
gate the hypothesis that combinatorial phonology results from
optimising signal systems for perceptual distinctiveness. The
model differs from previous models in two important respects.
First, signals are modelled as trajectories through acoustic space.
Hence, both holistic and combinatorial signals have a tempo¬
ral structure. Second, I use the methodology from evolutionary
game theory. Crucially, I show a path of ever increasing fitness
from holistic to combinatorial signals, where every innovation
represents an advantage even if no-one else in a population has
yet obtained it.
'This chapter describes research that builds on joint work with Bart de Boer, as published in de Boer & Zuidema,
2003 (see appendix C of this thesis). However, all modelling, text and graphs in this chapter are my own, except where
indicated otherwise.
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4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Natural language phonology is combinatorial
One of the universal properties of human language is that its phonology is combinatorial. In all hu¬
man languages, utterances can be split into units that can be recombined into new valid utterances.
Although there is some controversy about what exactly the units of (productive) combination are,
there is general agreement that in natural languages - including even sign languages (Deuchar,
1996) - meaningless atomic units (phonemes or syllables) are combined into larger wholes; these
meaningful combinations (words, or morphemes) are then further combined into meaningful sen¬
tences. These two levels of combination constitute the duality ofpatterning (Hockett, 1960).
In the traditional view, the atomic units are phonemes (minimal speech sounds that can make
a distinction in meaning), or the distinctive features of these phonemes (Chomsky & Halle, 1968).
Signal repertoires that are built-up from combinations of phonemes are said to be "phonemically
coded" (Lindblom et a/., 1984). For instance, the words "we", "me", "why" and "my", as pro¬
nounced in standard British English, can be analysed as built-up from the units "w", "m", "e"
and "y", which can all be used in many different combinations. One popular alternative view
is that the atoms are syllables, or the possible onsets, codas and nuclei of syllables (e.g. Levelt
& Wheeldon, 1994). A second alternative theory uses exemplars, which can comprise several
syllables or even words, as its basic units (e.g. Pierrehumbert, 2001). In this chapter, I will avoid
the debate about the exact level of combination - and the conventional term "phonemic coding"
- and instead focus on the uncontroversial abstract property of "combinatorial phonology"2.
Note that, whichever the real level of combination is, there is no logical necessity to assume
that all recurring sound patterns observed in speech, are in fact units of productive combination
in the speaker's brain. For instance, if one accepts that syllables or exemplars are the units of
combination used by the speaker, phonemes are still a useful level of description to characterise
differences in meaning. I distinguish between:
1. productively combinatorial phonology, where the cognitive mechanisms for producing,
recognising and remembering signals make use of a limited sets of units that are combined
in many different combinations. Productive combinatoriality is a property of the internal
representations of language in the speaker (I-language).
2In the animal behaviour literature the term "phonological syntax" (coined by Peter Marler, see Ujhelyi, 1996)
is often used, and Michael Studdert-Kennedy also uses the term "particulate principle" (coined by W. Abler, see
Studdert-Kennedy, 1998). Jackendoff (2002, p.238) uses the term "combinatorial, phonological system" on which my
terminology is based.
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2. superficially combinatorial phonology, where parts of signals overlap with parts of other
signals. Superficial combinatoriality is a property of the observable language (E-language).
Importantly, the overlapping parts of different signals need not necessarily also be the units
of combination of the underlying linguistic representations.
This chapter is concerned with mathematical and computational theories of the evolution of
combinatoriality of human languages at both these levels. It has often been observed that natural
language phonology is discrete, in that it allows only a small number of basic sounds and not all
feasible sounds in between. In this chapter, I argue that it is important to distinguish between
discreteness per se, and superficial and productive combinatoriality. In section 4.2,1 will review
existing models of Liljencrants & Lindblom (1972), Lindblom, MacNeilage & Studdert-Kennedy
(1984), de Boer (2001) and Oudeyer (2001, 2002), and argue that they are relevant for the origins
of discreteness, but have little to say about the origins of superficial and combinatorial phonology.
Nowak & Krakauer (1999) do address the origins of productive combinatoriality, but their model
has a number of shortcomings that make it unconvincing as an explanation for its evolution.
In my own model, that I will introduce in section 4.3,1 address the questions of why natural
language phonology is both discrete and superficially combinatorial. I assume, but do not show in
this chapter, that superficial combinatoriality is an important intermediate stage in the evolution
of productive combinatoriality.
4.1.2 The origins ofcombinatorial phonology
Although discrete, combinatorial phonology has often been described as a uniquely human trait
(e.g. Hockett, 1960; Jackendoff, 2002), it is increasingly realised that many examples of bird and
cetacean songs (e.g. Doupe & Kuhl, 1999; Payne & McVay, 1971) and, importantly, non-human
primate calls are combinatorial as well (Ujhelyi, 1996). For instance, the "long calls" of tamarin
monkeys are built up from many repetitions of the same element (e.g. Masataka, 1987), and
those of gibbons (e.g. Mitani & Marler, 1989) and chimpanzees (e.g. Arcadi, 1996) of elaborate
combinations of a repertoire of notes.
Such comparative data should be taken seriously, but it is unwarranted to view combinato¬
rial long calls in other primates as an immediate precursor of human combinatorial phonology,
because there are some important qualitative differences:
• Although a number of building blocks might be used repeatedly to construct a call, it does
not appear to be the case that rearranging the building blocks results in a call with a different
meaning.
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• It is unclear to what extent the building blocks of primate "long calls" are flexible and
whether they are learnt.
• In human language, combinatorial phonology functions as one half of the "duality of pat¬
terning": together with recursive, compositional semantics it yields the unlimited produc¬
tivity of natural language, but it is unclear if the single combinatorial system of primates
can be seen as its precursor.
Nevertheless, combinatorial phonology must have evolved from holistic systems by natural
selection. There are at least two views on what the advantages of combinatorial coding over
holistic coding are:
1. It makes it possible to transmit a larger number of messages over a noisy channel (the "noise
robustness argument", an argument from information theory, e.g. Nowak & Krakauer,
1999). Note that this argument requires that the basic elements are distinct from each
other, and that signals are strings of these basic elements. The argument does not address,
however, how signals are stored and created;
2. It makes it possible to create an infinitely extensible set of signals with a limited number
of building blocks. Such productivity provides a solution for memory limitations, because
signals can be encoded more efficiently, and for generalisation, because new signals can be
created by combining existing building blocks (the "productivity argument", a point often
made in the generative linguistics tradition, e.g. Jackendoff, 2002). Note that this argument
deals purely with the cognitive aspects, and views the acoustic result more as a side-effect.
These views are a good starting point for investigating the question of why initially holis¬
tic systems (which seem to be the default for smaller repertoires of calls) would evolve toward
combinatorial systems. However, as I explored in chapter 2, just showing an advantage does not
constitute an evolutionary explanation. At the very least, evolutionary explanations of an observed
phenotype, involve a characterisation of (i) the set of possible phenotypes, (ii) the fitness function
over those phenotypes, and (iii) a sequence of intermediate steps from an hypothesised initial
state to observed phenotype. For each next step, one needs to establish that (iv) it has selective
advantage over the previous, and thus can invade in a population without it. In section 4.2 I will
criticise some existing models because they lack some of these required components.
In language evolution, fitness will not be a function of the focal individual's traits alone,
but also of those of its conversation partners. That is, the selective advantage of a linguistic
trait will depend on the frequency of that trait and other traits in a population (it is "frequency
dependent"). Therefore, evolutionary game-theory (Maynard Smith, 1982) is the appropriate
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framework for formalising evolutionary explanations for language (Nowak & Krakauer, 1999;
Komarova & Nowak, 2003; Smith, 2004; van Rooij, 2004; Jager, 2005). In this framework, the
crucial concept is that of an evolutionary stable strategy (henceforth, ESS): a strategy that cannot
be invaded by any other strategy (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973). Thus formulated, the challenge
is to show that (i) repertoires of signals with a combinatorial phonology are ESSs, and that (ii)
plausible precursor repertoires, without combinatorial phonology, are not evolutionarily stable.
There are also theories of the origins of combinatorial phonology that do not assume a role
for natural selection. For instance, Lindblom et al. (1984), de Boer (2001) and Oudeyer (2001,
2002) see "self-organisation" as the mechanism responsible for the emergence of combinatorial
phonology. These authors use the term self-organisation in a very broad sense, where it can refer
to almost any process of pattern formation other than classical, Darwinian evolution. Liljencrants
& Lindblom (1972) use an optimisation heuristic, but do not make explicit which process under¬
lies the optimisation. In the next section I will argue that self-organisation and natural selection
need not be put in opposition, but can be seen as detailing proximate and ultimate causes re¬
spectively (Tinbergen, 1963; Hauser, 1996), where natural selection modifies the parameters of a
self-organising process (Waddington, 1939; Boerlijst & Hogeweg, 1991).
4.2 Existing Approaches
4.2.1 Maximising discriminability
Liljencrants & Lindblom (1972) argued that one can understand the structure of the sound systems
in natural language as being optimised for perceptual discriminability and articulatory ease, rather
than as arbitrary settings of parameters (as in the theories from the generative phonology tradition,
e.g. Chomsky & Halle, 1968). In the initial paper they focused on the discriminability of vowel
repertoires, and proposed the following metric to measure their quality:
where B, is a repertoire with |7?| distinct sounds, and dij is the perceptual distance between sound
i and sound j. The perceptual distance between vowels is determined by the position of peaks
(resonances) in the vowel's frequency spectrum. The frequency of the first and the second peak
can be used as coordinates in a two-dimensional space. The weighted Euclidean distance between
two such points turns out to be a good measure of perceptual distance between vowels. E is a
measure for the quality of the system, where lower values correspond to a better distinguishable
\R\ i-1
(4.1)
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repertoire. The E stands for "energy", in analogy with the potential energy that is minimised in
various models in physics.
Liljencrants & Lindblom (1972) performed computer simulations using a simple hill-climbing
heuristic, where at each step a random change to the repertoire is considered, and adopted only
if it has a lower energy than the current state. Their results compare favourably to observed data
on vowel system distributions. In figure 4.1,1 show similar results from a simple model with an
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Figure 4.1: Configurations of 5, 9 and 40 signals in an abstract acoustic space, when optimised
according to the Liljencrants & Lindblom (1972) criterion (equation 4.1). Shown are the config¬
uration found after 2000 hillclimbing steps, with distortions drawn from a Gaussian distribution
around each point (ax — ay = 0.05), starting from initial configurations where each signal has
(uniformly) random coordinates.
Liljencrants & Lindblom's results were important because they showed that the configuration
of sound systems in natural languages is not arbitrary, and can be understood as the result of
more fundamental principles. However, a number of questions remain. First of all, what in the
real world exactly is the optimisation criterion meant to be modelling? The Lindblom & Liljen¬
crants model is often described as "maximising the distances between vowels" or "minimising
the probability of confusion". It is important to realise, however, that the optimisation criterion
in equation (4.1) is neither. Minimising E = \ % by changing the configuration of a
set of vowels in a restricted acoustic space, is not necessarily the same a maximising the average
distance d — (or squared distance), nor is it the same as minimising the average
confusion probability C = P(j perceived\i uttered). At intermediate distances, these
three criteria behave very similarly. The crucial difference is at distance 0, when Liljencrants &
Lindblom's E goes to infinity, and at large distances, when both the E and C measures, but not d,
approach 0. In section 4.3.2 I will argue that in some cases Liljencraft and Lindblom's E in fact
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behaves unrealistically and that minimising the average confusion probability (or equivalently,
maximising the distinctiveness D = 1 — C) is a better criterion.
Second, we should ask which mechanism in the real world is responsible for the optimisation?
Lindblom himself has referred to both natural selection and self-organisation. As is discussed in
chapter 2, the frequency dependence of language evolution means that natural selection on the
level of the individual cannot be equated with optimisation on the level of the population. Before
we can invoke natural selection, we need to do at least a game-theoretic analysis to show that each
new configuration of signals in the acoustic space can invade in a population where it is extremely
rare. Models of this type will be discussed in the next section.
For self-organisation, the mechanism for optimisation has been worked out more precisely.
De Boer (2000; 2001) has studied a simulation model of a population of individuals that each
strive to imitate the vowels of others, and be imitated successfully by others. The agents in the
model have simplified but realistic mechanisms for recognition and articulation of vowels. They
maintain a repertoire of vowel prototypes, and modify the repertoire depending on their success
in imitating the vowels of others, as well as the success in being imitated. De Boer showed that in
this process of self-organisation — where all agents leam from each other - similar configurations
of vowels emerge as in the Liljencrants & Lindblom (1972) model, and as found empirically in the
languages of the world. De Boer's model does not explain, however, where the specific learning
procedures come from.
Finally, the important question remains of how to extend these models to more complex sig¬
nals? The models of Liljencrants, Lindblom and De Boer only deal with vowels and, hence,
only with the discrete aspect of human phonology. They have little to say about the evolution
of superficial and productive combination. Lindblom et al. (1984), and similarily de Boer (1999,
chapter 7), have studied models where signals are trajectories, going from a point in a consonant
space, to a point in a vowel space. But in these models the issue still really is the emergence of
categories, because the sequencing of sounds is taken as given and there is no interaction between
the dynamics in consonant space and those in vowel space.
4.2.2 Natural selection for combinatorial phonology
Nowak & Krakauer (1999) apply notions from information theory and evolutionary game theory
to the evolution of language. They derive an expression for the "fitness of a language". Imagine a
population of individuals, a set of possible signals and a set of possible meanings to communicate
about. Speakers choose a meaning to express (the intention), and choose a signal for it with a
certain probability. Hearers receive the signal, possibly distorted due to a certain degree of noise.
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Hearers subsequently decode the (distorted) signal and arrive at an interpretation. Using similar
notation as in section 3.5 of the previous chapter, the payoff of the interaction between a speaker
and a hearer is described with the equation:
M N N
W = ^2 (S"iiUijRjm), (4.2)
771=1 1=1 j= 1
where w is the expected payoff from an interaction between a speaker and a hearer, S rnl gives the
probability that the speaker will use signal i to express meaning m, U^ gives the probability that
i is perceived as j, and Ftjm gives the probability that the hearer interprets j as m. This equation
is identical to equation 3.1 when all possible meanings are equally valuable and equally frequent
(that is, the reward matrix V is the identity matrix).
Nowak & Krakauer define a language as the combination of a production and interpretation
matrix, i.e. L — {S, R}. The fitness of a language L in a situation where one needs to communi¬
cate with users of a language L' (where L' = {S', R'}), is now given by (assuming speaking and
hearing are equally important):
1 M N N
F(L, L') = 2 E E E (SrmU^RV + S'mjU,jRjm) . (4.3)
771=1 1 = 1 j= 1
Nowak et al. observe that when communication is noisy and when a unique signal is used
for every meaning, the fitness is limited by an "error limit": only a limited number of sounds can
be used - and thus a limited number of meanings be expressed - because by using more sounds
the successful recognition of the current signals would be impeded. Nowak et al. further show
that in such noisy conditions, fitness is higher when (meaningless) sounds are combined into
longer words. When the environment is combinatorial (i.e. objects and actions occur in many
combinations) the fitness is highest when meaningful words are combined into longer sentences
(compositionality). These results are essentially particular instantiations of Shannon's more gen¬
eral results on "noisy coding" (Shannon, 1948), as is explored in a later paper by the same group
(Plotkin & Nowak, 2000).
More interesting is the question how natural selection could favour a linguistic innovation that
introduces combinatorial phonology, in a population where that innovation is still very rare (the
"invasibility requirement", discussed in chapter 2). Nowak & Krakauer (1999) do not address
that specific problem mathematically. They do, however, perform a mathematical, game-theoretic
analysis of the evolution of "compositionality", and point out that this analysis can be easily
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adapted to the case of combinatorial phonology. It is worth spelling out the analysis for combina¬
torial phonology, because it reveals some strong assumptions.
In the analysis of compositionality, all mixed strategies are considered where both holistic and
compositional signals are used. Nowak & Krakauer show that strategies that use more compo¬
sitionality can invade strategies that use less. This means that under natural selection, languages
should evolve compositionality. When applied to combinatorial phonology3, the analysis starts
with S- and R-matrices of the following form:
I
s =
a b c d AA AB BA BB
mi 1 — X 0 0 0 X 0 0 0
m2 0 1 — X 0 0 0 X 0 0
m3 0 0 1 — X 0 0 0 X 0
tri4 0 0 0 1 — X 0 0 0 X
R =
V
mi m2 m3 1714
a 1 0 0 0
b 0 1 0 0
c 0 0 1 0
d 0 0 0 1
AA 1 0 0 0
AB 0 1 0 0
BA 0 0 1 0
BB 0 0 0 1 /
where a: is a single variable that describes how often the holistic strategy is used (with sig¬
nals a, 6, c, d) vs. how often the combinatorial strategy is used (with words built-up out of the
phonemes A and B). Nowak & Krakauer further assume that the confusion between holistic sig¬
nals (Uh) is larger than the confusion between words (uc), and that there is no confusion between





a b c d AA AB BA BB
a Uh 0 0 0 0
b Uh 0 0 0 0
c Uh 0 0 0 0
d Uh 0 0 0 0
AA 0 0 0 0 uc
AB 0 0 0 0 Uc
BA 0 0 0 0 uc
BB 0 0 0 0 uc
where the entries marked with a can be ignored because they will be multiplied with 0.
'Note that, even though we are only interested in phonology here, "meanings" do have a role because they determine
how many signals have to be kept distinct.
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With these assumptions, it is straightforward to describe the fitness of speakers of languages
L and L' when communicating with their own type or with the other, using equation (4.3) (many
terms simplify because of the many zero's in S, R and U). If L has a tendency x to use the
combinatorial strategy, and L' a tendency x', these fitnesses are:
F(L,L) = M ((1 - x) uh + xuc) (4.4)
F(L,L') = (((1 - x)uh + xuc) + ((l - x') uh + x'uc)) (4.5)
F(L',L') = M ((l - x') uh + x'uc) . (4.6)
From these equations, it follows immediately that a more combinatorial language can always
invade a population with a less combinatorial language. Note the following inequalities:
F(L', L') > F(L, L') > F(L, L) if (x' > x) A (uc < uh). (4.7)
This satisfies the criterion of invasibility discussed in chapter 2. If L' is very infrequent, then all
speakers of language L (the "residents") will have a fitness of approximately F(L, L) and the rare
speakers of language L' (the "mutants") will have fitness of approximately F{L, L'), because for
both residents and mutants the vast majority of interactions will be with speakers of language L.
Once the frequency of mutants starts to rise, the residents will gain in fitness, that is, move toward
a fitness F(L, L'). However, the mutants will gain even more by interacting more and more with
other mutants, that is, move toward F(LL').
Although this model is a useful formalisation of the problem and gives some important in¬
sights, as an explanation for the evolution of combinatorial phonology (and compositionality) it
is unconvincing. The problem is that the model only considers the advantages of combinatorial
strategies, and ignores two obvious disadvantages: (1) by having a "mixed strategy" individu¬
als have essentially two languages in parallel, which one should expect to be costly because of
memory and learning demands and additional confusion4. Nowak & Krakauer simply assume
that the second system is in place, and that the hearer interprets all signals correctly, even if x is
close to 0, and the number of learning experiences is therefore extremely small; (2) combinatorial
4An interesting question is what exactly the costs of speaking are. Modern humans acquire and use their native
language without much effort, and with neglible energy use (Fitch & Hauser, 2002). However, that does not neces¬
sarily generalise to earlier stages of language, and to the different variants that we consider in evolutionary models.
Moreover, there always are, as I argued in chapter 2, biophysical constraints on the available strategies. What counts
in evolutionary modelling is not an absolute measure of costs, but rather the relative advantages and disadvantages of
the competing strategies. The best interpretation of "costs" here, is therefore probably "missed opportunity costs".
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signals that consist of two or more sounds take longer to utter and are thus more costly5. A fairer
comparison would be between holistic signals of a certain duration (where continuation of the
same sound decreases the effect of noise) and combinatorial signals of the same duration (where
the digital coding decreases the effect of noise). This is the approach I take in the model of this
chapter, but like Nowak & Krakauer, I will look at invasibility in addition to optimisation.
4.2.3 Crystallisation in the perception-imitation cycle
A completely different approach to combinatorial phonology is based on "categorical perception".
Categorical perception (Liberman et al., 1957; Harnad, 1987) is the phenomenon that categori¬
sation influences the perception of stimuli in such a way that differences between categories are
perceived as larger and differences within categories as smaller than they really are (according
to an "objective", cross-linguistic similarity metric). For instance, infants of just a few months
old already perceive phonemes as closer to the closest prototype phoneme from their native lan¬
guage than it is according to an "objective" (cross-linguistic) acoustical metric (Kuhl etal., 1992).
Apparently, the frequency and position of acoustic stimuli gives rise to particular phoneme proto¬
types, and the prototypes in turn "warp" the perception.
Oudeyer (2001, 2002) observes that signals survive from generation to generation because
they are perceived and imitated. Categorical perception will therefore shape a signal repertoire
such that it conforms more and more to the prototype phonemes. Thus, emitted signals shape
perception, and distorted perception shapes the repertoire of signals in the cycle from emission to
perception to emission (the perception-imitation cycle; see also Westermann, 2001, for a model
of sensori-motor integration and its relevance for imitation and categorical perception).
Oudeyer (2001) presents a model to study this phenomenon. In this model, signals are mod¬
elled as points in an acoustic space. The model consists of two coupled neural maps, one for
perception and one for articulation. The perceptual map is of a type known to be able to model
categorial perception: its categorisation behaviour changes in response to the input data. It is
sketched in figure 4.2. In addition, the associations between perceptual stimuli and articulatory
commands are learned. Through this coupling between perceptual and articulatory maps, a posi¬
tive feedback loop emerges where slight non-uniformities in the input data lead to clusters in the
perceptual map, as well as weak clusters in the articulatory map, and hence to slightly stronger
5It is, of course, slightly awkward to criticise a model that Nowak & Krakauer (1999) never actually worked out.
The point here is that if one takes all the assumptions that they do spell out in the paper, and work out the model as
they suggest, the result is unsatisfactory. A better model of the evolution of combinatorial phonology must start with
different assumptions.
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non-uniformities in the distribution of acoustic signals. Oudeyer calls the collapse of signals in a
small number of clusters "crystallisation".
Oudeyer (2002) generalised these results to a model with (quasi-) continuous trajectories,
where a production module triggers a sequence of targets in the articulatory map, which yield
a continuous trajectory. This trajectory is then discretised at a very fine sampling rate, and each
point is presented to the neural map as before. Also in this version of the model, well-defined clus¬
ters form in the perceptual and articulatory maps. The signals can thus be analysed as consisting
of sequences of phonemes.
Oudeyer's model is fascinating, because it gives a completely non-adaptive mechanism for the
emergence of combinatorial phonology. However, the model does make a number of important
assumptions, such as the pressure for vocal imitation (a skill that is in fact very rare among
primates; Fitch, 2000) and the parameters of the neural maps. The validity of those assumed traits
would be much strengthened if one could show that these traits would be selected for in evolution.
It therefore remains an important question whether recombination increases the functionality of
the language, and thus the fitness of the individual that uses it. If not, one would expect selection
to work against it.
In particular, in Oudeyer's first model (2001), where signals are instantaneous, a large reper¬
toire of signals is collapsed into a small number of clusters. A functional pressure to maintain the
number of distinct signals would thus have to either reverse the crystallisation, or combine signals
from different clusters. In his second model (Oudeyer, 2002), signals are continuous trajectories
and potentially a much larger distinct repertoire can emerge. However, the functionality of the
repertoire is not monitored, and plays no role in the dynamics. It might or might not be sufficient.
The number of "phonemes" (the discrete aspect) that forms is a consequence of the parameters
and initial configuration, and in a sense accidental. The reuse (the superficial combination aspect)
in the model is built-in in the production-procedure.
The assumption that signals already consist of sequences of articulatory targets is justified
with considerations from articulatory phonetics, as I discussed in chapter 3, section 3: constraints
from articulatory motor control, it is argued, impose combinatorial structure on any large reper¬
toire of distinct sounds. Even if one fully accepts this argument, the need for a large and distinctive
repertoire is a functional pressure. In Oudeyer's model, however, there is no interaction between
the number of phonemes that is created, and the degree of reuse (the number of phonemes per
signal) that emerges. This issue, which seems the core issue in understanding the evolutionary
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origins of combinatorial phonology, is not modelled by Oudeyer. In my model, in contrast, I
ensure that the functionality increases rather than decreases.
4.2.4 Other models
All other models of the evolution of combinatorial phonology that I am aware of, also assume
the sequencing of phonetic atoms into longer strings as given. They concentrate rather on the
structure of the emerged systems (Lindblom et a/., 1984; de Boer, 2001; Redford et a1., 2001) or
on how conventions on specific combinatorial signal systems can become established in a popula¬
tion through cultural transmission (Steels & Oudeyer, 2000). Theories on the evolution of speech
developed by linguists and biologists focus on possible pre-adaptations for speech. MacNeilage
& Davis (2000) propose oscillatory movements of the jaw such as used in breathing and chewing
as precursors for syllable structure. Fitch (2000) sees sexual selection as a mechanism to explain
the shape of the human vocal tract. Studdert-Kennedy (2002) explains the origin of recombi¬
nation and duality of patterning as the result of vocal imitation. Finally, connectionist models
of phoneme discovery (e.g. Kohonen, 1988; Waibel, Hanazawa, Hinton, Shikano & Lang, 1989;
Guenther & Gjaja, 1996) learn from a samples from a language that already shows combinatorial
phonology.
These models and theories are interesting, and, importantly, bridge the gap with empirical
evidence on how combinatorial phonology is implemented in the languages of the world. How¬
ever, they are of less relevance here, because they do not address the origins of the fundamental,
qualitative properties of discrete and combinatorial coding. That is, they leave open the question
as to under what circumstances a system of holistically coded signals with finite duration would
change into a combinatorial system of signals.
4.3 Model Design
I will now present the design of a new model, that shares features with all three existing ap¬
proaches. Like Liljencrants & Lindblom (1972) and other models, it makes use of the concept of
"acoustic space", a measure for perceptual distinctiveness and a hill-climbing heuristic. Like the
Nowak & Krakauer (1999) model, the measure for distinctiveness is based on confusion probabil¬
ities, and my study includes a game-theoretic invasibility analysis. Finally, like Oudeyer (2002),
I model signals not just as points, but as trajectories through acoustic space.
In the model, I do not assume combinatorial structure, but rather study the gradual emergence
of superficially combinatorial phonology from initially holistic signals. I do take into account the
temporal structure of both holistic and phonemically coded signals. I view signals as continuous
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movements ("gestures", "trajectories") through an abstract acoustic space. I assume that signals
can be confused, and that the probability of confusion is higher if signals are more similar, i.e.
closer to each other in the acoustic space according to some distance metric. I further assume a
functional pressure that maximises distinctiveness.
4.3.1 The acoustic space
The model of this chapter will deal with repertoires of signals, their configuration and the sim¬
ilarities between signals. This requires conceptualising signals as points or movements through
a space. How could we define such an "acoustic space"? An appropriate definition of acoustic
space will, as much as possible, reflect the articulatory constraints as well as perceptual similari¬
ties, such that signals that cannot be produced fall outside the space, and that points in the space
that are close sound similar and are more easily confused.
For vowels, a simple but very useful acoustic space can be constructed by just looking at the
peaks in the frequency spectrum. These peaks (called "formants") correspond to the resonance
frequencies in the vocal tract, and are also perceptually very salient. Artificially produced vow¬
els with the correct peaks but otherwise quite different frequency spectra, are recognisable by
humans. From experiments where subjects are asked to approximate vowels sounds by manipu¬
lating just two formant frequencies, it is clear that a good representation of vowels can be given in
just two dimensions, with the first formant as the first dimension, and the effective second formant
as the second dimension (Carlson et al., 1970). There are a number of simple formulas (e.g. Man-
takas, Schwartz & Escudier, 1986, discussed in de Boer 1999) for calculating the effective second
formant, F%, given the second, third and fourth formant frequencies F%, F3 and F4 (measured in
"Barks", a scale based on psychophysical experiments, Traunmiiller, 1990).
Perceptual distance between two vowels a and b in the space of first and effective second
formant is typically defined as the (weighted) Euclidean distance:
d(a, b) = yj(Ff - F[f + A2 (F2a - F|)2, (4.8)
where A is a weight that balances the importance of the effective second formant relative to the
first formant, which is experimentally estimated at A = 0.3 (see de Boer, 1999 and references
therein).
A related approach for defining an acoustic space works with cepstral coefficients (Bogert,
Healy & Tukey, 1963). These coefficients (obtained by taking the inverse Fourier Transform of
the log of the frequency spectrum) describe the general shape of the frequency spectrum. The first
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coefficient is a measure of the total energy of the signal, and the subsequent coefficients give more
and more detailed information about the signal. The cepstral coefficients thus define a sequence
of features of the signal of decreasing importance. Vowels and diphthongs can be accurately
represented with the first two coefficients; for consonants we need five or six.
Although formants work well for humans, and in particular for European languages, pitch
is a more salient variable in the vocalizations and perception of other animals (although it is
now believed that several mammal species are able to perceive formants as well, e.g. Reby,
McComb, Cargnelutti, Darwin, Fitch & Clutton-Brock, 2005). Of course, it is difficult to tell
what the appropriate acoustic space is for modelling articulation and perception of early hominids
that feature in scenarios of the evolution of language (e.g Lieberman, 1984; Jackendoff, 2002).
However, the considerations that will be presented below remain the same, independent of the
exact nature of the underlying perceptual dimensions.
4.3.2 Confusion probabilities
Once we have constructed an acoustic space that captures the notion of perceptual similarity, we
can ask how distance in that space relates to the probability of confusion? Answering that question
requires us to make assumptions about the causes of confusion and the nature of categorisation.
We can get a general idea, by first looking at the simple example of a 1-dimensional acoustic
space, with just 2 prototype signals A and B (modelled as points in that space), and a distance d
between them:
Now assume that a received signal X, lying somewhere on the continuum, will be perceived
as A or B depending on which is closest (nearest neighbour classification). Finally, assume a
degree of noise on the emitted signals, such that when a signal, say A, is uttered, the received
signal X is any signal drawn from a Gaussian distribution around A:
A d B
A B
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Now we can calculate the probability that an emitted signal A is perceived as B:
roo
P(B perceived] A uttered) = / Af(p — 0, cr — S) dx
J
(4.9)
where 5 is the standard deviation6 of the Gaussian, and hence the characteristic distance of the
noise function. This integral, which describes the area under the Gaussian curve right of the point
|d, can be solved numerically, as in figure 4.3 (the integral of the Gaussian is called the "error
function": erf(x)).
This function has a number of important features. First of all, if the two signals A and B are
identical (i.e. d = 0), the confusion probability is not 100%, as the naive first intuition might
be, but 50%. Second, with increasing d, the confusion probability first rapidly decreases and
then slowly approaches 0 (see figure 4.3). Of course, the confusion probability as a function of
distance can have many different shapes depending on the exact type of noise and the exact type
of categorisation. Ultimately, this is an empirical question. It seems, however, that the function
will always have these general characteristics at d — 0 and in the limit of d —» oo.
In contrast, the previously discussed E measure (Liljencrants & Lindblom, 1972), and average
distance measure d, do not have both these properties. For the purposes of this chapter they are
therefore not appropriate criteria for optimisation. Figure 4.1(c) serves as an illustration: here
many signals are crammed into a small space. The configuration that maximises E will, regardless
of the noise level, always keep all signals distinct. The configuration that maximises d will, again
regardless of the noise level, always collapse all signals in 4 clusters in the four corners of the
space. At intermediate noise levels, both configurations are in fact suboptimal. A given noise
level defines a "channel capacity" for the acoustic space: cramming more or fewer signals in the
space will in fact impede the amount of information that can be encoded (Shannon, 1948).
If the acoustic space has more than 1 dimension, and if there are more than 2 signals, calcu¬
lations like in equation (4.11), quickly get extremely complex, and confusion probabilities are no
longer uniquely dependent on distance. We can, however, assume that the confusion probabilities
are generally proportional to a function of distance with a shape as in figure 4.3. Hence, let f(d)
6To avoid confusion, I will use the symbol S for the standard deviation (characteristic distance) of the acoustic noise
function, p for the standard deviation (the hill-climbing rate) of the hillclimbing heuristic that will be introduced later,
and ex for standard deviations in general.
4.3. MODEL DESIGN 89
(a) Each neuron in the perceptual map re- (b) In learning, the "location" of neurons
sponds maximally to sounds at a specific point is shifted towards the given signal (blue ar-
in the acoustic space (the "location" of that rows). Over time, the perceptual map will
neuron, drawn as black points in the graph), therefore reflect the distribution from which
and with decreasing strength to sounds that are the signals are drawn. The response of the
further away. The response (drawn as a green map will now be warped towards the most
circle) of the perceptual map to a given sig- frequently observed signals, which consti-
nal (the red circle) is calculated as a weighted tutes a form of categorial perception. In
average of the locations of neurons. If neu- the model of Oudeyer (2001), the distribu-
rons are distributed uniformly over the acous- tion of perceived signals is again dependent,
tic space (left panel) the response is accurate; through the coupling of the perceptual and
if they are distributed non-uniformly (right articulatory maps, on the existing categori-
panel) perception is warped. cal perception. A slight effect of categorical
perception will therefore be reinforced, until
very strong clusters of "phonemes" emerge.
Figure 4.2: Perceptual Warping, Categorical Perception and the emergence of combinatorial
phonology.
Figure 4.3: The probability of confusion as a function of distance (numerical solutions to equa¬
tion (4.9) for 5 — 0.5 (bottom curve), <5 = 1 (middle curve), and 8 = 2 (top curve)).
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be a function of distance d of that shape, parametrised by noise level 5 :
r°° i _x2
f(d) — / -7x=Te1^ dx. (4.10)
Jx=^d Y2nd
I will call the result f(d) of a specific d the "f-score" of d. As a first approximation, we can as¬
sume that confusion probabilities are proportional to these f-scores: P(B perceived\A uttered) oc
f(d(A, Bj). But we also know that the probabilities of confusing a signal with any of the other
signals in a repertoire (including the signal itself) must add up to 1: ^2X€R perceived\A uttered)
1. Hence, we can estimate the probability of confusing signal A with signal B as:
P(B perceived\A uttered) = yW (4"1
From this, it is now straightforward to define a measure for the distinctiveness D(R) of a
repertoire R with T signals. Let D be the average probability that a signal Rt from R is correctly




This equation relates the distances between signals in acoustic space to the probability of
confusing a random signal with another one, and thus gives a quality measure for repertoires of
signals. The measure plays an important role in the model I present here, even for more complex
signals that I will consider below. Ultimately, such a measure should of course be based on
empirical findings. However, the results I will present in this chapter do not depend on the exact
properties of this measure. I will come back to this issue later in this thesis.
4.3.3 Trajectory representation
We have a qualitative understanding of how to define the acoustic space with points representing
signals, and of how to estimate the confusion probabilities and distinctiveness as functions of the
distances between those points. We can now try to extend the model to deal with signals that have
a temporal dimension. It would be desirable if the same apparatus can still be used. I therefore
define temporal signals as trajectories: movements through the acoustic space. In my approach, a
trajectory is a connected sequence of points (each of which could correspond to, for instance, the
cepstral coefficients of the frequency spectrum of a small interval in the waveform).
To illustrate the feasibility of deriving trajectory representations from acoustic data, I show
in figure 4.4(a) a number of trajectories through vowel space that are based on actual recordings.
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The graph shows the trajectories from a number of recorded vowels, which correspond to more-
or-less stationary trajectories in the space, and from recordings of a number of diphthongs, which
correspond to movements from one vowel's region to another. Figure 4.4(b) and (c) show trajec¬
tories through the space defined by three of the first 6 cepstral coefficients. In this space we can,
to a certain extent, represent consonants as well. Overlaid in both graphs are the resulting trajec¬
tories of two recordings, illustrating that the construction is repeatable, albeit with considerable
variation.
In the model of this chapter I will not worry about the problems of constructing acoustic
spaces and drawing trajectories through them. Instead, I will take as the starting point a set of tra¬
jectories through an abstract acoustic space. The model is based on piece-wise linear trajectories
in bounded 2-D or 3-D continuous spaces of size lxl or lxlxl. Trajectories are sequences of
points with fixed length (parameter P), that always stay within the bounds of the acoustic space.
In the standard model, each point has a fixed distance (parameter S) to the immediately preceding
and following points in the sequence. I will also consider a variant, where this distance is not fixed
but either completely unconstrained, or anything between 0 and a given maximum value. That is,
if tx and tx+1 are neighbouring points, tx+1 can lay anywhere within a circle of the given radius
around tx (in the graphs this is indicated as "segment size unconstrained" or, e.g., "S < 0.1").
Signals in the real world are continuous trajectories, but in the model I need to discretise the
trajectories. To ensure that I do not impose the combinatorial structure we are interested in, I
discretise at a much finer scale than the phonemic patterns that will emerge. Hence, the points on
a trajectory are not meant to model atomic units in a complex utterance. They implement a dis¬
cretisation of a continuous trajectory that can represent either a holistically coded or phonemically
coded signal.
4.3.4 Measuring distances and optimising distinctiveness between trajectories
How do we extend the distance and distinctiveness measures for points to trajectories? Perhaps
the simplest strategy would be to look at a repertoire of trajectories one time-slice at a time, and
simply optimise - as before - the distinctiveness between the points. This is similar to the ap¬
proach in Lindblom eta/. (1984). With such an approach, however, the temporal dimension could
just as well have been left out, and the model has little to say about the emergence of superficial
combination. Combinatorial phonology emerges - if at all - as a trivial consequence of (i) the
formation of categories (phonemes), and (ii) sequencing imposed by the trajectory representa¬
tion. Whether or not signals are repetitions of the same phoneme, or combinations of different
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phonemes, depends on the initial configuration and the possible constraints on the shape of tra¬
jectories. This is illustrated in figure 4.5.
Much more interesting is when we measure the distance between complete trajectories and
optimise their distinctiveness. In such an approach, there is a role for combinatorial phonology:
the confusion probability between two largely overlapping trajectories might be very low, as long
as they are sufficiently distinct along one stretch of their length. As a provisional measure, I define
the distance between two trajectories t1 and tJ, as the average distance between the corresponding
points on the trajectories:
where tlp is the p-th point on the i-th trajectory in a repertoire, and d(a, b) gives the distance
between two points a and b. This distance measure then provides the input to the same of distance-
to-confusion function that I derived for points (equation 4.12).
One may argue that the distance metric in equation (4.13) is too simplistic, and does not
do justice to the fact that slight differences in timing of two signals will not affect their per¬
ceptual similarity much. One should thus expect a high probability of confusion between two
such signals, even though according to equation (4.13) they are very far apart. An alternative
distance measures, that does take into account such timing effects, is "dynamic time warping"
(DTW). DTW is an efficient method that before the advent of statistical models has been used
with reasonable success in computer speech recognition (e.g. Sakoe & Chiba, 1978). The dis¬
tance between two trajectories t and r is then defined as the sum of the distances between all
corresponding points in the best possible alignment of the two trajectories. In finding the best
possible alignment, one point from t can be mapped on several neighbouring points in r and vice
versa. In this way trajectories that resemble each other in shape, but that do not align perfectly
are still considered close. DTW models the way humans perceive signals, and in the final part of
this chapter I will look at a simulation that uses it.
However, even with such an improved distance measure, it is not clear how accurate the esti¬
mate of confusion probabilities is. The approach I have adopted here uses the pairwise distances
of all signals as an intermediate step in going from the configuration of trajectories to their con¬
fusion probabilities. For trajectories, it is far from trivial to derive the exact shape of the distance-
to-confusion, even if the noise and categorisation mechanisms were completely known. More
work is needed - both empirical and theoretical - to study whether this approach yields realistic
results. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I will take a pragmatic approach. It seems,
(4.13)
p=l
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(a) 3 vowels and 3 diphthongs (b) two recordings of "een" (c) two recordings of "ne-
gen"
Figure 4.4: Trajectory representations derived from recorded acoustic data. Each point on a trajec¬
tory is given by the cepstral coefficients of the frequency spectrum of a short time interval of the
signal. In (a) the first two coefficients are used; in (b) and (c) coefficients 1, 3 and 5 are used. The
blue and red curves in (b) and (c) are based on two different recordings each. The graphs illustrate
that it is possible to construct an acoustic space for trajectories with a meaningful interpretation.
However, it is also clear that there is much variation between different recordings, suggesting that
much more work is needed for the trajectory representation to be useful in any practical applica¬
tions (see Goldenthal, 1994, and subsequent work on using trajectory representations in speech
recognition). (Graphs created by Bart de Boer).
Figure 4.5: Optimising distinctiveness in each time-slice independently. Shown are the initial con¬
figurations of 5 trajectories (each consisting of just 2 points), two intermediate stages, and the
stable equilibrium. End-points are marked with a star symbol. The results can be interpreted as
"combinatorial phonology" (2 trajectories share begin- end endpoints), but this is a trivial result
from the fact that the begin-points and the end-points move independently to their equilibrium
configuration, although through chance, the begin- and end-points of each particular trajectory
can end up at different locations.
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as I argued above, that the general shape of the distance-to-confusion function is appropriate. I
will therefore mostly use the simple distance measure of equation (4.13), and consider several
alternative distance-to-confusion functions to ensure that the results do not crucially depend on
this assumption.
4.3.5 The hill-climbing heuristic
Now that I have defined a distance metric, it is straightforward to use a hill-climbing heuristic such
as Liljencrants & Lindblom (1972) and apply it to much more complex signals. Hill-climbing is
an iterative procedure, where at each step a random change to the repertoire is considered, and if
it improves the distinctiveness it is applied. Then another random change is considered and the
same procedure applies over and over again. In pseudo-code, the procedure looks as follows:
% 7? is a repertoire of signals
% S is the segment length parameter
% p is the hill-climbing rate parameter
% 6 is the acoustic noise parameter (characteristic distance)
for i — 1 to I
R' = CONSTRAIN( R + DISTURBANCE( p ), S);
if D(R', 8) > D(R, 8) then R = R';
end for
Here, disturbance applies random noise (Af(p = 0, a = p)), to all of the coordinates
of a (uniformly) random point on a random trajectory. D is the distinctiveness function given
in equation (4.12). constrain is a function that enforces that all points on the trajectories
fall within the boundaries of the acoustic space, and that all segments have maximum length S.
Hence, after a random point tx is moved to a new random position, the constrain function first
moves it back, if necessary, within the boundaries of the acoustic space; and then, it moves the
two points on both sides of the moved point, tx+i and tx-1, if necessary, such that the distance
to tx equals S. The direction from tx to tx+\ or tx-\ remains the same, unless the point would
cross the boundary of the space, in which case it is placed at a random point within the boundary
at distance 1 from tx. The same procedure is applied recursively to the neighbours of tx+\ and
tx-1 until the ends of the trajectory are reached.
Hill-climbing is just an optimisation heuristic, there is no guarantee that it will find the opti¬
mal configuration for the given criterion. Especially when the repertoire considered is relatively
complex, the system is likely to move toward a local optimum. Although better optimisation
heuristics exist, this problem is in general unavoidable for systems with so many variables. Also
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in Nature, the optimisation of sound systems may not have escaped the problem of local optima;
the real optimum is therefore not necessarily interesting for describing the patterns in human
speech. Instead, I will concentrate on general properties of the local optima I find, and on the
gradual route towards them.
4.4 Results
I have implemented versions of the basic model as outlined above in MatLab. I have run many
simulations with a large number of parameter combinations and a number of variations of the
basic model. These variations included two alternative noise-to-confusion functions (/(d) =
—tt— and fid) = —tt^t) and an alternative constrain function (S < S* and S = S*).
l+e(Sd) l+e(7d '
Because no real differences were observed in the results, I will here mostly present results with
the standard model. In some cases the captions of figures indicate that one of these alternatives is
used. In the following I will first briefly give an overview of the general behaviour of the model
in these simulations by means of a representative example, and then give a detailed analysis of
why I observe the kind of results that I do. In this section I consider simple optimisation; in the
next section I will extend these results to a game-theoretic analysis.
4.4.1 An overview of the results
I will describe the behaviour of the model in many different simulations by using the repre¬
sentative example depicted in figure 4.6. Figure 4.6(a) shows an the equilibrium configuration
of 9 point signals in an abstract acoustic space, optimised for distinctiveness at an intermediate
noise-level (<5 = 0.2). This particular configuration is stable: no further improvements of the
distinctiveness of the repertoire can be obtained by making small changes to the location of any
of the signals. The locally optimal distinctiveness is D = 0.66; that is, with the given noise level,
our estimate of the probability of successful communication of a signal is 66%.
Figure 4.6(b) shows 9 trajectories, consisting of 10 points and hence 9 segments each. Each
of these trajectories was created by taking 10 copies of one of the points in figure (a) and con¬
necting them. A small amount of noise was added to each point, and the constrain function,
as described above, was applied to each trajectory, enforcing a fixed distance (S = 0.1) between
all neighbouring points on the same trajectory. Due to this perturbation, the distinctiveness of this
repertoire of trajectories is somewhat lower, D = 0.62, than of the repertoire in (a). (The defi¬
nitions of distance and distinctiveness are such that a repertoire of stationary trajectories has the
same D as a repertoire of points at the same locations; hence, points and stationary trajectories, if
all the same length, are equivalent in the basic model).











(a) 9 instantaneous signals optimised for distinc¬
tiveness. D=0.66. Parameters: P = 1.
(b) 9 trajectories at same locations as the signals
in (a) with small perturbations. D=0.62. Param¬
eters: P = 10, S = 0.1.
0.2 w 0.3 0.4 ' 0.5 0.6 0.7
(c) 9 trajectories optimised for distinctiveness.
D=0.69. Parameters: P = 10, S = 0.1,
p = 0.1, I = 5000.
(d) 9 instantaneous sounds at same location as
endpoints in (c). D=0.55. Parameters: P = 1.
Figure 4.6: In a combinatorial phonology, distinctiveness of signals at each particular time-slice is
sacrificed for better distinctiveness of the whole trajectory. Instantaneous signal (or equivalently,
stationary trajectories) will be organised in patterns like (a) and not like (d) when optimised for
distinctiveness. For non-stationary trajectories, the same pattern, as in (b), is not stable, but will -
after optimisation- instead be organised like (c). Each individual time-slice, as illustrated with the
end-points in (d) is suboptimal, but the whole temporal repertoire is at a local optimum. Common
parameters: T = 9, 5 = 0.2
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What will happen if we now optimise, through hill-climbing, the repertoire of trajectories for
distinctiveness? One possibility is that the applied perturbations are nullified as much as possible,
such that the system moves back to the configuration of (a). That is not what happens, however.
Rather, the system moves to a configuration as in figure 4.6(c). In this configuration, there are 3
trajectories along the left, top and right boundaries; there are 4 trajectories bunched up in each
of the four corners; and there are 2 trajectories crossing the acoustic space, one starting near
the center and ending near the bottom-left comer, and one starting in the bottom-right corner at
ending near the center.
This graph shows a number of important features. First, all trajectories start or end near to
where other trajectories start and end. The repertoire therefore can be said to exhibit a superfi¬
cially combinatorial phonology: if we label the comers A,B,C and D, and the central region E,
starting top-left and going clockwise, we can describe the repertoire as: {A, B, C, D, AB, BC
CE, ED, DA}. That is, we need only 5 category labels (phonemes) to describe a repertoire of 9
signals. In contrast, the repertoire in (b) is most easily described by postulating 9 categories, one
for each trajectory7.
Second, some trajectories are bunched up in as small a region as possible, but other trajectories
are stretched out over the full length of the space. Third, the configuration of the repertoire appears
somewhat idiosyncratic and is in a local optimum8. Fourth, at each time-slice the configuration of
the corresponding points is in fact suboptimal. For instance, in figure 4.6(d) just the endpoints of
the trajectories in (c) are shown. 8 out of 9 of these points are closer to their nearest neighbour than
any of the points in (a). Before I extend these results to simulations with many more trajectories
of various lengths, and to acoustic spaces with more dimensions, I will first look at a number of
simple cases that explain why the optimised repertoires have these features.
4.4.2 The optimal configuration depends on the noise level
To evaluate the role of the noise parameter 5, it is instructive to first look at a simple, 1-dimensional
example with signals as points. Consider a situation with 3 signals, 2 of which are fixed at the
edges of a 1 -dimensional acoustic space. The third signal is at distance x from the leftmost signal,
and at distance 1 — x from the rightmost signal:
7I implicitly assume a model of categorisation here that favours robust and coherent categories. An interesting and
important question is how to measure the degree of "combinatoriality", but in this thesis I will rely on an intuitive
notion. I'll briefly come back to this issue in chapter 7.
8The stability of this configuration has not been rigorously established, but no qualitative changes have been ob¬
served in many thousands of additional iterations of the hill-climbing algorithm.
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Now what is the optimal distance x for maximising the distinctiveness? As it turns out, the
optimal x depends on the noise level S. Recall that distinctiveness D is defined as the average
probability of correct recognition (equation 4.12). In this case, we have three terms describing the
recognition probabilities of each of the three signals. These are:
- P-<*>=/(0) + /?) + /(!)
= ^fuum-fa „ (415>
- ftw -7mA+M (416)
The values of these three functions, for two different choices of the parameter 5 are plotted
in figure 4.7(a) and (b). If we add up these three curves, we find, for different values of 6, the
curves in figure 4.7(c). Clearly, for low levels of noise the optimal value of x is x = 0.5. For
higher noise levels, however, this optimum disappears, and the optimal configuration has x = 0
or x = 1. That is, if there is too much noise, it is better to have several signals overlap. At 5 = 1.0
(lowest curve in c), distinctiveness as a function of x is a slightly hollow curve.
Figure 4.8(a) shows a 2-dimensional system of 9 points optimised for distinctiveness with a
high noise level (5 = 1). The optimal configuration under these conditions is to have each signal
in one of the four comers: 3 corners with 2 signals, and one comer with 3 signals. With this
configuration, the distance between the two or three signals that share a corner is d = 0, and their
confusability high. But at least the distance to the other signals is high (d — 1, or d = \/2).
Maximising distinctiveness is here dominated by maximising summed distance, because the f-
scores are alomost linear with distance. Consider a signal in the bottom right comer, and consider
it moving to the left, that is, away from the two signals already in that comer. The gain in distance
from the bottom-right comer (Adbr), will be exactly cancelled out by the loss in distance from
the bottom left comer (Adbl). The gain in distance from the top-right comer, however (Ad.tr),
will not compensate for the loss in distance from the top-left corner (Adtl). To see why, consider
moving the signal a distance e to the left. The summed distance will increase only if the gain in
distance to the top-right:
Adtr2 = [e2 + 1] — [1] = e2, (4.17)
(a) Di(x) (bottom-left to top-
right), £>2(a:) (bottom-left to
bottom-right) and 1)3(2:) (top-
left to bottom-right) at S = 0.1.
(b) D\ (x) (bottom-left to
top-right), 1)2(2:) (bottom-
left to bottom-right) and
1)3(2:) (top-left to bottom-
right) at 8 = 1.
(c) D(x) =
I (Di(x) + D2{x) + D3(X))
at S = 0.1,0.2, 0.8,1.0 (top to
bottom).
Figure 4.7. Distinctiveness as dependent on distance and noise, Id example
i -4-




(b) 9 points, low noise level (<5 =
0.1)
* £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £*£—*
(c) 40 points, high noise level
(6 = 1.0)
Figure 4.8: The noise level determines how many signals can be kept distinct (in a and c the config¬
urations shown are close to convergence, in b it is after convergence).
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is larger than the loss in the distance to the top-left:
Adtl2 — [1 + 1] — [(1 — e)2 + 1] — [1 + 1] — [1 — 2e + e2 + 1] — 2e — e2, (4.18)
which is never the case if 0 < e < 1.
In contrast, in figure 4.8(b) a system of 9 points is shown that has been optimised for distinc¬
tiveness at a relatively low noise level (£ = 0.1). Here maximising distinctiveness is not equiv¬
alent to maximising summed distance, because of the relatively low noise level. To see why the
noise level determines whether it is equivalent, consider a small change to the configuration, for
instance moving the central point a bit to the left. Such a change will decrease the distance to some
points, and increase the distance to some other points. Now, note that the distance-to-confusion
function is approximately linear for relatively small distances (see figure 4.9). Therefore, max¬
imising distinctiveness corresponds approximately to maximising average distances only if dis¬
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Figure 4.9: The f-scores (y-axis) as a function of distance (x-axis). 5 = 1.0 (top curve), (5 = 0.1
(bottom curve).
4.4.3 Distinctiveness is a non-linear combination ofdistances
Figure 4.10 shows another 2-dimensional, 9 signal system. It has, after running the hill-climbing
algorithm, converged to a different local optimum (a). Why is this configuration stable? Consider
moving the signal a at the right-most end of the line, along that same line. For each alternative
x-coordinate of that signal, we can calculate the estimated probability of confusion with other
signals. The /-values for all the other signals are plotted in figure (b). For instance, the /-value
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of the central-left signal (its contribution to the confusion about a) go from very high (0.3) if a
would be on the left-most end of the line, to very low if a is at the right-most end of the line.
The probability of correct recognition of a, and hence its contribution to the total distinctive¬
ness, is inversely proportional to the sum of all /-values. In figure 4.10(c) I therefore give a plot
of the sum of all these values (with the contribution of each signal indicated in different colors).
That sum is in a local minimum at the actual location of a, which suggests that - at least initially
- distinctiveness will not improve by shifting a to the left. The plot doesn't tell the whole story,
though, because the probability of correct recognition of the other signals will also change due
to the new position of a. Nevertheless, it does illustrate that the distinctiveness of a repertoire
is a non-linear combination of the distances between the signals. Due to this non-linearity, the
resulting stable configurations are sometimes counter-intuitive.
4.4.4 Why trajectories stretch out
Finally, in figure 4.11 I explore the question of why many trajectories in my simulations stretch
out. In figure (a) I show 5 signals (in the bottom-left corner there are 2 signals on top of each
other). The signals are points in the acoustic space, which I will here interpret as stationary tra¬
jectories of some arbitrary length. The graph shows the configuration that maximises the summed
distance between the signals. The figure also gives the distance matrix, that gives for every pair
of signals the distance between them. Of course, the values are \/2 ss 1.4 (across the diagonals),
1 (horizontally or vertically) and 0 (for the pair in the bottom-left corner). The average distance
is d= 10.2/10 = 1.02.
Figure 4.11(b) shows an alternative configuration, with the fifth signal in the center. The
distance matrix shows that the distance of the fifth signal to the bottom-left corner has increased,
but at the expense of the distances to the three other corners. As a result, the average distance has
actually gone down to d = 0.96. The reason is that this configuration doesn't make optimal use
of the longest available distances over the diagonal. Importantly, however, at low noise-levels,
the distinctiveness of this configuration is in fact higher than of the configuration in (a). The
reason is that with relatively little noise and long distances, the distinctiveness-distance function
flattens out. Hence, there is more to be gained from avoiding confusion between the fifth and the
bottom-left signal, than there is from maintaining the excessive "safety margin" with the other
signals. In other words, the configuration in (b) sacrifices some average distance, to gain a more
even distribution of distances and, hence, a lower average confusion probability.
In a restricted space, increasing the distance with one sound will usually decrease the distance
with another sound. That is, there is a crucial trade-off between maximising one distance at
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(a) 9 points at a local optimum; 1
will consider moving one signal
a along the horizontal cline.
(b) The f-scores of all other sig¬
nals when a is moved along the
cline in (a).
(c) The sum of all the f-scores
of all other signals when a is
moved along the cline in (a).
Figure 4.10: Figure (a) shows a local optimum of a 9-signal repertoire optimised for distinctiveness.
What would happen if we move the signal at the right end of the cline in (a) horizontally to left?
The probability of correct recognition of that signal, a, is inversely proportional to the sum of the
f-scores of all other signals (see equation 4.11). Figures (b) and (c) show why this probability is
in a local optimum with a at its current location. Parameters: 8 = 0.1.
bh tr tl br bl tr tl br bl tr tl br
tr 1.4 tr 1.4 tr 1.4
tl 1 1 tl 1 1 tl 1 1
br 1 1 1.4 br 1 1 1.4 br 1 1 1.4
6/2 0 1.4 1 1 c 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 c 0.7 o bo 0.8
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.11: Why do trajectories stretch out? Three configurations and their distance matrices.
Abbreviations: bl: bottom-left, tr: top-right, tl: top-left, br: bottom-right, c centre.
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the expense of another. Although maximising distinctiveness D will generally lead to larger
distances d, due to the non-linear dependence of D on d, that trade-off can work out differently
when maximising D than when maximising d.
Figure 4.11(c) shows yet another configuration, now with the fifth trajectory stretched out
over the whole diagonal. As is clear from the given distance matrix, this configuration yields
larger distances than in (b). To go from (b) to (c) there is no trade-off. The distances from the
central, fifth signal to the top-left and bottom-left corners can be increased without decreasing the
distances to the other 2 signals. The reason is that the distance between a stationary trajectory t
and a stretched out trajectory t' is equal to the distance between t and the centroid of t' when t
(like the top-right and bottom-left signals) is on a line through all the points of t', but larger when
it's not (like the top-left and bottom-right signals). The distinctiveness in (c) is even larger than
in (b).
In figure 4.12 I show results from running the basic model under various parameter settings,
including with repertoires with many trajectories and with 3-dimensional acoustic spaces. These




So-far, we have seen that repertoires of signals with a temporal structure will, when optimised
for distinctiveness, not be organised in as many little clumps as needed, but instead stretch out.
Rather than staying away as far as possible from other trajectories along its whole length, each
trajectory will be close to some trajectories for some of its length, and close to other trajectories
elsewhere. In qualitative terms, these systems show superficially combinatorial phonology. The
model represents progress from existing work, because it deals with the discrete and combina¬
torial aspects as well as with the trade-off between them. It shows a possible sequence of fit
intermediates, and, hence, a route up-hill on the fitness landscape.
I have not, however, dealt with the invasibility requirement from chapter 2. Will an inno¬
vation, even if it represents an improvement, be able to invade a population where it is very
infrequent? To test for invasibility, I adapt the definition of distinctiveness to tell us something
about pairs of languages. This way we can ask the question: how well will a repertoire R' do
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when communicating with a repertoire RI Pairwise distinctiveness V is defined as follows:
V(R, R') = V . (4.19)
The quantity V(R,R') can be interpreted as the estimated probability of a signal uttered by a
speaker with repertoire R, to be correctly interpreted by a hearer with repertoire II'.
When we now consider the invasion of a mutant repertoire R' into a population with resident
repertoire R, four measures are of interest: T>(R, R), V(R, R') , T>(R', R) and T>(R', R'). That
is, how well does each of the repertoires fare when communicating with itself or with the other
repertoire, in the role of speaker or of hearer? Specifically, for the invasion of R', it is necessary
that V(R', R) > V(R, R) or V(R, R') > T>(R, R), or some weighted combination of these
requirements (depending on the relative importance of speaking and hearing). That is, a successful
mutant must do better against the resident language, than the resident language does against itself.
Can such situations arise?
Interestingly, this situation turns out to be very common. Consider the following Id example:
A B
• © # • © •
The configuration on the right (B) is better on all accounts. Obviously, there will be less
confusion between its signals because they are further apart (when x = 0.1 and 6 — 0.1,
D(A) = T>(A, A) = 0.70 vs. V(B, B) — 0.84). But configuration B will even do better when
communicating with A, both as a hearer (V(A, B) = 0.78) and as a speaker (D(B, A) — 0.76).
The reason is that by having its prototypes more pronounced, f-scores of the wrong signals de¬
crease more than the f-score of the right signal. This is illustrated in figure 4.13 for the slightly
exaggerated case of x = 0.45. In this example, the f-scores of distances to the left-most signal in
A follow a linear regime (a decrease of ~ 0.1 at each step), whereas the f-scores of the distances
from B's leftmost signal to the signals in A follow an exponential regime (a decrease of ~ 50%
at each step; see figure 4.13(d)).
Figure 4.14 and 4.15 show results from simulations with improved pairwise distinctiveness as
the optimisation criterion. Here, at every step of the hill-climbing algorithm a random change to
the existing resident repertoire R was considered, and kept only if the following condition is met:
V(R,R') > V{R,R) (4.20)
4.5. INVASIBILITY 105
1^ * T T T T r r
f
/
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 03 0 6 0.7 0.6 0.0
(a) 9 trajectories, length 2, seg¬
ment size unconstrained
(d) 9 trajectories, length 15,
S = 0.1
(b) 40 trajectories, length 2, seg¬
ment size unconstrained




(c) 9 trajectories, length 2, seg¬
ment size 5 = 1.0
(0 30 trajectories, length 20,
S = 0.07
Figure 4.12: Various signal systems optimised for distinctiveness. Common parameters: S = 0.1,
p = 0.05.
<d A. A =
.05 1 \ /.45 .5 ,55\ /.45 .05 .55
0 •05 dB.A = .05 0 •05 dA.B = .5 0 .5
.05 0 / V.55 .5 .45/ \ .55 .05 .45
(a) distances A vs. A (b) distances B vs. A (c) distances A vs. B
d f{d) d m
0.0 0.500 0.45 0.012
0.05 0.401 0.5 0.006
0.1 0.309 0.55 0.003
(d) f-scores
/.4i .33 .26\ .57 .29
UA.A = 31 .38 •31 ) Ub.A = .31 .38




(e) confusion A vs. A (f) confusion B vs. A (g) confusion A vs. B
Figure 4.13: Distance matrices, f-scores and confusion matrices. Parameters: 5 = 0.1, x = 0.45.
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Hence, the algorithm is almost identical to the hill-climbing algorithm used before, but with
the criterion of distinctiveness replaced by the criterion of pairwise distinctiveness:
% i? is a repertoire of signals
% S is the segment length parameter
% p is the hill-climbing rate parameter
% <5 is the acoustic noise parameter (characteristic distance)
for i = 1 to I
R' = CONSTRAIN( R + DISTURBANCE( p ), S);
if T>(R, R'15) > V(R, R, 8) then R = R' ;
end for
Figures 4.14(a-f) show the configuration of the repertoire at different numbers of iterations of
the hill-climbing algorithm. Figure 4.14(g) gives the pairwise distinctiveness measures for each
combination of these 6 configurations. At the diagonal of this matrix are the distinctiveness scores
of each configuration. As is clear from this matrix, each next configuration can invade a popula¬
tion with the previous repertoire. In bold-face we see the approximate evolutionary trajectory (the
actual steps in the simulation are much smaller and much more numerous). As is clear from fig¬
ure 4.14(f), the final configuration shows the same type of superficially combinatorial phonology
that I found in the straightforward optimisation version of the model.
This final configuration is probably an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, as defined in chapter 2.
However, the condition of equation (4.20) is slightly weaker than the condition for an ESS. To
establish rigorously that this configuration R is an ESS we would need to show there is no al¬
ternative configuration R' where V(R,R') > V(R,R), or if there is such a configuration that
T>(R,R) > V(R',R'). The condition here also differs from the condition used in Nowak &
Krakauer (1999). Whereas these authors assume that the total payoff is the exact average of pay¬
off as a hearer and payoff as a speaker (equation 4.3), in these simulations only the payoff as a
hearer was modelled9. I expect the behaviour of the model to change very little, but it would be
worthwhile to investigate the behaviour of the model with these different optimisation criteria.
These simulations have not yet been performed.
4.5.2 Individual-based model
As a final test of the appropriateness of the basic model, Bart de Boer and I studied an individual-
based simulation of a population of agents that each try to imitate each other in noisy conditions.
9That is, I used V{R,R') > T>(R,R) rather than (^V(R,R') + |V(R',R)) > V{R,R). Thanks to Matina



















(a) t=0 (b) t=500 (c) t=2000
(d) t=4000 (e) t=8000 (0 t= 13000
( a b c d e / \
a .24 .34 .33 .33 .33 .33
b .37 .50 .50 .49 .49 .49
c .41 .51 .71 .70 .69 .68
d .39 .52 .71 .76 .76 .75
e .39 .52 .71 .76 .77 .77
\ f .39 .52 .70 .75 .77 .79 )
(g) The pairwise distinctiveness matrix
Figure 4.14: Invasability experiments. Parameters are: T=9, P=10, D=2, N=0.05, S=0.1. The
confusion-probabilities are proportional to \ 2 , where 5 = 0.1 and d is the average segment-
l+e J
by-segment Euclidean distance. The approximate evolutionary trajectory is indicated with bold¬
face in the pairwise distinctiveness matrix of figure (g).
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This simulation (the current version implemented by Bart de Boer) is similar to the model de¬
scribed above, but now each agent in the population has its own repertoire, and it tries to optimise
its own success in imitating and being imitated by other agents of the population. Hence, a ran¬
dom change, as before, is applied to a random trajectory of a random agent in the population. If
this change improves the imitation success in interaction with a number of randomly chosen other
individuals in the population, it is kept. Otherwise, it is discarded.
This version of the model is like the imitation games of de Boer (2000). These only modelled
holistic signals (vowels) and did not investigate combinatorial phonology. The game implemented
here is a slight simplification of the original imitation game. First, all agents in the population
are initialised with a random set of a fixed number of trajectories. Then for each game, a speaker
is randomly selected from the population. This speaker selects a trajectory, and makes a random
modification to it. Then it plays a number of imitation games (50 in all simulations reported here)
with all other agents in the population. In these games, the initiator utters the modified trajectory
with additional noise. The imitator finds the closest trajectory in its repertoire (according to the
Dynamic Time Warping, DTW, distance metric) and utters it with noise. Games are successful if
the imitator's signals is closest to the modified trajectory in the initiator's repertoire. If it turns out
that the modified trajectory has better imitation success than the original trajectory, the modified
trajectory is kept, otherwise the original one is restored.
For vowel systems, it has been shown that optimising a single repertoire leads to similar
systems as a population-optimisation system (compare Liljencrants & Lindblom, 1972; de Boer,
2000). As it turns out, also for repertoires of trajectories these two types of models yield com¬
parable results, at least if the noise on the trajectories is time-correlated. That is, if distortions
of a point on the trajectory are not completely independent from distortions of its neighbouring
points. This is illustrated in figure 4.16.
In this figure the left frame shows the system of five trajectories that resulted from playing
imitation games in a population, using form-preserving noise. The right frame, for reference,
shows a system of five trajectories that resulted from optimising total distance (DTW metric) as
in the basic model. Observe that in both cases, the corners are populated by four trajectories,
which are bunched up. The fifth trajectory, in contrast, follows the diagonal. As before, an
analysis in terms of phonemes suggests itself: the four comers are basic phonemes, while the fifth
trajectory uses one as the comers as a starting phoneme and the opposite comer as the ending
phoneme. Both models result in similar systems of trajectories.
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Figure 4.15: A 16 trajectories signal system in a 3d acoustic space, after 1000 and 11000 iterations.
At each time step, a small random change is considered, and only adopted if it represents an
improvement according to the pairwise distinctiveness criterion (equation 4.19). Parameters are:
P = 15, S = 0.1, p = 0.05, <5 = 0.1. The final distinctiveness is D(R) — V(R, R) = 0.94.
(a) t= 1000 (b) t= 11000
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.16: Comparison of population-based models with the optimisation model. Frame (a) shows
the (five) trajectories of four agents (from a population of ten), when noise preserves the shape
of trajectories. Notice the similarities with the optimised trajectories in frame (c). If noise does
not preserve shape of trajectories, the trajectories tend not to stretch out, as shown in the frame
(b). Although it is rather hard to see, there are four clusters in the corners, and one in the middle.
(Graphs created by Bart de Boer).
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The middle frame, on the other hand, shows that when noise is not time-correlated, a system
results in which all trajectories are bunched up and an analysis in terms of phonemes is therefore
not possible. As noise in real signals is band limited, it follows that shape will always be preserved
to some extent. For computational reasons, we have not performed simulations in the population
condition with more than 5 trajectories. However, although less clean and not fully conclusive,
the results from the individual-based model seem to be consistent with the observations with the
basic model.
4.6 Conclusions
Natural language phonology is discrete and combinatorial. What I have shown in this chapter is
that these properties have functional significance: they aid the reliable recognition of signals by
the hearer. I have also shown that there is a series of steps that lead from a signal system without
to a system with these properties. Crucially, I have shown that each step in this series represents
an improvement, both in populations where it is extremely rare (invasibility), and in populations
where it is common.
These findings are consistent with several rather different scenarios for the emergence of com¬
binatorial phonology in the human species. In the simplest, but perhaps least plausible scenario,
the starting point is an ancestral population of individuals, each with a heritable repertoire of
holistic signals. At some point, a genetic mutation occurred in one individual that changed her
repertoire slightly toward combinatorial phonology. With the mutation, this individual commu¬
nicated slightly more successfully with the others in the population, even though her repertoire
was not identical to theirs. Consequently, the new genotype conferred a slightly higher fitness,
and the mutated gene spread in the population. Then a second mutation occurred, and a third etc.
Many such slight modifications eventually led to a situation where the language of the population
was superficially combinatorial, such that the capacity for productive combination, another type
of gene mutation, could invade.
The problem with this scenario is that it is inconsistent with the facts about the acquisition of
phonology, at least in modern humans. Languages differ enormously in the number and nature
of the units of combination, but there seems to be no heritable variation in the ability to acquire
any of these many different phonologies. Perhaps this interpretation of my model has more rel¬
evance when applied to combinatorial vocalisations in other species, but for human phonology
it is unrealistic to postulate many genes responsible for the specific shape of the sounds in our
languages.
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An alternative scenario is that combinatorial phonology arose in a population of learners that
each optimise their success in recognising and being recognised by making small adaptations to
their repertoire of signals. Combinatorial phonology, in this scenario, is the result of the interac¬
tion between many individuals in a population - a process that could be called "self-organisation".
The problem with such a scenario is that it requires powerful learning abilities of individu¬
als, such that, on average, the adaptations made represent improvements. That is, an individual
must be able to change her repertoire and accurately assess the relative benefits of the change
in the communication with others in the population. Modem humans seem to be able to make
such adaptations, both in first and in second language acquisition. But where does this successful
learning ability come from? Perhaps it was just there, by lucky coincidence, as a side-effect of
the evolution of other cognitive abilities; or perhaps the learning ability itself evolved by natural
selection. However, by simply postulating that there is such an ability, we have shifted the ex¬
planatory challenge from the emergence of repertoires of signals, to the emergence of learning
procedures for repertoires of signals.
I argue that there is a third scenario that represents a middle way, and avoids both the excessive
genetic determinism of the first scenario, and the reliance on happy coincidences of the second
scenario. Natural selection favours fitter individuals over less fit ones, but it is, in a sense, blind
for the (proximate) causes of the fitness differences. All other things being equal, natural selection
cannot tell the difference between an individual born with an "innate" repertoire of signals R, and
an individual that learned that same repertoire from experience. Hence, a mutation that changes
a learning rule such that it leads to a slightly more distinctive repertoire than that of the resident
population, is favoured by natural selection under the same conditions as any other mechanism
with the same effect (Harley, 1981; Maynard Smith, 1982, chapter 4).
We can thus view the signals in the model of this chapter as the outcome of a process of learn¬
ing from signals used in the population. The resident learning strategy will leam the repertoire as
is10; the mutant learning strategy will leam a different repertoire. The mutant will be favoured by
selection only if the differences are slight, and if the repertoire learned is more distinctive. Once
adopted by a significant fraction of the population, the mutant learning strategy will itself change
the shape of the population's repertoire: a process of self-organisation kicks in and makes the
repertoire more combinatorial.
In this view, self-organisation and natural selection are not alternative explanations for the
phenomenon of combinatorial phonology. Rather, natural selection shapes the parameters of the
l0The repertoire will reflect the resident learning strategy employed in previous generations. See chapter 7.
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self-organising process. Hence, self-organisation is the substrate of evolution (Thompson, 1932;
Waddington, 1939; Boerlijst & Hogeweg, 1991). With such an interpretation, the model of this
chapter is consistent with the ideas on selforganisation of Lindblom et al. (1984), de Boer (2001)
and Oudeyer (2002), while solving some of the problems with their formal models, as well as
with those of Liljencrants & Lindblom (1972) and Nowak & Krakauer (1999).
Chapter 5
Compositional Semantics1
Compositional semantics - where the meaning of a combination
is a function of the meanings of the parts - is a fundamental
property of natural language. Explaining its evolution remains
a challenging problem because existing explanations require a
structured language to be present before compositionality can
spread in the population. In this chapter, I study whether a
communication system can evolve that shows the preservation
of topology between meaning-space and signal-space, without
assuming that individuals have any prior processing mechanism
for compositionality. Ipresent a formalism to describe a commu¬
nication system where there is noise in signalling and variation
in the values (payoffs) ofmeanings. In contrast to previous mod¬
els, both the noise and payoffs depend on the topology of the
signal- and meaning spaces. I consider a population of agents
that each try to optimise their communicative success. The re¬
sults show that the preservation of topology follows naturally
from the assumptions on noise, payoffs and individual-based op¬
timisation.
'This chapter describes research that builds on joint work with Gert Westermann, as published in Zuidema &
Westermann, 2003 (see appendix C of this thesis). However, all modelling, text and graphs in this chapter are my own.
Some results have been published in Zuidema, 2003c (see appendix C).
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5.1 Compositionality in Natural Language
After discussing the evolution of combinatorial phonology in the previous chapter, I will now
focus on the evolution of another combinatorial principle that is a universal property of natural
language: compositional semantics, or "compositionality". It can be defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Compositionality) A language is compositional if it consists ofa set ofmeaningful
units which can be combined into larger wholes, in such a way that the meaning of the whole is a
function of the meaning of the parts and the way they are put together.
From a formal point of view, this definition is more ambiguous than one would like, be¬
cause the words "meaning" and "function" leave much room for interpretation depending on the
theoretical framweork one works in. In the philosophy of language, theoretical linguistics and
mathematical logic a vast literature is associated with "compositionality" (see Janssen, 1997 for
a review), and a strict interpretation of the concept exists that excludes many of the example con¬
struction I will give below. In this thesis, however, I will interpret compositionality in a broad,
intuitive sense, as is common in the field of language evolution (e.g. Batali, 1998; Wray, 1998;
Kirby, 2000; Brighton, 2002; Hurford, 2002a). In this interpretation, compositional semantics is
in contrast with a holistic semantics, where the meaning of an utterance cannot be derived from
the meaning of its parts at all.
However, I will restrict the use of the word "compositionality" to refer to a property of the
mapping between forms and meanings. That is, in my terminology, "meanings" cannot be com¬
positional; they can be combinatorial, i.e. be built-up from units that can be combined in many
different ways2. Similarly, forms are never compositional, but might be combinatorial. Thus, ut¬
terances with holistic semantics might show combinatorial phonology, that is they can be built-up
from meaningless elements (phonemes, syllables). The use of the words "holistic", "combinato¬















Figure 5.1: Holistic, combinatorial and compositional
2 At several points in this thesis, I will use (predicate) logic notation for such meanings. For logicians, such expres¬
sions have a semantics themselves (for instance, its truth conditions given a model) which can be compositional. In this
thesis, however, I will only be concerned with the mapping between (phonological) form and (conceptual) meaning.
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Together, combinatorial phonology and compositional semantics constitute duality of pat¬
terning (Hockett, 1960). In English, compositionality in its broad sense is evident in, for in¬
stance, productive morphology (such as the plural -s and the regular past tense suffix -ed), com¬
pound noun constructions (such as "thesis deadline", "dog house" and "bear country"), com¬
pound verbs ("move on", "move out", "keep on", "keep out") and phrasal syntax ("John sees
Mary", "Mary sees John", "Did Harry ever meet Sally?"). Natural languages use a range of com¬
positional mechanisms, with much variation between languages in which mechanisms are used,
and to which degree. English, for instance, makes, in comparison with Turkish or Russian, very
little use of productive morphology.
As in phonology, the units of combination in each of these compositional mechanisms remain
a topic of debate. In morphology, it has long been recognised that utterances that look as if
they are composed of smaller units, might in fact be stored and retrieved as whole chunks. This is
referred to with the term semi-productive morphology. For instance, in what language typologists
call fusional languages, one can identify word stems and suffixes, but the combinations are not
completely regular, i.e. there is no clear-cut boundary between the morphemes in a word. Rather,
the morphemes are often "fused" together and give a single, unsegmentable morph. An example
is Russian, where the words stol for "table" and lipa for "lime-tree" are inflected as follows
(examples from Comrie, 1981):
singular I plural I singular II plural II
nominative stol stol-y lip-a lip-y
accusative stol stol-y lip-u lip-y
genitive stol-a stol-ov lip-y lip
dative stol-u stol-am lipea lip-am
instrumental stol-om stol-ami lip-oj lip-ami
prepositional stol-e stol-ax lip-e lip-ax
Such imperfect compositionality poses a challenge to formal models of language. On the one
hand, the irregularities force one to store the larger chunks as unanalysed wholes in a lexicon.
In the Russian example above, a formal model would need to store the genitive singular form of
"lipa" as one unit "lipea", because that form cannot (or at least, not obviously) be derived from
the stem "lip" and the regular suffix -u or -a. On the other hand, one would like a formalism to
take advantage of the manifest regularities in the system. For English, this tension has led to the
on-going past tense debate. In this debate (see e.g. Clahsen, 1999, and the peer-commentaries in
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the same issue), one side denies the cognitive relevance of semi-regular inflections such as sing-
sang-sung, ring-rang-rung, and views the regularities solely as remnants of an older stage of the
English language. The other side argues that semi-regular and regular inflection is all part of the
same system, and that the right model of past tense inflection should therefore include associative
mechanisms.
More recently, researchers from diverse subfields of linguistics and from many different
schools, have argued that similar phenomena exists at all levels of language processing, from
phonology to syntax3. For instance, Bybee (2003) has argued that the construction "it's", al¬
though obviously a contraction of "it is", has linguistically and psychologically the profile of a
single word. In usage-based theories of language acquisition, it is proposed that children first ac¬
quire large chunks and only later discover the words and morphemes they consist of (Langacker,
1987; Tomasello, 2000; Lieven et al., 2003). In computational linguistics, Bod (1998, 2003) has
shown that large-coverage parsers benefit from storing large chunks of parse trees from a tree
bank. Finally, even within generative linguistics, the issue of the unit of storage and the need for
a heterogeneous model has recently come to the forefront (Nooteboom et al., 2002; Jackendoff,
2002).
For theories of the evolution of compositional semantics, the issue of the unit of combination
is relevant in two ways. First of all, it matters of course what exactly needs to be explained.
If, counter-factually, morphology were not productive at all, there would be no need for an evo¬
lutionary explanation for productive compositionality at this level of natural language. Second,
the existence of semi-productive, or "superficial" compositional patterns in languages raises the
question of where these patterns come from. It seems that either they are the remnants of an
earlier phase of the language (which implies that productive compositionality can become non¬
productive in historical language change), or they are the result of other mechanisms which bring
about the appearance of compositionality. Both routes to superficial compositionality suggest an
interaction between storage and productive mechanisms, and hold important clues for theories of
the evolutionary origin of productive compositionality.
5.2 The Evolution of Compositionality
Although the unit of combination in productive morphology and syntax is an open problem, there
is consensus that productive cbmpositionality, at some level, is an essential feature of human
3From an evolutionary point of view, a mixture of regular and irregular systems is exactly what one would expect.
For instance, the evolved "genetic code" that defines the mapping from genes to proteins also combines regular with
highly irregular rules (Nick Barton, p.c.; Maynard Smith & Szathmary, 1995). Models of the cultural evolution
of language predict that frequent meanings will be expressed with irregular words, whilst infrequent meanings are
expressed with regular combinations (Kirby, 2001). I'll briefly come back to these issues in chapter 7.
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languages. In animal signal systems, in contrast, compositionality occurs only rarely and only to
a very limited extent. A classic example of a compositional signalling system is the bee dance
(von Frisch, 1965, 1974), used to communicate the location of a newly discovered food resource.
In these dances two features of the "form", the length and direction of the longest stretch, map
on two aspects of the meaning: distance and direction of the food source. Although a fascinating
example, the facts that bees are a phylogenetically extremely distant species from humans, that
the dances can only be used to communicate distance and direction of food, that the signals
are analogue, and that a completely different medium is used, make it of little relevance for the
evolution of human language.
In non-human primates, little evidence of spontaneous use of compositionality exists. Chim¬
panzees and bonobos seem to be capable, typically only after intense training, of using combina¬
tions of signs to express compound meanings (Savage-Rumbaugh etal., 1986; Savage-Rumbaugh
& Lewin, 1994; Premack, 1971), but the evidence remains disputed (Pinker, 1994). Only anecdo¬
tal evidence about compositional communication in wild chimpanzees and gibbons exists (Ujhe-
lyi, 1996; Savage-Rumbaugh, 2000). An intriguing example of compositionality in wild Camp¬
bell monkeys has recently been described by Zuberbiihler (2002). Like Vervet monkeys (Seyfarth
et al., 1980), Campbell monkeys have an alarm call system, with specific calls for a small num¬
ber of predator categories. In addition, Campbell monkeys have a distinct grunt that modifies
the meaning of the call that follows: it weakens the meaning of the following call. In play¬
back experiments with monkeys from an other species (Diana monkeys), Zuberbiihler was able
to demonstrate that they respond reliably with the appropriate predator response when presented
with 3 types of alarm calls, but respond halfheartedly or not at all when these same calls were
preceded by the cancel grunt4.
How did limited compositional communication like in Campbell monkeys and the extensive
compositionality of human language evolve? Jackendoff (1999, 2002) includes compositionality
("use of symbol position to convey basic semantic relations") as one of the major stages in his
scenario for the evolution of language. In this scenario, productive combination of signs emerged
before the systems for word order, phrase-structure, agreement and inflection were in place (see
chapter 3). Jackendoff argues that modern languages contain "fossils" of the compositionality
stage. For example, the compositional compound noun construction in English mentioned above
4It is unclear to me whether the call system is an example of productive compositionality; it seems this would be
difficult to test, because the alarm calls in monkeys tend to be innate (Seyfarth & Cheney, 1997). If new calls can be
taught, one can easily distinguish between a productive system (where the effect of the cancel grunt would have to
generalise to the newly taught signal), and a holistic system that is superficially compositional. But if a repertoire of
calls is fixed, it is difficult to make this distinction.
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can be viewed as such a fossil: the meaning of a compounds like "gun shot" and "shot gun" is
deducible (but not completely specified) from the meaning of the component words and the order
in which they are put. That is, typically the second noun in a compound determines its type,
making gun shot a type of shot (or wound) and shot gun a type of gun. The rules are not strict
however; pickpockets are not a type of pockets, and whereas a snow man is made of snow, a fire
man is not made of fire.
A compositional language, without all the niceties of modern morphosyntax (in particular, hi¬
erarchical structure), corresponds roughly to Bickerton's concept of protolanguage (Bickerton,
1990). Recall from chapter 3 that protolanguage is the hypothetical precursor of modern lan¬
guage that is assumed to share many characteristics with pidgin languages (the limited languages
acquired by adults that need to communicate in a population where there is no dominant language)
and "Basic Variety" (the limited proficiency attained by adults learning a foreign language, Klein
& Perdue, 1997).
For those researchers who believe in a gradualist scenario for the evolution of human lan¬
guage, the assumption of a protolanguage with limited compositionality as an intermediate stage
is relatively uncontroversial. However, the exact properties of protolanguage and its precursors
are a topic of a debate (e.g. Wray, 2000; Tallerman, 2005). For instance, Jackendoff imagines a
transition from free concatenation to more fixed word order, but Bickerton explicitly rejects this
view (Bickerton, 2003a). Given the entirely hypothetical status of "protolanguage", this debate
is conducted with surprising vigour. In the end, as I have argued in chapters 1, 2 and 3, only a
complete and formal scenario, with convincing explanations for the transitions for one step to the
next, will resolve these disputes. Hence, in our efforts to formalise Jackendoff's scenario, the real
issue is to explain how the transition from a non-compositional stage to a compositional stage
could have happened.
Hurford (2002a) classifies explanations for the transition according to whether they postulate
an analytic route, where holistic signals are reanalysed as consisting of meaningful parts, or
a synthetic route, where pre-existing signals are combined in novel combinations. Whereas
Jackendoff clearly favours a synthetic route, the model of this chapter will explore an analytic
route. As I will argue below, no convincing formal model of an synthetic route has been proposed
yet.
As with the other transitions, explanations for the transition to compositionality can be fur¬
ther classified according to their reliance on language-specific, biological adaptations, versus
their reliance on domain-general learning mechanisms and self-organisation. Many researchers,
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including Pinker & Bloom (1990); Nowak & Krakauer (1999); Nowak et a1. (2000); Jackendoff
(2002), have argued for innate, language-specific cognitive specialisations for compositionality
that have evolved under natural selection. Such explanations can be further classified accord¬
ing to the assumed function of compositionality. Pinker and Jackendoff's verbal treatments keep
this crucial issue rather vague, and refer to a diverse array of advantages, from those for learn¬
ing, memorising and generalisation, to those for sharing information and for impressing peers
and sexual partners. The mathematical models of Nowak and colleagues are more precise, but
whereas in the model of Nowak & Krakauer (1999) the selection pressure is acoustic distinctive¬
ness, in Nowak et al. (2000) it is rather "learnability". These models are discussed in more detail
in the next section. Unfortunately, explanations of this type - even the mathematical models -
have generally remained much underspecified, and have not adequately dealt with the invasibil-
ity constraint and the problems of cooperation and coordination that I discussed in chapter 2. In
particular, as I will show below, the only existing formal models of the biological evolution of
compositionality, only establish that it leads to more successfull communication once it has been
adopted by the whole population.
The crucial question is, of course, how much the hominid brain has had to change to be able to
process compositional language (Lewontin, 1990). Most researchers, including Jackendoff, agree
that prelinguistic hominids, like modem Great Apes, must be assumed to have had a sophisticated,
combinatorial conceptual apparatus5. It is unclear to what extent these hominids could have made
use of such pre-existing cognitive abilities for processing a simple compositional language. Al¬
though most theories of grammar postulate computational procedures that appear very specific for
language, some linguists have argued that the disparity is more apparent than real. For instance,
Steedman (2002b) finds that combinatory categorial grammar (a formalism for describing natural
language syntax; Steedman & Baldridge, 2003) and classical planning algorithms (from artificial
intelligence) make use of exactly the same type of fundamental logical combinators. If the com¬
putational requirements for planning, tool use and navigation are not very different from those for
processing compositional language, then postulating biological innovations for compositionality
might not be necessary. The apparent failure of non-human primates to understand and produce
compositional messages, is perhaps better explained by their lack of attention to the intentions of
communication partners (Dunbar, 1998; Worden, 1998; Tomasello, 2003).
5 As I argued in chapter 3, it is difficult to give an exact characterisation of the kind of representations non-human
primates, prelinguistic hominids and prelinguistic human infants might have available. For the purposes of this chapter,
it is probably safe to think of these representations as something similar to (first-order) predicate logic. This is the
assumption made in many formal models of language acquisition (e.g. Pinker, 1979; Wolff, 1982; Buszkowski &
Penn, 1990), as well as in most models of the evolution of compositionality (Batali, 1998; Kirby, 2000; Hurford,
2000).
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A number of researchers have studied formal models of the transition to compositionality,
assuming just general learning and cognitive abilities and cultural evolution as the driving force
(Batali, 1998, 2002; Kirby, 2000, 2001; Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Hurford, 2000). These models
are interesting, and will play a major role in this thesis, but they face some new difficulties them¬
selves as well: (i) in many cases, the assumed cognitive abilities are much more language-specific
than one would like; (ii) cultural evolution, such as the progressively better structured languages
in the "Iterated Learning Model" (Kirby, 2000; Brighton, 2002), only takes off when there is
already some initial structure in the language.
Explaining the evolution of compositionality thus remains a challenging problem because
both the genetic and the cultural evolution explanation require a structured language to be already
present in the population before the linguistic innovations can successfully spread in a population.
In the next section I will first review a number of existing formal models, discuss the mentioned
problems in more detail and show that none of the models is complete or conclusive. I will
conclude from this review that the need to explore alternative explanations for the evolution of
compositional semantics remains.
In the rest of the chapter, I will (unfortunately) not solve this problem. In fact, I will not study
the evolution of productive compositionality itself, but focus on superficial compositionality in¬
stead. I will start from the observation that compositionality is a form of "topology preservation"
in the mapping from meanings to signals. That is, compositionality implies that similar meanings
are expressed with similar signals6.
In line with the consensus, I assume that the meaning space of early hominids was structured,
i.e. that the meanings expressed were not holistic, idiosyncratic, categorical objects, as in models
of the evolution of a simple lexica (such as signalling games in the tradition of Lewis, 1969,
discussed in chapter 2, section 2.6). Moreover, I will assume that communication was noisy, and
that very similar signals were easier confused than very distinct signals (as explored in chapter 4).
Based on these observations, I present the simplest possible extension of existing models, that
allows the similarities between meanings, the similarities between signals and the preservation of
topology to be formally described. I will show that in this model optimisation for noise robustness
automatically leads to topology preservation. For now, I only look at low dimensional signal and
meaning spaces. As a model for the evolution of compositionality it is obviously incomplete, but
6There are many difficulties with this statement, because there are many ways to define topologies for meanings
and signals, and many ways to define compositionality. For now, I will ignore these problems, but I will briefly come
back to this point in the discussion. In the model of this chapter I will consider only simple, one- or two-dimensional
Euclidean similarity metrics. I will leave more interesting topologies for future work.
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I claim the model does make a start with an alternative route, and suggests possible origins of
structure in lexical communication.
5.3 Formal Models of the Evolution of Compositionality
5.3.1 Natural Selection for Compositional Semantics
The first game-theoretic model of the evolution of compositionality was studied by Nowak &
Krakauer (1999). The analysis presented by these authors is closely related to their analysis of
the evolution of combinatorial phonology, that I discussed in the previous chapter. It is worth con¬
sidering the applicability of the model to the issue of compositional semantics, and the problems
with it, because it is the only formal model that, like the model I develop in this chapter, considers
the relation between noise robustness and compositionality.
To briefly recapitulate, Nowak & Krakauer consider a set of available meanings, a set of avail¬
able signals and three matrices S, R and U that describe production, interpretation and confusion
respectively7. For simplicity, they imagine a world where there are just objects and actions, and
consider two types of strategies, holistic (with a unique word for every object-action combina¬
tion) and compositional (with nouns for objects and verbs for actions). Their goal is to show that
compositionality can evolve, and to identify the conditions under which this will happen. Like
in the analysis of combinatorial phonology ("word formation"), Nowak & Krakauer view com¬
positionality ("basic grammatical rules") as a strategy for improving the robustness against noise.
They use the same measure for the quality (fitness) of a language as before (equation 4.3):
M N N
F(L, i') = 2EEE (Smil%R'jm + S'mjU,jRjm). (5.1)
771=1 i—1 j— 1
The analysis then starts with S- and R-matrices of the following form:
W\ W2 w3 U>4 N\Vi nxv2 n2vx N2V2
01A1 1 — X 0 0 0 X 0 0 0
0\A2 0 1 — X 0 0 0 X 0 0
O2A1 0 0 1 — X 0 0 0 X 0
O2A2 0 0 0 1 — X 0 0 0 X
7In this paper (Nowak & Krakauer, 1999), and other papers of the same group, the symbols P and Q are used
instead of S and R. They call P the "active matrix", and Q the "passive matrix". Hurford (1989) used for the same
matrices the symbols T and R, and talks about "transmission matrix" and "reception matrix"; Oliphant & Batali (1996)
use the symbols s and r, and Smith (2002, 2004) uses p and r. I will use the notation and terminology introduced
in chapter 2, which follows Oliphant & Batali and the standards in information theory by using the letters S and R
for sender and receiver, follows Nowak et al. in using the U for the confusion matrix, and follows the mathematical
convention to use boldface capitals to refer to matrices.
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0\a\ 0\a2 02a\ o2a2
W\ 1 0 0 0
W2 0 1 0 0
U13 0 0 1 0
W4 0 0 0 1
nrvx 1 0 0 0
n1v2 0 1 0 0
n2v! 0 0 1 0
n2v2 0 0 0 1
where a; is a single variable that describes how often the holistic strategy is used (with signals
W\,W2,W3,W4) vs. how often the combinatorial strategy is used (where signals are combinations
of nouns N\, N2 and verbs V\, V2). Nowak & Krakauer further assume that the confusion between
holistic signals (Uh) is larger than the confusion between combinations (uc), and that there is no
confusion between the two types of strategies.
The rest of the analysis is identical to the reconstructed analysis of combinatorial phonology
in chapter 4, and, with the same bit of algebra (see equations 4.4^1.6), Nowak & Krakauer (1999)
can therefore draw the same conclusion: a more compositional language L' — {S',R'} can
always invade a population with a less compositional language L — {S.R}, because the fitness
of L' in a population speaking L is higher than the fitness of L:
F(L', L') > F(L, L') > F(L, L) if (x' > x) A (uc < uh). (5.2)
It follows that only a fully compositional language is an Evolutionary Stable Strategy. Hence,
if the assumptions implemented in this model are correct, we should expect evolution to lead to
fully compositional languages. One might ask: why, then, do not all species have a compositional
communication system? Nowak & Krakauer argue that not all combinations of objects and actions
occur in the world or are relevant for communication and survival. If only a fraction 0 of all
combinations are relevant, the proper comparison is between a holistic system with N = cpnh
words (where n is the number of objects, and h the number of actions), and a compositional
system with n nouns and h verbs. Nowak & Krakauer observe that under these assumptions,
compositionality is only favoured if there are more relevant events than the sum of nouns and
verbs, i.e. N > n + h. They speculate that in other species compositional language was either not
a possibility due to other constraints, or not favoured by selection because there were not enough
relevant events to talk about (that is, N and <p were too small).
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Given that the analyses for combinatorial phonology and compositional semantics are almost
identical, it is unsurprising that the same objections apply. As I argued in chapter 4, the model
considers only the advantages of the combinatorial strategies, and not the disadvantages:
• By pre-determining where in the S and R matrix the non-zero entries are, the model effec¬
tively rules out all misunderstandings except those due to acoustic noise. The model thus
completely ignores the problem of coordination. If we assume that individuals speaking
a holistic language do not necessarily understand the compositional signals, then compo-
sitionality cannot invade in the population (the authors do note that in such a scenario, a
holistic language is an ESS as well, but do not elaborate on the consequences of this fact
for their analysis).
• The model assumes there is no confusion between nouns and verbs and no confusion be¬
tween the parallel holistic and compositional systems. The confusion between nouns and
between verbs is only determined by how many nouns or verbs there are. Effectively, the
compositional signals therefore have double the duration of holistic signals (for the reasons
explored in chapter 4 the confusion between compositional signals could in fact be lower
than between holistic signals in a model where both have the same duration. However, the
mechanism responsible for the results in that chapter falls outwith the scope of the Nowak
& Krakauer model).
However, the most important problem with the model is that compositionality here is fulfilling
the exact same function as combinatorial phonology. As I argued in the previous chapter, combi¬
natorial phonology is in fact a real solution for robustness against noise, and it can evolve through
natural selection in the ways that I explored. If this process is successful, all signals will be
reliably transmitted, if that is possible under the relevant constraints on noise and duration. If re¬
liable transmission is not possible, a repertoire of signals will be close to its information-theoretic
optimum (the channel capacity). In either case, compositionality, in the analysis of Nowak &
Krakauer, has nothing extra to offer! That is, if signals are already composed of meaningless
phonemes such that the acoustic confusion is minimised under the relevant constraints, then there
is nothing more to be gained from combining meaningful words into sentences8.
sThe authors mention that in addition to acoustic confusion, the mistakes can be due to "incorrect assignment of
meaning", which would give compositional semantics a different role than combinatorial phonology. However, in
the model, the confusion probabilities of holistic, single word utterances and compositional, two word utterances are
solely determined by the number of words in the repertoire, and the number of words in a sentence. This is justifiable
for confusion due to acoustic noise or incorrect assignment of meaning that somehow depends on the phonological
representations of words, if we assume that the word forms are distributed optimally over the available acoustic space.
For incorrect assignment of meaning due to other causes, I see no reason why the confusion probabilities would be as
in the Nowak & Krakauer model.
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5.3.2 Natural Selection for Learnability
In a later paper (Nowak, Plotkin & Jansen, 2000), Martin Nowak and colleagues present a model
where compositionality has a different function, which could be described as "learnability". The
model views words as something akin to a disease: they spread through a population through
contact between people that know the word - are "infected" - and those that do not. Nowak
et al. adapt a well-known equation from mathematical epidemiology, and study the spread of
words in the same holistic and verbs & nouns conditions as in the previous model. Like in
epidemiology, Nowak et al.'s model also considers how the abundance of words again decreases
when the individuals that know them die. This leads to an equilibrium situation where individuals
know only a limited set of words, and are only partly successful in the communication with
others. Because verbs and nouns can spread independently from each other, and can be combined
to express previously unseen meanings, the probability of successful communication is higher in
the compositional condition (if the number of relevant events is high enough, and learning nouns
and verbs not much more difficult than learning holistic signals). From this analysis, the authors
conclude that natural selection will favour the combinatorial strategy, once the number of relevant
meanings has reached a threshold value.
There are some serious problems with this model, from the points of view of both linguistics
and evolutionary biology. First of all, in the model only death limits the size of a language and the
model ignores aspects like meaning, memory limitations, ambiguity and signalling errors. Such
aspects are in fact more likely to limit the communicative success of a language, and existing
models that take them into account give rise to equilibria with very different characteristics (e.g.
Hurford, 1989; Oliphant & Batali, 1996). In these models communicative failure arises most
frequently from ambiguity, rather than from the absence of the word in an individual lexicon,
and compositionality will thus bring very different advantages and disadvantages. Although the
extreme case of ignoring all cognitive constraints might be interesting to analyse, it is unwarranted
to base an explanation of the evolution of compositionality on it, without making any reservations.
Second, the author's fail to establish the fitness advantage of an individual with a composi¬
tional language in a population that speaks the holistic language (the invasibility requirement from
chapter 2). Instead, they calculate the average fitness in a homogeneous group. This averaging
completely obscures the real problem of language evolution. The main "difficulties in imagining
how language could have arisen by darwinian evolution", that the authors refer to, have to do
with the problem of imagining how a syntactic individual can be successful in a non-syntactic
population. The basic idea of this model, that individuals learning a combinatorial language can
5.3. FORMAL MODELS OF THE EVOLUTION OF COMPOSITIONALITY 125
generalise to unseen examples, whereas individuals learning a holistic language cannot, is correct
but hardly surprising. The conceptual problems I discussed, as well as a number of technical
ones9, can perhaps be dealt with. However, as it stands, the model is completely unconvincing as
an explanation of the evolution of compositional semantics.
5.3.3 Cultural Evolution of Compositional Semantics
A completely different class of formal models that deals with the origins of compositional se¬
mantics are based on iterated learning. Iterated learning models (ILM) consider what happens
when the output of an induction process becomes the input for another induction process. The
crucial insight is that languages will become more learnable as a consequence of their cultural
transmission from generation to generation.
To see how this happens in a formal model, consider the following situation where we start
with a grammar G with some set of rules r\... r/v which produces a language L with some set
of sentences si... sm-
G' L' G"













If we now apply an induction procedure on the language L, we induce the grammar G', which in
turn produces a language L'. In a deterministic framework, we can imagine that G is a grammar
that the induction algorithm cannot learn perfectly, and therefore G G1. However, G' is likely to
be a learnable grammar because it is a consequence of a learning process; when we then proceed
to induce a grammar G" from L', the induction algorithm has a good chance of finding the correct
grammar, i.e. G' = G". In a probabilistic framework, things are even more interesting because
9 For instance, the comparison that the authors make between holistic and compositional strategies is inconsistent
with the assumptions they present in the preceding section on lexicon dynamics. In that section they assume that word
frequencies follow Zipf's law of exponential decrease with rank, whereas the "methods" section reveals - without any
motivation - that for the comparison between holistic and compositional language equal frequencies are used. It is not
hard to see that equal frequencies are in fact a best-case scenario for compositionality. Fitnesses depend on the proba¬
bility P(W) to know a relevant word W in the case of holistic language, and the probability P(N A V) to know the
relevant noun N - verb V combination in the case of compositionality. The probabilities P(W), P(N) and P(V) are
in the equilibrium proportional to the relative frequencies of the words, nouns and verbs, such that the average P(We)
over all relevant events e is independent from the frequency distribution, but the average P(Ne A Ve) has its optimum
at an equal distribution. Consequently, the fitness advantage of compositionality (F(Fe A Ve) — P{We)) has
its optimum at equal frequencies.
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here the accuracy of learning will increase over the course of a number of generations (Briscoe,
2000a, 2002b; Kirby, 2001; Zuidema, 2003a), as will be explored in more detail in chapter 6.
The relevance of this for the evolution of compositionality becomes clear if one considers
that - as in the model discussed in the previous section - compositionality aids learnability. That
is, the long, idiosyncratic lists of signals of holistic languages are difficult to learn, because the
learner needs to see an example of every single instance. In contrast, compositional languages
allow one to generalise from a fair number of training samples, to (possibly infinitely) many more
unseen cases. In cultural transmission with a bottle-neck (a "poverty of the stimulus"), holistic
language will therefore be unstable, and the language will therefore continue to change until it
has become learnable and hence compositional. Batali (1998) and Kirby (2000) were the first to
demonstrate in formal models that cultural transmission, with learners learning from learners, can
therefore yield a compositional semantics.
I believe the iterated learning models make an important point, and will explore in the next
chapters the important implications of these models for debates in linguistics on innateness, learn¬
ability and language universals. One weakness of the models studied so-far, is that the relations
with formal models and results in theoretical linguistics and learnability theory have not been
sufficiently explored. More importantly, however, the problem with the models as explanations
for the evolutionary transition to compositional semantics, is that they - in two different ways,
and to different degrees - already presuppose the existence of what they are meant to explain.
First, In Kirby's original models (Kirby, 2000, 2001, 2002a), the agents in the simulation
come equipped with the representational capacity for context-free grammars (enriched with se¬
mantics), and a specialised learning algorithm to induce such grammars from example sentences.
An important question is whether it is necessary and reasonable to assume that such learning abil¬
ities existed in early hominids before the object of learning, a compositional language, existed.
It only is, of course, if one could demonstrate that the ability to induce context-free grammars,
or any other sufficiently expressive formalism, is not language-specific, but part of the general
learning abilities that prelinguistic hominids can be reasonably assumed to have had. Iterated
Learning Models that use different formalisms and learning rules (e.g. Batali, 1998; Smith, 2002;
Brighton, 2002) seem less biased toward compositionality. Unfortunately, it is hard to judge what
kind of learning biases are reasonable.
Second, the success of an ILM is dependent on the probability that some kind of structure,
that the learning algorithm can detect, arises by chance. In Kirby's (2000) model, random strings
of characters are generated for (compound) meanings that cannot be expressed by the current
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grammar. E.g. if the meaning loves{Mary, Tiinde) cannot be expressed using the rules of the
current grammar, a random string abacdddbe might be generated to express it ("invention"). For
a related meaning, e.g. hates(Mary, Tiinde) another random string will be generated. Only when
by chance both strings share a substring, will the learner induce the corresponding compositional
rules10. In the simulations, the probability that this happens is relatively high, because of specific
choices for the number of possible characters and the random string length. It is unclear, however,
how realistic these choices are. Again, it is difficult to judge what kind of invention biases are
reasonable.
Kirby and colleagues are aware of these limitations. Kirby (2000) emphasises that the model
shows, contra Pinker & Bloom (1990), that there are processes other than Natural Selection ca¬
pable of explaining complex patterns in natural language. I believe it serves well as such a coun¬
terexample, and that the mechanism at work in the iterated learning model will play an important
role in understanding the features of natural languages. However, for similar reasons as explored
in chapter 4,1 think it is worthwhile to explore the fitness effects of increased compositionality, if
only to evaluate whether natural selection will work with such alternative processes, or against it.
5.4 Model Description
The model of this chapter follows Nowak & Krakauer (1999) in focusing on the interaction be¬
tween noise robustness and compositionality, but rather than viewing compositionality as a strat¬
egy to impose noise robustness, it views compositionality as a side-effect of optimising signals
for robustness. An assumption in the model - and a crucial difference with Nowak & Krakauer's
- is that not all mistakes are equally bad. If an interpretation is wrong but close, it is worse
than the correct interpretation, but better than a completely different interpretation. Another cru¬
cial difference with Nowak & Krakauer's, is that in my model agents always only know a single
language.
5.4.1 Hill-climbing
Similarities between meanings are reflected in a value matrix V, that describes the value of each
interpretation for any given intention, as I discussed in chapter 3. The expected payoff between a
speaker i and a hearer j then becomes (equation 3.1):
wi:i = V-(S'x(Ux R7)) (5.3)
'"Kirby makes no claim that the learning algorithm used models human language acquisition. Kirby studies how the
language changes over the course of many generations; he has deliberately simplified the learning algorithm, inspired
on Stolcke (1994), to reduce the computational and conceptual complexity of the model.
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In this formula, "x" represents the usual matrix multiplication and represents dot-multi¬
plication (the sum of all multiplications of corresponding elements in both matrices; the result of
dot-multiplication is not a matrix, but a scalar). There are M different meanings that an individual
might want to express, and F different signals (forms) that it can use for this task. S is a M x F
matrix that gives for every meaning m and every signal /, the probability that the individual
chooses / to convey m. Conversely, R is a F x M matrix that gives for every signal / and
meaning m, the probability that / will be interpreted as m. U (of dimension F x F) gives for
every uttered signal / the probability it is perceived as /', V (of dimension M x M) gives for
every intention m the payoff of an interpretation m'.
Based on this measure, I use some simple hill-climbing heuristics to improve the communi¬
cation. Specifically, I will report simulation results with three types of hill-climbing:
Global optimisation of a probabilistic lexicon: in this condition, there is a single S and a single
R matrix. The matrices are initialised with random, real-valued entries between 0 and 1
(and rows or columns normalised). At every step in the simulation, an entry in one of the
matrices is chosen at random, a small degree of noise is added (from a Gaussian A/*(0, p),
i.e. with mean p = 0 and standard deviation a = p, the "learning rate" parameter) and
the expected payoff w = V • (S x (U x R)) is measured. If w is at least as large as
before, the change is kept, otherwise it is reversed. The matrices describe the average
production and interpretation probabilities in a population; this condition thus corresponds
to the unrealistic scenario where communication is optimised for the benefit of the whole
population. These simulations mirror the analytic calculation of maximum fitness in Nowak
& Krakauer (1999); the main difference is the V-matrix.
Local optimisation of a probabilistic lexicon: in this condition, a population (of size N) of in¬
dividuals is modelled with everyone having her own S and R matrices. The matrices are
initialised with random, real-valued entries between 0 and 1 (and rows or columns nor¬
malised). At every step in the simulation, a random speaker i and a random hearer j are
selected, and the expected payoff between them is calculated (equation 5.3). As before,
an entry in either the speaker's S or the hearer's R is chosen at random, a small degree
of noise is added, and the change is kept if > lOy. This version of my model is very
similar to simulations reported in Nowak & Krakauer (1999); the main difference is again
the V-matrix.
Local optimisation of a deterministic lexicon: this condition is identical, except that the values
of the entries are restricted to either 1 or 0. That means that they are deterministic encoders
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and decoders, which can be shown to always perform better than their stochastic versions
(Shannon, 1948; Plotkin & Nowak, 2000). This simplification allows for an enormous
speed-up of the simulation (using the algorithms in appendix B of this thesis), allowing for
many more and larger-scale simulations. The random change in the hill-climbing procedure
is to move the only 1 in a random row or column to a random other position in that row or
column.
The motivation the local optimisation conditions is (i) that they are fast and straightforward to
implement; (ii) that they work well, and give, if not the optimum, a good insight in the characteris¬
tics of the optimal communication system; and (iii) that they consider the invasibility of linguistic
traits in a population where they are rare, and thus show possible routes to (near-) optimal com¬
munication systems, and in a sense form an abstraction for both learning and evolution11. If the
simulations converge such that all individuals have the same S and the same R matrix, these par¬
ticular matrices define an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (with respect to a strategy set containing
all strategies that are 1-step mutations from the ESS).
5.4.2 Semantic Similarity and Acoustic Confusability
The V and U matrices can be chosen to reflect all kinds of assumptions about the signal and
meaning space. A V could theoretically be constructed from empirical observations, if one could
list the "meanings" available for communication, and measure the payoff from all of these mean¬
ings as interpretations in the context of all these meanings as intentions. Alternatively, one could
estimate these values from a measure of semantic similarity and a function relating similarity to
payoff. Similarly, the U matrix could be constructed from empirical observations, if one could list
all the possible "signals" available for communication, and measure the probability of confusion
between each possible produced signal and each possible perceived signal12.
In this chapter I will not be concerned with measures of semantic similarity or confusability.
Instead, I will study the consequences of some specific choices for V and U that reflect qual¬
itatively different assumptions on (i) whether all meanings are equally valuable or not, and (ii)
"There are no deep philosophical reasons for the difference in the way I deal with invasibility in this chapter and the
previous. The difference is an arbitrary modelling choice. In this chapter, an explicit population of agents is modelled,
reflecting a preference for such explicit models in the Artificial Life community (although the abstractions that I do
make - for instance, using hill-climbing rather than an observational or reinforcement learning paradigm - are quite
unlike much Artificial Life work); in chapter 4, more in line with work in evolutionary game theory, invasibility is
dealt with without simulating a population.
12For simplicity, I assume throughout this thesis that the set of meanings available as "intentions" is the same as the
set available as "interpretations", and that the set of signals available as "articulations" is the same as the set available
as "acoustic perceptions". This is in contrast to work on signalling games in the tradition of Lewis (1969), where the
intentions ("situations") are from a different set than the interpretations ("actions"). For empirical estimates of the V,
U, S and R matrices it might be more convenient to distinguish between all these cases, but the essential apparatus
developed in this chapter will still be available.
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whether or not there is a topology in the meaning and signal space, and if so, of which dimen¬
sionalities.
For the V matrix, I will look at the following conditions. First, for the diagonal elements (the
correct interpretations) the homogeneous condition assumes that there are no qualitative differ¬
ences between meanings. Flence, all diagonal values are 1. In the heterogeneous condition, in
contrast, some meanings are more important than others. In the simulations under this condition,
I assign a random value v to each meaning, which defines the corresponding diagonal element in
V. For the off-diagonal elements in the V matrix, I consider three conditions:
Od: There is no topology in the meaning space. Hence, every wrong interpretation is equally bad:
all off-diagonal values in V are 0. A homogeneous, Od V matrix is a M x M unit matrix
as in figure 5.2(a).
Id: There is a 1-dimensional topology in the meaning space. The position of a meaning in that
space corresponds to its index in the matrix. That is, I assume that if m3 is the intended
meaning, interpretation TO3 gives the highest payoff, m2 and 7714 a lower but non-zero
payoff, mi and 7715 an even lower payoff and so forth. An example of a homogeneous, 1 d
V matrix is given in figure 5.2(b). An example of a heterogeneous, Id V matrix is given
in figure 5.2(c). The exact values of the entries in V are defined below.
2d: There is a 2-dimensional topology in the meaning space. Here I assume the meaning-space
is a perfect square. Each of the positions in this space is labeled with a unique number, as
illustrated in figure 5.3(a), which is the index of each particular meaning in the S, R and
V-matrices. Figure 5.3(c) is a V-matrix that reflects such a 2d topology.
Similarly, I will look at U matrices that reflect no topology, a 1-dimensional or a 2-dimensional
topology in the signal space. An example of the labeling of signals in a 2-dimensional signal
space, with the indices that are used in the S, R and U matrices, is given in figure 5.3b. In this
chapter I will not look at heterogeneous U matrices, but the generalisation is easily made, and in
chapter 7 I will look at one simple example of a simulation under this condition.
The precise values of entries of the V and U matrices are given by the following equations:
where v = 1.0 in the homogeneous V condition, and a random value (0.0 < v < 1.0) in the
"heterogeneous" V condition; without a topology ("Od"), the off-diagonal elements in U or V
V(p,q) = v/(l +d{p,q)),
U (p,q) = 1/(1 + d(p,q)),
(5.4)
(5.5)
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(a) V : Oc! (b) V : Id homogeneous (c) V : Id heterogeneous
Figure 5.2: Examples of V matrices that reflect different qualitative assumptions on the structure
of the meaning space. On the vertical axis are all meanings as intentions, on the horizontal axis
all meanings as interpretations. In (a) all meanings are equally valuable and interpretations only
give a payoff if they are absolutely correct. In (b) all meanings are equally valuable and correct
interpretations give the highest payoff (the diagonal entries), but slightly wrong interpretations
still give some payoff. In (c) different meanings have different values, and slightly wrong inter¬
pretations still give part of those payoffs. The size of circles is proportional to the value of the
corresponding entry; entries with value 0 are plotted as a small dot.
are 0 (i.e. d(p, q) — oo if p ^ q). With a topology, d(p, q) gives the squared Euclidean distance
between the positions of the two meanings or signals p and q. After these values are set, the rows
of both U and V matrices are normalised13 such that the values of each row add up to one.
In the 1-dimensional condition the position of a meaning or signal is simply defined as its
index. In the 2d condition, the meaning and signal spaces are 2-dimensional surfaces of size
(Vm x y/M) or (VF x y/F) (see figure 5.3a,b). Each of the positions in those spaces is labeled
with an index, with 0 in the bottom left corner, 1 one position higher and so-forth. When given an
index, we can calculate the corresponding x- and y-coordinates as follows:
• The x-coordinate is given by the largest integer smaller than the root of the index: x —
• The y-coordinate by: y — i modulo x.
5.4.3 Performance Measures
I monitor the behaviour of the model with two measures. The first is the average payoff, as given
by equation (5.3), averaged over all individuals interacting with all other individuals, both as
speaker and as hearer. The second is a measure for the degree of topology preservation between
"The normalisation of the V matrix is in fact unnecessary, and introduces an unfortunate boundary effect: meanings
with fewer neighbours have slightly higher diagonal values, as is apparent in the 1-dimensional condition at the top-left
and bottom-right corners (figure 5.2b) and in the 2-dimensional condition in the slightly different values for meanings
with 2, 3 or 4 neighbours (figure 5.3c). The effect is very small, however, and the simulations were therefore not
redone.
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(a) The 4x4 meaning
space, with the indices
of 16 meanings
(b) The 7x7 signal space, with the in¬
dices of 49 signals
(c) The 16 x 16 V-matrix,
giving for each of 16 possible
intentions, the payoff of each
of 16 possible interpretations,
and reflecting the 2d topology
of the meaning space. (V:2d
homogeneous)
(d) A 16 x 49 S-matrix, with 16 meanings
on the vertical axis and 49 signals on the
horizontal axis. The bottom left point rep¬
resents meaning 0 and signal 0.
(e) A 16 x 49 RT-matrix (transposed for
easy comparison), with 16 meanings on the
vertical axis and 49 signals on the horizon¬
tal axis.
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12 12 13 14 14 15 15
12 12 13 13 14 15 15
8 8 9 10 10 11 11
8 8 9 5 10 11 7
4 4 5 5 6 7 7
0 0 1 2 2 3 3
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(f) The 4x4 meaning
space, with the indices
of 16 corresponding sig¬
nals, according to S
(g) The 7x7 signal space, with the
indices of 16 corresponding meanings,
according to R (in boldface the pre¬
ferred signals in the S matrix).
(h) The 4x4 meaning
space, with neighbours in
signal space, according to
R, connected by edges.
Figure 5.3: 2d meaning and signal spaces and visualising topology preservation.
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the meaning space and the signal space in the emerging languages. Following Brighton (2002), I
use the correlation ("Pearson's r") between the distance between each pair of meanings and the
distance between the corresponding signals:
where S^ra] gives the most likely signal used to express m according to S. This measure gives
a value 1 when for every meaning-signal pair the coordinates in meaning space and signal space
are identical (or equivalent under mirroring and rotation), and 0 when the mapping is random
(Brighton, 2003).
For 2-dimensional meaning spaces I also visualise the topology preservation by plotting all
meanings as nodes in a meaning space, and connecting those nodes where the corresponding
signals are neighbours (one of maximum four) in signal-space. Figure 5.3 illustrates this visu¬
alisation technique, for the given S and R-matrices (figure 5.3d,e; the origin of these matrices
is not relevant here, but they result from the same simulation as reported in figure 5.12a). The
S matrix associates meanings with signals; in figure 5.3f the indices of the signals are plotted
at the locations of the corresponding meanings in meaning space. The R matrix associates sig¬
nals with meanings; in figure 5.3g the indices of the meanings are plotted at the locations of the
corresponding signals in signal space.
Finally, in figure 5.3h the representation I will use in this chapter is given. Here, points in
meaning space are connected if the corresponding signals are neighbours in signal space. Thus,
signals 5, 6, 12 and 13 (the 4 signals in the top left corner, see 5.3b), are all interpreted as meaning
12 (see the top left corner in 5.3g). The neighbours of these signals are 4, 11, 18, 19 and 20, which
are interpreted as meanings 8, 8, 9, 13 and 13 respectively. Therefore, in the final representation
meaning 12 is connected with meanings 8, 9 and 13. Using this representation, the topology
preservation between meaning space and signal space, which is almost perfect in this example, is
immediately clear.
5.5 Properties of the Optimal Lexicon
To give an idea of the properties of the optimal lexicon - that might or might not be an evolu¬
tionary stable strategy - I will in this section present results from some very simple simulations
with the frequency-independent hill-climbing heuristic (the "global optimisation of a probabilistic
lexicon" condition).
r = correlation (D (m, m') , D (5[m], 5[m']))
m m1P- A/f
(5.6)
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Throughout this chapter, I assume that there are more signals available than meanings to
express. This is a fairly strong assumption, but there are two good reasons for choosing it as
a starting point. First, if signals are from a continuous space (as in chapter 4), and meanings
from a finite (non-recursive), discrete space (such as first-order predicate logic), then there will be
(infinitely) many more possible signals than meanings. Although the number of possible signals
in the simulation is finite, the number of usable signals will - as in reality - be determined by the
amount of noise. Second, the assumption simplifies the dynamics considerably and, if the noise
level is sufficiently low, guarantees the existence of at least one Evolutionary Stable Strategy in
the "local optimisation" conditions. The dynamics of models with different assumptions on the
meaning- and signal-spaces (including continuous and hierarchically structured spaces) remain to
be explored (a start has been made with a related model by Matina Donaldson, p.c.).
5.5.7 Categorical Meanings, Noise-free Signalling
The simplest case is where there is categorical, noise-free communication. That is, every meaning
is unique and has no relation with other meanings, and signals are perceived as they are uttered.
These conditions (V : Od, U : Od) are described with a V and U that are both unit matrices
(matrices with l's on the diagonal, and O's everywhere else).
(a) Development of communicative suc¬
cess over 25000 iterations
(b) S matrix of a ran¬
dom individual, showing
for each meaning (verti¬
cal) the probability that
she will use any of the
signals (horizontal) to ex¬
press it.
(c) R matrix of the same in¬
dividual, showing for each
signal (vertical) the proba¬
bility that she will choose
any of the meanings (hori¬
zontal) as its interpretation.
Figure 5.4: The optimised lexicon in a population under categorical, noise-free conditions. The size
of circles is proportional to the value of the corresponding entry; entries with value 0 are plotted
as a small dot. (V : Od, U : Od, M = 8, F = 12, TV = 3, n = 0.1).
Optimising a population's lexicon under these conditions using the hill-climbing algorithm
described above, gives results as in figure 5.4. The average payoff increases steadily and reaches
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the optimal value (1.0). The S matrices in the population have maximal probability (= 1.0) for
a specific signal (horizontal) for each of the meanings (vertical), and probability 0 for all other
signals. In the R matrix these signals (vertical) are interpreted as the "correct" meanings. Because
there are more possible signals than meanings, some signals (/i, fe, /g, /n) are never used and
have arbitrary interpretations.
This simple simulation illustrates two properties of the optimal lexicon: specificity, "one
unique signal for every intention, and one unique interpretation for every used signal", if M < F,
and coherence, "everyone in a population uses the same signal for the same meaning".
5.5.2 Categorical Meanings, Noisy Signalling
If there is noise on the signal (due to a noisy environment and sensory limitations of the hearer),
the hearer will sometimes hear a different signal than the speaker uttered. We can model this by
introducing non-zero, off-diagonal entries in the matrix U. Here, I consider only the simplest
case, where signals vary on one axis determined by their index (U : Id).
!
(a) Development of communicative suc¬
cess over 100000 iterations
(b) S matrix of a random individ¬
ual.
(c) R matrix of
the same individ¬
ual.
Figure 5.5: A local optimum of the lexicon in a population under categorical, noisy conditions
(V : Od, U : Id, M = 10, F = 30, N = 3, n = 0.1).
Under these conditions, we expect a lower average payoff and S and R matrices that somehow
minimise the chance of confusion. Figure 5.5 shows that this is indeed what happens. The S
matrix shows that for every meaning, there is a prototype signal that individuals use. For these
prototype signals and their direct neighbours, the interpretation is the "correct" meaning. Little
clusters of neighbouring signals are all interpreted in the same way, such that prototype signals are
maximally distinct from each other. Thus, in addition to specificity and coherence, distinctiveness
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is a property of the optimal lexicon when the signalling is noisy. Note that, even though there are
many more signals than meanings, all signals have a specific "best" interpretation.
5.5.3 Semantic Similarities & Noisy Signalling
If we include in the model the assumption that not only signals have similarity relations, but also
meanings relate to each other, we can identify a fourth criterion of the optimal lexicon: regularity.
Figure 5.6 shows results that are obtained by running the same hill-climbing algorithm, with
V : Id and U : Id.
(a) Development of communicative suc¬
cess over 100000 iterations
(b) S matrix of a random individ¬
ual
I
(c) R matrix of the
same individual
Figure 5.6: Local optima for S and R under semantic similarities, noisy signalling conditions (V
Id, U : Id, M = 10, F = 30, N = 3, n = 0.1).
The local optima found by the hill-climbing algorithm show not only specificity, coherence
and distinctiveness, but also partial regularity: "similar signals tend to have similar meanings",
such that misinterpretations are still better than a random interpretation. The solution found is
a local optimum; the observed patterns suggest that the globally optimal lexicon is maximally
regular: with the parameters of the simulations in figure 5.6, meaning mi would be expressed
with signal /1, and signals /2 to are interpreted as m\ \ rri2 is expressed with /s, and to fe
are interpreted as m2 etc. This optimum is not found in this simulation; however, in the local
optimum of figure 5.6 neighbouring clusters of signals are, with only a few exceptions, associated
with neighbouring meanings. Measuring the degree of regularity r shows that it is consistently
higher under conditions with semantic similarities than without.
5.5.4 Properties of the Optimal Lexicon
These simulations illustrate that the optimal lexicon must have the following properties (provided
that M « F, and that the off-diagonal U and V values are relatively low):
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specificity: every meaning has exactly one signal to express it and vice versa (i.e. no homonyms,
and no real synonyms: if different signals have the same meaning they are very similar to
each other). In the representation I use in this chapter, this property is present if there is
only a single full-sized circle in each row of the S and R-matrices (or each column of the
RT-matrix).
coherence: all agents agree on which signals to use for which meanings, and vice versa. This
property is present if all S and R-matrices in a population are identical,
distinctiveness: the used signals are maximally dissimilar to each other, so that they can be easily
distinguished. In the U : Id condition, this property is visible in the S-matrix if the circles
are maximally dispersed over the width of the matrix, and in the R-matrix as little clusters
of signals that all have the same interpretation. In the U : 2d condition, this property is
visible in the distribution of preferred signals from the S-matrix in signal space (see, for
instance, the boldface meaning-signal pairs in figure 5.3g).
regularity: in the mapping between meanings and signals there is a preservation of topology,
i.e., similar signals tend to have similar meanings. In the (V : Id, U : Id) condition, this
property can be seen in the S and R-matrices as local staircase-like patterns. In the V : 2d
condition, it can be visualised using the technique I described in section 5.4.3. In all cases,
it can be roughly measured with the r correlation measure of equation (5.6), where a value
of r « 1 indicates perfect topology preservation.
These properties are quite different from the properties of the lexicon of any natural language,
which of course has not been globally optimised, where the V, U, M and F are all quite different,
and where the interpretation of each word is crucially dependent on the context. However, these
properties do follow naturally from the assumptions about topology in the meaning and signal
spaces I made in this model. If one were to design a code for communication over a noisy
channel, without context, the same properties would emerge: (i) senders should consistently use
a unique signal for each meaning they need to express, and receivers should decode each signal
with a unique meaning; (ii) everyone in the population should agree on the same code; (iii) when
there is a range of signals available, the signals used in the code should be well-spread over
the available space, and signals received with some distortion should be decoded as the most
likely (nearest) prototype; (iv) if there is freedom in how to organise the mapping, the damage
of unavoidable confusion should be minimised, such that misinterpreted signals receive the next
best interpretation.
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The exact shape of the optimal lexicon will depend on the specific choices of V, U, M and
F. For the purposes of this chapter, a qualitative understanding of its properties are sufficient.
The real issue for this chapter - and a recurrent theme throughout this thesis - is how traits that
might or might not be beneficial for the group, can invade in a population, i.e. emerge through
local optimisation. In the next sections I will study a simulation of a population of agents, where
each agent tries to optimise her success in communicating with a randomly picked other agent.
5.6 Local Optimisation of a Probabilistic Lexicon
Figure 5.7 shows results from a simulation with the same parameters as in figure 5.6, but with local
hill-climbing in a population with N — 40 agents and a higher learning rate (the random change
in the hill-climbing algorithm is from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation
p = 1.0). The figure shows S and R matrices from one random individual at three points in the
simulation: after 5 x 106 and 2 x 107 iterations, and in the stable equilibrium configuration (after
almost 1 x 108 iterations)14.
The lexicon that develops shows all 4 characteristics of the optimal lexicon. In the S matrix
at equilibrium (from around t — 1 x 108) every meaning is always expressed by one unique
signal; in the R matrix, that signal is always interpreted with the correct meaning (specificity).
At equilibrium, all agents have the same S and R matrices (coherence). It is not difficult to
see why these properties emerge in a local optimisation set-up. Consider that at any point in
the simulation, there is for each meaning one specific signal that gives the highest chance of
being understood (this is because all values are continuous, and the values in the R matrices are
therefore never exactly equal). For every speaker, it therefore pays off - on average - to use that
specific signal in the S matrix. Conversely, for every signal there is one specific meaning that is
the most probable interpretation. For every hearer, it therefore pays off - on average - to use that
specific meaning in the R matrix. Only a lexicon with specificity and coherence can therefore be
an Evolutionary Stable State.
In the S matrix at equilibrium, the preferred signals are (almost) maximally dispersed. Fig¬
ure 5.7i, which shows the Rr matrix from figure 5.7f (with open circles) overlain with the S
matrix of figure 5.7c (with closed circles), shows that in the R matrix, each of these preferred
signals (except at the edges) is at the centre of a little cluster of signals that are all interpreted with
14An interesting question is whether 10s iterations is too long for these results to be relevant for scenarios of
language evolution. That is, whether or not there has been sufficient time (criterion 6 in chapter 2) for the mechanism
modelled here to have played a role in shaping natural language. This is an important issue, but one that goes beyond
the scope of this thesis. Answering this question requires first of all more robust results on how the time to convergence
depends on the many parameters in the model, and second, a more concrete interpretation of what the optimisation
steps correspond to in the real world (genetic mutations, selection, learning events).
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(a) S matrix, t = 5 x 106 (b) S matrix, t = 2 x 107 (c) S matrix, i = lx 108
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(d) Rt matrix, t = 5 x 106 (e) Rr matrix, t = 2 x 107 (f) RT matrix, i = 1 x 10s
(g) S+Rt, t = 5 x 106 (h) S+Rt, t = 2 x 107 (i) S+RT, « = 1 x 10s
Figure 5.7: Development of specificity, coherence, distinctiveness and regularity in the lexicon of a
population under semantic similarities, noisy signalling conditions. At each time-step a random
speaker interacts with a random hearer and one of them performs a single hill-climbing step to
improve the communication. In this graph, R matrices are transposed, such that in both S and
Rt matrices meanings are on the vertical axis and signals on the horizontal axis. The size of
circles is proportional to the value of the corresponding entry; entries with value 0 are not plotted,
(a-c) show the S matrices, (d-f) the R7 matrices, and (g-i) the RT matrices (with open circles)
with the S matrices (with closed circles) overlain. Parameters: V : Id, U : Id, M = 10, F — 30,
N = 40, p = 1.0.
the same meaning (distinctiveness). The reason this property emerges is slightly more subtle.
One way to see why it is inevitable is as follows. Consider a population where the specificity
and coherence of a lexicon have been established, but distinctiveness has not. Assume futher
that there are many more signals than meanings, such that there must be signals that are not the
preferred signal for any meaning (the non-preferred signals). Moreover, because of the noise on
transmission (as modelled by the U matrix), a signal s as the preferred signal for meaning m is
not always perceived correctly, but sometimes perceived as a neighbouring signal s'.
In this situation (a concrete example is given in figure 5.8a), it pays off for an agent to shift
the interpretation of any non-preferred signal s' in the R matrix, to the same meaning R[s] = m
as that of a neighbouring preferred signal s. The same logic applies to non-preferred signals that
are further away than distance 1 from a preferred signal. Consequently, at least one little cluster
in the R matrix forms, as in figure 5.8c. Given that situation, it now pays off for an agent to shift
the preferred signal in the S matrix to the center of the cluster, or, if the cluster is at the edge
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of signal space, to this edge. This movement of the preferred signal, then, will mean that some
non-preferred signals are now closer to a different preferred signal and should be moved in the R
matrix, and the same process repeats. This sequence of steps does not describe the dynamics in
the simulation, where distinctiveness already appears before specificity and coherence have been
established. It does, however, show that a non-distinctive lexicon is not an evolutionary stable
state, because there exists a sequence of changes to lexicon that each improve the fitness of an
individual and can therefore invade in the population, as is illustrated in figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8: Only distinctive lexicons are evolutionary stable states. Consider a coherent, specific
lexicon as sketched in (a). This diagram shows the same S + R7 -representation as in figure 5.7(g-
i), with closed circles representing the preferred signals in the S-matrix, and both open and closed
circles representing the interpretation for each signal in the R matrix. This lexicon does not define
an evolutionary stable state, because all the changes to non-preferred signals in the R-matrix, as
indicated with vertical arrows in (b), are beneficial for an individual, even if the whole population
has adopted (a). These changes can therefore invade in the population. If the whole population
would adopt each of these change, (c) would describe the new population lexicon. This is not
a stable state either, because changing the preferred signals in the S-matrix, as indicated with
horizontal arrows in (d) again benefits an individual even if the whole population uses lexicon (c).
With a series of similar changes that can all invade the population as sketched in (e-g), we end
up with the maximally distinctive lexicon in (h). This lexicon does define an evolutionary stable
state.
In final observation in the matrices of figure 5.7, is that, with 3 exceptions, all signal-clusters
have neighbouring signal-clusters that express a neighbouring meaning (regularity). The degree
of regularity in this simulation is only small (the r correlation measure is around 0.2). In general,
regularity can be difficult to obtain because to go from a irregular to a regular lexicon, many
changes to the lexicon are required, and these changes might involve a decrease in fitness for
the individual that adopts them (because non-regular lexicons can also be evolutionary stable
states). Moreover, the contribution to the communicative success is small in comparison to the
other three properties, because it only plays a role for signals that are radically misperceived.
Nevertheless, regularity does emerge in many of the simulations. In the next section I show results
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in the deterministic lexicon condition, where simulations run extremely fast. In this condition,
many more, and more large-scale experiments could easily be performed, such that I can report
quantitative results on the prominence of regularity.
5.7 Local Optimisation of a Deterministic Lexicon
Figure 5.9 shows the average payoff and topology preservation for simulations under 3 different
conditions: (i) homogeneous and no topology in the meaning space ("V : 0<f'); (ii) homogeneous
and V : Id; (iii) heterogeneous and V : Od. The results are plotted with a logarithmic x-axis.
A first striking result from these simulations, is that convergence is more than 10 times faster if
there is a topology in the meaning space. To understand why, we should first ask why convergence
takes so long in the V : Od condition. As I discussed above, at any point in the simulation, there is
for each meaning a specific signal that has the highest chance of being understood correctly, and
similarly for each signal a specific meaning that is its most probable correct interpretation. The
optimal behaviour is therefore for all agents the same (assuming a large population). However,
the local hill-climbing algorithm that agents use bases its decisions at every step on a sample of
just one agent from the population. Stochastic fluctuations will therefore mean that initially (as
long as the differences between alternate signals for one meaning, and alternate meanings for one
signal are small) different agents will make different changes to their lexicons, and convergence
is postponed.
Suppose that, at some point, there is for a particular signal s a specific dominant interpretation
m in the population's R matrices. Now consider the changes the hillclimbing algorithm will
favour in the agents' S matrices. In the V : Od condition, a signal is either correctly interpreted
or it is not. Unless the random change the hill-climbing considers is signal s, an agent will thus
remain at a random other signal for meaning m. If there are 49 different signals, 48 out of 49
iteration of the hill-climbing algorithm do not contribute to convergence. In the V : Id condition,
in contrast, it does make a difference which of the "wrong" signals is used. Signals that are closer
to s, even if they are not equal to it, will give a higher payoff than those that are further a way.
Many more of the 49 iterations will now contribute to convergence, if only a little bit.
I suspect a similar mechanism is responsible for another striking result from these simulation.
Figure 5.10 shows the average payoff and topology preservation for 60 simulations where the
dimensionality of the signal space is varied. In all cases, the payoff reaches high levels (when the
signal space is Id) or intermediate levels (when the signal space is 2d and the overall noise-level
is consequently higher because each signal has more neighbours). Importantly, in all cases the













(a) Payoff («J) (b) Topology Preservation (r)
Figure 5.9: Average payoff (a) and degree of topology preservation (b) for 2 x 108 iterations under 3
conditions: (1) V:0d homogeneous, (2) V:ld homogeneous; (3) V:0d heterogeneous. The max¬
imum average payoffs that are reached depend on the arbitrary chosen values of the V matrices
(see also footnote 13); hence, only the shapes of the curves are important. Common parameters
are N=400, M=16, F=49, U:ld.
topology preservation reaches high levels (when the dimensionalities of meaning and signal space
match) or intermediate levels (when the dimensionalities mismatch).
As we have seen above, lexicons do not need to show topology preservation to be evolutionary
stable states. Why then, does such a high degree of topology preservation emerge in these sim¬
ulations? I surmise that a similar mechanism I described above is responsible. Consider again a
situation where not all conventions have been established, but a strong association exists between
a meaning m and a signal s. What should an agent do to express a neighbouring meaning to'? As
long as none of the signals has much chance of being interpreted as to', it pays off for an agent to
use a signal s' that is equal or close to s, because interpretation m at least generates some payoff
if m' was intended. This intuition - which implies that lexicons with regularity have a larger basin
ofattraction - needs to be worked out more formally, and tested in simulations.
Figure 5.11 shows examples of the S and R matrices at various stages in the simulations
of figure 5.9. Figure 5.12 shows examples of the communication systems in the simulations of
figure 5.10. These results (from local optimisation of a deterministic lexicon), show again the
same characteristics as before. In addition to specificity and coherence, distinctiveness can be
recognised in the S matrices, in that the used signals are maximally dissimilar to each other so
that they can be easily distinguished (compare figure 5.11a, at the start of the simulation, with
5.11c, at equilibrium). In the R matrices, clusters of neighbouring signals all are interpreted as
the same meaning. Typically, the most central signal (except at the edges) in such a cluster is the
one that is actually used by the S matrix (compare figure 5.1 lc with 5.1 Id).
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(a) Payoff (w) (b) Topology preservation (r)
Figure 5.10: Average payoff (a) and degree of topology preservation (b) at the random initialisation
and after 5 x 107 iterations for different parameters. Error-bars indicate standard errors (± %/a/N,
where N = 5 is the number of simulations with the particular parameters, and cr is the standard
deviation). Common parameters are P=400, M=36 and V:2d heterogeneous.
Topology preservation is even more pronounced than in the probabilistic lexicon condition.
Again, preservation of topology is not perfect (there is one major irregularity and several minor
ones in the signal-meaning mapping of figure 5.1 le and f. The topology preservation, according
to equation (5.6), is r = 0.915), but in all simulations performed it is surprisingly high. "Bad"
solutions, such as the S and R of figures 5.1 lc and d (r = -0.073), are stable once established
in the population, but have a much smaller basin of attraction. In the case of a two-dimensional
meaning space, we can draw plots like figures 5.12a-d, which show that the topology is almost
perfectly preserved if the dimensionalities of the meaning- and signal-spaces match (5.12a), al¬
though it is skewed if different meanings receive very different values (5.12b). But even if the
dimensionalities do not match, there is a strong tendency to preserve topology as well as possible
(5.12c and d).
When one analyzes the intermediate stages between the random initialization and the equi¬
librium solutions, it becomes clear that with a heterogeneous V valuable meaning-signal pairs
get established first, and change little afterwards. This can be seen for instance when comparing
figure 5.12d.b with d.c.
Finally, when the V matrix is heterogeneous (figure 5.12b and d), or there is a dimensionality-
mismatch (figure 5.12c and d), one can observe that meanings with very low value are sacrificed
for the benefit of robust recognition of more valuable meanings (a similar observation was made
in Nowak & Krakauer, 1999). These sacrificed meanings "deliberately" get expressed with a sig¬
nal that will be interpreted with a meaning that is very close. An analogue for this phenomenon
in natural language is using a word like "green" to express a color like turquoise, as happens in
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(a) S, U:ld, V:Od homog., t=0 (b) Rr, U:ld, V:Od homog., t=0
(c) S, U:ld, V:0d homog., t=cx) (d) RT, U:ld, V:0d homog., t=oo
(e) S, U:ld, V:ld homog., t=oo (f) RT, U:ld, V:ld homog., t=oo
(g) S, U:ld, V:0d heterog., t=oo (h) RT, U:ld, V:0d heterog., t=oo
Figure 5.11: (a)-(h) Examples of S and R matrices from the simulations of figure 5.9. For easy
comparison, the R matrices are transposed so that in all matrices meanings differ on the vertical
axis, and signals on the horizontal axis. Between the matrices the diagonal values of the V matrix
are plotted, where the diameter of a circle corresponds to value of the corresponding meaning.
Common parameters are P=400, M=16, F=49.
some languages, because a word "turquoise" doesnot exist in the language and a slight misunder¬
standing is better than no understanding at all.
5.8 Discussion
I started this chapter with a brief sketch of compositional semantics in natural language, and some
considerations about its evolutionary origins. I agree with researchers like Jackendoff (2002)
that compositionality is a fundamental design feature of human languages. I also agree with
Jackendoff that in the evolutionary history of language a stage might have existed where language
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(a) t=0 (b) t=106 (c) t=oo
(a) U:2d, V:2d homogeneous
(a) t=0 (b) t=106 (c) t=oo
(b) U:2d, V:2d heterogeneous
(a) t=o (b) t=io6 (c) t=oo
(c) U: Id, V:2d homogeneous
(a) t,=0 (b) t=106 (c) t=oo
(d) U:ld, V:2d heterogeneous
Figure 5.12: Topology preservation at equilibrium in 4 simulations with Id and 2d U matrices, and
homogeneous and heterogeneous 2d V matrices. Shown are results at initialisation (left column),
intermediate time (middle column) and at equilibrium (right column). Nodes are meanings (diam¬
eters correspond to value), edges connect neighbours in signal space (several signals can map to
a single meaning, such that nodes can have many neighbours; some meanings are not expressed,
and the corresponding nodes are not connected). Common parameters are P=400, M=16, F=49.
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was productively compositional, but where many of the intricacies of modern syntax, such as
hierarchical phrase-structure, were still absent.
Identifying intermediate stages is an important step in constructing a plausible evolutionary
scenario; a crucial next step, as I have argued, is to explain the transitions between stages, in this
case the transition from a stage without compositionality to a stage with this feature. Moreover,
I believe such a scenario must be formalised, such that its internal coherence can be evaluated
using techniques from analytic mathematics and computer simulation. Hence, the challenge is to
formulate plausible assumptions on the available strategy set and payoff function, and show how
compositionality can invade in a population that speaks a language without it.
In section 5.3 I have discussed a number of formal models that take up this challenge, and
found that neither is really convincing yet. I have argued that the assumed payoff-function in the
model of Nowak & Krakauer (1999) is implausible, because the additional costs of signals of
longer duration are not taken into account. If one does consider these constraints, compositional
semantics has nothing extra to offer over a phonology that minimises acoustic confusability. I
have further argued that the model of Nowak et al. (2000) does not deal properly with the invasion
of innovations in a population; the model only makes the rather obvious point that a compositional
language, once established, allows for generalisation, and hence a greater average fitness in the
population. Finally, I have discussed Iterated Learning models, like Kirby's (2000), and argued
that - for explaining the evolution of compositionality - these models assume too many a priori
cognitive abilities; a better model would consider a wider strategy set and consider the selective
advantages of compositional versus non-compositional strategies.
In the second part of the chapter I have studied a new model that focuses on a simpler, but
related problem: the evolution of a lexicon with topology preservation, where similar meanings
tend to be expressed by similar signals. I have introduced a formalism to describe the quality of a
lexicon, that includes a matrix U that describes the confusion probabilities of signals depending
on their similarity, and a matrix V that describes the payoff for all intention-interpretation pairs.
The strategy set the model considers corresponds to all possible choices of S and R matrices; the
payoff function is implicit in the U and V matrices. I identified four qualitative properties of the
optimal lexicon, and evaluated if they could invade in a population with a language without these
properties. I found that only lexicons that are specific, coherent and distinctive are evolutionary
stable strategies. Moreover, the simulation results suggest that evolutionary stable lexicons that
also show topology preservation are much more likely to emerge than those that do not.
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Hence, compared to existing models, the model represents progress in meeting the require¬
ments for evolutionary explanations of chapter 2. The model should still be made more formal
(with the intuitive arguments for why only lexicons with the listed properties are evolutionary
stable states turned into formal proofs), and the "sufficient time" requirement needs to be studied
(given that some of the simulations needed 108 iterations to converge).
But what exactly is the model explaining? The model shows that with simple assumptions on
topologies in the meaning- and signal-spaces, and individual-based optimisation, communication
systems can arise that show a structured mapping from meanings to signals. The existence of a
topology in the meaning- and signal-space should not be controversial, although it is not obvious
how many dimensions these spaces should have, and how payoff and confusability decrease with
distance in these spaces. It remains to be shown that a significant degree of topology preservation
also emerges if these spaces are of higher dimensionality (and perhaps hierarchical structure).
However, the main limitation of the current model is that topology preservation is not the same
thing as compositional semantics. Compositionality does imply that similar meanings are asso¬
ciated with similar sounds: a signal johnwalks is similar to both johnsleeps and marywalks. But
topology preservation in natural languages can also be due to sound symbolism, where "Words
whose meanings lie close to one another, are likewise accorded similar sounds" (von Humboldt,
1836, p. 74). The cognitive relevance of sound symbolism - such as in examples like slippery,
slimy, sluggish, sloppy, slithery, sleazy - is controversial, but it is clear that the common sounds
in such examples bear no direct semantic content, and the signals are therefore not compositional.
What then, does the model say about the evolution of compositional semantics? The assump¬
tion I make is that in a population where a language with some sort of topology preservation is
spoken, the fundamental new phenomenon of productive compositionality can more easily evolve.
Consider the example of figure 5.12a.c, which is the same system I used in figure 5.3 to explain
the use of the two-dimensional meaning- and signal-spaces and the visualisation of the topol¬
ogy preservation. Let us now interpret the horizontal axis of the meaning space as describing
agents, ranging from baby to granny, and the vertical axis as describing actions, ranging from
from lies to runs. Meaning 10 in figure 5.13a would then mean something like "the woman
walks" (the meanings here are thus assumed to be "combinatorial"; recall that I reserved the term
"compositionality" in this chapter for a property of the mapping between sounds and meanings).
Finally, let us interpret the axes of the signal space as describing two components of the signal, for
instance the horizontal axis as describing a first sound ranging from /bu/ to /bo/, and the vertical
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axis as describing a second sound ranging from /mu/ to /mo/. Signal 18 in figure 5.13b would
then correspond with something like /bima/.
/mo/ 6 13 20 27 34 41 48
5 12 19 26 33 40 47
/ma/ 4 11 18 25 32 39 46
runs 3 7 11 15 3 10 17 24 31 38 45
walks 2 6 10 14 /mi/ 2 9 16 23 30 37 44
sits 1 5 9 13 1 8 15 22 29 36 43
lies 0 4 8 12 /mu/ 0 7 14 21 28 35 42
baby girl woman granny /bu/ /bi/ /ba/ /bo/
(a) The 4x4 meaning space, with the indices
of 16 meanings
(b) The 7x7 signal space, with the indices of 49
signals
42 44 46 48
28 30 32 34
14 16 18 20
0 2 4 6
bomu bomi boma bomo
bamu bami bama bamo
bimu bimi bima bimo
bumu bumi buma bumo
(c) The 4x4 meaning space, with the indices of (d) The 4x4 meaning space, with the 16 cor-
16 corresponding signals, according to the S in responding signals
figure 5.3d.
Figure 5.13: Topology preservation interpreted as compositional semantics.
The topology preservation that emerged in the simulation of figure 5.12a, under this interpre¬
tation of the meaning and signal space, now describes a perfectly compositional system where
a "word" like ba means WALKS, and a word like mi means GIRL. Figure 5.13c (the same as
figure 5.3f) and figure 5.13d describe the same meaning space, but the latter represents signals
according to the interpretation above. This figure shows how topology preservation can, under
some assumptions, be viewed as compositional semantics.
Of course, the model does not model the evolution of productive compositionality. That is,
it is not concerned with the difficulties with or the benefits of generalising to unseen examples.
However, in a population where such a superficially compositional language is spoken, a mecha¬
nism for productive compositionality does not suffer from the initial selective disadvantages that
it would in a population that spoke a language without any structure in the mapping from mean¬
ings to signals (due to the problem of coordination). The model therefore represents a possible




The model I have presented in this chapter deals with a lexicon that relates meanings to signals
and vice versa. Unlike existing work, I have looked at situations where (i) the payoff of a meaning
as an interpretation of a signal, depends on how similar it is to the intended meaning; (ii) where
some meanings are more valuable than others; and (iii) where signals can be confused with each
other depending on their similarity. I found that the optimal lexicon, as well as the evolutionary
stable lexicon, show the following properties: specificity, coherence, distinctiveness, regularity
and the sacrificing of meanings with low value.
This model is perhaps interesting in itself, and the measures could potentially be related to
empirical observation of communication systems. For the evolution of compositional semantics it
offers a possible solution to some of the problems of existing models. Analogous to the model of
chapter 4, this model shows a path ofever increasing fitness from a non-compositional to a super¬
ficially compositional language. I suggest that this can be the intermediate step that productive




In this chapter I discuss a third major transition in the evolution
of language: the emergence of hierarchical phrase-structure. I
first briefly sketch what it is, and then introduce some of the
formal models that have been proposed to describe its nature,
its acquisition and its evolution. I then present a new model that
relaxes some of the simplifying assumptions in existing models.
1 The work that I describe here builds on joint work with Paulien Hogeweg, which appeared in Zuidema & Hogeweg,
2000 (see appendix C of this thesis), and with Tim O'Donnell, which appeared in O'Donnell & Zuidema, 2004 (see
appendix C). Most results described here have appeared in Zuidema, 2003a (see appendix C). All modelling, graphs
and text in this chapter are my own.
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6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Phrase-Structure in Natural Language
In the previous chapter I have discussed compositionality in natural language, where the meaning
of combinations is a function of the meaning of the parts and the way they are put together. The
combination of a proper noun (Mary) and an intransitive verb (walks) is perhaps the simplest
example: the meaning of the compound depends on the meaning of the parts. However, the way
words and morphemes are combined in most natural language sentences is considerably more
complex. Consider the following example sentence:
(6.1) "The clever mouse enjoys seeing the dog chase the cat".
Obviously, the meaning of the sentence depends on the meaning of the words, but crucially these
meanings need to be combined in a specific order. Thus, clever says something about the mouse,
and not about the dog or the cat. Similarly, only the mouse is enjoying and seeing, and only
the dog is chasing. The words clever and the mouse thus need to be first combined with each
other, and subsequently with enjoying and so-forth. Moreover, if we compare this sentence with
for instance "the mouse enjoys sleeping", it is clear that the clever mouse and the mouse, and
sleeping and seeing the dog chase the cat play the same parts in their respective sentences. Such
phrases (a word, or a number of words grouped together) can be used in the same positions, and,
hence, are of the same syntactic category. Other phrases cannot be used in the same positions;
they are of a different syntactic category.
The fundamental observation is that underlying a sentence like example 6.1 is a level of organ¬
isation that we can call phrase-structure (Chomsky, 1955, 1957; Higginbotham, 1997). Phrases
can be further combined into larger phrases, i.e. the structure is hierarchical, and such larger
phrases might be of the same syntactic category as one of the smaller phrases they contain, i.e.
the structure is recursive. All combinations are guided by rules of combination that regulate which
phrases of which category can be combined into larger phrases. The phrase-structure of a sen¬
tence can be represented with brackets, or more graphically as a tree. We can assign the following
structure to the example sentence:
[[The [clever mouse]] [enjoys [seeing [[the dog] [chase [the cat]]]]]]. (6.2)
If we add linguistic category labels to each of the phrases, this becomes a cumbersome formula,
which is more clearly represented as the tree in figure 6.1 (here difficulties with inflection, agree¬










the dog Chase Art N
I I
the cat
Figure 6.1: The conventional tree representation of the hierarchical phrase-structure of the example
sentence.
Since Chomsky (1957), recursive, hierarchical phrase-structure (henceforth, "phrase-structure")
has been widely recognised as a crucial design feature of human language. Jackendoff (1999,
2002) lists phrase-structure (without the subtleties of syntax in modem languages, such as func¬
tion words, agreement and case marking) as one of the major innovations in the evolution of
language. Current linguistic theories differ in whether they consider phrase-structure a primi¬
tive or an emergent property of resolving the semantic and syntactic dependencies in a sentence
(Rambow & Joshi, 1994). Nevertheless, there is consensus that formalisms for describing natural
language syntax need to account for the hierarchical and recursive structure of sentences. Context-
free phrase-structure grammars are the archetype formalism that can deal with these features, but
many other adequate formalisms exist. However, formalisms such as Markov processes (proba¬
bilistic finite-state grammars) or schema's with fixed slots (1st, 2nd, 3d word etc. in the sentence),
which occasionally emerge in debates about domain-specificity and innateness of language, fail
this requirement. In natural languages, phrases can, at any point in a sentence, be blown-up to
arbitrary length (e.g. replace "the clever mouse" with "the clever mouse, who all children in the
world love and admire,"). The inadequate formalisms would need a new path or schema for each
extension, without a systematic relation between subsequent versions of the sentence2.
In contrast, context-free phrase-structure grammars can deal with such long-distance de¬
pendencies, and recursive, hierarchical phrase-structure in general. Context-free grammars are
2Researchers proposing such formalisms often argue that "language really is finite" (e.g. Reich, 1969); but the issue
is not with (in)finiteness, but with a systematic relation between grammatical sentences.
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rewriting grammars, and thus specified by two sets of symbols, the terminal symbols Vte and the
non-terminal symbols Vnt and a set of production rules (see table 3.1 in chapter 3). The set of
strings that a rewriting grammar can generate is called a language; context-free grammars can
generate languages from the class of context-free languages. Informally, the context-freeness im¬
plies that the production rules are restricted to those of the form A i—> cr, where A is a single,
non-terminal symbol (A € Vnt), and a is a string of any number of terminal or nonterminal sym¬
bols (a € (Vnt U Vte)*). A sentence like example 6.1 is derived by starting with a start-symbol
S, and replacing it with the symbols NP and VP by applying a rule S i—> NP VP. The tree in
figure 6.1 shows all the subsequent applications of rules, all of which are context-free, necessary
to finally produce the whole sentence.
With the analysis of the power of different formalisms, Chomsky established a hierarchy of
formal languages that is now termed the Chomsky Hierarchy (introduced in chapter 3). Finite-
state languages in that hierarchy are languages that can be recognised by rewriting grammars
with more restrictions than context-free (there is only a single non-terminal on the right-hand
side of rules, and all terminal symbols occur on the right side of that non-terminal); context-
sensitive languages can be recognised by grammars with fewer restrictions (rules may be of the
form vAw i—> vaw, where A and a are defined as before, but v,w £ (Vnt U Vte)* represent a
context that is a necessary condition for application of the rule).
A fundamental task for theoretical linguistics has been to locate adequate formalisms for nat¬
ural language syntax on that hierarchy. Chomsky (1957) argued that even context-free grammars
are not powerful enough to model some frequent syntactic phenomena, and proposed "transfor¬
mations" as a solution. In the early eighties it was shown that Chomsky's original arguments did
not hold (Gazdar, 1981), and, in most linguistic frameworks, the traditional transformations were
abandoned again. Only a few years later, it emerged that there are in fact syntactic phenomena
in natural languages - although different from Chomsky's examples - that place them outside the
class of context-free languages (Huybrechts, 1984; Shieber, 1985). It is now believed that for
adequately modelling natural languages, the weak generative capacity of a formalism needs to be
slightly more than context-free.
However, it is also clear that not all context-sensitive languages can be natural languages,
because that class includes languages that are completely dysfunctional for communication (for
instance, languages with only prohibitively long sentences). The class of possible natural lan¬
guages is thus a different set, that is likely to be a subset of the context-sensitive languages (and
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probably disjoint from the context-free, and hence, finite-state languages3) but that is constrained
in many ways that have nothing to do with the Chomsky Hierarchy. This is sketched in figure 6.2.
The class of possible human languages is sometimes termed "Universal Grammar" (e.g. Nowak
et al., 2002), although that term is more commonly used to describe the universal, innate compo¬
nent of natural languages.
Figure 6.2: The four main classes of languages from the Chomsky Hierarchy and the class of pos¬
sible natural languages (UG). Type 3 languages are those recognised by finite-state grammars;
type 2 those recognised by context-free grammars; type 1 those recognised by context-sensitive
grammars; type 0 those recognised by any rewriting grammar (that is, by any computable function
/ Turing-machine). Note that £3 C £2 C £1 C £o- That is, the class of type 3 languages is a
proper subset of the class of type 2 languages and so forth.
Using empirical observations on linguistic diversity and language acquisition and use, lin¬
guists have tried to identify the relevant constraints and to find formalisms that account for such
constraints in the most natural way possible. Joshi (1985) proposed, based on his work on "Tree-
Adjoining Grammars", that the subclass of context-sensitive languages that are good models of
natural language, can be characterised as the class of mildly context-sensitive languages. Such
languages have a number of special properties, including being parsable in polynomial time and
the so-called "constant growth" property. Since several other popular formalisms have been
shown or conjectured to be mildly context-sensitive (Joshi et al., 1991), some consensus has
emerged about the upper and lower bound on the power of grammar formalisms.
3 Note, however, that it has not been established that all natural languages fall outside the context-free or even the
finite-state languages, nor that no (currently unknown) syntactic constructions exist in some language that go beyond
(mildly) context-sensitive power. Hence, the class of possible natural languages could intersect with all main classes
of the Chomsky Hierarchy. Most current theories of syntax, however, assume that the computational procedures
underlying all human languages are very similar; if the semantics in one human language requires trans-context free
power, then it is likely, according to these theories, that all human languages do.
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Unfortunately, otherwise much disagreement remains in the field about the appropriate for¬
malisms and the nature of these constraints, and a great many alternative frameworks for describ¬
ing syntax exist, each with many practitioners. I will not attempt to review these frameworks,
but they include Government & Binding / Principles & Parameters (GB/PP, Chomsky, 1981),
Head-driven Phrase-Structure Grammar (HPSG, Pollard & Sag, 1994), Combinatory Categorial
Grammar (CCG, Steedman, 2000; Steedman & Baldridge, 2003), Optimality Theory (OT, Prince
& Smolensky, 2004), Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG, Kaplan & Bresnan, 1982), Tree Ad¬
joining Grammars (TAG, Joshi et ah, 1991), the Minimalist Program (MP, Chomsky, 1995) and
Construction Grammar (Kay & Fillmore, 1999; Goldberg, 1995). Common themes can be iden¬
tified in recent developments in these different frameworks. Other than mild context-sensitivity,
these include lexicalisation (where productive rules are always associated with specific words),
heterogeneity, redundancy and stochasticity. Nevertheless, the differences between the frame¬
works - both in methodology and in content - are enormous, and a major obstacle for pursuing
interdisciplinary work on the psychology, biology or indeed the evolution of language.
6.1.2 Evolution ofhierarchical phrase-structure
Despite the many controversies in linguistics, there seems to be a consensus that natural languages
exhibit recursive, hierarchical phrase-structure. It is clear that this feature poses requirements on
the cognitive abilities of language users. They need to be able to produce and interpret sentences
with that structure. Moreover, infants need to acquire the syntax of their native language from
observations of the use of language around them, without much or any explicit instruction. With
language being such a salient behaviour of humans, the origins of these abilities in humans, and
these patterns in natural languages, are a fundamental question for both evolutionary biology and
cognitive science.
However, the poly-paradigmatic state of linguistics presents evolutionists with a difficult
problem: how can we say anything sensible about the origins of phrase-structure and Universal
Grammar, if we cannot even agree on what it is and how we should describe it? In particular, even
if we agree on a description of hierarchical phrase-structure, how do we decide on a reasonable
strategy-set and payoff function that we need for an evolutionary scenario?
Many linguists have simply resisted speculating about these issues. Noam Chomsky, notably,
has dismissed such speculations as untestable stories (e.g. Chomsky, 2002). Many non-linguists,
on the other hand, have simply ignored the complexities of syntax, and have focused on speech
and compositionality instead, apparently assuming that syntax would simply follow (as the rare
linguists concerned with evolution complain, e.g. Newmeyer, 2003; Bickerton, 2003b; Hurford,
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2002b). Yet others, including Pinker & Bloom (1990) and Jackendoff (2002) have taken up
the challenge and provided some intuition for selective advantages of grammatical constructs.
However, these verbal accounts have remained so much underspecified that it is difficult to even
start constructing the assumed strategy set, payoff function and initial selective advantage.
In this chapter I will evaluate a number of more or less formal approaches to this issue. I
will first discuss the models of Batali (2002) and Kirby (2002a) and a number of related models.
These authors leave hardly any role for natural selection (in a sense, they consider a strategy-set
in the evolution of grammatical language that includes just one learning strategy). Batali and
Kirby view hierarchical phrase-structure as an emergent property of the negotiation or iterated
learning of a communication system in a population of agents. I will argue, as I did in previous
chapters, that we need to evaluate the fitness consequences of different outcomes of such self-
organising processes. However, I will also argue that these models show that the evolution of
recursive, hierarchical phrase-structure differs in important ways from the evolutionary problems
considered in chapters 4 and 5.
Secondly, I will discuss a number of studies (Hashimoto & Ikegami, 1996; Nowak et a/.,
2002; Fitch & Hauser, 2004) that implicitly or explicitly use classes from the Chomsky Hierarchy
as the strategy set. This is an attractive approach, because the Chomsky Hierarchy offers some
well-understood concepts and tools, and the location of natural language on the Hierarchy is one
of the few topics in linguistics for which a broad consensus exists. Nevertheless, I will argue that
the Hierarchy is not suitable to serve as a strategy set, because it is not fine-grained enough and
because the different class boundaries in the hierarchy have no natural biological interpretation.
Thirdly, I will discuss a model by Nowak et a1. (2001). This model is based on what we
can call the Uniformity Assumption: the idea that all possible languages are of equal quality
and equally likely to be the target of learning. This model is interesting because it is elegant
and ambitious. However, I will argue that the crucial dependence on the Uniformity Assumption
ultimately makes the model of Nowak et al. of limited use.
In the rest of this chapter I will present a new model that further illustrates the difficulties with
the Uniformity Assumption in language evolution models, and highlights the interactions between
cultural and biological evolution. I will argue, based on this model, that a better understanding of
this interaction is crucial for understanding the origins of phrase-structure.
6.2 Related Work
6.2.1 Cultural Evolution in Expression-Induction models
Batali (2002) presents an explanation for the origins of phrase-structure in natural languages
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that does not involve biological evolution. Batali is interested in the properties of a language
"negotiated" between agents in a population. The agents in his simulation come equipped with the
ability to represent grammatical structures, to produce and interpret sentences, and to learn from
experience (induction)4. In every step in the simulation, a random speaker is selected from the
population and confronted with a logical formula from a predefined meaning space. The speaker
produces an utterance, and the hearer receives both the utterance and the meaning and updates her
memory. The model is an instance of what Hurford (2002a) calls "Expression-Induction models",
where structure emerges in a cycle of expression of I-language as E-language, and induction of
I-language from E-language.
In the model, knowledge of words and grammar is encoded in a collection of "exemplars",
each with an associated cost. When an agent in the role of speaker is presented with a meaning,
she searches for the cheapest way to express it. In the initial phase of the simulation, there is
no common language and she simply generates a random string of characters, even though a
high cost (proportional to the number of symbols in the signal and the number of predicates in
the meaning) is associated with this operation. When agents, in the role of hearers, receive an
unrecognised form-meaning pair, they simply store it as a holistic exemplar (a tree of depth 1),
with associated initial cost Co = 1.0.
After a number of cycles, agents will have stored a number of different exemplars. With
more and more exemplars stored, it becomes increasingly likely that the cheapest way to express
a given meaning is by reusing an existing exemplar, or by combining or modifying exemplars.
Two exemplars A and B, when combined, yield an exemplar E that is a tree, with as root the
combination of the meanings of A and B (with the arguments possibly renamed), and as daughters
the two exemplars (see figure 6.3). An exemplar can be modified by replacing a subtree. The
costs of a combination of exemplars is the sum of the costs of the parts, plus an additional cost for
modifying and combining them. This way, tree-structured exemplars are created; nodes in these
trees are labelled with semantic information (predicate logic expressions, rather than conventional
part of speech tags).
The "best" phrase-structure of a given sentence in Batali's model, is the one that has the lowest
total costs. Costs in Batali's model thus play the same role as probabilities in the probabilistic
grammar formalisms used in computational linguistics (e.g. Manning & Schiitze, 1999). In its
reliance on storage of many exemplars, the model is reminiscent of the Data-Oriented Parsing
model from that field (Bod, 1998).
4I use the terms "learning" and "induction" interchangeably and in a very broad sense, that includes any change in













(a) Exemplar A with
cost kA, pairing the
signal "ala" with the
meaning "object 1 is a
snake".
(b) Exemplar B with




(c) Exemplar C with
cost kc, pairing the
signal "isi" with the






zapodo (snake 1) (sang 1)
(d) Exemplar D, resulting from
the "invention" operation, with
cost ko — kinvention, pair¬
ing the signal "zapodo" with the
meaning "the snake sang".
1 1
ala eqeg
(e) Exemplar E = A o B, resulting
from combining existing exemplars,
with cost kE = kA+kB + kcornbine,
pairing the signal "alaeqeg" with the
meaning "the snake sang".
(moose l)(sang 1)
(moose 1) (sang 1)
I I
isi eqeg
(f) Exemplar F = E *— C with cost
kF = ks + kc + kmodify, pairing
the signal "isieqeg" with the meaning
"the moose sang".
Figure 6.3: Exemplars and combinations of exemplars in Batali's (2002) model.
160 CHAPTER 6. HIERARCHICAL PHRASE-STRUCTURE
When an exemplar is reused and leads to a successful communication (that is, the speaker's
intention and the hearer's interpretation are identical), its cost goes down. Therefore, exemplars
that prove useful in different combinations will be favoured, giving rise to the cultural evolution
of language structure5. Batali finds that the competition between exemplars leads to recursive and
compositional grammars, with which the agents can communicate about many more meanings
than they have exemplars. Batali estimates that the languages negotiated in the final stages of the
simulations can accurately convey 2.3 x 1013 different meanings (with a communicative accuracy
of around 98%), after fewer than 10 thousand learning observations and with several hundreds of
exemplars stored (unused exemplars are removed after a few cycles). Crucially, the languages in
these simulations, as in the Iterated Learning Model (Kirby, 2000), change and adapt to the bias
of the learning algorithm. The emerging languages share some important characteristics with
natural language including compositionality, phrase-structure and recursion, as well as specific
features such as agreement, reflexives and function words.
Steels (2004) presents a similar model, with a population of agents that negotiate grammatical
rules to express predicate-logic formulae. Like Batali, Steels' rules can associate a single word
or chunk of words with a single meaning, or associate with complex meanings. Also like Batali,
Steels associates a score with each of the rules in the emerging grammars. These scores go up
and down with successful or unsuccessful use, and regulate the choice from a set of alternative
parses.
The model differs from Batali's in a numbers of ways. First, Steels' formalism is much more
complex and, among other things, allows for both flexible and fixed constituent order rules. Such
rules are expressed as optional constraints. E.g., precedes(x, y) expresses the constraint that the
yield of constituent x must precede the yield of constituent y. The formalism decouples immediate
dominance from linear precedence (Gazdar & Pullum, 1981). Second, in Steels' "constructivist"
approach, a speaker uses herself and her knowledge of language as a model of the hearer. When
given a meaning that cannot be readily expressed with existing rules, new rules are created to
generate an utterance that the speaker herself would interpret correctly. Finally, in Steels' model
the meanings are grounded in an actual machine vision system that generates predicate-logic ex¬
pressions from video input, which leads to occasional confusion about the topic of a conversation.
It is not clear, however, how these expressions differ qualitatively from the predefined meaning
space of Batali.
5I will use the term "cultural evolution" here in a broad sense, without specifying the reproducers, replicators and
selection pressures as discussed in chapter 2. It would be interesting to work out in detail the analogy between biolog¬
ical evolution and the dynamics in the models of Batali and others, but for now it suffices to note that in these models
structure emerges over time (hence, "evolution") in a process where learners leam from learners (hence, "cultural").
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Steels' ideas about the learning mechanism are interesting, but unfortunately difficult to eval¬
uate because the algorithm is not precisely defined, the relation with existing models ignored6 and
very few results have been reported. Both Steels and Batali have chosen to work with idiosyn¬
cratic formalisms instead of some of the well understood formalisms from theoretical linguistics,
presumably out of disagreement with the "nativist" theories of language, in the context of which
most of these formalisms were originally developed. Nevertheless, I strongly suspect their for¬
malisms are in fact formally equivalent to some member of the family of stochastic tree grammars
(Joshi & Sakar, 2003); for comparison with other work, it would be better to design learning mod¬
els that work with well-understood formalisms instead.
Hurford (2000) and Kirby (2002a) present related models that do use such well-understood
formalisms. Both are versions of the iterated learning model discussed in chapter 5 (Kirby, 2000).
Recall that in that earlier model, individuals can produce and interpret sentences, and have a
language acquisition procedure to learn a context-free grammar from each other. The model
considers the transmission of language from generation to generation, where each generation is
represented with just a single agent (or a small number of agents, as in Hurford's model). At every
step the parent presents a relatively small number of examples of form-meaning pairs to the child
(the very first parent creates random strings for each of the meanings it wants to express). The
child then uses these examples to induce her own grammar. In the next iteration the child becomes
the parent, and a new individual becomes the child. The process is repeated many times. In the
iterated transmission steps the language becomes easier and easier to learn, because the language
adapts to the learning algorithm by becoming more and more structured. Note that knowledge of
language is transmitted vertically from generation to generation, unlike the models of Batali and
Steels where the language is negotiated horizontally with other members of a fixed population.
In Kirby (2000), there was a finite number of possible meanings - all combinations of agents,
actions and patients. Both Hurford (2000) and Kirby (2002a) use a predicate logic based seman¬
tics that has recursive structure. They both find - using different learning algorithms - that the
emerging grammars show recursive, hierarchical phrase-structure. Not only simple composition-
ality, but also the phrase-structure of natural languages could be the result of a cultural selection
pressure for increased learnability. Interestingly, the necessary constraints for learnability need
not evolve as a separate restrictive Universal Grammar, as in some "nativist" theories of language
acquisition, but follow logically from the fact that a child only needs to learn languages that have
6Steels (2004), when introducing the syntactic formalism, makes no reference to existing linguistic formalisms
(except construction grammar) despite obvious parallels, nor does he, when introducing the learning procedure refer
to any existing work on grammar induction, including even Batali's.
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been learnt by previous generations. This point will be worked out later in this chapter and in the
next.
The use of more or less standard formalisms makes these models easier to understand, and
reveals a number of strong assumptions, including a recursive, hierarchically structured mean¬
ing space and "innate" procedures for searching and combining the units of language. Similar
assumptions were made in the models of Batali and Steels, but because of the unconventional
formalisms and the lack of details, it remains difficult to describe and evaluate these assumptions.
In Kirby's model each generation consists of just a single agent and the model considers a large
meaning space. Hurford's model considers a small population of four agents per generation, and
only a small meaning space. An important question is how much the results depend on the spe¬
cific choices for modelling learning, meaning, grammar, the interaction between agents and for
the population size. I am not aware of any subsequent work on Hurford's model, but Smith &
Hurford (2003) reimplemented Kirby's model and studied how well it fares in a larger popula¬
tion, where agents learn from multiple "cultural" parents and from peers. They report that similar
results could be obtained, but only with a very careful choice of parameters.
More work remains to clarify the relation between the different models and to identify the
necessary and sufficient conditions for recursive, hierarchical phrase-structure to emerge. If the
results are confirmed in subsequent work this would constitute a compelling explanation for the
(proximate) origins of phrase-structure in human languages: in a population of agents with cog¬
nitive abilities and communicative intentions as in this model, it will emerge as the result of the
negotiation of a language in the population. The models, however, do not explain the (ultimate)
origins of these cognitive abilities. Why do agents have the production, interpretation and ac¬
quisition procedures that they have? It is possible, of course, that these abilities are accidental
properties of the human brain, that evolved under selection pressures independent from language.
It is difficult to assess the plausibility of that assumption. In the models, a process of cultural evo¬
lution produces languages with interesting properties; as I argued in previous chapters, the next
step is to study the fitness consequences of such processes. Results such as those of Batali, Steels,
Hurford and Kirby would be much strengthened if one could show that the learning algorithm
used is one from a family of "natural" algorithms, and that within that family there is a path of
ever increasing fitness towards it.
I have reviewed these Expression-Induction models here at some length because I believe
they bring an important lesson for modelling the evolution of syntax. These models show - as
does the model developed later in this chapter - that, for each learning algorithm A, it is useful
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to distinguish between the set of languages IZa that can be represented by the formalism used
by A, the set La that can be learnt by A, and the set 1a that are stable outcomes of a process of
cultural evolution that results from repeated application of A. In this chapter, I will explore the
implications of this distinction for scenarios of the evolution of phrase-structure.
The difficulties with formulating relevant models of the evolution of hierarchical phrase-
structure arise, in part, from the fact that human languages are both the result and the object
of a learning process. When we talk about the biological evolution of language, we really talk
about the evolution of the learning mechanisms. In the case of phonology and compositionality,
it seemed reasonable to describe the strategy set for evolution in terms of the end results of a
learning process. Implicit in that decision was the assumption that the signal space considered
in chapter 4 and the signal-meaning mappings in chapter 5 were reasonably close to the actual
strategy sets of learning mechanisms available for evolution.
In the case of phrase-structure it is much harder to choose a reasonable strategy set, because
the learning problem is much more difficult. Given a fully defined learning algorithm like Batali's
(2002) or Kirby's (2002), it is extremely difficult to describe (i) the set of languages that it can
learn {la), (ii) the languages that would result from cultural evolution in a population {1a), (iii)
the changes to these sets when we make a small change in the learning algorithm. Yet, we need
to characterise these sets to assess the fitness consequences of changes to the algorithm. I will
now discuss accounts of the evolution of phrase-structure based on notions from the Chomsky
Hierarchy, and argue that the failure to account for learning and cultural evolution is where they
go wrong.
6.2.2 Natural Selection & the Chomsky Hierarchy
When one, unlike Batali and others, tries to give an account of the origins of phrase-structure
that does involve natural selection, one immediately faces the problem of formulating a plausible
strategy set and payoff function. Given the consensus on characterising natural languages in terms
of the Chomsky Hierarchy, and the mathematical sophistication of such characterisations, it seems
an attractive proposal to define the strategies and payoffs in the evolution of syntactic language
in the same terms. For instance, Nowak et al. (2002), and similarly Komarova & Nowak (2003)
review formal approaches to the evolution of language. They present the Chomsky Hierarchy for
describing language, along with (statistical) learning theory for describing language acquisition
and the replicator equations for describing evolution. They conclude that "these approaches need
to be combined", but do not attempt such an integration.
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I believe a serious attempt to integrate these formal frameworks would soon show that the
Chomsky Hierarchy is in fact of little help in understanding the origins of syntax. As I briefly
discussed in chapter 3, the classes of the Chomsky Hierarchy are too coarse. When considering the
architectural constraints on the neural hardware, it seems that complexity in terms of the hierarchy
is extremely easy to get (Siegelmann & Sontag, 1991; Wolfram, 2002). When considering the
difficulties of parsing or learning, it seems the relevant distinctions cut through all main classes
of hierarchy (Barton & Berwick, 1987; Gold, 1967). Nevertheless, the idea of evolution having
"climbed the Chomsky Hierarchy" is implicit in many accounts. Two papers that have worked
this out in some more detail are Fitch & Hauser (2004) and Hashimoto & Ikegami (1996).
Fitch & Hauser (2004) attempt to show that in evolution, human processing capabilities have
crossed the boundary between finite-state and context-free languages, whereas those of tamarins
(and by assumption other non-human primates) have not. They presented human and monkey
subjects in the experiment with strings drawn from the finite-state language (ab)n (with for in¬
stance the strings abab and ababab) or from the context-free language anbn (with the strings aabb
and aaabbb). The a's and 6's are monosyllabic sounds produced by a human male and female
respectively. The n in the experiments is limited to values up to n < 3.
The subjects were trained on samples from one language, and then tested on whether they
can distinguish samples from this language from the other. Fitch & Hauser found that humans
easily pass this test: when trained on either the finite-state or the context-free language, they reject
samples from the other. Tamarins, on the other hand, fail the test in the context-free condition.
When trained on the context-free language, they accept both the context-free and finite-state test
samples.
These results are intriguing. At first sight they support the idea that humans have, in their
evolution, moved up to a different level of the Chomsky Hierarchy, and some researchers have
already enthusiastically hailed this conclusion (Friederici, 2004). However, there is a number of
difficulties with this analysis. First, in experimental formal language theory (O'Donnell, 2004) an
inherent methodological difficulty is that although formal languages are typically infinite, experi¬
ments necessarily work with finite data. To support the conclusion above, one needs to show that
the language human subjects acquire really is a context-free language, and not the finite subset
that they see during training (see figure 6.4). This can be assessed by testing whether subjects
generalise to samples with a larger n than they were trained on. In the supplementary material to
Fitch & Hauser (2004), the authors report that this experiment was performed and that the human
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subjects indeed seem to have acquired the context-free language, but a recent replication disputes
this claim (Perruchet & Rey, 2004).
Figure 6.4: In formal language theory, a language is a possibly infinite set of strings over some
alphabet, such as the languages AnBm, AnBn or {AB, AABB, AAABBB}. A class of lan¬
guages is a possibly infinite set of languages. Two important classes are the finite-state languages
(FSL), such as the language AnBm, and the context-free languages (CFL), such as the language
AnBn. Crucially, the class of finite-state languages is contained in the class of context-free lan¬
guages (fig. a). The problem for experimental formal language theory is that every context-free
language is a subset of some finite-state language, as well as a superset of many other finite-state
languages (fig. b). To make the argument that humans, but not monkeys, can process a language
that is outside the class of finite-state languages, one needs to show that every possible way of
distinguishing the grammatical from the ungrammatical utterances must involve hypothesising
some language outside the set of the finite-state languages. In the case of the Fitch and Hauser
experiments this involves, at the very least, ruling out the possibility that what has been learnt is
either a finite subset of a non-finite state language (by testing for generalisation to strings with
n > 3) or a finite-state superset of such a language (by testing for the ungrammaticality of strings
with m ^ n).
The second, and more interesting problem is that there exists a finite-state grammar anbm
that accepts all context-free samples in the experiment, and rejects all finite-state samples (if
n > 1). That is, the finite-state language anbm properly contains anbn but not (ab)n. Even
if one could show that the human subjects did not acquire the finite-state superlanguage7, the
question remains: if tamarins can learn finite-state languages, why haven't they acquired anbml
7Tecumseh Fitch, p.c., reports that this has also been established experimentally.
(a) The class of context-free lan¬
guages (CFL) is a superset of
the class of finite-state languages
(FSL).
(b) The context-free lan¬
guage AnBn is a sub¬
set of the FSL AnBm,
and a superset of the FSL
{AB, AABB, AAABBB}.
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The fact that they haven't suggests the relevant constraints on learning in this experiment, and
the differences between humans and monkeys, are not captured by notions from the Chomsky
Hierarchy8.
A very different study that considers the applicability of the Chomsky Hierarchy to language
evolution is Hashimoto & Ikegami (1996). These authors present a simulation model of the
evolution of phrase-structure rules in a population of agents. The agents have a fixed, innate
context-free grammar, with which they (in the role of speaker) generate strings, and (in the role
of hearer) parse strings received from speakers. The fitness of an agent in the model depends,
through a rather complicated pay-off function, on the number of successful interactions she has
been involved in, either as a speaker or as a hearer, and the length and novelty of the strings
produced or received. After a number of interactions in which fitness is assessed, agents produce
offspring proportional to their fitness and die. Every agent of the next generation inherits the
grammar of a single parent. With fixed probabilities, some mutations occur that add or delete a
random rule, or add, delete or substitute a random symbol in a rule.
Of course, context-free grammars can model recursive, hierarchical phrase-structure, but they
can also model a simple (finite) "lexical" strategy (see figure 3.4) or (finite-state) tail-recursion.
For instance, a grammar {S i—» the cat fears the dog, S i—> the dog fears the cat} generates two
sentences holistically, without assigning any phrase-structure to them. At the start of the simu¬
lations agents are initialised with just one lexical rule in their grammar. Lexical grammars need
one rule for each sentence they generate; combinatorial and recursive grammars, in contrast, can
generate many more sentences than they have rules. Because there is no limit on the number of
rules, both strategies could in principal generate all possible strings in the finite domain that was
used. However, in the mutation scheme used, at most one rule is added at a time. Expressive¬
ness (measured as the number of distinct strings of some finite maximum length) grows much
faster with grammar size using a syntactic strategy, and, under the parameter settings considered,
syntactic agents can therefore out-compete non-syntactic ones.
Hashimoto & Ikegami make an unconvincing attempt to discuss these results as the initial
phase of a climb in the Chomsky Hierarchy. Indeed, the finite grammars used at initialisation
are finite-state, whereas the grammars in final stages are not. However, that fact appears acci¬
dental, rather than saying anything substantial about the evolutionary dynamics in the simulation.
First, with the mutation scheme used, even random drift for a small number of generations would
8The fact that there exists a finite-state language that the tamarins cannot learn is not surprising of course. The point
here is that the monkeys might not acquire context-free anbn for the very same reasons as why they do not acquire
finite-state anbm.
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take the grammars out of the finite-state class. For instance, finite-state {S ab} is only two
mutations away from context-free {s i—> ab, S i—» aSbj. Second, whether or not a grammar is
finite-state or not, appears to have very little to do with fitness. The fitness scheme used only
considers the number of different strings a grammar can produce and parse. Now observe that
a finite-state grammar {s i—> a|6|aS|6s} is maximally expressive (for Vte = {a, 6}), and much
more so than for instance context-free grammar {s i—> a6|aS6}.
Note that in this model a grammar that accepts every possible string has maximum fitness,
whereas in natural language the whole notion of "grammaticality" implies that many possible
strings are in fact ungrammatical. Despite this unrealistic feature, Hashimoto & Ikegami's model
fitness scheme leads to some interesting observations. The payoff function has some counterin¬
tuitive and interesting consequences due to the fact that it is not a fixed measure, but depends
on the kind of grammars that are present in the population. For instance, they find that the most
expressive agents are not necessarily the most successful, because they are poorly understood by
others in the population, and that a score for not being recognised accelerates the evolution of
complex phrase-structure.
In my own previous work (Zuidema, 2000; Zuidema & Hogeweg, 2000), I have reimple-
mented, simplified and extended the Hashimoto-Ikegami model. This new model still uses
context-free grammars as the strategy set, and the number of strings in an agent's language that are
shared with others as the basis for the payoff function. I found that the reason "syntax" evolved
in the original model, is that the authors used a rather arbitrary scoring scheme, where there is a
significant payoff for agents that produce novel and complex strings, independent of whether they
are understood or not (i.e. a selection pressure that is, in part, frequency-independent).
When this unrealistic scoring scheme is replaced by a number of simple payoff functions, an
interesting paradox emerges (Zuidema & Hogeweg, 2000). If both speakers and hearers benefit
from successful communication (the mutual benefit condition), every linguistic innovation rep¬
resents an initial selective disadvantage, because it leads to increased confusion. In this condition,
complex syntax does not evolve9. On the other hand, if only hearers benefit (the hearer benefit
condition), the willingness to speak is lost, because only the speaker's competitors benefit from
her speaking. In the first version of the model, where production is enforced, this shows itself
in the development of excessively complex grammars, which make the produced strings often
impossible to parse with the parsing procedure used. In a later version of the model, a parameter
9 Although it would be stable once it got established, because it is always best to have the same language as everyone
else in the population.
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was introduced that regulates the probability of producing strings. When allowed to evolve, the
parameter went quickly to 0, which meant that agents did not communicate at all anymore.
The paradox is thus that if you benefit from others understanding you, you shouldn't say
anything novel, whereas if you don't benefit, it's best not to say anything at all. This paradox
is a natural consequence of the problems of coordination and cooperation that I discussed in
chapter 2, and it occurs also in simple models of the evolution of phonology and vocabulary. It
is important, however, to work out solutions to this paradox that are relevant for the evolution of
phrase-structure.
Pinker & Bloom (1990) suggest one such solution. They observe that for complex syntactic
constructions, comprehension is always ahead of production, in acquisition, in use and perhaps
also in evolution. We can thus imagine a scenario where syntactic innovations do offer an imme¬
diate selective advantage in the mutual benefit condition, because hearers can understand the new
constructions even though they cannot actively use them themselves. It would be interesting to
work out this proposal in a formal model.
Alternatively, under the hearer-benefit condition, a possibility might be that the willingness
to speak is maintained through kin selection, whereas the evolution of complex syntax is driven
by both the benefits of sharing more information with kin, and the benefits of making messages
difficult to understand to non-kin. This could be called the encryption hypothesis (Will Lowe,
p.c.). In Zuidema (2000) and Zuidema & Hogeweg (2000) we studied a simulation model where
agents are placed on a 2d spatial grid. Preliminary results supported this hypothesis, but more
formal work on this hypothesis, in the framework of social evolution theory (chapter 2), would
be worthwhile. A related idea is what Fitch (2000) calls the "password hypothesis" about the
evolution of complex patterns in bird song, which says that the function of these patterns is to
distinguish kin from non-kin intruders.
In summary, there have been efforts by Fitch & Hauser (2004), Hashimoto & Ikegami (1996),
myself and others to find a plausible scenario for the evolution of recursive, hierarchical phrase-
structure using the classes of rewriting grammars from the Chomsky Hierarchy. In such a sce¬
nario, two or more stages are postulated (that is, finite-stateness and context-freeness), and ex¬
periments or simulations are performed to show that non-human primates are in one stage, and
humans in another, or that simulated evolution can guide a population from one stage to the other.
These efforts run into a number of problems. First, it is clear that the actual strategy set
available to evolution is much more constrained. For instance, the tamarins in the Fitch & Hauser
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experiments do not learn anbm and the agents in the simulations cannot parse many of the finite-
state and context-free languages that could have been useful. How to formalise the constraints on
the strategy set from learning and parsing - that is, how to define the set of learnable languages
La - is a difficult question. In simulations we can of course use specific learning, production and
interpretation algorithms that implement these constraints without a formal characterisation of the
set La- This is the approach taken in this chapter, but it is somewhat unsatisfactory, because it is
difficult to evaluate the generality of a specific simulation.
Second, it is not clear how to assign payoffs to the strategies in such a set. One proposal is
to make payoff proportional to the number of strings in a language that are shared with others in
the population. The problem is that this gives maximum potential fitness to grammars that accept
any string over the alphabet used, which is clearly not what we see in natural language. Also, it
seems that fitness in such a scheme is completely independent from the location on the Chomsky
Hierarchy. More natural is a fitness scheme that is based not on whether a sentence can be parsed,
but on whether it is interpreted correctly10. In simulation models we can explicitly incorporate a
semantics - and reward correct interpretations - circumventing the problem of having to evaluate
the payoff of grammars on a purely syntactic level. This is perhaps the best way forward, but
again somewhat unsatisfactory because of the lack of generality.
Third, even if we choose a rather arbitrary strategy set and payoff function, it is still not
trivial to show the evolution of phrase-structure, because of the problems of cooperation and
coordination. Solutions to these problems remain an open issue.
6.2.3 The Uniformity Assumption
An approach that circumvents these problems and does give general results, is presented in
Nowak, Komarova & Niyogi (2001) and follow-up papers (Komarova, Niyogi & Nowak, 2001;
Mitchener & Nowak, 2002). This approach builds on a tradition of models of language known
as Principles & Parameters (Chomsky, 1981), and of certain abstract models of learning in learn-
ability theory (e.g. Bertolo, 2001; Niyogi, 1998). The core idea of the Principles & Parameters
approach is to parameterise the variation in possible natural languages. That is, to find a descrip¬
tion of natural languages where all differences between languages are characterised by different
values of a set of binary parameters. With such a description in hand, the task of learning a
language can now be described as the setting of these parameters. Theoretically, a description
"'The assumed function of phrase-structure in models like Hashimoto & Ikegami (1996) and Zuidema & Hogeweg
(2000) is simply to generate more messages, i.e. the quantitative advantages, and little attention has been paid to the
likely advantages in the kind of semantic information that can be encoded and the kind of generalisations it allows in
learning, i.e. the qualitative advantages. Perhaps the Chomsky Hierarchy is of more relevance there.
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of language variation and acquisition that fits this scheme is a logical possibility, if the number
of possible grammars is finite. In practise, however, such a description might be prohibitively
complex.
The description simplifies enormously with the assumption that all possible grammars are
equivalent in important ways. Such an "Uniformity Assumption" states, for instance, that all lan¬
guages are equally useful for communication and equally easy or difficult to learn. Note that such
an assumption implies that La = Ta, that is, it excludes the possibility that cultural evolution
favours some languages over others. The mathematically convenient symmetry such an assump¬
tion introduces allows one to formulate simple models of language acquisition that use only the
number of possible grammars and the number of available sentences to learn from as parameters.
Note, however, that such an assumption forces one to treat grammatical rules as separate from
the lexicon (as lexical variation clearly is unbounded), and to view child language development
as a process of jumping from one adult grammar to another (because the Uniformity Assumption
excludes growth in grammatical complexity). The assumption therefore goes hand in hand with
a view that knowledge of language is specified in great detail in an innate Universal Grammar
(UG)11. The term UG, in this tradition, can refer to both the innate language faculty and the set
of possible grammars it allows.
In line with this tradition, Nowak et al. (2001) present a model of the evolution of Universal
Grammar, where the UG is passed on to the next generation genetically and the actual grammars
passed on culturally. Each individual "knows" one of the grammars from UG. That knowledge is
passed on - strictly vertically - to her offspring, but mistakes are made in learning. If a mistake
is made, the child ends up with a different grammar from the set of possible grammars. Finally,
the authors assume that knowing a grammar i confers a fitness advantage that depends on the
frequency of grammar i in the population. That is, speakers of the most frequent language receive
most offspring. An evolving population, where the UG is constant, can thus be described in
terms of the changes in the relative frequencies Xi of each grammar type i in the population,
the probabilities Qji that a child ends up with grammar j when learning from her parent with
grammar i, and the fitness F, of a grammar i (F* = xjfji' where fjt gives the payoff from
the communication between two individuals speaking i and j).
11 Of course, many models of grammar learning have been proposed that do assume such an extensive UG, but
do relax the Uniformity Assumption somewhat. For instance, Niyogi & Berwick (1995) assume a learning model
where parameters are set based on triggers in the input data, which occur at different frequencies; Briscoe (2002a)
incorporates the possibility of prior biases in his statistical parameter procedure; in Yang (2000) the language learner
maintains multiple settings of parameters in parallel, and in learning converges to a single setting.
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The first result that Nowak et al. obtain is a "coherence threshold". This threshold is the nec¬
essary condition for grammatical coherence in a population, that is, for a majority of individuals
to use the same grammar. They show that this coherence depends on the chances that a child
has to correctly acquire her parent's grammar. This probability is described with the parameter
q. Nowak et al. show analytically that there is a minimum value for q to keep coherence in the
population. If q is lower than this threshold value, all possible grammar types are equally fre¬
quent in the population and the average communicative success is minimal. If q is higher than
this value, one grammar type is dominant; the communicative success is much higher than before
and reaches 100% if q — 1.
The second result relates this required fidelity (q\) to an upper and a lower bound on the
number b of sample sentences that a child needs. The authors consider two learning strategies, that
they claim represent the extremes on the possible strategies. The first is the "memoryless learner",
that starts with a random grammar k in UG, and jumps to a random other grammar k' every time
it is confronted with a training sentence that is inconsistent with grammar k. The second is the
"batch learner" that memorises all b training sentences it receives, and picks a random grammar
from the set of grammars consistent with all those sentences. The authors are aware, of course,
that these learning algorithms are unrealistic. However, they argue that the algorithms represent
an upper and a lower bound on the performance of realistic learning strategies.
In particular, the authors claim that the batch learner's performance is the best possible; the
minimum number of sentences bc it needs to reach the required fidelity q\ for grammatical coher¬
ence therefore represents a lower bound for any learning algorithm. The authors show that bc is
proportional to the total number of possible grammars N. The actual number of sample sentences
b is finite; Nowak et al. conclude that only if N is relatively small can a stable grammar emerge
in a population. I.e. the population dynamics require a restrictive Universal Grammar (UG).
However, in a companion paper this claim is weakened. The authors write:
"Note that the number of candidate grammars can also be infinite, provided that
children have a prior probability distribution specifying that some grammars are more
likely than others". (Komarova, Niyogi & Nowak, 2001, p. 44)
Here, they (correctly) present the finiteness of the hypothesis space as an assumption, rather than
a conclusion from the model. The authors do, however, still make the claim that human language
learning must have an intermediate performance in between that of the "memory-less learner"
and the "batch learner". This claim is the core of the approach, because it allows the authors to
study aspects of the cultural and biological evolution of language, without solving the problem
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of specifying the set of languages that can be learnt by a specific algorithm (£a) or the set that
results from cultural evolution {Ia)- In this chapter, however, I will show that this claim again
depends on the uniformity assumption. In iterated learning, even a biased learning algorithm as
mediocre as the one I present in section 6.3.1, will outperform the unbiased batch learner, because
its bias is automatically the right one.
In the third part of Nowak et a1. (2001), the authors consider the biological evolution of
alternative UGs. In their scenario, a more restrictive UG can invade a population with a less
restrictive UG, because it improves the learning accuracy. Mitchener & Nowak (2002) work out
formally the conditions for such invasions, in simple examples with 1 or 2 UGs, that allow for
1 or 2 grammars. This analysis thus deals with the invasibility constraint, and provides a path
of ever increasing fitness. However, the analysis gets extremely complex at times, even though
only extremely simplified situations are considered. Moreover, it is unclear if the methods can
be extended to deal with an non-uniform evolutionary scenario that starts with a limited proto-
language and ends with a language approaching the complexity of modem language.
In short, Nowak and colleagues worked out an elegant framework to relate evolution and
acquisition of grammars. If it could be adapted to deal with the evolution of phrase-structure per
se, and other key features of syntax, that would be major progress. Unfortunately, the tractability
of the equations depends largely on the simplifying assumption that all grammars are, in important
senses, equivalent to each other. Such uniformity is a respectable null hypothesis in many issues
in linguistics12, but when applied to language evolution it is problematic (Newmeyer, 2003). Non-
uniformity brings qualitatively different dynamics, as I will show below, but it is unclear how the
framework can be extended to deal with such cases.
Implicit in the analysis, as in other leamability models (e.g. Gold, 1967; Wexler & Culicover,
1980), is the assumption that every possible grammar from some set is equally likely to become
the target grammar for learning. If even the best possible learning algorithm cannot distinguish
between all grammars from that set, the set of allowed grammars must be restricted. However,
Expression-Induction models such as those discussed above give reason to believe that this as¬
sumption is not the most useful for language learning. Language learning is a very particular type
of learning problem, because the outcome of the learning process at one generation is the input for
the next. The samples from which a child leams with its learning procedure, are therefore biased
by the learning of previous generations that used the same procedure (Kirby, 1994; Christiansen,
1994; Deacon, 1997). In the rest of this chapter I will develop a new computational model that
12Especially, of course, in political debates about the status of minority languages.
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explores the consequences of this phenomenon for the thinking about the evolution of hierarchical
phrase-structure.
6.3 Model Description
I have discussed a number of vastly different approaches to understand the origins of phrase-
structure in natural languages. I first reviewed models known as Expression-Induction models,
that show that from rather general learning procedures languages with a non-trivial recursive,
hierarchical phrase-structure can emerge in a process of cultural evolution. I argued that these
models fall short as ultimate explanations for the origins of phrase-structure, because they do not
explain the origins of the particular learning abilities. The models do, however, have important
implications, because they show that for non-trivial learning algorithms, the set of languages that
can be represented IZa, the set that can be learnt La and the set of languages that emerges in
cultural evolution Ia are radically different sets.
I then reviewed two mathematically convenient ways to define a strategy-set, one based on
the Chomsky Hierarchy and the other based on the Uniformity Assumption. It emerged from this
review that in both approaches it is extremely difficult to incorporate the constraints from learning,
parsing/production and cultural evolution. The classes of the Chomsky Hierarchy are not suitable
to define a biological meaningful strategy set or payoff function. The Uniformity Assumption
does allow one to define strategies and payoffs and to study invasibility, but the techniques to do
so do not extend to systems without uniformity.
Hence, it seems the best way forward is to design and study simulation models - as Smith
(2003b) did for learning strategies for vocabulary and simple compositionality - that do (i) ex¬
plicitly incorporate computational procedures for the learning, interpretation and production of
hierarchical phrase-structure, (ii) model a population with cultural transmission and cultural evo¬
lution, (iii) consider variants in these procedures, and (iv) associate different fitnesses with differ¬
ent outcomes. Such models are bound to become excessively complex, so we should search for
minimal models that do include these components. In the following I will present the design of a
model that represents a step in this direction. It will not yet incorporate all four of these compo¬
nents. In particular I will not deal with (iii), because I consider only a single learning algorithm.
The goal is to design a model that includes components i, ii and iv, and is as simple as possible,
but sufficiently rich to illustrate the problems with models based on the Chomsky Hierarchy and
the Uniformity Assumption.
In the next section, 6.3.1, I will present a simple learning algorithm for context-free phrase-
structure grammars. In section 6.4.1 I briefly discuss its learning abilities, and in section 6.4.2
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I will present a simple iterated learning model. Finally, in section 6.4.3 I include natural selec¬
tion, and show how cultural evolution makes the dynamics deviate from predictions in existing
work.The model I develop in these sections thus integrates learning, cultural evolution and natural
selection. Although it has so far little to say about the evolutionary origins of the ability to learn
phrase-structure per se, I hope it represents another step toward an formal account of the evolution
of phrase-structure.
6.3.1 A Simple Model of Grammar Induction
The first step is to design a grammar induction algorithm that is simple, but can nevertheless deal
with some non-trivial induction problems. The algorithm uses context-free grammars to represent
linguistic abilities. In particular, the representation is limited to grammars where all rules are of
one of the following forms: (1) J4nt,(2)iH BC, (3) A h-» Bt. The nonterminals A, B, C
are elements of the non-terminal alphabet Vnt, which includes the start symbol S. t is a string of
terminal symbols from the terminal alphabet Vt.
Hence, we can easily characterise the set of language representable by this algorithm (JZa)•
Note that, beyond context-freeness, the restrictions on the rule-types above do not limit the scope
of languages that can be represented: rule types (1) and (2) are those of the Chomsky Normal
Form, with which, as is well known, any context-free language can be modelled. They are,
however, relevant for the language acquisition algorithm; rule type (3), for instance, allows a
simple formulation of the compression step (described below), such that only a single new non¬
terminal needs to be introduced at every learning step. Note further that the class of languages that
this formalism can represent is unlearnable by Gold's criterion (Gold, 1967). That is, there will
always be multiple hypotheses consistent with the training data, such that the target grammar can
not be uniquely identified. Note finally that the model involves no semantics. Although I believe
semantics plays a major role in language learning and language evolution, as explored also in
chapter 5, the goal of this chapter is to evaluate the applicability of the Chomsky Hierarchy and
the Uniformity Assumption in these questions. Semantics has so-far not played much of a role in
the discussion; my approach is therefore to see how far we get without the extra complication.
For determining the language L of a certain grammar G I use simple depth-first exhaustive
search of the derivation tree. For computational reasons, the depth of the search is limited to a
certain depth d, and the string length is limited to length I. The set of sentences (L' C L) used in
training and in communication is therefore finite. In production, strings are drawn from a uniform
distribution over L'. In the communication between two agents, the speaker chooses a random
element s from her language, and the hearer checks if s is an element of his own language. If so,
6.3. MODEL DESCRIPTION 175
the interaction is a success, otherwise it is a failure (the success of interactions will play a role in
the version of model that includes natural selection, as will be discussed below).
The language L is generated by calling the function search-subtree ("S"',d), which
can be defined in pseudo-code as follows:
% I is the maximum string length parameter.
% L is an initially empty set.
search-subtree (s,d')
if (d' < 1 OR LENGTH^) > 1) Stop
if (allterminal(s)) add s to language L
for all rules r
for each fit of r on s
apply r to s, yielding s'
search-subtree (s', d! — 1)
The grammar induction algorithm used in the model consists of three operations: (i) incorpo¬
ration, (ii) compression and (iii) generalisation. The learner leams from a set of sample strings
(sentences) that are provided by a teacher. The design of the learning algorithm is originally in¬
spired by Kirby (2000) and is similar to the algorithm in Wolff (1982). The algorithm fits within
a tradition of unsupervised grammar induction algorithms that search for compact descriptions of
the input data (e.g. Solomonoff, 1960; Stolcke, 1994; Rissanen & Ristad, 1994; van Zaanen &
Adriaans, 2001). The three operations are defined as follows:
Incorporation: extend the language, such that it includes the encountered string; if string s is
not already part of the language, add a rule S > s to the grammar.
Compression: replace frequent and long substrings with a nonterminal, such that the grammar
becomes smaller and the language remains unchanged; for every valid substring z of the
right-hand sides of all rules, calculate the compression effect v(z) of replacing z with a
nonterminal A; replace all valid occurrences of the substring z' — argmaxZv(z) with A if
v(z') > 0, and add a rule A > z' to the grammar. "Valid substrings" are those substrings
which can be replaced while keeping all rules of the forms 1-3 described above. The
compression effect is measured as the difference between the number of terminal and non¬
terminal symbols in the grammar before and after the replacement (i.e. the sum length of
all rules in the grammar). The compression step is repeated until the grammar does not
change anymore. At every step, the number of non-terminal symbols increases by 1.
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Generalisation: equate two nonterminals, such that the grammar becomes smaller and the lan¬
guage larger, for every combination of two nonterminals A and B (B ^ S), calcu¬
late the compression effect v of equating A and B. Equate the combination (A',B') =
argmaxA bv{A, B) if v{A', B') > 0; i.e. replace all occurrences of B with A. The com¬
pression effect is again measured as the difference between the number of symbols before
and after replacing and deleting redundant rules. The generalisation step is repeated until
the grammar does not change anymore. At every step, the number of non-terminal symbols
decreases by 1.
For the grammar acquisition algorithm these three operations can be used in several set¬
ups. For the purposes of this chapter, I have chosen simple off-line learning: compression and
generalisation occur after all training strings have been received. I have added one additional
step to this basic algorithm. To avoid insufficient expressiveness, the generalisation phase con¬
cludes with a check for the size of the language. If this size is smaller than some minimum,
E = size(L) < Em, I generate Em — E random strings13 and incorporate them in the
grammar. This procedure can be considered a substitution for the semantics that is left out in
the model, because it prevents the simulation to collapse to the perfectly leamable, but totally
pointless language with just a single sentence (expressiveness E = 1). Thus, in pseudo-code, the
learning algorithm is:
% i,j are agent objects, each with their own grammar G and language L;
% (o is a parameter for the initial string length;
% Vte is the terminal alphabet;
teach (i,j)
repeat T times
i generates random string s from Li
j calls incorporate(s)
repeat until Gj does not change anymore
j calls compress()
repeat until Gj does not change anymore
j calls generalise()
if (E < Em )
repeat Em — E times
generate a random string s £ (Vje)* of size < Iq




6.4.1 Learnable and Unlearnable Grammars
The algorithm described above is implemented in C++ and tested on a variety of target gram¬
mars. I will not present a detailed analysis of the learning behaviour here, but limit myself to
a simple example that shows that the algorithm can learn some (recursive) grammars, while it
cannot leam others. The induction algorithm receives three sentences (abed, abeabed, abcab-
cabcd). The incorporation, compression (repeated twice) and generalisation steps (without the
extend expressiveness step, i.e. with Em = 0) yield subsequently the following grammars:
(a) Incorporation (b) Compression (c) Compression (d) Generalisation
S H-> abed S H-> abed S i—► Yd S H-* Xd
S H-» abeabed S H Xd S i—► Xd S t--> Xabcd
S H-> abcabcabcd S H-> Xabcd S i—> Xabcd X t--» XX
X H-> abcabc X i—> YY X H-> abc
Y i—> abc
In (b) and (c) the substrings "abcabc" and "abc" are subsequently replaced by the non¬
terminals X and Y. In (d) the non-terminals X and Y are equated, which leads to the deletion
of the second rule in (c). One can check that the total size of the grammar reduces from 24, to 21
and further down to 19 and finally 16 characters.
From this example it is also clear that learning is not always successful. Any of the four
grammars above ((a), (b) and (c) are weakly equivalent, i.e. generate the same string language)
could have generated the training data, but with these three input strings the algorithm yields
grammar (d). Many target grammars will never be leamt correctly, no matter how many input
strings are generated. In practise, each finite set of randomly generated strings from some target
grammar, might yield a different result. Thus, for some number of input strings T, some set of
target grammars are always acquired, some are never acquired, and some are some of the time
acquired. This variation in difficulty is an important precondition for the occurrence of cultural
evolution.
If we can enumerate all possible grammars, we can describe this with a matrix Q, where
each entry describes the probability that the algorithm learning from sample strings from a
target grammar i, will end up with grammar j (since the learning algorithm is deterministic, this
means that Q^ gives the proportion of possible sets of example sentences - "texts" in leamability
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theory jargon - generated by a parent grammar i that will lead to a child grammar j). Qu is the
probability that the algorithm finds target grammar i.
We can now be a bit more precise about "learnability" and "learnable languages". A class of
languages £ is leamable, in Gold's (1967) sense of "identification in the limit", only if there exists
an algorithm that can learn all languages i in that class in the limit of infinitely many example
sentences: limr_>00(Q^'r = 1) . For grammatical coherence, in the sense of Nowaketal.
(2001), we need for a specific algorithm A, a specific dominant language i and a given number of
A T*
training samples T, the Q-' to be above a threshold value q\.
A different definition of learnability is based on the degree of similarity (or expected commu¬
nicative success) between a target grammar i and the leamt grammar j, where j is induced with
A rp
algorithm A from T training samples generated by i. This value C i.' can be estimated by count¬
ing how many out of a finite sample of strings generated by grammar i are accepted by grammar
j. In the idealised model of Nowak et al. (2001) all grammars/languages are at equal distance a
A t A T
from each other, and hence Cfy = a if i ^ j, and = 1 if i — j. In such a model, only
the probability that the correct grammar is induced is relevant. In the current model, however,
the probability that the induced grammar is identical to the target grammar is vanishingly small
for all interesting grammars. More relevant is whether or not the induced grammar is sufficiently
similar to the target grammar. This value will be reported in the simulation results.
Given the various concepts of leamability, how should we define the set of leamable languages
La1 In the current model it is probably best to think about this set as those languages with a C-
score above a given base-line. Given the limitations of the learning algorithm, how do we ensure
that learning is successful? The following section will show that for this we need nothing more
than to assume that the output of one learner is the input for the next.
6.4.2 Iterated Learning: the Emergence ofLearnability
To study the effects of iterated learning, I extend the model with a population structure. In the new
version of the model individuals (agents, that each represent a generation) are placed in a chain.
The first agent induces its grammar from a number E of randomly generated strings. Every
subsequent agent (the child) learns its grammar from T sample sentences that are generated by
the previous one (the parent). Using the matrix Q from the previous section, we can formalise
this iterated learning model with the following general equation, where Xi is the probability that
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grammar i is the grammar of the current generation:
N
Axj = "JTxjQji (6.3)
j=o
In simulations such as the one of figure 6.5 the communicative success C;j between child j
and parent i rises steadily from a low value (here 0.65) to a high value (here 1.0). In the initial
stage the grammar shows no structure, and consequently almost every string that the grammar
produces is idiosyncratic. A child in this stage typically hears strings like "ada", "ddac", "adba",
"bcbd", or "cdca" from its parent. It cannot discover many regularities in these strings. The child
therefore cannot do much better than simply reproduce the strings it heard (i.e. T random draws
from at least Em different strings; with the given parameters, the expected C-score is 0.65, which
is the baseline, above which I will call a language learnable), and generate random new strings if
necessary, to make sure its language obeys the minimum number (Em) of strings.
However, in these randomly generated strings, sometimes regularities appear. I.e., a parent
may use the randomly generated strings "dcac", "bcac", "caac" and "daac". When this happens
the child tends to analyse these strings as different combinations with the building block "ac".
Thus, typically, the learning algorithm generates a grammar with the rules S dcX, S i—> bcX,
S i—► caX, S i—> daX, and X i—> ac. When this happens to another set of strings as well, say with
a new rule Y i—» b, the generalisation procedure can decide to equate the non-terminals X and Y.
The resulting grammar can then generalise from the observed strings, to the unobserved strings
"deb", "beb", "cab" and "dab". The child still needs to generate random new strings to reach the
minimum E, but fewer than in the case considered above.
Now consider the next step in the simulation, when the child becomes itself the parent of a
new child. This child is presented with a language with more regularities than before, and has a
fair chance of correctly generalising to unseen examples. If, for instance, it only sees the strings
"dcac", "bcac", "caac", "beb", "cab" and "dab", it can, through the same procedure as above,
infer that "daac" and "deb" are also part of the target language. This means that (i) the child
shares more strings with its parent than just the ones it observes and consequently shows a higher
between generation communicative success, and (ii) regularities that appear in the language by
chance, have a fair chance to remain in the language. In the process of iterated learning, languages
can thus become more structured and better learnable.
Similar results with different formalisms were already reported before (e.g. Kirby, 2000;
Brighton, 2002), but here I have used a standard grammar formalism (context-free grammars)
180 CHAPTER 6. HIERARCHICAL PHRASE-STRUCTURE
(a) Leamability Cy (b) Number of rules (c) Expressiveness
Figure 6.5: Iterated Learning: although initially the target language is unstructured and difficult
to learn, over the course of 20 generations (a) the learnability (C!J; where i is the grammar at
time t — 1 and j the grammar at time t.) steadily increases, (b) the number of rules steadily
decreases (combinatorial and recursive strategies are used), and (c) after a initial phase of over-
generalisation, the expressiveness remains close to its minimally required level. Parameters: V* =
{a, b, c, d}, Vnt = {S, X, Y, Z, A, B, C}, T=30, E=20, Zo=3. Shown are the average values of 2
simulations.
without semantics and an extremely simple learning algorithm. The results show that the effects
of iterated learning do not depend on semantics or other idiosyncratic features of previous mod¬
els. Furthermore, the model provides the simplest illustration of the fact that in iterated learning
representable but unlearnable languages will disappear, and that over the course of a number of
generations the languages can become better and better leamable.
It is interesting to contrast the observations here with popular interpretations (e.g. Wexler,
1999; Bertolo, 2001) of negative results in leamability theory, such as Gold's proof (Gold, 1967).
Whereas in the usual interpretations of that proof it is assumed that we need innate constraints
on the search space in addition to a smart learning procedure, here I show that even a simple
learning procedure can lead to successful acquisition, because restrictions on the search space
automatically emerge in the iteration of learning. If one considers leamability a binary feature -
as is common in for instance Principles & Parameters theory - this is a rather trivial phenomenon:
languages that are not learnable will not occur in the next generation. However, if there are
gradations in leamability, the cultural evolution of language can be an intricate process where
languages get shaped over many generations.
6.4.3 Language Adaptation and the Coherence Threshold
When we study this effect in a version of the model where selection does play a role, it is also
relevant for the evaluating the claims of Nowak et al. (2001) and Komarova et al. (2001). The
model is therefore extended such that every generation consists of P agents. We can now not only
measure the success in communicating with a parent (the between generation success, CbetweenX
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but also the success in communicating with other agents of the same generation (the within gen¬
eration success, Cwithin)- Hence, we have at every point a population of parents and a population
of children. Children communicate with each other; when they become parents themselves the
expected number of offspring of any one of them (the fitness) is determined by the number of
successful interactions it had. Children still acquire their grammar from sample strings produced
by their parent. Adapting equation 1, this system can now be described with the following equa¬
tion (where, assuming an infinite population size, Xi is now the relative fraction of grammar i in
the population):
N
AXi = xjfjQji - 4>xi (6.4)
j=0
Here, fi is the relative fitness (quality) of grammars of type i and equals f, — Y2j xjFij > where
Fij is the expected communicative success from an interaction between an individual of type i
and an individual of type j. The relative fitness / of a grammar thus depends on the frequencies
of all grammar types, hence it is frequency dependent. 4> is the average fitness in the population
and equals (f> = JT x,/t. This term is needed to keep the sum of all fractions at 1.
This equation is essentially the model of Nowak et al. (2001). Recall that the main result of
that paper is a "coherence threshold": there is a minimum value q\ for the learning accuracy q
to keep coherence in the population. If q < qi, then coherence is lost because natural selection
is not effective; if q > q\, one dominant grammar emerges. We can try to apply the calculations
of Nowak et al. to a simulation with the learning algorithm and selection as described above. In
the simulation I will report below, learners are presented T — 100 sample sentences, with initial
string length Iq — 12 and an alphabet of 4 characters.
The model of Nowak et al. uses three parameters: a (the similarity between two different
languages), T and N (the number of possible languages). The applicable expression for qi is the
following:
qi = , 2/V- (6.5)1 + Va
Assuming a string length I = 12, we can make an estimate of a as follows. There are 412 strings
of length 12 over the given alphabet. Assuming languages with 100 strings, the probability that a
random string s is part of the language L is P(s G L) = Given the large number of strings,
the similarity a between two random languages can be estimated as a w 100 • P(s G L) = 1°i2° •
Plugging this value in equation (6.5) yields an estimate of the "coherence threshold" at learning
accuracy q\ ~ 0.05.
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Crucial for grammatical coherence is that the accuracy of a given learning algorithm is above
this value. Nowak et al.'s calculation of the accuracy of the batch learner, qbatch> is as follows:
(i-<i-«*■)")
Qbatch t ~\t t\ ' (6-6)(.Na1)
Assuming string length and number of strings as above, an estimate of N is:
Nk f 4 ] « 10520. (6.7)
[iooJ
Hence, NaT, the divider in equation (6.6), will be astronomical, on the order of 10420. Because
the value of the denominator will be between 0 and 1, it follows that qbatch ~ 0 and therefore
Qbatch « Qi- That is, the batch learner will, with so many possible languages and so few
training samples, have almost no chance of discovering the target grammar, and the system should
therefore be below the coherence threshold.
Below the threshold, all languages occur at equal frequency, and we therefore expect the
within generation communicative success to be equal to the similarity between languages, i.e.
Cwithin — a ~ 0.05. This result depends on a number of strong assumptions. For instance,
Nowak et al. (2001) assume that the population is infinite, and that all grammars are of equal
quality (uniformity), such that only the frequency of a grammar in the population determines the
payoff it will receive. But most importantly, the authors assume that all possible grammars are
at equal distance a from each other, whereas in the present simulation model many distances are
possible. These assumptions are all violated in the present model, as well as in reality of course14.
Before discussing how to adapt the model of Nowak et al., I will first present the results from the
simulation model and compare them with the calculations above.
Figure 6.6 shows results from a simulation with the grammar induction algorithm described
earlier in this chapter. Unlike the simulations of figure 6.5, these simulations deal with a relatively
difficult learning problem: here the initial string length is long, i.e. l0 = 12, whereas before it
was Io = 6. Learning is therefore not successful. In the left region of the graph it can be seen that
the between-generation C is around 70%, which (with the given parameters) means that only the
strings a child has seen during training, are shared between a parent and a child. The child has
not been able to make any correct generalisations. Qualitatively, we see that the simulation in this
14See Wiehe (1997) for a critique of the error threshold model, on which the analysis of Nowak et al. (2001) is
based.
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phase is indeed below the coherence threshold. There is no dominant grammar in the population,
and agents score only about 15% in their communication with peers. This is reasonably close to
the predicted 5%; the disparity is explained by mentioned unrealistic assumptions15.
Figure 6.6: Results from a run under fitness proportional selection. This figure shows that there are
regions of grammar space where the dynamics are apparently under the "coherence threshold"
(Nowak et ah, 2001), while there are other regions where the dynamics are above this threshold.
The parameters, including the number of sample sentences T, are still the same, but the language
has adapted itself to the bias of the learning algorithm. Parameters are: Vt = {0,1, 2, 3}, Vnt =
{S1, a, b, c, d, e, /}, P=20, T=100, E=100, Zo=12. Shown are the average values of 20 agents.
However, around generation 70 the behaviour of the simulation starts to diverge radically
from these analytical predictions. First, the between generation communicative success suddenly
rises. Children are now able to successfully generalise beyond the strings that are seen during
training, and score around 90% in communicating with their parents. The reason is the same
as in the previous section: the languages have adapted to the learning algorithm. Crucially, the
grammatical coherence in the population also rises. In this second phase, agents score between
30% and 70% in the communication with peers. With always the same T (number of sample
sentences), and with always the same grammar space, there are regions where the dynamics are
apparently under the "coherence threshold", while there are other regions where the dynamics are
above this threshold. The language has adapted to the learning algorithm, and, consequently, the
coherence in the population does not satisfy the prediction of Nowak et al.
Recall that Nowak, Komarova & Niyogi (2001) and Komarova, Niyogi & Nowak (2001)
considered an upper and a lower bound on the performance of learning algorithms, and claimed
that the performance of human language learning must be in between those bounds. That is,
they claimed that (i) the batch learner represents the best possible learning strategy, and that (ii)
the number of training samples it requires for grammatical coherence, given by equations (6.5)
l5Because of the variation in distances between languages, we can expect the "effective similarity" to be higher, and
therefore the actual value of qi and the equilibrium C,mthin as well.
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and (6.6), represents a lower bound on the number of samples children require, and hence a
fundamental requirement for effective biological evolution of the language faculty. Figure 6.6
falsifies that the claim. It shows that in iterated learning, a biased algorithm can do better than the
unbiased batch learner, because over time the languages will adapt to the bias.
Although it is clear that the simulation of figure 6.6 is inconsistent with the calculations in
Nowak et al. (2001) and Komarova et a1. (2001), my results do not yet unambiguously prove that
the batch learner, if implemented with the same parameters as in the current simulation, would
lead to worse grammatical coherence in the population. The difficulties I see with demonstrating
a difference in performance for this particular case are many. First, it is extremely difficult to im¬
plement the batch learner in a computer program, because of the astronomical number of possible
languages (although I cannot exclude the possibility that an ingenious way exists to encode which
subset of 10520 possible languages are consistent with the training data, and to choose a random
language from a uniform distribution over that subset). Second, although the equations above
could in principle be adapted to include the effects of unequal distances, the math quickly gets
very complicated. The problem is that equations (6.5) and (6.6) are not valid if a is an average
rather than a constant.
On a more general level, however, there is no doubt that the central claim of Nowak et al.
(2001) and Komarova et al. (2001) that the batch learner provides a lower bound on the number
of training samples needed in human language acquisition is untenable. The batch learner is an
unbiased learner: it chooses a random language from all those possible languages that are con¬
sistent with the T sample sentences received. It is unbeatable only if all possible languages have
equal probability of becoming the target language. If, however, there is a skew in the distribution
of possible target languages, and if a learning algorithm is biased towards the more likely targets,
that algorithm can beat the unbiased learner. The iterated learning model studied in this chapter
provides the mechanism by which this situation will arise in culturally transmitted systems such
as language.
6.5 Conclusions
I believe that these results have some implications for our thinking about both language acqui¬
sition and language evolution. In particular, I think the model and results offer a different per¬
spective on the argument from the poverty of the stimulus, and thus on one of the most central
"problems" of language acquisition research: the logical problem of language acquisition. This
is the problem every child is facing when acquiring the grammar of its native language: she has
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insufficient evidence to uniquely determine which is the target grammar from the set of all gram¬
mars that would in principle be possible. I will discuss the new perspective evolutionary models
offer in the wider debate about such arguments in the next chapter.
Formal models of language learning often specify three components (Bertolo, 2001). The first
is the innate knowledge of language a child has, which defines a hypothesis space for language
learning. The second is the primary linguistic data, which provides the input to the learning pro¬
cedure. The third is the learning procedure, that guides the child through the hypothesis space
based on the input data it encounters. Using such a scheme, one might be tempted to describe
the model I presented in this chapter as follows: it uses context-free grammars as the hypothesis
space, unordered positive examples ("text") as primary linguistic data and a simple greedy, com¬
pression based heuristic as the search procedure. How can learning be successful, given the often
cited mathematical proof (Gold, 1967) that learning under these conditions is impossible?
The answer is of course that the question is wrong. Gold's proof is about certain classes of
formal languages and establishes that no algorithm can be guaranteed to leam any language from
such a class. It makes no claim about whether or not a specific algorithm will be able to leam lots
of specific languages from the class. Gold's proof only implies that an algorithm cannot leam all
the languages from the class. Accepting for a moment Gold's definition of leamability (which is
different from the definition I adopted), the proof shows that not all context-free languages can
naturally occur as culturally transmitted codes.
Now, what determines which languages do, and which ones don't? The present model il¬
lustrates that it is unnecessary to assume - as theorists of language acquisition have often done
(Wexler & Culicover, 1980; Bertolo, 2001) - additional, innate knowledge of language to con¬
strain the set of naturally occurring languages. The only languages a child will ever need to leam,
are languages learnt and transmitted by previous generations. Hence, the poverty of the stimulus
is never a problem; rather, the ancestors' poverty is the solution to the child's.
The relevance of this perspective for language evolution is two-fold. First, Gold's proof
and other mathematical learnability results are often - erroneously - cited as proof for domain-
specific, innate knowledge of language (Wexler, 1999), of a sort that could only have arisen if
it were selected for in human evolution (Pinker & Bloom, 1990). It is important to note that
although the conclusion may be correct, the arguments for it are not (Pullum & Scholz, 2002;
Scholz & Pullum, 2002; Johnson, 2004). Parsimony suggests that the natural explanandum for
language evolution research is the learning strategy (which, in a process of cultural evolution,
gives rise to languages with the structure we observe today), and certainly not an ornate, innate
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database of syntactic rules and principles, as some naive theories of language acquisition have it
(e.g. Cook, 1993).
Second, a methodological point for evolutionary linguistics is that the definition of a strategy
set and a payoff function must take into account the constraints from learning, usage and cultural
transmission. This might seem an obvious point, but it is an extremely difficult task. It is therefore
tempting to simplify the description of learning by considering random walk or parameter setting
models as upper and lower bounds on the performance of the real learning strategy. The problem
with this approach is that - through cultural evolution - the learning strategy will change the
learning task. Derived lower and upper bounds might therefore no longer be valid.
The model I presented does suggest some promising future directions for establishing more
positive results on the evolution of phrase-structure. The model incorporates most of the compo¬
nents of an evolutionary analysis - only variation in the learning strategies is missing. A simple
approach to introduce variation would be to vary the parameters of the model: the terminal and
non-terminal alphabet, the initial string length Iq, the minimal expressiveness Em and the number
of training samples T. I haven't implemented such an extended model only because I believe real
progress on these issues will come from a second future direction: the development of better,




I started this thesis, in chapter 1, by arguing that theories of the evolutionary origins of language
need to be formalised and to entail complete scenarios of the transitions necessary to get from
primate-like communication to modem human language. Theories with these features can be
tested both by confronting them with empirical data, and by evaluating their internal coherence
and consistency with other tested theories. In this thesis I have tried to contribute to such a
testable theory, by surveying the formal requirements on such scenarios (drawing on insights from
mathematical population genetics, evolutionary game theory and theoretical linguistics), and by
proposing specific models for some of the transitions involved.
In chapter 21 reviewed formal, foundational models from evolutionary biology. This review
yielded a list of criteria for evolutionary scenarios. The evolutionary process is described by (1)
heritable traits, (2) a strategy set and (3) a payoff function. To show that a strategy can evolve,
one needs to show that it can (4) invade a population without it, and that (5) there is a path of
fit intermediates from the hypothesised start point to the end point of evolution. Furthermore,
one needs to show (6) that the mutational load has not been too high, and that (7) the predicted
time to fixation of innovations is realistic. These requirements lead to two main problems in the
evolution of communication and language, which I termed (8) the problem of cooperation, and (9)
the problem of coordination, respectively. Finally, I argued that evolutionary explanations need
to (10) specify and relate the assumed levels of selection and heritability.
In chapter 3 I reviewed a specific scenario for the evolution of language, proposed by Ray
Jackendoff (2002). Jackendoff lists a number of different stages, and hints at the selective ad¬
vantages of each of the innovations. However, his treatment remains very informal. Based on an
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inventory of formal models from linguistics, I argued that there are three "major transitions" in
the scenario that can be formally characterised: the emergence of combinatorial phonology, of
compositional semantics and of hierarchical phrase-structure. An important distinction in such
characterisations is that between I-language, the language system internal to the language user,
and E-language, the observable language external to the user.
In chapter 4 I studied a model that addressed the first of these transitions: the evolution of
combinatorial phonology. After arguing that existing models fail some of the listed requirements,
I considered a new model where the strategy set consists of all configurations of a set of trajec¬
tories in an acoustic space. I then proposed a measure of confusability as the payoff function. In
simulations, I showed that combinatoriality in the E-language can emerge, without the I-language
necessarily having that property. I argued that in a population where the E-language is combina¬
torial, an I-language which takes advantage of that fact can more easily evolve.
In chapter 5 I discussed the evolution of compositional semantics. The strategy set of the
model I presented, included all possible S (production) and R (interpretation) matrices, which
represent a mapping from a meaning space to a signal space and vice versa. I considered a
payoff function where the payoff depends on the probability of correctly interpreting a received
signal. This function took into account noise and coordination. Crucially, I considered the case
where, if the interpretation was different from the intended meaning, the payoff was still higher for
interpretations more similar to the intention than for those less similar. In simulations, I showed
that with these assumptions the mapping between sounds and meanings can become structured
(superficial compositionality), without the underlying cognitive procedures necessarily making
use of that property (productive compositionality). Analogous to chapter 4, I argued that in a
population with superficial compositionality, productive compositionality can more easily evolve.
In chapter 6 I focused on the evolution of recursive, hierarchical phrase-structure. Formu¬
lating a reasonable strategy set and payoff function for phrase-structure is difficult. I reviewed a
number of existing models, and then presented a new computational model that integrated many
of their features. From this study it emerged that, in general, the set of languages TZa thai can be
represented, the set Ca that can be learned, and the set J4 of languages that are stable in cultural
transmission, are all different. Moreover, the relation between TZa, A,4,1a and the learning strat¬
egy A can be extremely complex. Definitions of a strategy set based on TZa, such as those based
on the Chomsky Hierarchy (which ignore learning), and definitions based on the Uniformity As¬
sumption (which exclude cultural evolution and imply that TZa = £a = T4), are therefore unsat¬
isfactory. The computational model I developed in this chapter showed the feasibility of a model
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that integrates learning, cultural evolution and natural selection. The results from the simulations
have important consequences for theorising about the acquisition and evolution of syntax. They
do not, however, present a satisfactory explanation for the third major transition - the evolution of
hierarchical phrase-structure - because the model did not yet present a reasonable set of possible
learning strategies. This issue is left for future work.
7.2 Contributions
The primary goal of this thesis has been to contribute to the development of scientifically rigorous
theories of the origins of human language. Formalisation and empirical testability are generally
seen as the key features of scientific theories. Although not of the level of mathematical and em¬
pirical sophistication of some subfields of linguistics and biology, I hope this thesis includes some
contributions to this end in a field where consensus on the goals and requirements of research is
still lacking. Another important criterion for scientific theories is the potential to connect them
with theories in related fields. I believe there are many such connections to be made, both within
linguistics and within biology. In this section I will discuss some possible contributions of this
thesis concerning testability; in sections hereafter I will raise some implications for related fields.
In this thesis, I have adopted a gradual scenario, with the complexity of modern language
evolving in a number of steps rather than in one "big bang". With Pinker & Bloom (1990),
Jackendoff (2002) and many others, I have assumed that the driving force behind this evolution
has been the need to reliably convey more and more information. In chapters 2 and 6 I briefly
mentioned alternative selection pressures where complex language serves to impress peers or
sexual partners (e.g. Dessalles, 1998), or to communicate with kin (e.g. Fitch, 2004). Of course,
it is impossible to measure empirically which of these selection pressures really was responsible
for each of the transitions. However, we can evaluate the coherence of a complete scenario if it is
precise and formal enough, and we can derive specific predictions from such a scenario that can
be empirically tested.
This thesis has presented a framework, rather than a complete scenario. This was most ob¬
vious in chapter 6, where a reasonable strategy set was still lacking. But also in chapter 4 and
5 I have not committed myself to a very specific scenario. In these chapters I argued that the
hillclimbing heuristic used can be interpreted as describing either evolutionary optimisation, or
optimisation through learning, or a combination of both1. Nevertheless, I think in either interpre-
'The validity of this argument can be further investigated in simulation models where the processes of evolution
and learning are modelled at a more concrete level.
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tation, there are many starting points for empirical research. Some examples of specific testable
issues are:
• In chapter 4 I proposed the use of trajectories through a low-dimensional acoustic space as
the representation of signals with non-zero duration. Although I provided some examples
of real acoustic data using this representation (courtesy of Bart de Boer), it remains an
empirical issue whether signals in animal and human communication can in general be
adequately described in this representation.
• Also in chapter 4, I presented a measure for the quality of a repertoire of signals, based
on the average probability to confuse those signals. The function to relate distance to
confusion probabilities was motivated by an extremely idealised case of just two signals
in a one-dimensional acoustic space with Gaussian noise. The shape of the distance-to-
confusion function in more realistic circumstances can be empirically estimated.
• The model of chapter 4 predicts that combinatorial repertoires are less confusable than non-
combinatorial systems within the same acoustic and time constraints. This prediction can
be tested empirically, both in humans and in other animals.
• More theoretical work is needed on a measure for how combinatorial a signal repertoire is,
but within the same conceptual framework this could in principle be measured in human
languages and animal communication systems. This would yield comparative data on how
unique combinatorial phonology really is in nature.
• In chapter 5 I used a measure for the degree of topology preservation (proposed by Brighton,
2003). If acoustic and semantic similarity are operationalised, this measure could be ap¬
plied to natural language data (as worked out by Shillcock et a1., 2004). It would be inter¬
esting to apply this measure to empirical data on primate communication as well.
• The model in chapter 6 suggests languages adapt to the language users in order to become
easier to leam. It would be interesting to analyse empirical data on creolisation (Bickerton,
1990) and rapid language change in Nicaraguan sign language (Senghas et a/., 2004) from
this perspective.
Possible contributions toward formalisation, and thence testability of the internal coherence
of theories of language evolution are:
• The list of formal requirements on scenarios of the evolution of language from the perspec¬
tive of evolutionary biology in chapter 2.
• The steps toward formalisation of Jackendoff's scenario for the evolution of language in
chapter 3.
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• The strategy set using the trajectory representation in chapter 4, which is an improve¬
ment over representations used in Nowak & Krakauer (1999) and Liljencrants & Lindblom
(1972), but very similar to the representation used in Oudeyer (2002). The relation with
trajectory models in speech recognition remains to be explored (Goldenthal, 1994).
• The payoff function based on confusability in chapter 4, which is an improvement over the
measures used in Liljencrants & Lindblom (1972); Lindblom etal. (1984); the relation with
work in phonetics and signal detection theory remains to be explored.
• The payoff function that includes the "value matrix" V in chapter 5, which is an improve¬
ment over the measures used in for instance, Oliphant & Batali (1996), Steels (1995) and
Nowak & Krakauer (1999); the relation with work in distortion theory and compression
theory remain to be explored.
• The learning algorithm in chapter 6, which is a simplification of algorithms presented in,
for instance, Wolff (1982), Stolcke (1994) and Kirby (2000).
• The distinction between the sets of representable, learnable and stable languages in chap¬
ter 6.
7.3 Implications for Linguistics
I believe the main implication of this and related work for the field of linguistics concerns a debate
we can call the "nativism-empiricism debate" (even though these terms are overstating the posi¬
tions of actual researchers involved). Nativists have postulated that children must be bom with
extensive knowledge of the structure of human languages. Empiricists, on the other hand, assume
that children are able to acquire natural languages using just general-purpose learning mecha¬
nisms. They have attempted to show this in neural network models of learning and development,
but have by and large failed to convince nativists. Based on the models and results from this thesis
and related work, I argue that the persistence of the disagreement can be understood from the fact
that empiricists have not provided a satisfactory answer to two fundamental questions:
1. How can it be that children always guess right? That is, from the wide range of logical
possibilities, how come children always choose the ones that are consistent with observed
constraints on natural languages?
2. How can children learn the class of human languages without specific prior knowledge in
the light of all the negative formal learnability results?
Each of these questions leads to a variant of the "argument from the poverty of the stimulus"
(see Pullum & Scholz, 2002, for a brief history), which states that much of human language must
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be innate because there is insufficient information in the "primary linguistic data". I will briefly
review both versions of the argument, and then consider the new twist that evolutionary models
as studied in this thesis can give to this old debate.
7.3.1 The Poverty of the Stimulus I
Despite many revisions of theories in the nativist tradition, the argument from the poverty of
the stimulus continues to be the prime justification for assuming an extensive, innate Universal
Grammar. For example, Jackendoff (2002, p. 69) uses the following quote from Chomsky (1965)
to explain the argument:
"It seems clear that many children acquire first or second languages quite success¬
fully even though no special care is taken to teach them and no special attention is
given to their progress. It also seems apparent that much of the actual speech ob¬
served consists of fragments and deviant expressions of a variety of sorts. Thus it
seems that a child must have the ability to "invent" a generative grammar that defines
well-formedness and assigns interpretations to sentences even though the primary
linguistic data that he uses as a basis for this act of theory construction may, from the
point of view of the theory he constructs, be deficient in various respects." (Chomsky,
1965, p. 200-1)
Well-known examples of the miraculous choices that children make concern, among others,
wh-transformation (i.e. the ways to formulate who, what and where questions), negations, pro¬
nouns and quantification. For instance, in example 7.1 (from Crain, 1991), there are complex
constraints on whether or not "he" can refer to "the Ninja Turtle".
(7.1) a. The Ninja Turtle danced while he ate the pizza
b. He danced while the Ninja Turtle ate the pizza
c. While he danced the Ninja Turtle ate a pizza
Children know that "he" in sentence (b) cannot refer to the "the Ninja Turtle", and, according
to the argument, they need innate syntactic constraints because "there are no data available in
the environment corresponding to the kind of negative facts that constraints account for" (Crain,
1991).
Jackendoff (2002, p. 85) uses the following example, from Gruber (1965), to explain what he
calls the "Paradox of Language Acquisition":
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(7.2) a. Every acorn grew into an oak.
b. Every oak grew out of an acorn.
c. An oak grew out of every acorn.
d. *An acorn grew into every oak.
"Every" in the first three examples quantifies over both the oak and the acorn, while in (d) it
quantifies only over the oak, making the sentence uninterpretable. There seems to be no "natural"
solution to this idiosyncracy of language. The paradox is that while linguists struggle with the
construction, children miraculously always get it right:
"The community of linguists, collaborating over many decades, has so far failed to
come up with an adequate description of a speaker's knowledge of his or her native
language. Yet every normal child manages to acquire this knowledge by the age of
ten or so, without reading any linguistics textbooks or going to any conference. How
is it that in some sense every single normal child is smarter than the whole community
of linguists?" (lackendoff, 2002, p. 83)
Chomsky, Crain, Jackendoff and many others have used such examples to argue for the ex¬
istence of innate, language-specific knowledge. If children always make the right choice, even
though clearly sensible logical alternatives exist based on the available evidence, then obviously
they must have prior knowledge of the task. Universal Grammar is the theory of that prior knowl¬
edge. Pinker & Bloom (1990) and others, have argued that it is "vanishingly unlikely" that this
innate knowledge is a side-effect of the evolution of general learning mechanisms; rather, they
claim, it must be the result of a gradual process of natural selection. That is, the Universal Gram¬
mar is a language-specific adaptation of humans for the use of natural language:
"[..] it would be vanishingly unlikely for something that was not designed as a tele¬
vision set to display television programs; the engineering demands are simply too
complex. [...] We suggest that human language is a similar case. We are not talking
about noses holding up spectacles. Human language is a device capable ofcommuni¬
cating exquisitely complex and subtle messages, from convoluted soap opera plots to
theories of the origin of the universe. Even ifall we knew was that humans possessed
such a device, we would expect that it would have to have rather special and unusual
properties suited to the task of mapping complex propositional structures onto a se¬
rial channel, and an examination of grammar confirms this expectation." (Pinker &
Bloom, 1990)
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7.3.2 The Poverty of the Stimulus - II
The case for such a view on Universal Grammar is often said to be strengthened by mathematical
results from learnability theory. This different version of the argument from the poverty of stim¬
ulus starts from the observation that the formalisms that are needed to describe natural language
have to be able to represent recursive, hierarchical phrase-structure. Humans can generalise from
the sentences they have heard to completely new expressions, many of which might not have been
used by anyone ever before. This is known as the "productivity argument" (Chomsky, 1955). In
fact, as I discussed in chapter 6, although there is now a wide range of competing grammatical
theories, there is also converging evidence that a proper formalism for human language has to
be mildly context-sensitive (Joshi et ah, 1991). Moreover, there is broad consensus that children
have to learn their language from primary linguistic data that is relatively impoverished: chil¬
dren cannot solely rely on negative evidence, semantic information, carefully selected training
sentences ("motherese") or statistical cues (e.g. Atkinson, 2001).
It is therefore not unreasonable to study the leamability properties of popular formalisms,
and try to derive general results on whether it is possible to learn grammars (of the type that
linguists agree are necessary for human language) from primary linguistic data (of the type that
psycholinguists believe is available to the child). The first to establish such general results was
Mark Gold (1967). He emphasised the interrelatedness of assumptions about the nature of human
grammar and the nature of the language acquisition process:
"[...] a model of the rules of usage of natural languages must be general enough to
include the rules which do occur in existing natural languages. This is a lower bound
on the generality of an acceptable linguistic theory. On the other hand, the consid¬
erations [on leamability] impose an upper bound on generality: For any language
which can be defined within the model there must be a training program, consisting
of implicit information, such that it is possible to determine which of the definable
language is being presented." (Gold, 1967, p. 448)
Gold put forward a criterion for learnability and a formal characterisation of the available
training data. Gold's leamability criterion, "identification in the limit", is a criterion for a class
of languages, and not for individual languages per se2. He showed, for each of these types of
data and for a number of formal classes of languages, whether or not they were identifiable in
2With respect to a specific algorithm, it makes sense to ask whether it can learn a specific language. Gold, how¬
ever, asks whether any algorithm can learn all the languages from a given class. Hence, the words "learnable" and
"leamability" can mean rather different things when they are used in the context of a specific algorithm, or in the
general sense with reference to a class of languages. Unfortunately, much confusion about this distinction exists in the
literature (Scholz & Pullum, 2002; Johnson, 2004)
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the limit. Most famous is his result that super-finite classes of languages, which include the
classes of context-free and of context-sensitive languages, are not learnable from positive data.
Similar negative learnability results have been obtained with less restrictive learnability criteria
(e.g. Wexler & Culicover, 1980, discussed in Bertolo, 2001). These negative results have led
to a consensus among theorists of language acquisition in the generative tradition that human
languages are simply not learnable without serious innate constraints:
"The basic results of the held [of learnability theory] include the formal, mathemat¬
ical demonstration that without serious constraints on the nature of human gram¬
mar, no possible learning algorithm can in fact learn the class of human grammars."
(Wexler, 1999)
However, after initial pessimism on the learnability of formal grammars, more positive results
also emerged. Most notably: (i) Horning (1969, discussed in Bertolo, 2001), which showed that
the class of stochastic context-free grammars are identifiable in the limit; (ii) Wexler & Hamburger
(1973, discussed in Batali, 2002) which showed that context-free grammars are identifiable in the
limit if the input includes the proper semantic information for every sentence; and (iii) Angluin
(1980, discussed in Kanazawa, 1998), which showed that non-trivial classes of grammars, that
include subsets of context-free and context-sensitive grammars, are identifiable in the limit from
positive data.
Encouraged by such positive results, a small number of researchers has worked on designing
algorithms that indeed induce grammars from examples (e.g. Wolff, 1982; Stolcke, 1994; Clark,
2001; Klein & Manning, 2002; Adriaans et al., 2002), with some success. How can such positive
results be reconciled with the negative learnability results that are quoted so often in the nativist
tradition? It is worth considering that question in some detail, since it relates directly to the
connectionist and evolutionary models that we will discuss later.
Gold (1967), in fact, is very careful in his discussion of the relevance of his negative results.
He discusses three solutions for the leamability problem (i) additional restrictions on the class
of possible human grammars, (ii) indirect negative evidence and (iii) a priori restrictions on the
class of training samples that a child may expect. We can interpret each of the mentioned positive
results as elaborations on these possible solutions. That is, Horning (1969) is variant of solution
(iii), because it assumes that the learner can rely on statistical information in the training data;
Wexler & Hamburger (1973) is a variant of solution (ii), because it assumes that learner can
derive indirect negative evidence from the semantics of training sentences; and Angluin (1980) is
variant of solution (i) by identifying non-trivial, but restricted classes.
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Much discussion has followed on whether or not the child has negative evidence available, and
whether or not parents adapt their infant-directed speech to facilitate language learning. Again a
consensus has emerged among nativists that these potential solutions are empirically invalidated
and that suggestions of the contrary can be safely ignored. For example, in Bertolo (2001), a
recent introduction to "learnability theory" with contributions from 6 different authors, none of the
theoretical and algorithmic positive results above, except for Homing's, has even been referred to.
Instead, researchers in this field have concentrated on models within a Principles and Parameters
framework, in which learning is restricted to setting a small number of parameters. It is important
to note, however, that even if Gold's solution (i) is adopted, there is still a significant jump to make
to go from restricting the class of possible grammars, to assuming an extensive innate Universal
Grammar with "parameter setting" as the only challenge in the acquisition of syntax (Scholz &
Pullum, 2002). Gold describes solution (i) as follows:
"The class ofpossible natural languages is much smaller than one would expect from
our present models of syntax. That is, even if English is context-sensitive, it is not
true that any context-sensitive language can occur naturally. Equivalently, we may
say that the child starts out with more information than that the language it will
be presented is context-sensitive. In particular, the results on leamability from text
imply the following: The class ofpossible natural languages if it contains languages
of infinite cardinality, cannot contain all languages of finite cardinality." (Gold, 1967)
Nothing in these formal results shows that the necessary constraints are language-specific
adaptations; they could simply be generic properties of the human brain, or, as in the model of
chapter 6, the result of a form of cultural evolution. On intuitive grounds, that possibility is
dismissed as "vanishingly unlikely". Moreover, also the nature of the available linguistic data
is an empirical and not a formal issue. Although solid empirical results exist that make many
of proposed sources unlikely, the jump in the nativist literature to (always) assume the worst-
case scenario of only positive data3 ("text") is premature4. Nevertheless, research that makes
different assumptions is often treated with rather unjustified disdain in the leamability literature.
For example:
"It seems that some psychologists, suspicious of the innateness claims which have
provided the intellectual backdrop to so much of the progress in modern linguistics,
3In fact, the assumption is even stronger than just "positive data", because it considers positive data in any order,
no matter how bizarre.
4It seems even in contradiction with other empirical results; see the discussion on children (not) learning language
from television conversations in Pinker (1994, p. 278).
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have found it difficult to give up on the belief that linguistic environments really do
have properties (if only we could identify them) which would enable us to see them
as providing a sufficient basis for grammar induction. We can be fairly confident in
our conclusions under this heading, but we owe it to the skeptics to provide some
justification for this confidence." — (Atkinson, 2001, p. 16)
Hence, we can conclude that the variant of the argument from the poverty of stimulus that
has emerged from the field of learnability theory is based on firm, formal results that show that
learning is impossible without the proper and interrelated assumptions on what grammars are
possible in the first place, and what primary data is available. In a sense, these results reflect
the widely accepted view that "pure empiricism", that is, learning without a bias (starting with
a "tabula rasa") is an untenable position (as even anti-nativists emphasise, Elman et al., 1996).
From that basis, a much less formal argument can be made that the necessary constraints must be
innately specified because it is so unlikely that they derive from general constraints on cognition,
communication and learning.
7.3.3 Empiricist A rguments
The challenge to empiricists is to provide an adequate response to this intuitive stance, and to
present an alternative theory that is general enough to include observed rules in human languages
and restricted enough to allow their acquisition. Empiricists have attempted to show the feasibility
of such an alternative account (see e.g. Seidenberg, 1997, for a review). The most prominent
approach has been to build fully specified neural network models that can display some realistic
linguistic behavior. Rumelhart & McClelland's (1986) English Past Tense model without "rules"
and Jeff Elman's (1991) Simple Recurrent Neural Networks to learn (fragments of) context-free
languages and their successor models are the most well-known examples.
Elman's models, for instance, are specifically designed to disprove the poverty of the stim¬
ulus argument, as is evident from titles like Learning the unleamable (Lewis & Elman, 2001).
However, there are some serious theoretical problems with the kind of syntactic patterns these net¬
works can represent in principle (long-distance dependencies, see for instance, Steedman, 2002a),
as well as some lack of clarity about what the networks have actually learned5. Steedman (2002a),
Jackendoff (2002) and many others have laid out unsolved challenges for connectionists for mod¬
elling syntactic and semantic phenomena.
5Typically, error rates on predicting the next word are reported, but these conflate performance on trivial task, e.g.
nouns follow determiners, with performance on syntactically challenging tasks.
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More generally, however, the problem with the whole approach of disproving the poverty of
the stimulus, is that such models, even when successful, do not do away with language specific
innate knowledge, shaped by natural selection in a process of biological evolution (Pinker &
Bloom, 1990). They may push back how much language-specific knowledge must be assumed
innate, but they still depend on a large number of crucial parameters and architecture design
choices: parameters that regulate when to insert a new hidden unit, different activation functions
for hidden and output units, mechanisms to update weights and topological relations between
hidden units, phonological feature extraction, inflection classes. Presumably, these design choices
are all crucial for the observed behaviour.
Therefore, although connectionist models might suggest modifications to the nativist theo¬
ries, they do not solve the poverty of the stimulus: the primary linguistic data and general purpose
learning mechanisms are not sufficient. Hence, even if connectionists would meet all these chal¬
lenges (and work by Pollack, 1988 and subsequent work, comes a long way; moreover, formal
results on Turing equivalence of neural networks, Siegelmann & Sontag, 1991, ensure that it is
possible), nativists could simply argue that all they have accomplished is a lower-level implemen¬
tation of the nativist theory. These architectures and parameters are language specific, and not
some random variant of general learning mechanisms; and that infants have the proper innate ar¬
chitectures and parameters for learning language is exactly what nativist theory has been claiming
all the time. They are the Universal Grammar.
Kirsh (1992), in an early (constructive) critique of connectionist responses to the stimulus
poverty arguments, formulates this as follows:
"[...] to discover a network that will learn successfully, designers must choose with
care the network's architecture, the initial values the weights are set to, the learning
rule, and the number of times the data set is to be presented to the network [...]. Ifsuch
parameters are not controlled for, successful learning is extremely improbable. In
thoughtful modelling, these parameters are chosen on the basis of assumptions about
the nature of the function the system is to learn. That is, on the basis of assumptions
about the task and task domain. Prima facie, then, although the learning mechanism
operating on data is a general one, the success of this mechanism depends equally on
a set of antecedent choices that seem to be domain specific." (Kirsh, 1992, p. 297)
7.3.4 Language Evolution
Instead, from the field of language evolution a simple but much more promising answer has been
put forward: children are so good at learning language, because languages have adapted to the
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idiosyncracies of infants learning strategies:
"Human children appear preadapted to guess the rules of syntax correctly, precisely
because languages evolve so as to embody in their syntax the most frequently guessed
patterns. The brain has co-evolved with respect to language, but languages have done
most of the adapting." (Deacon, 1997, p. 122)
It might be "extremely improbable" that a random learning mechanism leams a random lan¬
guage successfully, it does not necessarily follow that the learning mechanism therefore has to
be adapted to the task (Fodor, 1989; Kirby, 1994; Christiansen, 1994; Deacon, 1997). The prob¬
ability that a random learning mechanism is successful when learning a language that is shaped
by generations that were using the same mechanism, is something entirely different and could be
very high. This proposal — in its informal, verbal presentation — has been met with some un¬
derstandable skepticism by nativists. In response to the quote above, Jackendoff has commented:
"But this puts the cart before the horse. Deacon is correct that human languages do
not push the envelope of Universal Grammar very much. But our question is: What
is this envelope anyway such that languages, however they evolve over time, must
conform to it? Given all the differences among the languages of the world, what
is it about them that enables children to "guess the rules of syntax" so well? This
something, whatever it is, is what is meant by Universal Grammar." (Jackendoff,
2002, p. 81-82)
This criticism reflects the common idea in generative linguistics that the structure of lan¬
guages which we observe, directly reflects the structure of the innate "envelope" for language. In
other words, this is the idea that the theory of language universals is the same as the theory of
language innateness. If one accepts the Uniformity Assumption, and the restricted notion of UG
that comes with it, Jackendoff's stance is correct. For instance, Niyogi & Berwick (1995), Yang
(2000) and others have studied models of language change based on parameter-setting learning
algorithms. Unsurprisingly, the dynamics in such models are rather straightforward. In a Prin¬
ciples and Parameters framework, the innate "envelope" is so restrictive, that all there is left for
the cultural process is to move from one particular setting of the parameters to another, without
any qualitative change in the expressivity or leamability of the language (Zuidema, 2003b; see
appendix C of this thesis).
However, if the "envelope of Universal Grammar" is less restrictive, can more interesting
things happen? That is, if we do not start from the assumption that there is a restrictive, innate
UG, but rather allow the cultural transmission process to favor certain types of languages over
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others and actually make qualitative changes in the language, do we observe anything like the
process that Deacon describes? This is exactly what the model in chapter 6, and the related
Expression-Induction models discussed in that chapter, address. These models show that if we
make the obvious assumption that the result of learning in one generation is the output for the next,
then the necessary constraints for learnability automatically emerge. Moreover, these models
show that the Uniformity Assumption is in some sense a worst case scenario for learnability. If
we, in contrast, assume that the innate "envelope" allows a wide range of qualitatively different
languages, a process of language adaptation will shape the languages over successive generations
to become progressively better learnable.
The fact that languages can change over time and adapt to the language user creates an in¬
teresting methodological problem for research on language evolution6. Because of this fact, the
"appearance of design" cannot, by itself, be taken as evidence for adaptation, although it is used
as such in many studies (e.g. Pinker & Bloom, 1990; Jackendoff, 2002; Pinker & Jackendoff,
2004). For instance, Pinker & Jackendoff (2004) present the fact that human vowel perception
appears to be different from non-human primate vowel perception as evidence for the view that
human hearing has been shaped by natural selection for speech perception. If we accept the idea,
however, that languages can adapt to their users, there is a reasonable alternative hypothesis: any
arbitrary feature of human hearing, whether or not it has been selected for, will be reflected in the
structure of human language because language will adapt to it.
To illustrate this idea I have run the model of chapter 5 with a U matrix where randomly
chosen signals are more reliably recognised than others (see figure 7.1a). After running the hill-
climbing heuristic, we see in the resulting language, figure 7.1b, that language reflects these
arbitrary features of the agents' perception. Language adapts to the language user, rather than the
other way around. If we interpret the hill climbing in the model of chapter 5 as learning, there is
a perfectly valid explanation for the match between language and user that involves no biological
evolution (see Kirby, 1999, for an analogous argument about syntactic patterns in language and
cognitive constraints on parsing).
We can conclude that in addition to (i) a theory on what must be innate given the available
primary linguistic data, we need (ii) a sophisticated theory on how the structure of the languages
6It also poses a methodological problem for language acquisition research: "Children must discover the rules that
generate an infinite set, with only a finite sample. They evidently possess additional language-learning abilities that
enable them to organize their language without explicit guidance. These abilities diminish with age and may be bio¬
logically based. However, scientific efforts to isolate them experimentally encounter a methodological complication:
given that today's languages were acquired by children in the past, language input to children already includes products
of innate biases. It is therefore difficult to determine whether any particular linguistic element observed in a child's
language is inborn or derived." (Saffran et al., 2001; references omitted).
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1000000 S:
(a) The heterogeneous U matrix, (b) From top to bottom: U matrix diagonal values, S matrix
with randomly chosen diagonal val- and RT matrix. S and RT at t = 1000000 (at equilibrium),
ues.
Figure 7.1: Results from a simulation with the model of chapter 5, a heterogeneous U matrix in the
"local optimisation of a deterministic lexicon" condition. The resulting language reflects arbitrary
features of the agents' perception.
of the world has emerged given the (innate) learning abilities, the cognitive, articulatory and
perceptual features of humans and the processes of cultural transmission (Kirby, 1999). It is clear
that the model discussed in chapter 6 is a poor version of such a theory. The model was designed
to be as simple as possible and to study the phenomenon of language adaptation in abstracto and
its relevance for arguments from learnability theory.
A likely conclusion from this new line of research is that with "general" learning algorithms
that did not evolve for language, only languages that are structurally quite different from contem¬
porary, human languages will emerge. The door is therefore open for language-specific adapta¬
tions as imagined in the nativist tradition. However, some of their critics have emphasised that
they have no principled objections against such adaptations (Elman eta/., 1996). For instance:
"Once it finally appeared on the planet, it is quite likely that language itself began
to apply adaptive pressure on the organization of the human brain [...]." (Bates &
Goodman, 1999)
The picture that emerges is one where children's learning mechanisms shape the languages
over a number of generations, and natural selection shapes the learning mechanisms. Senghas
et al. (2004) recently phrased a very similar conclusion, based on many years of empirical research
on the emergence of a new sign language in a school for the deaf in Nicaragua:
"In this way, evolutionary pressures would shape children's language learning (and
now, language-building) mechanisms to be analytical and combinatorial. On the
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other hand, once humans were equipped with analytical, combinatorial learning mech¬
anisms, any subsequently learned languages would be shaped into discrete and hier¬
archically organized systems." (Senghas et al., 2004, p. 1782)
Such a perspective turns the argument from the poverty of the stimulus on its head. Language
- by virtue of it being a culturally transmitted code - is necessarily leamable. Some of its features,
such as hierarchical phrase-structure, do not present a problem for learning, but rather a solution
for cultural transmission through a bottleneck. Children only appear to have prior knowledge,
because they happen to make the same arbitrary choices as all the generations before them; they
appear to have been adapted for language, because the sounds, meanings and rules of language
have been shaped by the learning and usage of previous generations. However, the learning
mechanisms might in turn have been shaped by natural selection such that the complex outcome
of the cultural evolution is biological adaptive. Perhaps it is not totally inconceivable that such a
view will help to bring the ongoing empiricism-nativism debate to an end.
7.4 Implications for Biology
The most obvious implication for biology of the work described in this thesis, is for issues in
the evolution of animal communication. The combinatorial phonology in the songs of birds,
cetaceans and gibbons (Ujhelyi, 1996), as well as the topology preservation in vervet alarm calls
(Seyfarth & Cheney, 1997) and rudimentary compositional semantics in Campbell monkey calls
(Zuberbiihler, 2002), bee dances (von Frisch, 1965, 1974) and perhaps gibbon calls (Ujhelyi,
1996), might all have evolved the same way as they did in human language. Similarly, the syntac¬
tic patterns and recursion observed in the songs of some birds, might have the same origin as such
patterns in human language. The models of chapters 4, 5 and 6, or adaptations of these models,
might therefore be applicable to evolutionary questions about communication in all these other
species.
The observation that languages themselves can evolve culturally points at another possible
connection with evolutionary biology. A whole tradition exists of drawing parallels between
biological evolution and language change, going back at least to Charles Darwin. Darwin was
influenced by observations from historical linguistics before he formulated his theory of evolution
by natural selection (Darwin, 1859), and wrote about the parallels in his later work. For instance,
in the Descent ofMan, Darwin writes (as quoted in Mesoudi et al., 2004):
"A struggle for life is constantly going on amongst the words and grammatical forms
in each language. The better, the shorter, the easier forms are constantly gaining the
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upper hand, and they owe their success to their own inherent virtue." (Darwin, 1871,
P-91)
In modern terminology, we can draw parallels between species and language, between the
gene and the words and rules7 of a language, between speciation and language birth, and between
extinction and language death and so-forth. This is not just an amusing curiosity; potentially, the
tools and concepts of evolutionary biology can be used to analyse data from historical linguistics
and linguistic typology. For linguists, one benefit is that the field of mathematical modelling
of evolution (as discussed in chapter 2) is much more advanced than mathematical modelling
of language change (e.g. Niyogi & Berwick, 1995; Yang, 2000). For biologists, there could be
benefits from applying and extending their tools to an alternative domain, where much empirical
data is available (and more and more is easily accessible through the internet).
Finally, a third possible connection between the models in this thesis and issues in biology,
concerns the origins of the genetic code. In descriptions of genetics, biologists have always used
linguistic terminology, such as code, information, expression, translation, transcription, "language
of the genes", and so-forth. But the analogy goes deeper than that. Through a by now well
understood code, almost universal for life on earth, specific triplets of DNA nucleotides (the
building blocks of genes) code for specific amino-acids (the building blocks of proteins). The
origins of the genetic code are, like the origins of human language, still largely an open issue and
there are many parallels to be drawn (Maynard Smith & Szathmary, 1995; Nick Barton, p.c.). The
DNA codon, or the transfer-RNA "copy" of it, is the analogue of a word, and the amino-acids of
its meaning.
Szathmary (1993) has proposed a scenario for its origin, which involves an earlier stage where
amino-acids help ribozymes (RNA based enzymes) to catalyse reactions, and where RNA "han¬
dles" are the precursors of modem transfer-RNA. These handles attach to specific amino-acids,
and help to position the amino-acid precisely on the ribozyme. Szathmary imagines that at this
stage each amino-acid (the "meaning") can get attached to multiple RNA handles ("words"), as
in models (as for instance, in chapter 5) of the cultural evolution of language where each meaning
can be expressed by many different words (signals). In this scenario, different amino-acid/RNA-
handle combinations are in competition with each other. Eventually, a specific handle gets estab¬
lished for each amino-acid, and a precursor genetic code emerges. Interestingly, there is even a
form of "topology preservation", where similar codons tend to code for similar amino-acids.
7The best analogy with the gene is probably the lexical entry (word) and its associated meaning and syntactic
category or"supertag" in lexicalised frameworks (e.g. Gamut, 1991; Steedman, 2000; Joshi, 2004).
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7.5 Future Work
This thesis provided an exploration of a complete and formal scenario of the evolution of lan¬
guage. Much more work can and should be put into analysing and extending the models proposed
in chapters 4, 5 and 6. An important extension to chapter 4 would be to provide a good measure
of the degree to which a signal repertoire is combinatorial. In chapters 4 and 5, I made the as¬
sumption that with a combinatorial or compositional E-language, these features can more easily
evolve in the I-language. This assumption should be tested in follow-up models.
The model in chapter 6 should be replaced by a model with a much more robust learning
algorithm, that can be parametrised such that the evolutionary dynamics of a wide set of possible
learning strategies can be explored. I believe such a new model could be both important for the¬
ories of language evolution, and much strengthen the discussed implications for linguistics and
biology. Unfortunately, the unsupervised learning of grammar is a major problem forms a whole
project in itself. I have started to work on a new algorithm for unsupervised grammar learning,
that unlike the algorithm in chapter 6 works with a stochastic grammar formalism (stochastic tree
substitution grammars, which should make the learning more robust), includes semantic represen¬
tation (based on the lambda calculus, which should make the definition of payoff more straight¬
forward) and integrates, like Batali (2002), learning with parsing (based on memoised, left-corner
parsing techniques).
Is a serious scientific investigation of language origins feasible? As I discussed at the start
of this thesis, many scholars worry that the problem is underdetermined, that is, that there will
always be many explanations consistent with the scarce empirical facts. I hope to have shown in
this thesis that evolutionary biology and linguistics bring enough formal constraints on evolution¬
ary explanations to evaluate (and reject) many current proposals, and to define clear challenges
for mathematical and computational modellers. Whether the problem really is principally under-
determined is an open issue, but I feel there is every reason to try to meet these challenges and
work out rigorous scenarios in the framework sketched.
Ultimately, a detailed understanding of how language evolved will depend on a detailed un¬
derstanding of how language works: How can the biological hardware of the brain process lan¬
guage? How does a child acquire the knowledge of her native language? How does the structure
of natural languages depend on these learning and processing mechanisms? These are formidable
challenges. If evolutionary linguistics can contribute anything to answering these questions, it
will prove to be not only a fascinating but also a worthwhile exercise.
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Appendix A
Wright's Adaptive Topography
Consider the single locus, two alleles model of figure 2.1. Recall the expression for average fitness of the 3 possible
genotypes (equation 2.5):
w = p2WAA + 2pqWAa + (A.l)
Because p + q = 1 this expression can be rewritten as:
P2wAa + 2p(l - p)wAa + (1 - p)2w,2-.,aa
= p2WAA +2pWAa - 2p2WAa + Waa — 2pwaa + p2Waa- (A.2)
The derivative of w with respect to p is now (provided the fitness coefficients are independent of p):
dw
— = 2pWAA + 2wao — 4pUUa - 2waa + 2pwaa
dp
= 2 (PWAA + WAa - 2pWAa ~ Waa + pwaa)
= 2 (pWAA + (1 - p)wAa ~ pWAa ~ (1 - p)waa)
= 2 {pWAA + qWAa ~ PWAa - ?t»aa)
= 2(p(wAA ~ WAa) ~ q(Waa ~ WAa)) ■ (A.3)
Now, recall the expression for the change in p (equation (2.6)), which can in a few steps be rewritten as:








= —{pu>AA + qWAa - W). (A.4)
w
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Inserting equation (A.l) into equation (A.4), and rearranging using the fact that q = 1 — p, gives:
Ap = =(pWAA + qWAa ~ P2WAA - 2pqWAa ~ q2Waa)
w
= =(pWAA ~ p2WAA + qWAa ~ 2pqWAa - q2Waa)
w
P 2
= =(p(WAA ~ PWAA) + qWAa ~ 2pqWAa ~ 9 Waa)
w
p 2
= =(p(l - P)wAA + qWAa - 2pqWAa - q Waa)
w
= ZlipqWAA + qWAa - 2pqwAa ~ q2Waa)
w
VQ
= -{pWAA + WAa-2pWAa-qWaa)
w
pq / \
= — (PWAA + WAa - pWAa - pWAa - qWaa)
W
PQ
= —(PWAA + (1 - p)WAa ~ PWAa ~ qwaa)
w
pq / \





Equation (A.5) and (A.3) can be combined into equation (2.9), as is explored in the main text.
Appendix B
Local Optimisation of a Deterministic Lexicon
Distributed hillclimbing:
For g=0 to I do
i <— random integer, 0 < i < P
j <— random integer, 0<j<P,j^i
m <— random integer, 0 < m < M
f <— random integer, 0 < f < F
if g is even do
w <— quicksuccess-m(S" ,R\U, V, m)
f - s'M
5![m] — /
w' <— quicksuccess-m(51, R?, [/, V, m)
if w > w' do 5"[m] <— /'
else do
w <— quicksuccess-f(5J, /?', (7, V, /)
m' Rl[f]
Rl [/] «- m
w' *— quicksuccess-f(5'J, R',U, V, f)
if w > w' do Rl[f] <— m'
quicksuccess-m(5, R, U, V, m) <—
£/,o V[m][R[f|] x U[S[m]][f]
quicksuccess-f(5, R, U, V, f) <—
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Abstract
We study a computational model of the evolution of
language in groups of agents to evaluate under which
circumstances syntax emerges. The fitness in the
model depends on the composition of the population.
We find that this fact significantly alters the evolu¬
tionary dynamics. If scores are attributed to both
speaker and hearer, expressive syntax is hard to ob¬
tain. If scores are attributed only to the hearer, syntax
develops, but agents loose the willingness to speak.
Implications and a possible solution of this paradox
are discussed.
Introduction
Among the many differences between human language
and other animal communication systems, syntax is
widely acknowledged to be particularly important.
Syntax allows us to combine a finite set of meaningful
units into an unbounded set of combinations. It allows
us to speak about events happening at other times and
places. It allows us to communicate about causal rela¬
tions, to phrase questions or imperatives, and to share
in detail previous experiences. The emergence of syn¬
tactic language is therefore considered to be one of the
major transitions in evolution (Szathmary & Maynard-
Smith, 1995).
In the traditional view, syntax reconciles the need
for high expressiveness with some of the natural
boundary conditions on communication such as mem¬
ory limitations, errors in distinguishing sounds, or
bottlenecks in the transmission of language knowl¬
edge. However, present-day language fulfills many
more functions than exchanging information, includ¬
ing facilitating social relations, individual expression,
increase of status, esthetic experience and perhaps in¬
ternalizing our knowledge of the world. It is unclear in
what way such functions are recent side-effects, or play
an important role in explaining the origins of language.
Discussions of such issues tend to be very unsatisfac¬
tory, because they seem hardly restricted by empirical
or theoretical bounds. Computational modeling offers a
'Present address: Sony CSL, 6, Rue Amyot, 75005,
Paris, Prance; webpage: www-binf.bio.uu.nl/~jelle
novel approach to these issues, because such models are
at least restricted by whether or not the combination of
assumptions implemented in the model yield the hy¬
pothesized outcome: syntactic language. This paper
discusses a simple computational model of an evolving
group of communicating individuals and studies un¬
der which selection pressures expressive, syntactic lan¬
guage arises. Before describing the model architecture
and results, we will first briefly discuss the theoretical
background and some related work.
Evolution of language
Probably the most well-known speculation on the ori¬
gins of human language is the paper of Pinker & Bloom
(1990). Pinker & Bloom argue that syntax must origi¬
nate in a process of evolutionary optimization, because
"natural selection" is the only explanation for the ori¬
gins of complex design in nature. The paper brings to¬
gether a valuable collection of findings, but from a the¬
oretical perspective it is problematic, because it lacks
precision and formalization. In its weakest interpreta¬
tion the central claim is trivial (there is no doubt that
only members of the human species can acquire fluency
in a human language) and in its strongest interpreta¬
tion ("evolution has led to genes that explicitly specify
a universal rule system for language") the claim is un¬
tenable. However, the lack of a more precise aspect
to Pinker & Bloom's work, makes it hard to position
their ideas between these extremes.
Moreover, Pinker & Bloom's paper is symptomatic
for the popular fallacy in linguistics that one can only
choose between two explanations: (i) language orig¬
inates in a genetic evolution, or (ii) language arises
as the spontaneous result of general cognitive skills
and social structure. We believe that putting these
two explanations in opposition, excludes the most in¬
teresting part of the story. Spontaneous pattern for¬
mation ("self-structuring") needs a mechanism to set
the right parameters, and evolution needs a plausible
substrate to operate on. Viewing self-structuring as a
substrate for evolution (Boerlijst & Hogeweg, 1991a)
offers a fresh perspective that allows one to study how
evolution, genetic information, learning, development,
embodiment and social structures all interact to shape
human language. Note that such an interactionist ac¬
count differs fundamentally from a naive "some parts
of language are innate, some are learned" view.
Computational modeling
Recent work that studied such interactions in compu¬
tational models has produced a wealth of new hypothe¬
ses and insights (Hurford, 1989; Hashimoto & Ikegami,
1996; Batali, 1997; Steels, 1997; De Boer, 1999; Kirby,
2000; Nowak & Krakauer, 1999; Hurford, 2000). Such
models are relatively precise implementations of the
underlying set of assumptions, and allow one to evalu¬
ate the internal coherence of such a set. Moreover, they
are productive, in the sense that they often show unex¬
pected behaviors that help to generate new hypothe¬
ses and concepts. And although they are necessarily
simplified representations, the fact that their behav¬
ior can be experimentally evaluated makes it possible
to study more complex phenomena than with analyt¬
ical methods alone. Computational models therefore
pre-eminently can make tractable systems with many
variables and interactions.
On the issue of the origins of syntax, a number of
intriguing mechanisms have been identified using com¬
putational modeling techniques. Although very di¬
verse, they all emphasize the fact that syntax greatly
increases the number of possible forms in a language.
For instance, Batali (1997), Kirby (2000) and Hurford
(2000) studied how cultural evolution can account for
the emergence of syntax. Although they use several
different formalisms, the common idea in this work
is that the internal knowledge of language (the infi¬
nite "I-language") is transmitted culturally (via a fi¬
nite "E-language") from one agent to another. This
"transmission bottleneck" works as a filter, in which
syntactic elements of language typically out-compete
non-syntactic elements, because the former sure inher¬
ently used more often.
Nowak & Krakauer (1999) studied a game-theoretic
model of language evolution and identify a different
mechanism that can account for the emergence of
syntax. Using the matrix representations of Hurford
(1989), they infer a "linguistic error limit". Given that
an individual makes mistakes in distinguishing sounds
with a probability that depends on the similarity be¬
tween those sounds, Nowak & Krakauer calculate a
limit on the number of messages an individual can
convey. They show mathematically that word forma¬
tion and syntax can help overcome such a limit. More¬
over, they show that both non-syntactic and syntactic
strategies are evolutionary stable strategies (i.e. cannot
be invaded by other strategies). However, every mixed
strategy can be invaded by every mixed strategy that
uses more syntactic sentences. Thus, the evolutionary
process should lead towards grammar.
Hashimoto & Ikegami (1996) showed that syntax can
emerge in an evolving group of communicating agents.
The agents in their model have an internal rewriting
grammar, that generates a formal language using lex¬
ical or syntactic strategies. Because there is no limit
on the number of rules, both strategies could in prin¬
cipal generate all possible strings in the finite domain
that was used. However, at the start of the simula¬
tions agents are initialized with just one rule in their
grammar. Because mutations add rules one at a time,
and expressiveness grows much faster with grammar
size using a syntactic strategy, syntactic agents out-
compete non-syntactic ones.
An important aspect of Hashimoto & Ikegami's
model is that fitness is not a fixed measure, but de¬
pends on the kind of grammars that are present in the
population. This leads to some counterintuitive re¬
sults. For instance, they find that the most expressive
agents are not necessarily the most successful and that
a score for not being recognized accelerates the evolu¬
tion of syntax. These observations are the starting
point for the model study reported in this paper.
The model
The model reported in this paper is a variant of the
model of Hashimoto & Ikegami (1996). Of the many
aspects that might be relevant, we study only one par¬
ticular type of interaction: between evolutionary dy¬
namics and group structure. We therefore ignore all
aspects of grammar, except for the fundamental prop¬
erties of compositionality and recursion. We ignore se¬
mantics, by just attributing scores for successful pars¬
ing. And we ignore learning, by assuming that agents
end up with the same internal grammar, except from
some changes that result from mutations in the innate
component of language.
In this simplified model we will show that evolution
shapes the linguistic environment of agents, but, con¬
versely, that the group structure also shapes the evo¬
lutionary process. This interaction guides evolution in
unexpected directions, and, depending on the imple¬
mented function of language, can both facilitate and
hinder the development of syntax.
The model consists of a population of agents with an
internal rewriting grammar, which they inherit with
some mutations from their parent. The grammars are
context free grammars, with nonterminal and terminal
symbols from the small alphabets Vnt = {S1, A, B] and
Vte = {0,1} respectively. As an extra restriction, we
don't allow the "S" at the right-hand sides of rules.
At the start of most simulations, agents are initialized
with a grammar with just one rule: randomly S >-)• 0 or
S i-> 1. Agents have the ability to derive ("speak") and
parse ("understand") strings of 0's and 1 's of maximum
length 6, using the rules from the grammar. Within
these constraints the maximum expressiveness is 126.
We define compositionality as using the non-terminals
A and B, and recursion as using rules that were used
before in the same branch of the rewriting tree.
Agents interact in a set-up of "language games".
In every game all agents can speak one string and
try to recognize the strings produced by other agents.
Every generation a number of games is played and
scores are attributed for successful communication. In
most simulations, we use an explicit "innovation pres¬
sure". This pressure is implemented by discounting
scores with the number of times a string is already
heard before, and corresponds to a semantic need for
a rich repertoire of forms. We designed several scor¬
ing schemes that reflect hypotheses on the function of
language. The most important schemes are labeled
"communication" and "perception":
communication corresponds to a selection pressure
to optimize the total of exchanged information, such
that both the speaker and the hearer benefit from
successful communication. This pressure is imple¬
mented by a score for recognition and for being rec¬
ognized.;
perception corresponds to a selection pressure to op¬
timize the total of information received, in order to
make use of the knowledge of others (as if one indi¬
rectly shares someone else's perception). This pres¬
sure is implemented as a score for recognition;
We replace all agents every generation with offspring
of the present population. The number of offspring of
an agent depends on the total score it has received rel¬
ative to other agents. Random mutations are applied
to the offspring with fixed probabilities for modifica¬
tion of existing rules ("replace"), duplication of a ran¬
dom rule ("add") or deletion of a rule ("delete"). We
also implemented a mutation "shift", that swaps a rule
with the previous rule in the grammar and occurs with
a probability per rule. These mutations correspond to
conventions in evolutionary programming and allow for
optimizing some of the relevant features of grammars,
but otherwise they are more or less arbitrary.
The group effect
Fitness in this model is not a static function of an
agent's grammar ("genotype"), but it depends on the
grammars of other agents too. The general observation
in experiments with the model with many different pa¬
rameter settings is that this fact strongly influences the
evolutionary dynamics (Hashimoto & Ikegami, 1996).
The success of an agent's individual language is deter¬
mined by how well it matches the language of the whole
group, rather than by how much information it can en¬
code ("expressiveness"). We call this phenomenon the
"group effect".
Figure 1(a) shows an example simulation, with a
"communication" scoring scheme and "innovation",
that shows clearly some of the mechanisms that play a
role. From the initial level of expressiveness of 1, the
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(b) The same run in a "phase space"
Figure 1: An example run with very clear epochal evolu¬
tion. Shown are the running averages and individual agents
at every tenth generation. Note that most individual points
are hidden under the grey line, (a) During an epoch, ex¬
pressiveness stays at a fixed level. In fact, in the first stage
(E=31) the dominant language stays exactly the same for
thousands ofgenerations. Individual agents with higher ex¬
pressiveness occur, but are not able to survive in the group,
(b) Grammars do vary, however, which is possible because
of the neutrality in the grammar-language mapping (see
text). In the phase space, one can clearly see that gram¬
mar size fluctuates during an epoch. All jumps to higher
levels take place when grammars are relatively large. Such
grammars are clearly larger than necessary and have a neu¬
tral tails. Parameters: default "communication" run with
innovation pressure (see section "selective advantages")
population evolves within several hundreds of genera¬
tion to a level of 31. At this point, evolution has de¬
veloped via selection and random mutations grammars
that are redundant and not very structured, and com¬
bine several strategies in the rewriting process from
the start symbols "S" to a distinct sequence of termi¬
nal characters.
For a very long time, from around generation 860
until 5510, the population remains fixed at a level of
expressiveness of 31. Analysis of the language reveals
that the set of strings of the majority of agents remains
unchanged for this whole period. However, frequently
agents appear that have a much higher level of expres¬
siveness. This illustrates that (i) the mapping from
grammar to language is very non-linear, because a sin¬
gle mutation can make a dramatic change in the size
of the language, and (ii) there is a very strong group
effect, because agents that have a much higher expres¬
siveness (and thus are "objectively" much better), can
nevertheless not persist in the population. Thf reason
is that the languages of these agents differ t6o much
from the language of the group. The agents therefore
obtain fewer scores for being recognized and possibly
even for recognizing.
Another striking observation in this simulation is
that, although the languages remain unchanged for
several thousands of generations, the grammars un¬
dergo a constant reorganization. This illustrates that
the mapping from language to grammar is not only
non-linear, but also very redundant.
Figure 1 (b) shows a graph of the same simulation in
a "phase space" that shows the average grammar size
versus the average expressiveness at each generation.
As one can clearly see, once a certain level of expres¬
siveness is reached, the evolutionary process "wanders
around" for a long time, without significant changes
in the expressiveness ("neutrality"). Only when the
grammars are relatively large, and thus have many
unused, redundant rules, a chance event causes the
population to jump to a new level of expressiveness.
This chance event is that two agents mutate to the
same richer language, and thus can obtain in their
mutual communication enough scores to compensate
for differing from the group. This mechanism relates
to the idea of "neutral networks" — networks of con¬
nected points in genotype space that correspond to
the same phenotype — that forms a good explanation
for the occurrence of "epochs" or "punctuated equilib¬
ria" in evolving systems with a fixed fitness function
(Van Nimwegen et al., 1999).
Selective advantages
While the "group effect" occurs under all parameter
settings of the model, its role can be quite different
for each of the scoring schemes and the initial gram¬
mars we considered. We observe compositional and
recursive grammars only in about half of the parame¬
ter combinations we considered. Even if scores are ex¬
plicitly discounted with the number of times a string is
already used before ("innovation pressure"), expressive
syntax does not necessarily emerge.
This fact is surprising, because the intuitive expecta¬
tion is that expressiveness is selectively advantageous.
Indeed, with (i) an explicit innovation pressure, the
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Figure 2: Communication with innovation pressure for
three different types of initial grammars. With a suffi¬
ciently large initial lexical grammar, expressive syntax can
not develop.
average score per agent has it optimum at maximal
expressiveness. However, implicitly expressiveness in¬
fluences the scores in other ways as well: (ii) expressive
speakers are more likely not to be understood, and (iii)
expressive listeners are more likely to understand.
This leads to an interesting interplay between each of
these roles of expressiveness and the group effect. Un¬
der communication settings (ii) not being recognized
is disadvantageous, while (iii) recognition is advanta¬
geous and in both scoring dimensions similarity to the
group's language is important. Under perception set¬
tings (ii) not being recognized and (iii) recognition
are beneficial, while similarity to the group's language
is important for recognition, but dissimilarity is bet¬
ter for not being recognized (and thus hindering one's
competitors). Moreover, the strength of the group ef¬
fect depends on the size of the group's language and
the variation within the group. In various experiments
we obtained the following results:
communication does not lead to highly expressive
grammars with the default initial grammar and with¬
out the innovation pressure. If the initial grammar is
an expressive, recursive grammar, the high level of ex¬
pressiveness can be maintained. In Contrast, with a
medium size lexical grammar, grammars remain lexi¬
cal and expressiveness remains limited.
With an innovation pressure and the default initial¬
ization expressive syntax eventually does develop. In
this type of runs we observe a stepwise development,
with typically long intervals at the same level of expres¬
siveness. Expressive syntactic grammars are reached
only after very many generations. With an expressive,
recursive initial grammar, the high level of expressive¬
ness can be maintained. With a medium size lexical
grammar expressiveness remains limited and no syntax
develops (see figure 2).
With "communication" as the function of language,
perception / with Innovation pressure
Figure 3: A typical example of a simulation with "percep¬
tion" settings, the default initial grammar and an innova¬
tion pressure. Shown are the average expressiveness over
time, and the percentage of failures in derivation. After
around 3000 generations this percentage approaches 100,
indicating that very little communication is maintained.
syntax can thus be maintained if present, but is hard to
obtain. If the initial grammar is of sufficient size and of
a lexical type, syntax never develops. These results are
particularly interesting, as they resemble the situation
that is traditionally thought to precede the emergence
of grammar: large, lexical protolanguages, with com¬
munication benefits for both speaker and hearer.
perception shows rapid growth in expressiveness in
most cases considered. With the default initialization
and no innovation pressure, expressive syntax develops
within a few hundred generations. With the lexical ini¬
tialization it takes much longer, but the development
of syntax was usually observed.
With an innovation pressure and default initial
grammars the growth is generally slower than with¬
out such an innovation pressure. Infrequently, we even
observe runs that remain lexical throughout the simu¬
lation. When initialized with an lexical grammar, the
runs with innovation pressure show such behavior.
"Perception" thus yields expressive syntax in most
cases considered (see figure 3). The benefits of not
being understood seem to be a strong incentive to de¬
velop more expressive language. Interestingly, an inno¬
vation pressure makes the development of syntax less
likely. Apparently, the fact that the hearer benefits
from richer input hinders this development.
Paradox
Another striking feature of perception runs is the high
number of failures that occur in derivation (see fig¬
ure 3). Apparently, agents develop grammars that are
able to parse a high number of strings, but nevertheless
frequently fail in derivation. This is possible because of
the asymmetry in parsing (complete bottom-up search
of the derivation tree) and derivation (random top-
down walk). This possibility was not implemented
intentionally. Nevertheless, the evolutionary process
discovered it and "actively" exploits it.
This observation points at a important assumption
in the model: agents are forced to participate in the
language game. A classic altruism problem thus arises:
if speaking behavior is beneficial only for an individ¬
ual's competitors, why would it be retained in evolu¬
tion? We extended the model with a parameter for
probability to speak. Under perception settings this
parameter indeed quickly evolves to zero.
Interestingly, these results constitute a paradox: un¬
der those circumstances that syntactic expressiveness
develops, willingness to speak disappears. Under the
circumstances where willingness to speak is retained,
syntactic language does not develop. We studied a pos¬
sible solution for this paradox in a model where agents
are localized on a 2D grid and interact only with their
immediate neighbors. Such spatial models are known
to naturally yield altruism, because spatial patterns
make multilevel evolution possible and kin selection
more likely (Boerlijst & Hogeweg, 1991b).
The willingness to speak can be retained in the spa¬
tial model with perception settings. The parameter
that determines the probability of an agent to speak
at its turn in the language game, is initialized at 0.1.
As one can see in the example of figure 4, the aver¬
age value rapidly evolves to a high value close to the
maximum. Spatial patterns are responsible for this
selection pressure towards altruistic behavior. If one











Figure 4: Perception in space. Shown is the average frac¬
tion of the maximum of expressiveness (maximum is 126)
and willingness to speak (maximum is l). Parameters are:
initial population size — 2000, number ofgames per genera¬
tion = 1, maximum string length — 6, minimum number of
understanders = 0, madd = 0.1, mrep = 0.01, mdel — 0.01,
maximum number of parsing steps = 500, maximum num¬
ber of derivation steps = 60, self-interaction not allowed,





Some of the striking differences in the results of dif¬
ferent scoring schemes can be better understood by
looking at a very simple game-theoretic model, where
there are just two agents and two levels of expressive¬
ness. If we work out the language games that take
place in such a set-up, we find that both the low/low
and the high/high situations are equilibria in the com¬
munication case, but in the case of perception only the
high/high situation is an equilibrium. These results
qualitatively corresponds to the results we obtained in
the simulations.
The essential observation here is that, although ho¬
mogeneous high expressiveness is the "best" solution,
unilateral high expressiveness under communication
setting is in fact disadvantageous. It seems a promis¬
ing approach to extend this game-theoretic analysis to
a more general case, with more levels of expressive¬
ness and more interacting agents. However, many as¬
pects of the model behavior depend on the non-linear
mapping between grammar and language and can not
easily be captured in such an analysis.
Conclusions
Traditionally the origins of language are thought to be
explained as either the spontaneous result of human
cognitive abilities and social interactions, or the result
of an evolution of our innate language capacity. This
model study shows an example system where both so¬
cial interaction and evolutionary updating play a role.
Not because one part of language can be explained by
"nurture" and another part by "nature", but because
they fundamentally interact: social interactions shape
the evolutionary process and vice versa.
Also, traditionally language and the evolution of lan¬
guage are studied in terms of how much information
about the outside world can be transmitted. Our re¬
sults suggest that this might not always be the most
interesting way of looking at language, because lan¬
guage can have its own dynamics within a group that
is quite independent from how well it represents the
outside world.
Moreover, this model study shows results that devi¬
ate from the traditional picture that lexical protolan-
guages became larger and larger until syntax became
necessary. If communication if beneficial for both
speaker and hearer and the population uses an ex¬
tensive lexical language, syntax does not develop. If
the traditional picture holds, the question arises which
mechanisms are responsible for the differences.
Finally, spatial patterns have not played much of
a role in speculations about the origins of language.
Results from this study suggest that such spatial pat¬
terns can be relevant. The fact that present-day lan¬
guage shows obvious spatial patterns indicates that
a global approximation perhaps excludes important
mechanisms.
Many open questions remain. For instance, un¬
der perception settings there is an indirect benefit of
speaking that leads to high values of the willingness to
speak. Why then, does this indirect benefit not result
in the same disadvantage of unilateral high expressive¬
ness that we observe under communication settings?
Such intriguing issues are left for future work.
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Abstract. In this paper we explore the similarities between a mathe¬
matical model of language evolution and several A-life simulations. We
argue that the mathematical model makes some problematic simplifica¬
tions, but that a combination with computational models can help to
adapt and extend existing language evolution scenario's.
1 Introduction
The debate on the origins of language has been dominated by "verbal" theories,
both in scientific publications (see e.g. [3]) and in popular, best-selling books
(e.g. [1]). Recently also mathematical models of the evolution of language, es¬
pecially those of Martin Nowak et ah, have received much attention (e.g. [6]).
These models are sometimes seen as a validation of the earlier verbal theories.
Steven Pinker, e.g., writes in the accompanying news story of [7] that the paper
shows "the evolvability of [one of] the most striking features of language", i.e. its
compositionality.
Although we appreciate the major contributions in these books and papers,
we still observe many shortcomings in the proposed theories. Both the verbal
and the mathematical accounts tend to overlook many crucial details. Verbal
theories often underestimate the intricacies of the evolutionary dynamics and
take "evolution" too much as a general problem solver. The mathematical mod¬
els often make crucial simplifications that are linguistically poorly motivated.
In particular, both types of theories have shown little appreciation for the im¬
portance of the "frequency dependency" of language evolution and the role of
selforganization there-in.
A-life models, on the contrary, have shed light on both the dynamics of
language evolution and the explanatory role of selforganization. However, A-
life models are too often studied as relatively isolated cases, and too seldomly
systematically compared with each other and with mathematical models (the
review papers [8, 4] are exceptions, although they unfortunately do not discuss
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mathematical models). In this paper we explore the similarities between a re¬
cently published mathematical model [6], our own A-life simulations [9] and the
model'of Kirby [5]. We believe that such an approach can eventually both avoid
the problematic simplifications of mathematical models, and the ad hoc-ness of
many A-life models. In the conference presentation we will also discuss some
shortcomings of "verbal" theories as revealed by A-life models.
2 The mathematical model
Nowak et al. use in [6] an elegant formalism that is in line with our view that
one should study both the cultural dynamics of language and the evolutionary
dynamics that operate on the parameters of the cultural process. We will discuss
here only the model for cultural dynamics.
Nowak et al. assume that there is a finite number of states (grammar types)
that an individual can be in. Further, they assume that newcomers (infants)
learn their grammar from the population, where more successful grammars have
a higher probability to be learned and mistakes are made in learning. The system
can now be described in terms of the changes in the relative frequencies Xi of
each grammar type i in the population:
In this differential equation, /, is the relative fitness (quality) of grammars
of type i and equals /, = Yl,jxjFij> where Fij is the expected communicative
success from an interaction between an individual of type i and an individual of
type j. The relative fitness / of a grammar thus depends on the frequencies of
all grammar types, hence it is frequency dependent. The proper way to choose F
depends on the characteristics of language use (production and interpretation).
Qij is the probability that a child learning from a parent of type i, will end
up with grammar of type j. The probability that the child ends up with the
same grammar, Qu, is defined as q, the copying fidelity. The proper way to
choose Q depends on the characteristics of language acquisition (learning and
development). (</> is the average fitness in the population and equals <j) = JT Xifi.
This term is needed to keep the sum of all fractions at 1).
The main result that Nowak et al. obtain is a "coherence threshold": they
show mathematically that there is a minimum value for q to keep coherence
in the population. If q is lower than this value, all possible grammar types are
equally frequent in the population and the communicative success in minimal. If
q is higher than this value, one grammar type is dominant; the communicative
success is much higher than before and reaches 100% if q = 1. Further, Nowak et
al. derive an upper and a lower bound on the number of sample sentences that






We argue that computational models that we [9] and others [2] have studied fit
the general format of equation 1 well, but differ significantly in the particular
choices for the representation of language use and language acquisition, i.e. the
functions F and Q. In the limited space that is available here we will only shortly
mention two examples of^interesting, qualitative differences that these choices
bring.
First, for sake of simplicity Nowak et al. assume that all grammars are equally
expressive, and are all equally similar to each other. This has the unrealistic
consequence that the benefits of interacting with another individual (F) are ei¬
ther maximal or minimal. We studied a computational model [9] were we used
context-free grammars to represent the linguistic abilities of agents. This formal¬
ism can represent "languages" of many different types and levels of expressive¬
ness. In that study, we did not model learning explicitly, but in stead assumed
(as in equation 1) that children end up with a slightly different grammar than
their parents.
One of the surprising findings was that once a certain type of language was
established in the populatibn, the language kept changing but remained of the
same type. The language types formed "self-enforcing regimes", because the lan¬
guage present at time t determines which agents will be successful and reproduce
to the next generation, and therefore indirectly determine the language at time
t + 1. We found three such regimes: (i) idiosyncratic, non-syntactic languages,
(ii) compositional languages and (iii) recursive languages. In a population where
a rich but idiosyncratic language is established, syntax could not emerge. This
phenomenon is important for understanding the consequences of the frequency
dependency of language evolution, but is excluded in the simplifications of the
mathematical model.
Second, Nowak et al. consider two extreme possibilities for the learning al¬
gorithm, and claim to have found a lower and a upper bound on the number of
training samples that a learning algorithm needs to reach the coherence thres¬
hold. However, in their analysis they have not taken into account that the choice
of the grammar that a child has to learn is biased by how well previous genera¬
tions have been able to learn and maintain it.
In a follow-up of the study above, we have implemented a variant of the
"iterated learning model" of Kirby [5], in which agents are endowed with a
language-acquisition algorithm to learn the context-free grammars. Kirby found
that in the process of iterated cultural transmission the language adapts itself
to be better learnable by individual agents. Concretely, this means that the
language becomes compositional (syntactic) and that agents are more successful
in learning it than would be expected a priori. We replicated this finding, and can
show that agents in fact need less training samples than Nowak et al. calculate as
a lower bound for maintaining a stable language in the population. The reason
is that not only do individuals evolve to be better at language-learning, but
also do languages evolve to be better learned [1]. Again, this phenomenon is
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important for our understanding of the origins of language, but excluded in the
simplifications of the mathematical model.
4 Conclusions
Research on the evolution of language faces two aspects of language that are
particularly important: (i) it is transmitted, at least in part, culturally, and
learned by one individual from the other; (ii) it is a group phenomenon, that
occurs only between individuals and has no apparent value for an individual in
isolation. These aspects make that the fitness of individual is not a function of
its language acquisition system alone, but is dependent on the cultural dynam¬
ics and the composition of the group it is in as well. This observation brings
restrictions and opportunities for language evolution scenario's that are deemed
to be overlooked in both verbal and mathematical theorizing. We conclude that
A-life models can help to evaluate the validity of these scenarios and help to
adapt them, while at the same time mathematical models can help to compare
computational models and to identify common themes between them.
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Commentary/Rachiin: Altruism and selfishness
f reshing to read an article unabashedly stressing the role of the en¬
vironment in prosocial behaviour. That in principle one can imag¬
ine behavioural reinforcement as explaining virtually all of the
variance in altruistic behaviour, is certainly possible: In the limit,
we could have the case where evolution has been evolution for a
purely environmentally plastic brain (e.g., Quartz & Sejnowski
1997). One can make a powerful case for some endogeneity of
prosocial behavior (Zizzo, in press). Yet, although one can make
an argument for the partial endogeneity of interdependent pref¬
erences, it is not obvious how the evidence is incompatible with a
partial role of genetic inheritance in explaining behavioral vari¬
ance, nor why this should not be considered as the most natural
interpretation (e.g., Rushton et al. 1986).
Rachlins evidence suggests that (1) conditional cooperation is
important, and (2) it is subject to framing effects (i.e., whether you
believe you are playing against a computer or otherwise). Con¬
cerning point 2, Rachlin is right to suggest that framing effects are
pervasive (e.g., Cookson 2000). He claims that they are due to dif¬
ferent frequencies of reinforcement; this may very well be true,
but it is no more than a conjecture, and so it is unclear how it can
be used as a proof of Rachlin s theory of altruism relative to other
theories. Concerning point 1, reinforcement over an act is not
identical to reinforcement over a pattern of acts, and to prove the
latter, Rachlin would really need to discuss the evidence on knowl¬
edge transfer from one game to a different game, to see whether
reinforcement in one situation translates into reinforcement in an¬
other situation.
In favour of Rachlin s thesis, there are contexts where this is the
case, at least in the short run implied by tire laboratory settings
(e.g., Guth et al. 1998). In some current experimental work, I have
subjects first play a set of games that change to the degree in which
the subjects are cooperative or close to zero-sum, and then they
play a set of new, never-before-encountered games (with different
players, eliminating repeated game effects). When the first set of
games is more cooperative, behaviour in the second set of games
is also more cooperative. While not all the evidence can be rec¬
onciled with a simple reinforcement learning account, it is what
Rachlins theory needs.
A deeper problem is whether the pattern of acts diat is rein¬
forced is what Rachlin claims it to be ("altruism") or something en¬
tirely different. There are many possible preferences that would
be able to explain why cooperation in the finitely repeated Pris¬
oners Dilemma (PD) is conditional on an expectation of cooper¬
ation from the other player. Preferences, as we economists use
them, are a behavioral concept: They are preferences as revealed
in behaviour and so are closely related to Rachlin s patterns ofacts.
They include utility functions with two elements, one based on
material gain and the other on a payoff transformation component
implying inequality aversion (Fehr & Schmidt 1999), reciprocity
(Falk & Fischbacher 1998), trust responsiveness (Bacharach et al.
2001), pure or impure altruism (Palfrey & Prisbrey 1997), or per¬
ceived fairness (Konow 2000). They will all lead to different pre¬
dictions depending on whether subjects believe they are playing
against a computer, or if they believe they are playing with a hu¬
man being, because you will be fairness-sensitive towards a human
being, but not against a computer. Even if the agents are, and re¬
main, purely self-interested, they may find it optimal to cooperate
because of the repeated nature of the game, whether with humans
(Kreps et al. 1982) or (in different ways) with computers (because
subjects can try to "crack the system" of how to make the most
money). Otherwise, for a wide range of payoff transformations,
with a modicum of rationality, the PD becomes a different game
where mutual cooperation is a possible equilibrium, and the
greater the expectation is of cooperation from the co-player, the
greater will be the expected payoff for cooperating and hence
the likelihood of cooperation. Therefore, the interpretation of co¬
operation in the finitely repeated PD is likely to be difficult. This
matters, because the preferences that subjects have or acquire
may make very different quantitative predictions in many differ¬
ent game settings (e.g., for other trust games; see Bacharach et al.
2001). This is why experimental economists have been focusing on
a variety of different games to assess what preferences subjects
have (e.g., Charness & Rabin 2000; Zizzo 2000a): The PD para¬
digm is simply not discriminative enough.
Rachlins section 4 definition of altruism appears based on the
intrinsic value of an act that is beneficial to a group: This would
correspond to what economists would label "impure altruism" or
"warm glow," albeit further specified with relation to a group. Un¬
fortunately, there is no specific reason to believe that this is the
pattern of acts that gets reinforced rather than, say, others with
greater predictive power such as inequality aversion (e.g., Fehr &
Schmidt 1999; Zizzo 2000b). Perhaps his theory can be rescued by
making it more general, but this may be at the cost of virtual un-
falsifiability. If Rachlin wants to convince nonbehavioural psy¬
chologists, he might need to show how his theory is better than al¬
ternative theories that make precise quantitative predictions, and
how it can then receive unequivocal support or falsification in the
laboratory. Nevertheless, he is right in stressing the role of behav¬
ioural reinforcement, and behavioural psychologists like him can
bring useful new perspectives to our understanding of prosocial
behavior. In particular, framing effects are real, and none of the
models I mentioned can really explain them except in specific
cases or with auxiliary or unmodelled hypotheses. Zizzo (2000b)
tried to fill the modelling gap among reinforcement, framing ef¬
fects, and preferences using neural network agents learning to
play "altruistically" or "enviously" in new games, but this work is
very preliminary and tentative.
The importance of social learning in the
evolution of cooperation and communication
Willem Zuidema
Language Evolution and Computation Research Unit, Theoretical and
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Abstract: The new emphasis that Rachlin gives to social learning is wel¬
come, because its role in the emergence of altruism and communication
is often underestimated. However, Rachlin s account is underspecified and
therefore not satisfactory. I argue that recent computational models ofthe
evolution of language show an alternative approach and present an ap¬
pealing perspective on the evolution and acquisition of a complex, altruis¬
tic behavior like syntactic language.
Rachlin calls attention to the role of social learning in the emer¬
gence of altruistic behavior in humans. This shift of emphasis in
thinking about altruism has intriguing consequences. Acknowl¬
edging the important role of learning leads one to ask at least three
new and challenging questions: (1) about the exact mechanisms by
which altruistic behavior emerges in learning and development;
(2) about the ways in which the existence of learning mechanisms
has changed the evolutionary process; and, vice versa, (3) about
the ways in which evolution has shaped the learning mechanisms
that lead to altruism. We can no longer - as is common in tradi¬
tional game-theory - ignore the intricate mapping between geno¬
types (the genes) and phenotypes (the behaviors) and the strong
dependence of this mapping on the individual's (cultural) envi¬
ronment.
Rachlin s article is a welcome effort to underline this point, but
I think his explanation for the emergence of altruistic behavior in
humans suffers from underspecification: Some crucial concepts
are too loosely defined to make it possible to really agree or dis¬
agree with his analysis. I will discuss Rachlin s answers to the pre¬
vious questions from this perspective and then try to show that
some recent computational models in the related field of the evo¬
lution of communication offer a more precise account of the evo¬
lution of altruistic behavior.
Rachlin-'s answer to the first question is a mechanism similar to
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self-control. Humans discover that choosing for a whole pattern
of altruistic activities is in the end more rewarding than repeating
alternative, selfish activities, even though the latter offer more
short-term benefits. The problem with this account is that it is un¬
clear what constitutes a "pattern." Without a theory on how indi¬
viduals represent and acquire this knowledge, we can never iden¬
tify the different strategies that individuals can choose from.
A related problem arises for Rachlin s implicit answer to the sec¬
ond question. Rachlin gives the example of a woman who puts her
life in danger to rescue someone else's child. His explanation of
her brave behavior rests on the crucial assumption that the woman
at some point in her development had to choose between life-long
altruism or life-long selfishness. If there are only these two
choices, and if the first choice is indeed more profitable in the long
run, natural selection of course favors the tendency to choose it.
However, Rachlin gives no arguments why the choice would be so
constrained. I find it difficult to accept that with all the subtle in¬
fluences that genes have on our behavior, selectively avoiding life-
threatening situations was not a possibility.
Rachlin s implicit answer to the third question is no solution to
that objection. Essentially, he explains the evolution of altruistic
behavior by claiming that it is not really altruistic after all. Altru¬
istic - at least in its traditional sense in evolutionary game theory
(Maynard Smith 1982) - are those behavioral strategies that ben¬
efit others, but harm the individual that employs them even
though less harmful strategies are available. A game-theoretic
analysis oftire evolution of alarm calls in certain bird species (May¬
nard Smith 1982) therefore emphasizes evidence that the calls re¬
ally are harmful and that other strategies are really available. In
contrast, the altruistic strategy in Rachlin's scenario is in the long
run advantageous, and better alternatives are not available; it is
thus not really altruistic in the traditional sense.
Rachlin acknowledges this, but he does not mention that the
analogy between his explanation and group selection therefore
breaks down. Group selection, like kin selection, is a mechanism
that is capable of explaining real altruism. The decrease in the fit¬
ness for the individual is explained by assuming a higher or lower
level of selection, that is, that of the group or that of the gene.
Therefore, the fitness of a worker bee that does not produce any
offspring really is low (it is zero by definition), but the fitness of
the whole colony or the fitness of the genes that cause her steril¬
ity is high. The empirical validity of these explanations remains
controversial, although their explanatory power is appealing.
Researchers in the related field of language evolution have al¬
ready explored many aspects of the interactions between learning
and evolution. Language is a complex behavior that is, at least in
some cases, used for altruistic purposes (of course, sometimes
selfish motives like intimidation, manipulation, and encryption
can also play a role). The population as a whole benefits from the
altruistic use of language, as it does from other altruistic behav¬
iors. In particular, the population benefits from using syntactic
language (Pinker & Bloom 1990), but it is not trivial to explain how
an individual that uses syntax can be successful in a nonsyntactic
population.
By using a methodology of computational modeling that avoids
the underspecification of Rachlin s arguments, researchers in this
field have shed some new light on how this behavior has emerged
(Hurford 2002; Steels 1999). For example, these models have
shown that when individuals learn language from each other with
rather generic learning mechanisms, a rudimentary syntax can
emerge without any genetic change (Batali 1998; Kirby 2000). The
learning algorithms, for example, the recurrent neural network
model in Batali (1998), provide - although far from finally - a fully
specified candidate answer to the first question we posed previ¬
ously.
Similarily, in recent work I have explored some provisional an¬
swers to the second and third questions. In Zuidema (2003, forth¬
coming) I explore the consequences of the fact that language it¬
self can, in the process oflearners learning from learners, adapt to
be more learnable (Kirby 2000). As it turns out, this cultural
process facilitates the evolutionary process. Evolutionary opti¬
mization becomes possible, because the cultural learning process
fulfills the preconditions for a coherent language in the popula¬
tion. Moreover, the model also shows that much less of the
"knowledge of language" needs to be innately specified than is
sometimes assumed. Cultural learning thus lifts some of tire bur¬
den of genetic evolution to explain characteristics of language. Al¬
ternatively, Zuidema and Hogeweg (2000) present results of a spa¬
tial model of language evolution. These results show that syntax
can be selected for through a combined effect of kin selection and
group selection.
These answers are far from final, but I believe that such well-
defined models present an appealing perspective on how cultural
learning can lead to tire successful acquisition and creation of a
complex, altruistic behavior like syntactic language, and why the
learning mechanisms operate the way they do.
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Altruism is a form of self-control
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Abstract; Some commentators have argued that all particular al¬
truistic acts are directly caused by or reinforced by an internal
emotional state. Others argue that rewards obtained by one per¬
son might reinforce another persons altruistic act. Yet others ar¬
gue that all altruistic acts are reinforced by social reciprocation.
There are logical and empirical problems with all of these con¬
ceptions. The best explanation of altruistic acts is that - though
they are themselves not reinforced (either immediately, or de¬
layed, or conditionally, or internally) - they are, like self-con-
trolled acts, part of a pattern of overt behavior that is either ex-
trinsically reinforced or intrinsically reinforcing.
The commentaries demonstrate the enormous variety of
approaches that may be taken to explain altruism. Though
these approaches each afford a different perspective on the
target article, I have attempted to classify them under a few
general and overlapping headings. I will discuss each head¬
ing in turn, referring to specific commentaries as I go. Al¬
though all of the commentaries are thoughtful and deserve
thorough discussion, it is not possible in this limited space
to answer each commentator in detail. Instead, I have tried
to highlight crucial points and respond to common criti¬
cisms.
R1. Teleological behaviorism, cognition,
and neuroscience
Gray & Braver draw implications from the behavioral cor¬
respondence of self-control and altruism for both cognition
and neuroscience. Their suggested empirical tests are cer¬
tainly important and worth doing. But I do not believe that
you can crucially test a behavioral model, or even a purely
cognitive model, with neurophysiological measurements.
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Joachim De Beule Joris Van Looveren Willem Zuidema
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Pleinlaan 2, B-1050, Brussel, Belgium
{joachim, joris, jelle}@arti.vub.ac.be
Abstract
We present a model that explicitly connects low-level perception and
categorization, hierarchical meaning construction and syntactic language.
The model shows a solution to the "symbol grounding problem" [7]: the
meaning of the symbolic system—logical symbols and syntactic rules—is
grounded in its relation with a simplified but realistic world. We discuss the
different components of this collaborative effort: (i) a realistic simulation
of Newtonian dynamics of objects in a 2D plane; (ii) schema-based event-
perception and categorization; (iii) a semantics based on predicate logic; and
(iv) a categorial grammar for the production and interpretation of language.
The integration of the different components poses on the one hand novel and
important constraints; on the other hand, it allows for experiments that help
to identify the relations between the different levels.
1 Introduction
In recent years artificial life researchers have begun to study the origins and nature
of human language. Such studies have concentrated on the emergence of a lexicon
of arbitrary form-meaning mappings, through evolutionary optimization [11, 15]
or through coupled learning in populations of agents [8, 19, 16]. With the same
approach, interesting results have also been obtained on the emergence of sound
systems [4] and syntax [9, 2]. These studies focused on issues that were largely
ignored in more traditional approaches, in particular the question: how did human
languages become the way they are? Moreover, they put an emphasis on studying
"complete agents" that not only are able to interpret language (the focus of most
work in linguistics), but also to produce and acquire language, and use it to perform
a task in an environment. This emphasis shift brings new criteria on what makes
useful representations, formalisms and models, and it brings new challenges.
Harnad [7] defines one of these challenges as the "symbol grounding problem":
how is symbol meaning to be grounded in something other than just more meaning¬
less symbols? Harnad argues that it is cognitive theory's burden to explain how
"human beings (or any other devices) [...] can (1) discriminate, (2) manipulate,
(3) identify and (4) describe the objects, events and states of afFairs in the world
they live in", and "can also (5) 'produce descriptions' and (6) 'respond to descrip¬
tions' of those objects, events and states of affairs." [7]. We present here a system
that is, for a simplified world, capable of doing all these things.
But our ambitions go further. If we are to seriously explore the functional and
semantic constraints on the (1) use, (2) acquisition and (3) evolution of language,
we need a sophisticated model of meaning that is grounded in interactions with
the world. Most existing models of the evolution of syntactic language [e.g. 2, 9]
presuppose the existence of a set of (extremely simple) meanings. In this article we
describe a system that was designed to investigate the acquisition and evolution
of a language that is grounded in a rich interaction with the world. The system
has similarities with other attemps to build integrated systems, most notably
SHRDLU [22] and the Talking Heads (TH) experiment [20]. The most important
differences with these systems are that the present system is much more adaptive
(the knowledge of the world is not pre-programmed as in SHRDLU) and (unlike
the Talking Heads) can deal with a dynamic world and grammatical language.
2 Simulating Newtonian dynamics
As a first step towards our new system, we built a virtual and simulated world
for our agents to live in. We need a world complex enough to allow for hidden
states, time, causation, etc. A simple yet realistic model of part of the real world
seems a good candidate. Therefore we chose to implement a blocks world that is
two-dimensional and only consists of rigid polygonal bodies, but where the bodies
actually behave as prescribed by the laws of Newtonian physics, including rotation,
static and dynamic friction, gravity, etc.
There is a vast amount of literature on how to implement rigid body simula¬
tions, e.g. [13, 1, 12]. What is important for our purposes is that it is possible to
simulate real undeformable world objects very realistically. Although we will not
elaborate about technical and mathematical details of rigid body dynamics, we
mention that colliding contacts are handled by impulse forces including friction
and energy dissipation (see [6, 14] and [3] for a thorough analysis of the subject),
while resting and sliding contacts are handled by action/reaction forces as de¬
scribed in [1], slightly modified to allow for fast friction force calculation. Using
this scheme, the behavior of simulated rigid bodies is very realistic.
At every simulation step we can ask the system to provide us with information
about its current state. For example we can get information about the position of
blocks in the simulation. This information can be used to supply an agent with
input or observations. Figure 1 gives a sequence of frames for a simple simulation
of a ball bouncing down some stairs and colliding with some domino bricks.
3 Conceptualization
The simulation described in the previous section provides input for an agent. It
defines the world of interaction for an agent; the world the agent should observe,
reason about and act upon. The first question at this point is what type of data
Figure 1: A ball, initially rotating anti-clockwise, bounces down the stairs.
/
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from the simulation should be given to an agent. For example, we could provide
an agent with all pixel values of a simulation window. The other extreme would be
to give the agent access to the entire state of the simulation (positions, impulses,
contacts, etc.) This would not be consistent with our aim and philosophy of
grounding both the origin and meaning of an agent's concepts, for then, the world
would again be part of the agent. Therefore, we transform (not copy) part (not
everything) of the state of the simulation to a new set of observation variable-value
pairs. This raw data represents the equivalent of data an animal receives through
its receptors. Of course, it is not equivalent, it only represents perceptual data as
one would define it in a real animal. However, the agent does not get information
from the simulation that could not be provided by applying segmentation and
other standard image processing techniques on camera images [as in the TH, 18].
The next question is: what should the event detection or concept formation
system do with this raw data? It should be able to detect meaningful and thus
useful concepts with respect to the agent's task (e.g. a language or discrimination
game, prediction, "moving all red blocks to the left"). In addition, it should be
able to create new detector channels, new concepts triggered by other primitive
or previously created event detectors. For example, assume an agent is at some
point able to measure, through observation, positions of objects in the world and it
would be useful for the agent to create a detector for approaching objects. A new
approach detector could be built, looking for pairs of objects of which the positions
are getting closer. Note that, because newly created detectors in their turn become
building blocks for other event detectors, arbitrarily abstract concepts could come
to existence. As explained in [7], these will still be grounded. Finally, it should be
possible to attach actions and predictions to the occurrence of an event.
3.1 Implementation
Our implementation consists of item and template data-structures, together with
a system for processing them. An item has a set of features, every feature having a
name, a value and a history (see later). Observation of the simulation results in a
set of object items with features for position, color, etc. Other items representing
more abstract or new channels should be created. This is the task of templates.
Templates are detectors for various things: simple object items, but also for con¬
figurations of objects (e.g. "tower") or events (e.g. approaches or touches). Basic
templates consist of an activation slot and an action slot. The activation slot is a
set of conditions on items the template needs to get activated. For example, the
approach template mentioned above, could have an activation slot
(and (has-feature-p position ?x)
(has-feature-p position ?y)
(decreasing-p (distance ?x ?y)))
where has-feature-p and decreasing-p are predefined predicates and distance
could be a newly evolved detector. The symbols starting with a question mark
represent variables, to be bound to items for activation of the template: the tem¬
plate can be activated when it can find a binding for its activation slot consisting
of items that, when filled in, make the activation predicate become true. The
action slot of a template could for example be to create a new item.
Features also have a history that reflects the change the feature value has made
before it got its current value and is the way our event detection system handles
time and change. Because it is impossible to record every change, these should be
filtered and abstracted. We therefore adopted some ideas from qualitative physics
(see e.g. [21, 10]): only the direction of change of a feature's value is recorded.
4 Semantic descriptions
The conceptualization module recognizes and filters events from the huge stream of
raw data. In turn, the resulting event stream is filtered for events that are impor¬
tant to the agent at a certain time. This is the semantic subsystem's responsibility:
to act as an attention focusing system, providing a concrete representation (se¬
mantic descriptions) for those aspects of the perceived environment that require
immediate processing (action planning, verbalization, etc.)
4.1 Semantic descriptions
In our system, semantic descriptions (SD) express a certain aspect of the envi¬
ronment. The SD's are a form of predicate logic. Variables can correspond to
any item from the conceptualization module, and thus to both objects and events.
Predicates describe properties of an item, or relations betweens items. For reasons
that will become clear in section 5 one variable is singled out as the head of a SD.
For example "the blue square approaches the circle." is described by the SD:
(?x I (approach ?x) (agent ?y ?x) (blue ?y)
(square ?y) (patient ?z ?x) (circle ?z))
This sequence says that ?x must be an approach event with an agent ?y that is
blue and square and a patient ?z which is a circle. Variable ?x is the head of the
meaning; this is indicated by the explicit mention to the left of the operations. The
same predicate sequence can also be used to express the head ?y, in which case a
natural language rendering could be "the blue square approached by the circle".
The predicates in a SD can also play a functional role, for example (patient
?z ?x) can, given a suitable binding for ?z, extract the patient of ?z and bind it
to ?x. The agent has an evaluator that is able to process these descriptions within
the set of current perceptions, and construct a set of bindings for the variables in
a description that make the description true.
4.2 Meaning Construction
Since our agent lives in a complex, changing world, we want it to be adaptive.
Instead of providing an agent with a predefined set of SD's, we must include a
mechanism that allows the agent to create new SD's on-the-fly, as it needs them to
describe something. Whenever the agent has constructed a new description, it can
give it a name and incorporate it in its repertoire of operations. The constructed
description can thus become itself a possible building block for future descriptions.
There is an important interplay between the conceptualization and the con¬
struction of SD's. When semantic descriptions axe used often, this indicates that
they are important, which might trigger a process to move the detection of the
meaning one stage earlier, to the conceptualization phase. This could be compared
to e.g. learning to dance: in the beginning one has to consciously think of every
step one makes, but after a while the whole process becomes fluent and automatic.
5 Grammar
The final component of the system, the grammar, deals with transforming a SD
to natural language and vice versa. Many grammar formalisms exist, but for our
purposes we needed one that can deal with our SD's and that supports the funda¬
mental properties of language: compositionality, phrase structure and recursion.
Categorial grammar is such a formalism. In a categorial grammar every element
of a language (i.e. a word or a phrase) has a syntactic category assigned to it.
In the simplest case, there are only two basic categories: n and s (for noun and
sentence, respectively). All other categories can be constructed by combining the
basic categories according to certain constraints.
For example, "block" is of the basic category n. Now, if we want to say "the
block", we need "the" to be of a category that can be combined to the right (the
constraint) with an n to result in something of n. In our notation, "the" is therefore
of category (n n r): it results in a category n (the first one), if it is followed by
(constraint r) a phrase of category n (the second one). Similarly, we can define a
verb "approaches" as something that produces a complete sentence s if it is both
preceded (constraint 1) and followed by something of category n: ((s n 1) n r).
In this pure form, categorial grammar is equivalent to context-free grammars, but
it has the advantages that all grammatical rules remain implicit in the lexicon
and that the r and 1 constraints can easily be extended with less rigid constraints
needed for free word-order languages.
In the categorial grammar tradition the usual way to deal with the meanings
of combinations of lexical entries, uses Church's lambda calculus [see e.g. 5, for a
discussion]. To do so we have to extend the semantic description to include lambda
(A) terms. Lambda terms can be seen as listing the variables that still need to be
substituted; they disappear when a complete semantic description is reached. The
semantic description for "x approaches y" is (x and y still need to be filled in):
(1) : (A?x A?y I ?x I (approach ?z) (argl ?z ?x) (arg2 ?z ?y))
When applied to the SD (2) : (?p I (circle ?p)), the resulting description is
(3): (A?y I ?p I (approach ?z) (argl ?z ?p) (arg2 ?z ?y)) (circle ?p))
I.e. the variable ?x in (1) is replaced by the head of (2), and the A?x is removed.
We have implemented a production algorithm and an interpretation algorithm
that, given the proper lexicon, map a SD on a natural language expression and
vice versa. These are fairly straightforward search algorithms:
production starts with a target SD; the system selects all partial matches in the
lexicon and searches for a way to combine these entries that yields a correct
sentence, with a semantics that is identical to the target description.
interpretation starts with a natural language sentence; the system finds all par¬
tial matches in the lexicon and searches a way to combine these entries such
that it matches the complete sentence and yields a consistent interpretation
(a semantic description, without A's and with all variables bound).
6 An example of the system at
In this section we give an example of how the system
behaves on input from a simple simulation shown in
fig. 2, where two red squares are moving in opposite
direction. In this example, the agent could be the
speaker in a language game. It therefore has to pick
a subject from the simulation to talk about, find a
semantic description for it and finally verbalize this
description in a grammatical correct utterance.
The first step the system takes when a simulation starts is try to detect events.
For this example, the system had definitions for various moving events (e.g. moving
left, falling down), several kinds of objects (square, rectangle), various features
(color) and some other events (approach). At the end of the frame sequence (see
fig. 2), observation resulted in 5 body-items, 2 contact items, a move-left and
move-right item, 2 falling items, 3 approach items and 3 move-away items.
The next step is to pick an item as a subject to talk about and find a (preferably
unique) description for it. Suppose the system picks the square moving to the right.
Some descriptions found by the system for this item were:
(?x I ((SqUARE ?x) (LGW ?x)))
(?x I ((MOVING-RIGHT ?y) (ARG1 ?y ?x)))
(?x I ((ARG2 ?y ?x) (MOVE-AWAY ?y) (ARG1 ?y ?u)
(MOVING-LEFT ?u) (SQUARE ?x) (SQUARE ?y))>
The final step is to transform the semantic descriptions to a grammatical sentence.
For this the system has a lexicon; the entry for the word "approaches" is as follows:
form A's head meaning category
"approaches" (A?y A?x) ?x ((APPROACH ?z) ((S N R) N L)
(ARG1 ?z ?x) (ARG2 ?z ?y))
work
Figure 2. Two views of
an example simulation.
Using lexicon entries like this, the system is able to produce and interpret sentences
or noun phrases that describe objects or events in a running simulation. The
semantic descriptions given above would be translated to:
"the low square"
"the moving to the right"
"the red square moving away from the square moving to the left"
7 Discussion and future work
Our system is an attempt to combine ideas from both classical AI and new, adap¬
tive AI. Both approaches have their difficulties and merits, both answer different
questions. Often, the problems of one approach are the answers provided by the
other. A major problem of classical AI is that it produces carefully engineered
non-adaptive systems. A major problem of distributed, dynamically complex sys¬
tems is that they are hard to engineer, unpredictable, and if a successful system
is built it is hard to define what precisely it is that made it work.
An important thing that should be added to Harnad's list of challenges for
cognitive theory [7] is how an agent can learn and adapt to changes in the envi¬
ronment. We argue language plays an important role in this and have designed
a system that provides us with the means to test this hypothesis. At the same
time, it allows us to investigate important issues on the origins and evolution of
language.
While building an integrated, open system we had to make each subsystem
powerful enough to meet other subsystems' requirements. For example, the se¬
mantic description language we developed needs to be able to handle all things it
gets from the conceptualization module. It must also be able to provide the input
required by the grammar module: if we want to incorporate tense and aspect in
the language, the conceptualization module needs to know about time, in such a
way that appropriate information can be propagated to the grammar module and
vice versa. The principle of integration thus provided us at each level with some
design guidelines.
But this principle can also be used by the system itself. If an agent feels at the
grammatical or semantical level that a concept for an approach+touch event would
be useful, it can instruct its conceptualization module to create a collision notion
according to the requirements of the higher levels. We plan to use the system to
investigate some specific aspects of language like tense, grammar, causality, etc.
The main goal is to answer questions about the origins and evolution of language.
We will therefore have to extend the system with good learning algorithms. In
addition, we plan to replace the simulation by a camera and a robot arm. The
simulation could still be used as an "imagination module" by an agent (see [17]
for an implementation of this idea and related papers for psychological evidence
for such a module in humans).
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Abstract
Language acquisition is a very particular type of
learning problem: it is a problem where the tar¬
get of the learning process is itself the outcome of
a learning process. Language can therefore adapt
to the learning algorithm. I present a model that
shows that due to this effect - and contrary to
some claims from the Universal Grammar tradi¬
tion - "unlearnable" grammars can be success¬
fully acquired, and grammatical coherence in a
population can be maintained.
1 Introduction
Human language is one of the most intriguing adap¬
tive behaviors that has emerged in evolution. Language
makes it possible to express an unbounded number of
different messages, and it serves as the vehicle for trans¬
mitting knowledge that is acquired over many genera¬
tions. Not surprisingly, the origins of language are a
central issue in both evolutionary biology and the cog¬
nitive sciences.
The dominant explanation for the origins and nature
of human language postulates a "Universal Grammar":
an innate system of principles and parameters, that is
universal, genetically specified and independent from
other cognitive abilities. In this paper, I study an argu¬
ment that lies at the heart of this dominant position: the
argument from the poverty of stimulus. This argument
states that children have insufficient evidence to learn
the language of their parents without innate knowledge
about which languages are possible and which are not.
This claim is backed-up with a series of mathematical
models. Here, we will focus our discussion on two such
models: Gold (1967) and Nowak et al. (2001).
Gold (1967) introduced the criterion "identification in
the limit" for evaluating the success of a learning al¬
gorithm: with an infinite number of training samples
all hypotheses of the algorithm should be identical, and
equivalent to the target. Gold showed that context-free
grammars are in general not learnable by this criterion
from positive samples alone. This proof is based on the
fact that if one has a grammar G that is consistent with
all the training data, one can always construct a gram¬
mar G' that is slightly more general: i.e. the language
of G, L(G) is a subset of L(G').
Nowak et al. (2001) provide a novel variant of the ar¬
gument from the poverty of stimulus, that is based on a
mathematical model of the evolution of grammars. The
first step of their argument is a "coherence threshold".
This threshold is the minimum learning accuracy of an
individual that is consistent with grammatical coherence
in a population, i.e. with a majority of individuals to use
the same grammar. The second step relates this coher¬
ence threshold to a lower bound (bo) on the number of
sample sentences that a child needs. They derive that bo
is proportional to the total number of possible grammars
N. From this and the fact that the number of sample
sentences is finite, Nowak et al. conclude that only if N is
relatively small can a stable grammar emerge in a popu¬
lation. I.e. the population dynamics require a restrictive
Universal Grammar.
2 Model design
These models have in common that they implicitly as¬
sume that every possible grammar is equally likely to be¬
come the target grammar for learning. If even the best
possible learning algorithm cannot learn such a gram¬
mar, the set of allowed grammars must be restricted.
There is, however, reason to believe that this assumption
is not the most useful for language learning. Language
learning is a very particular type of learning problem,
because the outcome of the learning process at one gen¬
eration is the input for the next.
The model study I present here is motivated by this
observation. The model consists of an evolving popu¬
lation of language learners, that learn a grammar from
their parents and get offspring proportional to the suc¬
cess in communicating with other individuals in their
generation. The grammar induction procedure is fixed;
it is inspired by Kirby (2000). The details of the gram¬
matical formalism (context-free grammars) and the pop¬
ulation structure are deliberately close to Gold (1967)
and Nowak et al. (2001) respectively.
I use context-free grammars to represent the linguis¬
tic abilities. In particular, the representation is limited
to grammars G where all rules are of one of the fol¬
lowing forms: A t, A BC, or A i-i Bt. Since
every context-free grammar can be transformed to such
a grammar, the restrictions on the rule-types above do
not limit the scope of languages that can be represented.
They are, however, relevant for the language acquisition
algorithm that will be discussed below. Note that the
class of languages that the formalism can represent is
unlearnable by Gold's criterion.
The language acquisition algorithm used in the model
consists of three operations: (i) incorporation (extend
the language, such that it includes the encountered
string), (ii) compression (substitute frequent and long
substrings with a nonterminal, such that the grammar
becomes smaller and the language remains unchanged),
(iii) generalization (equate two nonterminals, such that
the grammar becomes smaller and the language larger).
3 Results
The main result is in figure 1, which shows two curves:
(i) the average communicative success of agents speaking
with their parents which is the measure for the learnahil-
ity of the language (labeled "between generation C"),
and (ii) the average communicative success of agents
speaking with other agents of the same generation (la¬
beled "within generation C") which gives the fitness of
agents and is a measure for the grammatical variation in
the population.
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Figure 1: Parameters are: Vt = {0,1,2,3}, Vnt =
{S, a, 6, c,d,e, /}, P=20, T=100, M=100, l0=12
For a long period the learning is not very successful.
The between generation C is low (grammars are unlearn¬
able), and consequently the within generation C is also
low (the dynamics are below the "coherence threshold"
of Nowak et al. 2001). In other words, individuals are
so bad at learning that members of the population can
not understand each other. Around generation 70 this
situation suddenly changes. The between generation C
rises, and very quickly also the within generation C rises
to non-trivial levels. With always the same number of
sample sentences, and with always the same grammar
space, there are regions of that space where the dynam¬
ics are apparently under the coherence threshold, while
there are other regions where the dynamics are above
this threshold. The language has adapted to the learn¬
ing algorithm, and, consequently, the coherence does not
satisfy the prediction of Nowak et al. In many runs (not
shown here) I have also observed 100% learning accu¬
racy of children. The grammars in this situations are
thus learnable by Gold's criterion. In some, but not all
cases, these emergent grammars are recursive.
4 Discussion
I believe that these results, simple and preliminary as
they may be, have some important consequences for our
thinking about language acquisition. In studies like the
mathematical models of Gold and Nowak et al., one de¬
rives from the properties of the learning procedure (the
search procedure), fundamental constraints on the na¬
ture of the target grammar (the search space). My re¬
sults, like those of Kirby (2000) and others, indicate that
in iterated learning it is not necessary to put the (whole)
explanatory burden on constraints on the search space.
In my model, the target grammars are learnable, not
because the used formalism imposes restrictions on the
grammars, but because the targets dynamically change
and - in the iteration of learners learning from learn¬
ers - adapt to the used learning algorithm. In other
words, neither the search space nor the search proce¬
dure directly determine which grammars "exist"; the set
of target grammars at the end of the simulation is the
emergent result of iterating a search process over and
over again.
Isn't this Universal Grammar in disguise? Learnabil-
ity is - consistent with the undisputed proof of Gold
(1967) - still achieved by constraining the set of targets.
However, unlike in usual interpretations of this proof,
these constraints are not strict (some grammars are bet¬
ter learnable than others, allowing for an infinite "Gram¬
mar Universe"), and they are not a-priori: they are the
outcome of iterated learning. The poverty of stimulus is
here no longer a problem; instead, the ancestors' poverty
is the solution for the child's.
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Abstract. Compositionality is a fundamental property of natural lan¬
guage. Explaining its evolution remains a challenging problem because
existing explanations require a structured language to be present before
compositionality can spread in the population. In this paper, I study
whether a communication system can evolve that shows the preservation
of topology between meaning-space and signal-space, without assuming
that individuals have any prior processing mechanism for composition¬
ality. I present a formalism to describe a communication system where
there is noise in signaling and variation in the values of meanings. In
contrast to previous models, both the noise and values depend on the
topology of the signal- and meaning spaces. I consider a population of
agents that each try to optimize their communicative success. The re¬
sults show that the preservation of topology follows naturally from the
assumptions on noise, values and individual-based optimization.
1 Major transitions in the evolution of language
Human languages are unique communication systems in nature because of their
enormous expressiveness and flexibility. They accomplish this by using com¬
binatorial principles in phonology, morphology and syntax [8], which impose
important requirements on the cognitive abilities of language users. Explaining
the origins of the structure of language and the human abilities to process it is
a challenging problem for linguistics, cognitive science and evolutionary biology.
Mathematical and computational models have been invaluable tools for getting
a grip on this problem [11].
Jackendoff [8] has laid out a scenario for the various stages in the evolution
of human language from primate-like communication, that reflects a growing
consensus and can be summarized with the following "major transitions":
1. Prom situation-specific signals (e.g. alarm calls), to signals that are non-
situation-specific but from a closed class;
2. Prom (1) to an open, unlimited (learned) class of signals and, subsequently,
a phonological combinatorial system;
3. Prom (1) to the concatenation of signals and, subsequently, the use of order¬
ing of signals to convey semantic relations ("compositionality");
4. Prom (2) and (3), which constitute the ingredients of a protolanguage, to
hierarchical phrase structure and recursion,
5. From (4) to modern language, with a vocabulary for abstract semantic re¬
lations, grammatical categories, grammatical functions and a complex mor¬
phology.
Presumably, all transitions have greatly increased the number of distinct
"signs" (signal-meaning pairs) that can be expressed, transmitted, memorized
and learned. Jackendoff argues convincingly that modern languages contain "fos¬
sils" of each of the intermediate stages. E.g. the compound noun construction
in English can be viewed as a fossil of stage (3): the meaning of words like
"doghouse" and "housedog" is deducible (but not completely specified) from
the meaning of the component words and the order in which they are put.
Less consensus exists on how the transition from each stage to another could
have happened. Some have argued for extensive innate, language-specific cogni¬
tive specializations that have; evolved under natural selection (e.g. [1, 8]. This
is an appealing position, in line with dominant "nativist" theories in linguistics
and evolutionary biology. Unfortunately, explanations of this type have gener¬
ally remained much underspecified. Jackendoff admits: "I will not inquire as to
the details of how increased expressive power came to spread through a popu¬
lation [...]. Accepted practice in evolutionary psychology [...] generally finds it
convenient to ignore these problems."([8], p. 237)
Ignoring this problem is an unfortunate tradition. Understanding how inno¬
vations can spread in a population is the essence of any evolutionary explanation,
and a better end-result is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the
spread of innovations. Specifically in the case of language, the spread of innova¬
tions is not at all obvious, even if the end-result - when the whole population
has adopted an innovation - is demonstrably better, because of two important
difficulties that arise from the frequency-dependency of language evolution : (i) if
only the hearers benefit from communication, it is not clear why speakers would
evolve as to give away - altruistically - more and more information [15, 21]; (ii)
even if both speakers and hearers benefit, it is not clear how there can be a pos¬
itive selection pressure on a linguistic innovation if that innovation appears in
a population that uses a language without it, and, moreover, how that pressure
can be strong enough to prevent it from being lost by drift [6, 3, 21].
A number of researchers have explored the possibilities of general learning
and cognitive abilities and cultural evolution explaining the transitions instead
(see [20, 11] for reviews and references), or, of cultural evolution facilitating
the genetic evolution of linguistic innovations [5, 9], These models are useful in
clarifying the conditions for the "major transitions", but face some new diffi¬
culties themselves as well: (i) in many cases, the assumed cognitive abilities are
much more language-specific than one would like; (ii) cultural evolution, such as
the progressively better structured languages in the "Iterated Learning Model"
[10, 2], only takes off when there is already some initial, random structure in the
language.
Explaining the evolution of aspects of natural language like combinatorial
phonology and compositionality thus remain challenging problems because both
the genetic and the cultural evolution explanation require a structured language
to be already present in the population before the linguistic innovations can
successfully spread in a population. In this paper, I focus on compositionality:
the property that the meaning of the whole (e.g. a sentence) is a function of the
meaning of the parts (e.g. the words) and the way they are put together. I do not
study the evolution of compositionality itself, but explore a possible route for a
structured language to emerge without the capacity for compositionality present
in the population. That structure is topology preservation between meaning-
space and signal-space, i.e. similar meanings are expressed with similar signals.
In the next section I present a formalism to describe a communication system
where there is noise in signaling and variation in the values of meanings. In
contrast to previous models, both the noise and values depend on the topology
of the signal- and meaning spaces. In section 3 I present a model of a population
of agents that each try to optimize their communicative success under these
circumstances. The results, in section 4, show that the preservation of topology
between meaning-space and signal-space follows naturally from the assumptions
on noise, values and individual-based optimization.
2 A formalism for communication under noisy conditions
Assume that there are M different meanings that an individual might want
to express, and F different signals (forms) that it can use for this task. The
communication system of an individual is represented with a production matrix
S and an interpretation matrix R. S gives for every meaning m and every signal
/, the probability that the individual chooses / to convey m. Conversely, R gives
for every signal / and meaning m, the probability that / will be interpreted as
m. S is thus a M x F matrix, and R a F x M matrix. Variants of this notation
are used by [7, 14] and other researchers.
In addition, following [13], I assume that signals can be more or less similar to
each other and that there is noise on the transmission of signals, which depends
on these similarities. Further, I assume that meanings can be more or less similar
to each other, and that the value of a certain interpretation depends on how close
it is to the intention. These aspects are modeled with a confusion matrix U (of
dimension F x F) and a value matrix V (of dimension M x M). This notation
is an extension of the notation in [13], and was introduced in [22],
These four matrices together can describe the most important aspects of a
communication system: which signals are used for which meanings by hearers
and by speakers, how likely it is that signals get confused in the transmission,
and what the consequences of a particular successful or unsuccessful interpreta¬
tion are. Interestingly, they combine elegantly in one simple expression for the
expected payoff wy of communication between a hearer i and a speaker j [22]:
= v-(s'x(ux r;')) (i)
In this formula, "x" represents the usual matrix multiplication and repre¬
sents dot-multiplication (the sum of all multiplications of corresponding elements
in both matrices; the result of dot-multiplication is not a matrix, but a scalar).
A hypothetical example, loosely based on the famous Vervet monkey alarm
calls [17], might make the use of this formalism and measure clear. Imagine an
alarm call system of a monkey species for three different types of predators: from
the air (eagles), from the ground (leopards) and from the trees (snakes). Imagine
further that the monkeys are capable of producing a number (say 5) of different
sounds that range on one axis (e.g. pitch, from high to low) and tahte these are
more easily confused if they are closer together. Thus, the confusion matrix U
might look like in the left matrix of figure 1.
V =
received signal \
sent signal | 1 kHz 2kHz 3kHz 4kHz bkHz f intentions \1 kHz 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 interpretations 4- eagle snake leopard
2kHz 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 V = eagle 0.9 0.5 0.1
3kHz 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.0 snake 0.2 0.9 0.2
4kHz 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.2 ^ leopard 0.1 0.5 0.9
5kHz 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.7
Fig. 1. Confusion and value matrices for the monkeys in the example, describing the
noise in signaling and the value of intention-interpretation pairs in their environment.
Further, although it is obviously best to interpret a signal correctly, if one
makes a mistake, typically not every mistake is equally bad. For example, if a
leopard alarm is given, the leopard response (run into a tree) is best, but a snake
response (search surrounding area) is better than an eagle response (run into a
bush, where leopards typically hide) [17]. Thus the value matrix V might look
something like the right matrix in figure 1.
f interpretation/ sent signal \ received signal 4- eagle snake leopard
intention \. 1 kHz 2kHz 3kHz 4kHz bkHz 1kHz odqdq
eagle odooododo R = 2 kHz d od od
snake 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 3kHz qdqqd
\ leopard 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4kHz qodqd
^ bkHz oqdqd
Fig. 2. Production and interpretation matrices for the monkeys in the example, de¬
scribing which signals they use for which situations.
For any given production and interpretation matrix, we can through equa¬
tion (1) calculate the expected payoff from communication. Assume a speaker i
with its S' as the left matrix in fig. 2, and a hearer j with its R-7 as the right
matrix in that figure. The expected payoff of the interaction between i and j
if the constraints on communications are as in U and V in fig. 1 is, by proper
application of equation (1): wy = 0.7 x 0.9 + 0.2 x 0.5 + 0.2 x 0.5 + 0.6 x 0.9 +
0.2 x 0.5 + 0.1 x 0.5 + 0.2 x 0.9 + 0.7 x 0.9 = 2.33
In this simple example, the matrices U and V are very small, and reflect only
a 1-dimensional topology in both signal and meaning space. The matrices S and
R are set by hand to arbitrarily chosen values. In contrast, in the simulations
of this paper we will consider larger and more complex choices for U and V,
and we will use a hill-climbing algorithm to find the appropriate (near-) optimal
settings for S and R.
3 Distributed hill-climbing
Based on the measure of equation (1), I use a hill-climbing algorithm to improve
the communication. To speed up the simulations, I make the simplification that
the values in the S and R matrices are all either 1 or 0, i.e. they are deterministic
encoders and decoders, which can be shown to always perform better than their
stochastic versions [18, 16]. Hill-climbing in the simulations reported here is
distributed, i.e. I simulate a population (size 400) of agents that each try to
optimize their success in communicating with a randomly selected other agent
(see the author's website for details). Experiments (not reported here) suggest
that distributed hill-climbing, although orders of magnitude faster, leads to very
similar results as global hill-climbing. In some of the simulations, agents are
placed on a grid (size 20 x 20) and interact only with their direct neighbors
(8, except for agents at the edge which have less neighbors), but also in this
condition very similar results are obtained.
The motivation for this style of optimization is (i) that it is fast and straight¬
forward to implement; (ii) that it works well, and gives, if not the optimum, a
good insight on characteristics of the optimal communication system; and (iii)
that it shows possible routes to (near-) optimal communication systems, and in
a sense forms an abstraction for both learning and evolution.
The V and U matrices can be chosen to reflect all kinds of assumptions
about the signal and meaning space. In this paper I vary whether all meanings
are equally valuable (v = 1.0, labeled "homogeneous"), or get assigned a random
value (0.0 < v < 1.0, labeled "heterogeneous"). I further vary whether or not
there is a topology, and if so, of which dimensionality. The diagonal elements of
V are always v and of U always 1.0. Without a topology ("Od"), the off-diagonal
elements in U or V are 0. With a topology, the off-diagonal elements are given
by V(p,q) = v/(l + D(p,q)) and U(p,q) = 1/(1 + D(p,q)), where D(p,q) gives
the squared Euclidean distance between the positions of the two meanings or
signals i and j. In the 1-dimensional condition ("Id"), the position of a meaning
or signal is simply defined as its index. In the 2d condition, the meaning and
signal spaces are 2-dimensional surfaces of size (y/M x y/M) or {VF x y/F).
The x-coordinate is then given by the largest integer smaller than the root of
the index: x — int(y/i). The y-coordinate by: y = i modulo x. After these values
are set, the rows of both U and V matrices are normalized.
I monitor the behavior of the model with two measures. The first is the
average payoff, as given by equation (1), averaged over all individuals interacting
with all other individuals, both as speaker and as hearer. The second is a measure
for the degree of topology preservation between the meaning space and the signal
space in the emerging languages. Following [2], I use the correlation ("Pearson's
r") between the distance between each pair of meanings and the distance between
the corresponding signals:
r = correlation(D (m,m') ,D (S[m],S[m'])) , (2)
m,m' £M
where S'[m] gives the most likely signal used to express m according to S.
For 2-dimensional meaning spaces I also visualize the topology preservation
by plotting all meanings as nodes in a meaning space, and connecting those nodes
where the corresponding signals are (one of maximal 4) neighbors in signal-space.
le+06 le+07
iterations
(a) Payoff (w) (b) Topology Preservation (r)
Fig. 3. Average payoff (a) and degree of topology preservation (b) for 2 x 108 iterations
under 3 conditions: (1) V:0d homogeneous, (2) V:ld homogeneous; (3) V:0d heteroge¬
neous. The maximum average payoffs that axe reached depend on the arbitrary chosen
values of the V matrices; hence, only the shapes of the curves are important. Common
parameters are P=400, M=16, F=49, U:ld.
4 Results
Figure 3 shows the average payoff and topology preservation for simulations
under 3 different conditions: (i) homogeneous and no topology in the meaning
space ("V:0d"); (ii) homogeneous and V:ld; (iii) heterogeneous and V:0d. The
results are plotted with a logarithmic x-axis. They show that convergence is more
than 10 times faster if there is a topology in the meaning space. Recall that in
the topology condition, interpretations with a meaning close to the intention
are also rewarded. That fact facilitates establishing conventions regarding which
signals to use for which meanings, because it creates more possibilities to break
the initial symmetry (when no convention is established, every signal-meaning
pair is equally good or bad).
Figure 4 shows the average payoff and topology preservation for 60 simula¬
tions where the dimensionality of the signal space is varied, and where hearers
*
are selected randomly from either the whole population ("dis"), or from one of
the speaker's 8 neighbors ("spatial"). In all caSGs, the payoff reaches high levels
(when the signal space is Id) or intermediate levels (when the signal space is 2d
and the overall noise-level is consequently higher because each signal has more
neighbors). Also, in all cases the topology preservation reaches high levels (when
the dimensionalities of meaning and signal space match) or intermediate levels
(when the dimensionalities mismatch).
(a) Payoff (w) (b) Topology preservation (r)
Fig. 4. Average payoff (a) and degree of topology preservation (b) after 5 x 107 it¬
erations for different parameters. Error-bars indicate standard deviations. Common
parameters are P=400, M=36 and V:2d heterogeneous.
The emerging communication systems are visualized in fig. 5 and 6 and can
be summarized with the following properties:
Specificity: every meaning has exactly one signal to express it and vice versa
(i.e. no homonyms, and no real synonyms: if different signals have the same
meaning they are very similar to each other).
Coherence: all agents agree on which signals to use for which meanings, and
vice versa. Specificity and coherence are also found in "language game" models
where there is no noise on signaling (e.g. [14, 19]).
Distinctiveness: in the S matrices, the used signals are maximally dissimilar
to each other, so that they can be easily distinguished (compare figure 5a, at the
start of the simulation, with 5c, at equilibrium). In the R matrices, clusters of
neighboring signals all are interpreted as the same meaning. Typically, the most
central signal (except at the edges) in such a cluster is the one that is actually
used by the S matrix (compare figure 5c with 5d). Distinctiveness is also found
in the "imitation game" [4], where no meanings are modeled.
Topology preservation: if there is a topology in both the meaning- and signal-
space (as determined by V and U), similar signals tend to have similar meanings
[22]. This preservation is not perfect (there is one major irregularity and sev¬
eral minor ones in the signal-meaning mapping of figure 5e and f. The topology
preservation, according to equation (2), is r = 0.915), but in all simulations per¬
formed it is surprisingly high. "Bad" solutions, such as the S and R of figures 5c




















(g) S, U:ld, V:0d heterog., t=oo 'h) Rr, U:ld, V:0d heterog., t=oo
Fig. 5. (a)-(h) Examples of S and R matrices from the simulations of figure 3. For easy
comparison, the R matrices are transposed so that in all matrices meanings differ on
the vertical axis, and signals on the horizontal axis. Between the matrices the diagonal
values of the V matrix are plotted, where the diameter of a circle corresponds to value
of the corresponding meaning. Common parameters are P=400, M=16, F=49.
and d (f = —0.073), are stable once established in the population, but have a
much smaller basin of attraction. In the case of a two-dimensional meaning space,
we can draw plots like figures 6a-d, which show that the topology is almost per¬
fectly preserved if the dimensionalities of the meaning- and signal-spaces match
(6a), although it is skewed if different meanings receive very different values
(6b). But even if the dimensionalities do not match, there is a strong tendency
to preserve topology as well as possible (6c and d).
Valuable meanings first: When one analyzes the intermediate stages between
the random initialization and the equilibrium solutions (not shown here; see au¬
thor's website), it becomes clear that with a heterogeneous V valuable meaning-
signal pairs get established first, and change little afterward.
Meanings sacrificed: Finally, when the V matrix is heterogeneous (figure 6b
and d), or there is a dimensionality-mismatch (figure 6c and d), one can ob¬
serve that meanings with very low value are sacrificed for the benefit of robust
recognition of more valuable meanings (a similar observation was made in [13]).
These sacrificed meanings "deliberately" get expressed with a signal that will be













Fig. 6. Topology preservation at equilibrium in 4 simulations with Id and 2d U matri¬
ces, and homogeneous and heterogeneous 2d V matrices. Nodes are meanings (diame¬
ters correspond to value), edges connect neighbors in signal space (several signals can
map to a single meaning, such that nodes can have many neighbors; some meanings are
not expressed, and the corresponding nodes are not connected). Common parameters
are P=400, M=16, F=49.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I have shown that from simple assumptions about topologies in
meaning- and signal-space, and individual-based optimization, communication
systems can arise that show a structured mapping from meanings to signals. In a
population where such a language is spoken, the fundamental new phenomenon
of compositionality can presumably much more easily evolve.
There is no space here to explore the many connection between these simu¬
lations and the fields of Information Theory [16] and Evolutionary Game The¬
ory [12]. In a sense, the matrices of figure 5 and 6 describe evolutionary stable
strategies, under the constraints of communication over a noisy channel. These
connections, and the analytic proofs that can be worked out in these frameworks,
will be the topic of future work.
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Evolution of an Optimal Lexicon
under Constraints from
Embodiment
Abstract Research in language evolution is concerned with
the question of how complex linguistic structures can emerge
from the interactions between many communicating
individuals. Thus it complements psycholinguistics, which
investigates the processes involved in individual adult
language processing, and child language development
studies, which investigate how children learn a given (fixed)
language. We focus on the framework of language games
and argue that they offer a fresh and formal perspective on
many current debates in cognitive science, including those on
the synchronic-versus-diachronic perspective on language,
the embodiment and situatedness of language and cognition,
and the self-organization of linguistic patterns. We present a
measure for the quality of a lexicon in a population, and
derive four characteristics of the optimal lexicon: specificity,
coherence, distinctiveness, and regularity. We present a
model of lexical dynamics that shows the spontaneous
emergence of these characteristics in a distributed population
of individuals that incorporate embodiment constraints.
Finally, we discuss how research in cognitive science could



























There exists a long tradition of formulating and studying formal models of language
processing and language learning. These models have generally focused on the lin¬
guistic competence of a single individual. They have proven to be appealing because
such formalisms offer precision and clarity, have led to successful technology, and have
allowed for extensive theoretical research to complement empirical work.
However, these competence models have abstracted away many arguably crucial
characteristics of language. These abstractions are viewed with growing uneasiness by
cognitive scientists, linguists, and other researchers. Some of their concerns are well
known: competence theories lack an appreciation of linguistic performance and of the
communicative function of language, and they place a strong emphasis on symbolic
processing and innateness (see, e.g., [8, 33, 17] for criticisms).
Here we focus on a particular criticism: traditional models fail to acknowledge how
much of linguistic structure emerges from communication and embodiment. Recent
research on natural language pragmatics, for instance, has focused on language as a
cooperative phenomenon where communication is viewed as a joint action between
the participants [4], This view is in contrast to the traditional approach in which speak¬
ing and hearing are investigated in isolation as individual actions. Researchers in the
© 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Artificial Life 9: 387-402 (2003)
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framework of emergentism have argued that the structure of language should be ex¬
plained as the emergent result of the many interactions between known processes in
evolution, development, speaking, listening, and language change over time [17].
This type of work emphasizes the role of (i) the function of language for commu¬
nication between individuals (cooperativity), and (ii) the biophysical constraints of the
human body and its environment (embodiment) in the explanation for the origin and
development of linguistic structure. We are sympathetic to these arguments and share
the criticism of a tradition that in some sense equates the formalisms of the researcher
with the mechanisms of the real brain. However, we regret that this general criticism
goes hand in hand with a reluctance to use formal models at all. Many researchers
have focused instead uniquely on empirical or philosophical approaches (e.g., [17]), or
on building "embodied" robots (e.g., [32]).
The goal of this article is to argue that formal models can deal in a meaningful way
with embodiment, situatedness, and self-organization. They can help to define these
concepts and elucidate the role they play in the development of complex language.
Language games, such as those studied in recent years in the field of artificial life (see,
e.g., [29, 15] for reviews), are a prime candidate for this purpose. Language games are
models of language change and language evolution in populations of communicating
individuals. Although in most of these models cooperativity and embodiment have not
played much of a role, we believe they can be successfully extended to incorporate
these important aspects.
The notion of embodiment comes in different flavors. On the one hand, a learning
system can be incorporated into an actual robotic body, highlighting the need of the
system to cope with sensory limitations [32] and allowing it to manipulate its envi¬
ronment and to develop representations based on sensorimotor interactions with this
environment [22], On the other hand, and more in line with the notion adopted here,
embodiment can mean incorporating constraints from sensory, brain, and psycholog¬
ical processing into models without explicitly constructing an artificial body. These
approaches are complementary, and neither presents a fully embodied system. In this
article we argue that the latter notion of embodiment can be studied with formal mod¬
els, by incorporating sensory constraints (in the form of noise on the signals) and brain
and cognitive processing constraints (by assuming limited processing resources and
topological relations between meanings and between signals) into such models.
The models of language evolution that we will consider are multi-agent models.
They define a population of individuals that talk to each other and learn from each
other, using a language that as a result changes over time. Individuals in the mod¬
els have limited production, memory, and perception abilities, and they have limited
access to the knowledge of other individuals. The models evaluate the complex rela¬
tionship between (i) acoustic, cognitive, and articulatory constraints, (ii) learning and
development, (iii) cultural transmission and interaction, (iv) biological evolution, and
(v) the complex patterns that are to be explained: the phonology, morphology, syntax,
and semantics that are observed in human languages.
The type of language game we examine here is concerned with how a common
lexicon can develop in a population of individuals (often called agents in this context).
In these games, an agent can act either as a speaker or as a hearer. The purpose of
a communicative act is the transmission of a meaning from the speaker to the hearer.
Meanings cannot be transmitted directly but are encoded by linguistic forms. We can
investigate how, based on a great number of such linguistic exchanges under different
constraints, a shared lexicon develops so that different speakers use the same word
for the same meaning and hearers interpret words with intended meanings. In our
models we restrict ourselves to the development of a common lexicon, thus skipping
the much more complex and controversial issues in syntax. Nevertheless, we hope
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to make the point that language games offer an appealing framework to study other
aspects of language as well. For language games that do incorporate grammar, we refer
to the extensive review by Kirby [151.
From the perspective of language games, the development of a shared lexicon sim¬
ply cannot be studied in isolation within one individual, because it depends on the
interactions between individuals. In that respect it is a prime example of an aspect of
language that escapes study in traditional approaches.
In the rest of this article we will discuss the general framework of these models
and present a measure for the quality of a lexicon. We will then study a model that
is simple, but is nevertheless novel and serves well to illustrate our approach. Finally,
we will discuss how simple language games can be extended to incorporate realistic
aspects of cognition, embodiment, and communication.
2 The Optimal Lexicon
The communicative success of a population depends on the organization of the lin¬
guistic forms in that population's language, and on how these forms relate to different
meanings: how uniquely does one form refer to one meaning? How likely is a speaker
to choose a specific linguistic form for a meaning, and how likely is a listener to at¬
tribute a certain meaning to a received form? To what extent do individuals agree
on the meaning-form mappings? How easily can different forms be confused when
communication is noisy?
In this section we will first derive a formal description of what would be the optimal
lexicon, that is, the lexicon that leads to the highest communicative success in the
population. To do so, we need a measure for communicative success. Such a measure
is presented next. Similar formalisms were used in [11, 21] and other papers, but our
measure is chosen so that we can incorporate some real-world constraints on noise in
signaling (like [18]) and different values for different meanings ([14, 191 incorporate in
their models the related idea of different frequencies for different meanings).
Speakers can express what they want to say in different ways. Likewise, hearers
can interpret spoken forms in different ways. Communicative success is high when the
hearer's interpretation of a received form matches with the intention of the speaker.
We assume a set of N agents that communicate by forms F to convey meanings M.
In a given interaction, a speaker chooses a form f for a meaning m, and the hearer
interprets the heard form f* (which may differ from / if transmission is noisy) and
assigns it the meaning m*. Communication is optimal if speakers and hearers always
agree on the meaning for an exchanged form, that is, if m = m* for any choice of m.
We denote by S'(f | m) the probability that an agent i uses the form f to express
the meaning m. Similarly, R'(m \ f) is the probability that agent i as a hearer interprets
the form f as the meaning m. We assume that there are a finite number \M\ of relevant
meanings and a finite number |.F| of forms used. Further, we assume that similarity
between different forms and between different meanings can be measured (e.g., [16]).
We also assume that communication is noisy, that is, the hearer can misperceive a
certain form, and more similar forms are more easily confused. We denote by U( f* \ f)
the probability that an agent perceives the form f as the form f* if can be equal to
/*, indicating that the hearer has perceived the form correctly).
Finally, we assume that the communication is successful if the hearer's interpretation
is close to the sender's intention. The probability of successfully conveying a certain
meaning thus depends on the probabilities of the sender using certain forms and the
probabilities of the hearer perceiving and interpreting these forms correctly. We denote
by V(m*, m) the value (or reward) for the hearer understanding m* when the speaker
intended m. Thus V is a measure of communication quality. It should express both
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the relative importance of a certain meaning, and the relations between alternative
meanings. For example, we could assume that interpreting a signal with a meaning
that is wrong but similar is better than interpreting it with just a random meaning, or
that being able to express frequent meanings is more important than being able to
express infrequent ones.
From these observations, we derive a simple equation that describes the probability
P(m* | m) of any hearer j having an interpretation m* when the speaker i intended
m:
P(m* | m) = * (S< (f \m)'u (/* I /) • rJ im* I /*)) (D
n ; fsF/'eF
This equation says that the probability of the meaning m being perceived as m*
("understanding m as m*") is the probability of agent i using the form / to encode
meaning m, the hearer perceiving form /* and then interpreting it as m*. Because we
sum over all N agents as speakers and all but one as hearers (TV — 1; agents do not talk
to themselves), we divide the whole expression by N(N — 1).
From here it is only a small step to define the communicative success C of the whole
population of N agents talking about all \M\ meanings:
That is, overall communicative success is the sum of the probabilities for all mean¬
ing transmissions weighted by their values (assuming that all meanings are equally
frequent). This measure is normalized with the number of meanings.
Because S, R, U, and V can all be described as matrices, we can in fact summarize
Equations 1 and 2 as follows:
where the 'x' indicates usual matrix multiplication, and the indicates the summation
of the product every element in one matrix with its corresponding element in the other
matrix (dot multiplication).
Equation 3 constitutes a very general quality measure for a communication sys¬
tem between individuals (described by the matrices S and R), under some embodied
constraints of articulation and perception (described by U) and semantic/pragmatic
constraints on how useful an interpretation is given a certain intention (described by
V). By choosing the proper U and V, a wide range of different noise and reward func¬
tions can be modeled. However, these matrices can of course not capture all aspects
of the embodiment and environment. For instance, the development of conceptual
and articulatory abilities and the dependence of rewards and confusion probabilities
on specific contexts cannot be modeled directly with our four matrices. However, the
formalism is easily extendable to incorporate such aspects. Moreover, even if not all
aspects of animal (e.g., [24]), human, or robot communication (e.g., [32]) are modeled,
the formalism gives a principled way to abstract out those aspects of embodiment that
are nonessential for the emerging language.
With equation 3 in hand, we can now investigate under which conditions commu¬
nicative success is maximized. We will n5T"f»rovidltf- analytical results for any specific
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choice of U and V. Instead, we will present numerical results for a variety of choices
of U and V with a simple hill-climbing algorithm. The algorithm used throughout this
section is the following:
1. Initialize a population of P individuals, each with an \M\ x |.F| matrix S (a
production lexicon) and an I/7! x \M\ matrix R (a reception lexicon) set with
random values and columns normalized.
2. Measure C according to Equation 3-
3. Apply a random change (from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard
deviation n = 0.1) to a random entry in a random matrix of a random individual,
and normalize the column.
4. Measure C' according to Equation 3-
5. If C > C', revert the change; otherwise C := C'.
6. If maximum steps are reached, stop; otherwise go to 3.
Note that in the simulations that use this algorithm an individual's lexicon is not
changed as a direct consequence of communication, but is changed randomly. How¬
ever, this random change may lead to higher communicative success, in which case the
change is retained. We use this simple global optimization procedure to analyze what
the optimal lexicon will look like for different choices of U and V. In Section 3 we
will look at the more realistic situation where agents optimize their individual commu¬
nicative success, that is, where optimization is local and distributed.
2.1 Categorical Meanings; Noise-Free Signaling
Let us first consider the simplest case of categorical, noise-free communication. That
is, we assume that every meaning is unique and has no relation with other meanings.
Further we assume that forms are perceived as they are uttered. In short, both U and
V are unit matrices (matrices with l's on the diagonal, and 0's everywhere else).
If we optimize a population's lexicon under these conditions using the hill-climbing
algorithm described above, we obtain results as in Figure 1. Here C increases steadily
and reaches the optimal value (1.0). The S matrices in the population have maximal
probability (= 1.0) for a specific form (horizontal) for each of the meanings (verti¬
cal), and probability 0 for all other forms. In the matrix R these forms (vertical) are
interpreted as the "correct" meanings. Because there are more possible forms than
meanings, some forms are never used and have arbitrary interpretations.
From this simple simulation we can derive two properties of the optimal lexicon:
specificity, one unique form for every intention, and one unique interpretation for every
used form, if \M\ < |F|; and coherence, that is, everyone in a population uses the same
form for the same meaning.
2.2 Categorical Meanings, Noisy Signaling
If there is noise on the signal (due to a noisy environment and sensory limitations of
the hearer), we can expect the hearer to sometimes hear a different form than the
speaker uttered. We can model this by introducing nonzero off-diagonal entries in the
matrix U. Here, we consider only the simplest case, where forms vary on one axis,
determined by their index, and we set the values of U depending on the distance from
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(a) Development of communicative success
over 25000 iterations
(b) S matrix of a random
individual, showing for each
meaning (vertical) the prob¬
ability that she will use any
of the forms (horizontal) to
(c) R matrix of the same indi¬
vidual, showing for each form
(vertical) the probability that
she will choose any of the
meanings (horizontal) as its
Figure I. The optimal lexicon in a population under categorical, noise-free conditions. The size of circles is pro¬
portional to the value of the corresponding entry; entries with value 0 are plotted as a small dot. (V and U are unit
matrices, |/V1| = 8, \F\ = 12, N = 3, n = 0.1).
the "correct" form (and subsequently normalize every row of U):
U(f* | /) = (4)U J
1 + (/ - f*)2
We expect a lower optimal value of C. Moreover, for optimized C, we also expect
to find matrices that somehow minimize the chance of misinterpretation. Figure 2
shows that this is indeed what happens. The S matrix shows that for every meaning,
there is a prototype form that individuals use. For these prototype forms and their
direct neighbors, the interpretation is the "correct" meaning. Thus, little clusters of
neighboring forms are all interpreted in the same way, such that prototype forms are
maximally distinct from each other. Thus, in addition to specificity and coherence,
distinctiveness is a property of the optimal lexicon when the signaling is noisy. Note
that, even though there are many more forms than meanings, all forms have a specific
"best" interpretation. We can obtain similar results with form spaces that have more
dimensions [36] or continuous values [37].
2.3 Semantic Similarities and Noisy Signaling
If we include in the model the assumption that not only forms have similarity relations,
but also meanings relate to each other, we can identify a fourth criterion of the optimal
lexicon: regularity. Figure 3 shows results that are obtained by running the hill-climbing
algorithm of this section, with U as in Equation 4 and, similarly, V as follows (and rows
subsequently normalized):
V(m*, m) = 1 — (5)
1 + (m — m*)z
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(a) Development of communicative success (b) S matrix of a random individual. (c) R matrix of the
over 100000 iterations same individual.
Figure 2. A local optimum of the lexicon in a population under categorical, noisy conditions (V-unit matrix, U as in
Equation 4, |M| = 10, \F\ = 30, N = 3, n = 0.1).
Here, V is maximal when the intended meaning m and understood meaning m* are
the same and decreases with increasing distance between m and m*.
The local optima found by the hill-climbing algorithm show not only specificity,
coherence, and distinctiveness, but also partial regularity-, similar forms tend to have
similar meanings, such that misinterpretations are still better than a random interpreta¬
tion. The solution found is a local optimum; the globally optimal lexicon is maximally
regular: with the parameters of the simulations in Figure 3, meaning m.\ is expressed
with form f\, and forms f2 to are interpreted as my meaning m2 is expressed with
p, and /4 to f(, are interpreted as and so on. This optimum is not found in this
simulation; however, in the local optimum of Figure 3 neighboring clusters of forms
are, with only a few exceptions, associated with neighboring meanings. In related
work [36] we found that with a slightly different representation the optimum can easily
be found as well. Measuring the degree of regularity (as the correlation between the
distances between each pair of meanings and the distances between their associated
forms) shows that it is consistently higher under conditions with semantic similarities
than without.
2.4 Properties of the Optimal Lexicon
From these experiments we can conclude that the optimal lexicon must have the fol¬
lowing properties (provided that \M\ < |F|, and that the off-diagonal U and V values
are sufficiently low):
• Specificity-. Every meaning has exactly one form to express it, and vice versa (i.e.,
there are no homonyms, and no real synonyms: if different forms have the same
meaning, they are very similar to each other).
• Coherence-. All agents agree on which forms to use for which meanings, and vice
versa.
• Distinctiveness-. The forms used are maximally dissimilar to each other, so that they
can be easily distinguished.
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(a) Development of communicative success (b) S matrix of a random individual (c) R matrix of the
over 100000 iterations same individual
Figure 3. Local optima for S and R under semantic similarities, noisy signaling conditions (V as in equation 5, U as in
Equation 4, |M| = 10, \F\ = 30, N == 3, n = 0.1).
• Regularity-. In the mapping between meanings and forms there is a preservation of
topology, that is, similar forms tend to have similar meanings.
3 Language Games
After establishing the properties of an optimal lexicon, we can now turn to language
games, where there is no global optimization, but rather, every individual tries to op¬
timize its own communicative success. Language game models can be viewed as an
extension of the basic communication model that consists of a sender, a message, and
a receiver. Language games consider a population of individuals (agents) that can both
send and receive. A language game then is a linguistic interaction between two or
more agents that follows a specific protocol and has varying degrees of success. The
types of models that we will consider have the following components: (i) a linguistic
representation, (ii) an interaction protocol, and (iii) a learning algorithm. In this section
we will discuss the choices we have made for each of these components, based on a
review of existing models.
3.1 Linguistic Representation
By a representation we mean here a formalism to represent the linguistic abilities of
agents, ranging from recurrent neural networks [1] or rewriting grammars [13, 35] to
a simple associative memory [11, 21, 28, 20, 6, 12, 26], representing the strength of
associations between meanings and forms.
In the model of this section, we use the same S and R matrices as in Section 2. Forms
and meanings thus remain abstract. Other researchers (e.g., [30, 31) have chosen more
concrete representations, such as random concatenations of consonants and vowels
for the forms, or positions in a psychophysical^ motivated color space for meanings.
However, these models do not have similarity relations between forms or between
meanings. Instead, forms and/or meanings are categorical, and as a result the form-
meaning associations in the emerging languages are completely arbitrary (as in our first
model, Sections 2.1 and 2.2). A possible exception is the model in [31]; however, in that
article it is not clear whether the stochasticity in the meaning space is dependent on
the assumed topology (i.e., whether a wrong but close interpretation is more valuable
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than a far-off interpretation), and regularity and distinctiveness are not measured or
analyzed.
In contrast to these models, we assume here that there are varying degrees of similar¬
ity between forms and between meanings, i.e., there is a topological space of meanings,
and a topological space of forms. In that respect, our model is more similar to mod¬
els of the evolution of grammatical language, where associations between structured
meanings and structured forms are not arbitrary (e.g., [14, 2]). For the sake of simplic¬
ity, we report here results from simulations where forms and meanings each vary on a
one-dimensional axis. As in Section 2, we interpret the index of meanings and forms
in the S and R matrices as their positions on these axes. Even such a similarity metric,
which is only a first step toward more cognitive plausibility, brings fundamentally new
behaviors.
3.2 Interaction Protocol
The agents in language game models interact following simple protocols. In most
models two agents—a speaker (initiator) and a hearer (imitator)—are chosen at random.
Three types of games can be distinguished. In the imitation game [51, in contrast to the
present models, meanings play no role. However, as in our model and in contrast to
most other language game models, the imitation game assumes noise and similarities in
the form space and studies the emergent maximization of the distance between them.
In the imitation game, the initiator chooses a random form from its repertoire and
utters it. The imitator then chooses the form from its own repertoire that is closest to
the received form and utters it. If the initiator finds that the closest match to this (heard)
form is the form that it originally used, the game is successful. Otherwise the game is
a failure.
In the naminggame [28], meanings do play a role. The speaker chooses a meaning
and a form to express that meaning, and the hearer makes, based on the perceived
form, a guess of what is meant. The hearer then receives feedback from the speaker
on the intended meaning, that is, whether its guess was correct. The game is a success
if the speaker's intention and the hearer's interpretation are the same, and a failure
otherwise. The naming game serves as a model system for studying the emergence of
conventional form-meaning associations.
In the observational game, the meaning of the expressed form is immediately avail¬
able to the hearer (as in situations where the speaker points at the object that is the
topic of a conversation). This simplification has been used in most language game
models studied so far (e.g., [11, 28, 21, 1, 13, 12]).
In the model described here, we make another simplifying assumption. We pick
two random agents from the population. The first agent learns from the other, and
is randomly assigned the role of either speaker or hearer. We then assume that the
first agent is able to assess the overall communicative success in communicating with
the other agent, and learns through a form of hill climbing as described below. The
effect of one interaction in our model can thus be seen as the average effect of many
interactions in the naming game. In Section 4 we will discuss the consequences of
relaxing this assumption.
3.3 Learning Algorithm
In most models, the learning algorithm that agents use to improve their linguistic abil¬
ities is very simple (see [27] for a discussion of the required biases of these learning
algorithms and how these biases can evolve). In all of the language game models men¬
tioned above, a mechanism is implemented to keep track of the success of each form
or form-meaning association. Whether or not a specific association is used depends
on this score. Such algorithms can be considered variants of a hill-climbing process:
'-"'—III, t teStt*
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given a present state of the system, a random variation is tried out. If the performance
is better than before, this variation is kept, and otherwise it is discarded.
The difference from a standard hill-climbing algorithm (such as in Section 2) is that
optimization is local (every agent optimizes its individual success) and many variants
are tried out at the same time. That is, at any one time we can view associations with a
high score as constituting the present state of the system. For the other associations, the
(low) scores are estimates of how much communication would improve by adopting
it. If adopting it would improve communication at this point, the scores will go up and
the association will eventually become part of the system.
In the language game model of this section, we will simply use a local hill-climbing
variant. After picking two random agents, the learning agent makes a random change
in its S matrix (if it is assigned the role of speaker) or R matrix (if it is the hearer). The
learner checks if that change improves the communicative success in communicating
with the other agent according to the following equation (which is almost identical to
Equation 3, but now for one specific speaker and hearer):
CiJ = — (S* x (U x Rj)) ■ V (6)
\M\ v v "
If ^before > ^after» change is kept; if not, the change is reversed. Note that in this
distributed hill climbing, at every interaction the target of the hill-climbing process can
be different, because each interaction is with a random other agent in the population
and because other agents are learning at the same time.
3.4 Self-Organization of the Optimal Lexicon
The main result that we present here is that close approximations of each of the prop¬
erties of the optimal lexicon emerge from the local interactions that we have defined
above. Figure 4 shows results from a simulation with the same parameters as in Fig¬
ure 3, just with a larger population (N = 40) and a higher noise level (the random
change in the hill-climbing algorithm is from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and
standard deviation n = 1.0). The figure shows S and R matrices from one random
individual at three points in the simulation: after 5 x 106 and 2 x 107 iterations, and in
the stable equilibrium configuration (after almost 1 x 10s iterations).
The lexicon that develops shows all four characteristics. In the S matrix at equilibrium
(labeled t = oo), every meaning is always expressed by one unique form; in the
R matrix, that form is always interpreted with the correct meaning (specificity). At
equilibrium, all agents have the same S and R matrices (coherence). In the S matrix,
the total distance between all preferred forms is (almost) maximal; in the R matrix, each
of these preferred forms (except at the edges) is the center of a little cluster of forms
that are all interpreted with the same meaning (distinctiveness). Finally, with three
exceptions, all form clusters have neighboring form clusters that express a neighboring
meaning (regularity).
The degree of regularity in this simulation is small (the correlation between the
distance between each pair of meanings and the distance between their corresponding
forms is around 0.2). In general, regularity can be difficult to obtain because to go from
an irregular to a regular lexicon many changes to the lexicon are required. Moreover,
its contribution to the communicative success is small in comparison with the other
three properties. In [36] we show results with a different representation, where the
entries in the S and R matrices are always 1 or 0, and random changes move a 1 to a
different position in the matrix. In this setup regularity can much more easily emerge,
both in the global and in the distributed hill-climbing condition.
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Figure 4. Development of specificity, coherence, distinctiveness, and regularity in the lexicon of a population under
semantic similarities, noisy signaling conditions. At each time step a random speaker interacts with a random hearer
and one of them performs a single hill-climbing step to improve the communication. In this graph, the R matrices are
transposed, so that in both S and Rr meanings are on the vertical axis and forms on the horizontal axis. The size of
circles is proportional to the value of the corresponding entry; entries with value 0 are not plotted, t = oo indicates
any time after the simulation has converged (from around t = 108) to the stable equilibrium. (V as in Equation 5, U
as in Equation 4, |A11 = 10, |F| = 30, N = 40, n — 1.0.)
4 Toward More Cognitive Plausibility
Our results show that there is no necessity for explicit and innately specified "princi¬
ples" that guarantee specificity, distinctiveness, coherence, and regularity. It is possible
in principle that these basic characteristics emerge from simple interactions between
agents, a generic learning algorithm, and topological meaning and form spaces. That is,
they emerge from the embodiment (i.e., general perceptual and processing constraints)
and situatedness (i.e., interactions between individuals) of the simulated agents.
Of course, the biophysical constraints of real humans are different from the ones
implemented in this model. The next step in our research is therefore to evaluate
whether more realistic constraints lead—through similar dynamics—to an emergent
language with more realistic characteristics. Here we consider three possible extensions
of the model.
4.1 Limited Feedback
In the distributed hill-climbing simulations we assumed that an agent makes a random
change in one of its matrices, and then evaluates if that change increases the success
in communicating with one other individual. In reality, that information might not be
available. It is therefore worth examining if the same results can be obtained with the
minimal assumptions of feedback on whether or not a communication about a single
meaning has been successful (as in the naming game [28]), or on shared contexts
between speaker and hearer (as in the observational game [25]).
We have done some experiments that show that at least specificity, coherence, and
distinctiveness can easily emerge in a naming game setup [37]. Figure 5 shows one of the
emerging languages from these experiments, it shows a pattern formed through local
interactions between two communicating agents, expressing nine different meanings
with forms from a two-dimensional form space. Each of the nine clusters in this figure
shows strong associations from two agents for one particular meaning.
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Figure 5. Local interactions: emergence of distinctiveness, coherence, and specificity. Dispersed forms in form
space, obtained through local interactions between communicating agents. Each of the nine clusters in this figure
shows associations from both agents for one particular meaning. Large dots are strong association. (Parameters:
N = 2, |M| = 9; form space continuous—i.el, |F| = oo; perceptual noise 10%.)
4.2 Cooperativity
An important principle in line with the joint-action view of human communication has
been formulated by Grice [91 as the principle of cooperation-. In a conversation, the
speaker makes certain assumptions about the expectations of the hearer, and she uses
these assumptions to communicate her intended message effectively. This principle
involves the provision of enough, but not too much, information in a message, the
relevance of the message to the current conversation topic, and the truthfulness of the
information provided. In interpreting the message, the hearer relies on the speaker to
have obeyed these principles.
In the context of language game models, we can extend this principle to the coop¬
erative creation of new words: a speaker that is interested in communicative success
should only generate a new form if no form for the intended meaning already exists in
the language. For example, a speaker who wants to talk about a duck-billed platypus
but has forgotten the name for it (or never knew it) would not make up a random word
and thus confuse the hearer. Instead, she would either circumvent the term or describe
the animal, and somehow prompt the hearer to give the name. By querying the hearer
for a possible form, the speaker allows herself to make assumptions about the beliefs of
the hearer and therefore to engage in a cooperative language game (as opposed to the
merely interactive language games that are traditionally studied). Such an extension of
the language game framework is plausible in that it views language as a cooperative
phenomenon and as a means to maximize the efficiency of communicating intended
meanings. It will prevent the creation of an excess of new forms, thereby reducing the
number of synonyms and the cognitive load.
4.3 Analogy
When an agent creates a new form in a language game, it usually randomly assembles
phonemes (e.g., [28]). This mechanism is in line with the claim of the "arbitrariness of
the sign" [7]: the structure of the form has no relationship to the meaning conveyed
by it. While this is true for many forms in today's existing languages, there is evidence
suggesting that, in the creation of new forms, the intended meaning should be taken
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into account. First of all, when new words are created in, for example, English, they are
often compounded and derived from existing words to ease their understanding. Thus,
someone who eats bananas will be called a "banana-eater" rather than a "manslo," to
indicate the semantic relationship with bananas and eaters. While such a process cannot
be applied to simple language games directly, it does show a structural relationship
between words that reflects a semantic relationship between their meanings.
Second, there is growing evidence for the hypothesis that the sound of a word can
suggest its meaning ("sound symbolism"). This idea was first mentioned by Plato and
has been pursued since then, for example, by von Humboldt [34]. Subsequent psy¬
cholinguists research has shown that in the formation of words, certain sounds can rep¬
resent certain meanings. For example, in assigning the two words Mil and Mai to images
of big and small tables, 80% of subjects chose Mai to stand for the larger table and Mil
for the smaller table, indicating that /a/ suggests large size and /i/ small size [231. These
results have been reproduced and extended by numerous researchers (see e.g. [10]).
A less controversial version than such absolute sound symbolism (where sounds
carry meaning) is a relative sound symbolism that can be directly applied to the cre¬
ation of new forms in naming games. It is described by von Humboldt [34, p. 74] as
"Words whose meanings lie close to one another, are likewise accorded similar sounds,"
while the sounds themselves bear no direct semantic content. In Sections 2 and 3 we
presented results where such relative sound symbolism (regularity) emerges as an op¬
timal solution in noisy conditions. However, we can also imagine that agents actively
exploit a form of topology preservation when creating new forms. In a language game
the decoding of the form by the hearer could then work as follows:
Find a meaning for the form f:
for the nearest neighbor f1 of f according to the similarity.
metric, find the best meaning m'
associate f with a meaning which is closest to m1
This approach can help to reduce ambiguity in the hearer's lexicon. Preliminary
results suggest faster convergence of the language than in the original model, due
to the emergence of regularities in the form-meaning mapping. Further, we found
several examples of parameter settings that would not lead to convergence under the
classical settings, but did converge under these topological settings. Finally, we find
an unexpected delay in the convergence in the final stage, due to conflicts between
competing partial regularities. This delay indicates that lexicon creation is subject to
the opposing pressures of topological preservation and distinctiveness maximization.
We could assume that in the evolution of vocabularies of human languages, words
with similar meanings might have developed to be as similar as possible (and thus
predictive of their meaning) while at the same time being as distinctive as possible (to
facilitate communication with already known words). A new form that is created to be
similar to another in order to facilitate understanding of its meaning would then undergo
variation (historical change) to become more arbitrary as it became more established
and a prediction of its meaning became less important than its distinctiveness from other
forms. While we have not incorporated these constraints in our current simulations, we
believe that they present a promising direction in the endeavor to integrate language
game formalisms with cognitive approaches to language.
5 Conclusions
We have discussed the relevance of language evolution models to the study of em¬
bodiment and self-organization of language, and presented a formalism for describing
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language games. Language game models are complementary to work that studies lan¬
guage processing and language acquisition. The models we discussed are simple; their
value is that they make the roles of diachrony, embodiment, and self-organization in
emerging linguistic structure explicit and testable.
We have argued that the environment and embodiment of communicating agents in
the real world impose a topology on both the meaning and the form space of their
communication system. We have shown that with these topologies the optimal lexicon
has four characteristics: specificity, coherence, distinctiveness, and regularity. We have
further shown that in a distributed population of agents that each have generic learning
capabilities, a lexicon can be established that shows each of these four characteristics.
Our results on distinctiveness and regularity follow naturally from the framework
that we have described in this article. Nevertheless, they have not been reported in
the extensive literature on the modeling of language evolution. We believe that this
fact in itself is support for our approach to embodiment, where we try to incorpo¬
rate constraints from sensory, brain, and psychological processing into formal models
without explicitly constructing an artificial body. However, much work remains to be
done on explaining the role of these constraints in the evolution of language. In the
final part of the article, we have therefore raised issues where cognitive science can
inform language game modeling, and eventually lead to a detailed understanding of
how complex language has emerged from many simple interactions.
Acknowledgments
The writing of this article was supported by European Commission RTN grant HPRN-
CT-2000-00065 to Gert Westermann, and a Prins Bernhard Cultuurfondsbeurs and a
Marie Curie fellowship of the European Commission to Willem Zuidema. Part of the
research described in this article was performed while WZ was at the A.I. Lab of the Vrije
Universiteit Brussel and funded through a Concerted Research Action fund (G.O.A.) of
the Flemish Government and the VUB.
We thank Kenny Smith, Charlotte Hemelrijk, Hanspeter Kunz, and two anonymous
reviewers for helpful comments.
References
1. Batali, J. (1998). Computational simulations of the emergence of grammar. In J. Hurford &
M. Studdert-Kennedy (Eds.), Approaches to the evolution oflanguage: Social and cognitive
bases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
2. Batali, J. (2002). The negotiation and acquisition of recursive grammars as a result of
competition among exemplars. In T. Briscoe (Ed ), Linguistic evolution through language
acquisition: Formal and computational models. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
3. Belpaeme, T. (2001). Simulating the formation of color categories. In B. Nebel (Ed.),
Proceedings of the InternationalJoint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'01) (pp.
393-398). San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann.
4. Clark, H. H. (1996). Using language. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
5. De Boer, B. (1999). Self-organisation in vowel systems. Ph.D. thesis, Vrije Universiteit
Brussel AI lab.
6. de Boer, B., & Vogt, P. (1999). Emergence of speech sounds in changing populations. In
D. Floreano, J.-D. Nicoud, & F. Mondada (Eds.), Advances in Artfical Life (pp. 664-673).
Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
7. de Saussure, F. (1916). Course in general linguistics. La Salle, IL: Open Court. Translated by
Roy Harris. Edition published in 1986.
400 Artificial Life Volume 9, Number 4
W. Zuidema and G. Westermann Evolution of an Optimal Lexicon
8. Elman, J. L., Bates, E. A., Johnson, M. H., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Parisin, D., & Plunkett, K.
(1996). Rethinking innateness: A connectionist perspective on development. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
9. Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and
semantics, volume 3: Speech acts (pp. 41-58). New York: Academic Press.
10. Hinton, L., Nichols, J., & Ohala, J. J. (Eds.) (1995). Sound symbolism. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
11. Hurford, J. (1989). Biological evolution of the Saussurean sign as a component of the
language acquisition device. Lingua, 77, 187-222.
12. Kaplan, F. (2000). L'emergence d'un lexique dans unepopulation d'agents autonome. Ph.D.
thesis, Universite Paris 6, Sony CSL-Paris.
13. Kirby, S. (2000). Syntax without natural selection: How compositionality emerges from
vocabulary in a population of learners. In C. Knight, J. Hurford, & M. Studdert-Kennedy
(Eds.), The evolutionary emergence oflanguage: Socialfunction and the origins of linguistic
form. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
14. Kirby, S. (2001). Spontaneous evolution of linguistic structure: An iterated learning model
of the emergence of regularity and irregularity. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary
Computation, 5, 102-110.
15. Kirby, S. (2002). Natural language from Artificial Life. Artificial Life, 8, 185-215.
16. Landauer, T., Foltz, P., & Laham, D. (1998). Introduction to latent semantic analysis.
Discourse Processes, 25, 259-284.
17. MacWhinney, B. (Ed.) (1999). The emergence of language. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
18. Nowak, M. A., & Krakauer, D. C. (1999). The evolution of language. Proceedings of the
National Academy ofSciences of the U.S.A., 96, 8028-8033.
19. Nowak, M. A., Plotkin, J. B., & Jansen, V. A. (2000). The evolution of syntactic
communication. Nature, 404, 495^198.
20. Oliphant, M. (1999). The learning barrier: Moving from innate to learned systems of
communication. Adaptive Behavior, 7.
21. Qliphant, M. & Batali, J. (1996). Learning and the emergence of coordinated
communication. Centerfor Research on Language Newsletter, 11.
22. Pfeifer, R. & Scheier, C. (1999). Understanding intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
23. Sapir, E. (1929). A study in phonetic symbolism. Journal ofExperimental Psychology, 12,
225-239.
24. Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (1997). Some general features of vocal development in
nonhuman primates. In C. T. Snowdon & M. Hausberger (Eds.), Social influences on vocal
development (pp. 249-273). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
25. Smith, A. D. (2001). Establishing communication systems without explicit meaning
transmission. In J. Kelemen & P. Sosik (Eds.), Advances in Artificial Life (Proceedings 6th
European Conference on Artificial Life, Prague). Berlin: Springer.
26. Smith, K. (2002). The cultural evolution of communication in a population of neural
networks. Connection Science, 14, (5-84.
27. Smith, K. (2003). Natural selection and cultural selection in the evolution of
communication. Adaptive Behavior, 70(1), 25—44.
28. Steels, L. (1997). Self-organising vocabularies. In C. Langton & K. Shimohara (Eds.),
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Artificial Life: Synthesis and simulation of
living system (pp. 179-184). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press*
29. Steels, L. (1997). The synthetic modeling of language origins. Evolution ofCommunication,
1, 1-35.
Artificial Life Volume 9, Number 4 401
W. Zuidema and G. Westermann Evolution of an Optimal Lexicon
30. Steels, L. (1998). The origins of syntax in visually grounded robotic agents. Artificial
Intelligence, 103, 133-156.
31. Steels, L., & Kaplan, F. (1998). Stochasticity as a source of innovation in language games. In
C. Adami, R. Belew, H. Kitano, & C. Taylor (Eds.), Proceedings ofArtificial Life VI (pp.
368-376). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
32. Steels, L., Kaplan, F., Mclntyre, A., & Van Looveren, J. (2002). Crucial factors in the origins
of word-meaning. In A. Wray (Ed.), The Transition to Language. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
33. Tomasello, M. (Ed.) (1998). The newpsychology of language: Cognitive andfunctional
approaches to language structure. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
34. von Humboldt, W. (1836). On Language. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Translated from the German by Peter Heath. Edition published in 1988.
35. Zuidema, W. (2003). How the poverty of the stimulus solves the poverty of the stimulus. In
S. Becker, S. Thrun, & K. Obermayer (Eds.), Advances in neural information processing
systems 15 (proceedings ofNlPS'02) (pp. 51-58). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
36. Zuidema, W. (2003). Optimal communication in a noisy and heterogeneous environment.
In W. Banzhaf, T. Christaller, P. Dittrich, J. T. Kim, & J. Ziegler (Eds.), Advances in Artificial
Life (proceedings of the 7th European Conference on Artificial Life) (pp. 553-563). Berlin:
Springer Verlag.
37. Zuidema, W. & Westermann, G. (2001). Towards formal models of embodiment and
self-organization of language. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Developmental Embodied
Cognition. Edinburgh, UK.
402 Artificial Life Volume 9, Number 4
Commentary/fdcVendoti: Precis of Foundations ofLanguage: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution
nodes, there are 2" linear orders. This can quickly lead to large
numbers, but these are still smaller than the r/i(!) possible permu¬
tations that would result from m constituents (for m = 3 as in the
present example, this gives six). ,
The present proposal is that syntax does indeed provide only for
the more modest constraints given by a-temporal syntax. A-tem-
poral syntax is sufficient to specify a crucial ingredient of syntax,
called structure-dependence in many of Chomsky's publications.
Structure dependence is decidedly not the specification of linear
order, but the specification of domination and sisterhood alone.
Order of constituents is only partially determined by structure
dependence. The remaining task is that of phonology, semantics,
and pragmatics combined. I have nothing to say about the latter
two, but will assume that principles of informatior^itructure (such
as "Agent First" and "Focus Last," Foundations, Ch. 8, sect. 8.7)
are of primary importance here. Again, avoidance of duplication
seems to make a syntactic determination of order superfluous at
best in those cases in which other principles are at work already.
4. The role of phonology. As for linear order in phonology, it is
indisputable that phonology (in contrast to syntax) needs linear or¬
der as a core concept. The string of phonemes /pit/ is in contrast
with the string /tip/, while /ipt/ is a possible, but unrealized word
in English, and any other permutation of the three phonemes is
ill-formed in English. In other words, the elementary notions of
contrast, distinctiveness, and well-formedness in phonology in¬
clude linear order. Structuralist phonology used the term "syntag-
matic relation" in this connection; here, "syntagmatic" literally
means "in accordance to the time axis." Furthermore, a number
of phonological rules are generally cast in terms of linear order.
For example, the basic rule ofcompound stress in English or Ger¬
man says that the first of two parts in a compound carries main
stress. For stress in phrases, the reverse holds (simplifying con¬
siderably): the second of two constituents in a phrase receives
main stress. In other words, phonology is very much about the
temporal line-up of chunks of speech. Given that it is grounded in
the phonetics of speech, this does not come as a surprise.
Furthermore, some of the syntactic movement operations as¬
sumed in syntactic theory are clearly related, at least functionally,
to either information structure (as in "topic first") or to preferred
positions for constituents with either strong stress (focus posi¬
tions) or weak stress (deaccentuation). Given that syntax is not
conceived as "knowing" about nonsyntactic principles such as
stress, it is almost inevitable to assign the respective movement op¬
erations to some other domain.
5. Where does order come from ? If the present hypothesis
about temporally unordered syntactic constituents should be cor¬
rect, it would leave us with one crucial question: From what rules
or principles does the actual order (encoded in phonological struc¬
tures) derive? No complete answer can possibly be given here, hut
parts of the answer have been identified already: Jackendoffpoints
out in several places that there are principles of ordering which
are part of semantics, information structure in particular, and of
phonology, heaviness constraints and stress preferences in partic¬
ular.
Lexical information (either on individual items or on more or
less extended lexical classes) must be another source of temporal
order: Prepositions versus postpositions are an obvious example,
prenominal versus postnominal adjectives might provide a further
case.
Next, phonology itself provides ordering information, as we can
see from principles, such as the one requiring long constituents to
follow short ones (Behaghel's law).
Setting aside the cases just enumerated, there are substantial
remaining problems. My formal proposal at this point is that the
rules providing the interface between syntax and phonology -
Jackendoff s "PS-SS interface rules" (Ch. 5, sect. 5.6) - provide
the natural locus for stating the constraints on linear order for syn¬
tactic and/or semantic constituents. Such rules are, by necessity,
sensitive to information stemming from both of the components
between which they mediate. Here again, the architecture of
grammar proposed by Jackendoff provides a fruitful base for fur¬
ther research.
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evolution of language?
Willem Zuidema3 and Bart de Boer4'
"Language Evolution and Computation Research Unit, School of Philosophy,
Psychology and Language Sciences, and Institute ofAnimal, Cell and
Population Biology, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9LL, United
Kingdom;bKunstmatige Intelligence, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 9712 TS
Groningen, The Netherlands, jelle@ling.ed.ac.uk b.de.boer@ai.rug.nl
http://www.ling.ed.ac.uk/~jelle http://www.ai.rug.nl/~bart
Abstract: Jackendoff s scenario of the evolution of language is a major
contribution towards a more rigorous theory of the origins of language, be¬
cause it is theoretically constrained by a testable theory of modem lan¬
guage. However, the theoretical constraints from evolutionary theory are
not really recognized in his work. We hope that Jackendoff s lead will be
followed by intensive cooperation between linguistic theorists and evolu¬
tionary modellers.
There has been a vigorous debate in the evolution of language lit¬
erature on whether the human capacity for language evolved grad¬
ually or with an abrupt "big bang." One of the arguments in favor
of the latter position has been that human language is an all or
nothing jrhenomenon that is of no value when only part of its ap¬
paratus is in place. From a developmental perspective this has al¬
ways been a peculiar argument, seemingly at odds with the grad¬
ual development of phonological, syntactic, and semantic skills of
infants. In the context of the evolution of language, the argument
was eloquently refuted in a seminal paper by Pinker and Bloom
(1990). However, Pinker and Bloom did not go much further than
stating that a gradual evolution of Universal Grammar was possi¬
ble. They did not explore the consequences of such a view for lin¬
guistic theory, and their approach was criticized by both the or¬
thodox generativists and the latter's long-term opponents.
Jackendoff (2002) has now gone one step further. If linguistic
theory is incompatible with gradual evolution and development,
perhaps linguistic theory needs to be revised. Jackendoff has writ¬
ten a powerful book around the thesis that the language capacity
is a collection of skills ("a toolbox"). Some of these skills are lan¬
guage-specific, some not, and each of them is functional even
without all or some of the other skills present. From his decom¬
position of linguistic skills follow a number of hypotheses on plau¬
sible intermediate stages in the evolution of language, that fit in
neatly with many other theories, models, and findings in this field.
Jackendoff s book therefore presents a significant departure
from the generative, "formalist" tradition, where the evolution of
language has received little attention. In this tradition, the struc¬
ture of human language has often been viewed as accidental rather
than as adapted to the functions that language fulfills in life.
Chomsky and others have been dismissive about attempts to re¬
construct the evolution of language, which they regard as unsci¬
entific speculation. Chomsky famously observed that "we know
very little about what happens when 101H neurons are crammed
into something the size of a basketball" (Chomsky 1975).
In contrast, Jackendoff presents the different tools from the
"toolbox" as adaptations for better communication. Moreover, he
gives a rather complete scenario of successive, incremental adap¬
tations that is consistent with his view on how modern language
works, and how it can be decomposed. Interestingly, he argues
that present-day languages show "fossils" of each of the earlier
stages: expressions and constructions that do not exploit the full
combinatorial apparatus of modern language. Jackendof f s book is
therefore a major contribution towards a more rigorous, scientific
theory of the evolution of language, in part because it leads to
some testable predictions, but more importantly because it is the¬
oretically constrained by a testable theory of modern language.
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However, Jackendoffdoes not really recognize that, in addition,
evolutionary theory brings stringent theoretical constraints (Bar¬
ton & Partridge 2000). Good evolutionary explanations specify the
assumptions on genotypic and phenotypic variation and selection
pressures, ofwhich the consequences can be worked out in math¬
ematical and computational models. For instance, Nowak et al.
(2001) derive a "coherence threshold" for the evolution of lan¬
guage, which poses a strict constraint on the accuracy of both ge¬
netic and cultural transmission of language for linguistic coher¬
ence in a population to be possible. In this type ofwork, one often
finds that "adaptive explanations" that seem so obvious in a verbal
treatment such as Jackendoff s, are in fact insufficient.
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1983) studied a "conformism con¬
straint" that arises from the positive frequency dependency of lan¬
guage evolution: Linguistic innovations are not advantageous in a
population where that innovation is very infrequent. Imagine, for
instance, a population that is in the second state of Jackendoff s
scenario. That is, individuals can use a large vocabulary of learned
signals in a non-situation-specific manner, but their language is
not compositional: Signals cannot be analyzed as consisting of
meaningful parts. Suppose that a child is born with a genetic mu¬
tation that makes her more inclined to analyze sentences compo-
sitionally. Would this child profit significantly from this mutation,
even if the language of the population she is bom into is not at all
compositional? If not - and it takes some creativity to come up
with reasons why she would - evolutionary theory predicts that
the new gene will disappear through negative selection or random
drift (Fisher 1922).
That is not to say that language did not evolve according to Jack-
endoff's scenario, but just to emphasize that each of the transitions
between the phases he proposes is a challenge in itself. The evo¬
lution of language is not, as is sometimes suggested, a domain for
just-so stories. Rather, it turns out that it is very difficult to find
even a single plausible scenario for the evolutionary path from pri¬
mate-like communication to the sophisticated toolbox of human
language that will survive close scrutiny from mathematical and
computational modeling. Recently, this insight has led to a surge
in the interest in "explorative," computational models (see Kirby
2002b; Steels 1997; for reviews). They have yielded intriguing
ideas on adaptive and nonadaptive explanations for the emergence
of shared, symbolic vocabularies (e.g., Oliphant & Batali 1996),
combinatorial phonology (e.g., de Boer 2000; Oudeyer 2002),
compositionality and recursive phrase-structure (e.g., Batali 2002;
Kirby 2002a).
For instance, the suggestion of Kirby (2000) - referred to but
not discussed in Jackendoff s book - is that a process of cultural
evolution might facilitate the emergence of compositionality. If a
language is transmitted culturally from generation to generation,
signals might frequently get lost through a bottleneck effect (that
arises from the finite number of learning opportunities for the
child). Signals that can be inferred from other signals in the lan¬
guage, because they follow some or other systematicity, have an
inherent advantage over signals that compete for transmission
through the bottleneck. With some sort ofgeneralization mecha¬
nism in place (not necessarily adapted for language), one always
expects a language to become more compositional (Kirby 2000),
and, more generally, better adapted to the idiosyncrasies of the in¬
dividual learning skills (Zuidema 2003).
Throughout his book, Jackendoff uses metaphors and termi¬
nology from computer science. Terms like processing, working
memory, and interface make it sometimes appear as if he is de¬
scribing a computer rather than processes in the human brain.
However, nowhere do his descriptions become sufficiently formal
and exact to make them really implementable as a computer pro¬
gram. In this light, his criticism of neural network models oflan-
guage acquisition and his mentioning only in passing of computa¬
tional models of the evolution of language is unsatisfactory.
Jackendoff s challenges for connectionists are interesting and to
the point, but it is equally necessary for theories such as Jackend¬
off s, especially their implications for development and evolution,
to be made more precise and to be extended in computational and
mathematical models.
In sum, in the effort to find a plausible scenario for the evolu¬
tion of human language, a book like Jackendoff s Foundations of
Language, based on a broad and thorough review of linguistic the¬
ory and facts, is extremely welcome. But as explorative computa¬
tional models such as the ones discussed have been very fruitful
in showing new opportunities and constraints for evolutionary ex¬
planations of human language, we hope that Jackendoff s lead will
be followed by intensive cooperation between linguistic theorists
and evolutionary modellers.
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Abstract. The commentaries show the wide variety of incom¬
mensurable viewpoints on language that Foundations of Lan¬
guage attempts to integrate. In order to achieve a more compre¬
hensive framework that preserves genuine insights coming from
all sides, everyone will have to give a little.
R1. Goals
My goal in writing Foundations ofLanguage was threefold.
First, I wished to develop a framework for studying lan¬
guage - the parallel architecture - which would permit a
better integration of all the subfields and theoretical frame¬
works of linguistics with each other and with the other cog¬
nitive neurosciences. Second, I wished to persuade lin¬
guists to join more fully in this integrative enterprise. Third,
I wished to persuade cognitive neuroscientists outside lin¬
guistics that the past forty years have brought genuine in¬
sights in linguistic description - albeit somewhat obscured
by the technical opacity of linguistic theory - and that the
parallel architecture offers better prospects for renewed di¬
alogue. The commentaries suggest that I have succeeded to
some extent, but that there still is a long way to go and a lot
of preconceptions to overcome (including, no doubt, my
own). The difficulties of integration are legion: The study
of language, more than any other cognitive capacity,
stretches the limits of interdisciplinarity, all the way from
neuroscience and genetics to social policy and literary the¬
ory, with linguistics, psychology, and anthropology in be¬
tween.
Many of the commentators focus on issues in Fmmda-
tions that are touched upon only tangentially or not at all in
the precis appearing here. In this response I will do my best
"fb m;lke*clear what is at stake. My hope, of course, is that
readers will thereby be engaged enough to want to tackle
the whole book.
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A central goal of evolutionary biology is to explain the origin of complex organs — the ribosomal machinery that
translates the genetic code, the immune system that accurately distinguishes self from non-self, eyes that can resolve
precise images, and so on. Although we understand in broad outline how such extraordinary systems can evolve by
natural selection, we know very little about the actual steps involved, and can hardly begin to answer general questions
about the evolution of complexity. For example, how much time is required for some particular structure to evolve?
In a recent paper, Lenski et al. [1] give an intriguing example of how "digital organisms" can evolve. Their work
suggests many lines of research, which might shed new light on an old problem.
Complex systems — systems whose function requires many interdependent parts — are vanishingly unlikely to
arise purely by chance. Darwin's explanation of their origin is that natural selection establishes a series of variants,
each of which increases fitness. This is an efficient way of sifting through an enormous number of possibilities,
provided there is a sequence of ever-increasing fitness that leads to the desired feature. To use Sewall Wright's
metaphor, there must be a path uphill on the "adaptive landscape".
Figure 1: The adaptive landscape (usually) is a graph of fitness against genotype. Sketched is a hypothetical example,
in which alleles at two genes have a continuous range of effects. Both real and digital organisms have, in contrast, a
discrete set of possible genotypes involving many more than two genes. Thus, mutations can take them in very many
directions. This high dimensionality makes it more likely that there is some path uphill to the "adaptive peak" (See
The crucial issue, then, is to know what variants are available (what can be reached from where) and what is
the fitness of these variants. Is there a route by which fitness can keep increasing? Population genetics is not much
help here. Given the geometry defined by mutation and recombination, and given the fitnesses, we can work out




how complex features evolve requires plausible models for the geometry of the adaptive landscape, which population
genetics by itself does not provide.
"Artificial Life" — the study of life as it could be — provides a variety of such models. For instance, Thomas Ray
[3] developed a model, called "Tierra", where digital creatures are little computer programs that copy themselves and
compete with each other for memory and processing time. Fitness here —just as in the real world — is defined very
indirectly by the rate of self-replication of the creatures relative to others. Ray's creatures evolved strategies to hinder
competitors and even to parasitize other creatures. Karl Sims [4] created a simulated physical world in which "digital
creatures" successfully evolve both their bodies and brains in order to beat other creatures in a variety of tasks such
as swimming, walking and jumping. Lipson and Pollack [5], in a recent follow-up study, actually made such walking
creatures as little robots and showed that the evolved locomotion strategies work even in the real world. Fitness in
these models is defined implicitly by the complex relation between brain and body architecture and the resulting way
of moving.
In Lenski et al.'s recent study, the creatures consist of a string of instructions, each instruction being chosen from
26 possibilities. Like Ray's creatures, the instructions must implement self-replication in order for the creature to have
offspring. But like Simm's creatures, they are also rewarded for performing a specific task: they can replicate faster
by manipulating information from the environment. Each organism receives two random 32 bit strings as inputs, and
is rewarded if it produces an output string that matches one of 9 possible logical operations. For example, the logical
operation NAND ("not and") returns a 0 in the output string only if the corresponding digits in the input strings are
both 1, and a 1 in all other cases. One of the 26 possible instructions in a creature's "genome" is a logic operation
(NAND), whilst the others perform various manipulations: copying, input/output, etc. Composite logic operations
are valued according to the number of elementary NAND operations needed to perform them. The most valuable is
EQU ("equal"), which returns a 1 only if both input bits are the same (this requires 5 NAND operations) as well as
other operations with move intermediate results between registers. A hand-written program required 19 operations to
achieve EQU; a digital organism needs additional code for replication.
Initially, 3600 identical organisms were set up, each with 15 instructions that allowed replication, plus 35 dummy
instructions. In each replication, point mutations occured at a rate 0.0025 per instruction, and single-instruction
insertions or deletions occurred at a rate of 0.056 per genome. In one run, EQU evolved after 111 steps. (A "step"
is counted whenever offspring differed from parent along the successful lineage; in most cases steps corresponded
to single mutations, but 8 steps involved two or three mutations). Over a further 233 steps, the ability to perform
additional logic operations evolved, and so fitness increased further. The way in which these organisms evolved was
broadly as one would expect. In particular, the evolution of EQU depends on there being fit steps that lead up to it, as
allowed by the reward system shown in Table 1.
Function name Logic operation Reward
NOT —*A 2
NAND -i(A and B) 2
AND A and B 4
OR_N (A or ->B) 4
OR (.AorB) 8
AND_N (A and -<B)- 8
NOR ->A and -*B 16
XOR (A and -<B) or {pA and B) 16
EQU (A and B) or (--A and ~^B) 32
Table 1: Rewards for performing logical operations. The symbol -> denotes negation ("not"). Logic operations are
performed digit by digit on one or two input strings. Thus, when applied to the input strings "110" and "011", the
operation AND would yield "010".
Lenski et al. experimented with the computer model in much the same way that geneticists experiment with model
organisms, by changing the fitness regimes and by knocking out instructions on the evolved genomes one at a time
to test their effect on fitness. They can also do something that geneticists usually cannot: trace back the evolutionary
history of the genome that first produced EQU. From the results from this study, Lenski et al. emphasise one feature in
particular: often, deleterious changes are established along the path to evolution of EQU. From a population genetics
point of view this result is less surprising than it may seem at first sight. One expects some deleterious mutations to
be picked up by random drift in a population of only 3600 organisms. Moreover, these digital organisms are asexual,
so that a deleterious mutation can be established if it occurs together with a favourable mutation (hitch-hiking, [6, 7]),
or if a new mutation occurs that produces a fit genotype when combined with the initially deleterious mutation. In the
example analysed by Lenski et al., most of the deleterious mutations along the lineage leading to EQU only reduced
fitness slightly, by less that 3%. However, two reduced fitness by more than 50%, and were only rescued by mutations
which occurred immediately afterwards — in one case, by the mutation which first produced EQU. Moreover, that
evolution of EQU required the previous mutation, which initially greatly reduced fitness. This pattern, of strong
epistatic interaction, was seen in the final stages of 3 of the 23 replicates in which EQU evolved.
So, in these simulations adaptation frequently depends on the occurrence of double mutations, either in the same
generation, or in close succession. Suppose that a particular deleterious mutation arises at rate p,i and reduces fitness
by s. It is expected to persist for ~ 1/s generations [8] during which time mutations at another locus occur at rate
p2. If both occur together, they confer a strong advantage, and are picked up by selection. So, we expect a rate
of accumulating these interacting pairs of ~ p-tpz/s, compared with ~ p\ for single favourable mutations. The
observation that interacting pairs do get established quite frequently tells us something about the relative abundance of
paths involving single mutations versus double mutations: possibly, once all single-mutation steps have been explored,
the population must wait until the rarer doublets arise.
In Lenski et al.'s artificial organisms, the mutation rate per site is quite high (0.0025) so that favourable pairs can be
picked up by selection at an appreciable rate; this would be unlikely in most real organisms, because there, mutation
rates at each locus are low. There are, however, some biological examples in which double mutations contribute
to adaptation — the first deleterious, the second favourable in combination. In general terms, Manfred Eigen has
argued that evolving populations of RNA molecules form a "quasi-species" [9], with high diversity maintained by
predominantly deleterious mutation away from a wild-type sequence that is itself vanishingly rare. This diversity
allows the population to explore a larger fraction of sequence space. More specifically, the secondary structure of
rRNA molecules can be determined through the pattern of covariation of substitutions: if one base changes, its partner
changes soon after in order to maintain base pairing. Here again, the first change occurs by chance, in opposition to
selection, and is compensated by the second [10], Lenski et al. do not explore the applicability of their model to such
issues.
Artificial Life models such as Lenski et al.'s are perhaps interesting in themselves, but as biologists we are con¬
cerned here with the question what Artificial Life can tell us about real organisms. The difficulty in answering that
question is that much work in this field is rather isolated from traditional evolutionary biology. Well-established theo¬
ries and methods from population genetics and game theory are too often ignored — and Lenski et al., although they
explore the evolutionary dynamics in quite detail, are no exception. There are, however, ways in which Artificial Life
can benefit from evolutionary theory, and vice versa. Can we understand exactly how complexity evolves in these
artificial models? Can we find general rules which describe the process? For example, could we predict how long it
is likely to take for a function such as EQU to evolve, given mutation rates and fitnesses? Here, there are population
genetics principles which are helpful: the relative rates of single vs. double mutations that we discussed, ideas about
"hitch hiking" [6] and Haldane's "cost of selection" [11], and so on. Since the entire fossil history of digital organisms
is preserved in the computer, it really should be possible to understand their evolution in quantitative terms.
But conversely, there are also potential benefits for evolutionary biology. In population genetics and evolutionary
game theory we design models to study the success and failure of a prefined set of traits or strategies in the struggle
for life. But what are the possible traits? And how well do they work out in particular environments with particular
competitors? These questions are ignored in traditional models — they come in as parameters to be provided by devel¬
opmental biology and ecology. For understanding the evolution of complex traits this is not satisfactory, because these
parameters are themselves shaped by evolution. Evolutionary processes constantly shift the targets of evolutionary
optimization, create spatial patterns, turn competitors into mutualists and create new levels of selection. Artificial Life
models of such phenomena (e.g. [12, 13, 14]) promise to be useful for developing the concepts and techniques to deal
with that challenge, but only if they are combined with the insights from almost a century of population genetics.
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Abstract.—Lipson et al. (2002) presented an elegant linear algebraic formalism to define and study the evolution of
modularity in an artificial evolving system. They employed simulation data to support their suggestion that modularity
arises spontaneously in temporally fluctuating systems in response to selection for enhanced evolvability. We show
analytically and by simulation that their correlate of modularity is itself under selection and so is not a reliable indicator
of selection for modularity per se. In addition, we question the relation between modularity and evolvability in their
simulations, suggesting that this modularity cannot confer enhanced evolvability.
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Modularity is a major principle of design and abounds in
nature. Functional separation of modules—from eukaryote
organelles to Drosophila limbs to human cognitive' facul¬
ties—may give robustness to changing inputs and facilitate
future improvement. The question of the evolutionary origins
of such modularity is important and the recent simulation
study of Lipson et al. (2002) is therefore a welcome contri¬
bution. They introduce a potentially extremely useful for¬
malism that allows one to quantify modularity and study its
evolutionary origins. Environmental variables are described
by a vector E, and phenotypic traits by a vector P. A matrix
A, which premultiplies E to give P, then describes the or-
ganismal process of transforming environmental input into
phenotypic output.
Lipson et al. argue that the "blockiness" of A and its
correlate, the number of zero elements, are measures of mod¬
ularity. By assigning fitnesses to realized phenotypes de¬
pending on their distance from an arbitrarily chosen optimum,
Lipson et al. (2002) study the evolution of modularity. Their
simulations show that the frequency of zero elements in the
matrices deviates from the expected value (1/3, the frequency
of zero elements at initialization and among random muta¬
tions) when the environment changes rapidly. Lipson et al.
attribute these results to a "second order (delayed) pressure
for decomposition for adaptability," (p. 1554) that is, the un¬
coupling of traits to allow independent optimization of each
and hence increased ability to adapt to new environments.
Enhanced evolvability is concluded to be a cause, as well as
a fortunate outcome, of the preponderance of zero-element-
rich matrices. We disagree with this conclusion and believe
that an alternative explanation exists. In addition, we feel
that modularity cannot influence evolvability in their study.
In the simulations of Lipson et al., the element values of
E are restricted to — 1 and +1 and the element values of A
are restricted to — 1, 0, and + 1. The elements of the phenotype
vector P are therefore restricted to the range —n —> n, where
n is the number of dimensions of the vectors (eight in the
simulations of Lipson et al.). They restrict the elements of
F, the arbitrary optimal phenotype, to — 1 and +1. The op¬
timal phenotypes are therefore restricted to a small subset of
all possible phenotypes, centered on the origin. We find that
matrices with many zero elements tend to produce pheno¬
types that are closer to the zero vector, and therefore on
average closer to the optimal phenotypes (mathematical de¬
tails are given in the Appendix).
Rather than appealing to enhanced evolvability, the pre¬
ponderance of zero-rich matrices can be explained by the
advantage delivered to any A that can maintain a phenotype
close to the origin, despite environmental perturbation (i.e.,
canalization; Waddington 1942). In Figure 1 we give the
probability distribution of the value of an element of P as a
function of £, the number of zero elements in the correspond¬
ing row of A. As £ increases, the value of the focal element
of P is more tightly distributed about the origin. Figure 2
reveals the relation between £ and the mean scalar residual
(negatively correlated with Lipson et al.'s measure of fitness)
in a focal dimension; increasing £ reduces the residual and
thus increases fitness. Conducting simulations of our own,
we have been able to demonstrate frequencies of zero ele¬
ments significantly greater than 1/3, even when mutation is
suppressed. Hence, individual lineages may thrive or decline,
but cannot evolve and therefore cannot be under selection
for enhanced evolvability (see Fig. 3 and Table 1).
Moreover, in the set-up of Lipson et al., it is unclear why
enhanced evolvability is expected to play any role. Each el¬
ement of the vector P is the result of (dot-) multiplying a
separate row vector from A with E. Contrary to the sugges¬
tions of Lipson et al., manipulating the elements of such a
row vector has no effect on the value of other elements of
P. This means that when evolving A in the context of a certain
environment E and a certain target phenotype F, every ele¬
ment of the actual phenotype P can be optimized indepen¬
dently. Interestingly, a different use of the same formalism
was suggested by Lipson et al. and avoids this problem. Un¬
der this alternative scheme, vector E describes the genotype
and matrix A describes the genetic architecture of the phe¬
notype (e.g., pleiotropy), a framework similar to the multiple
quantitative trait model proposed by Taylor and Higgs
(2000). By allowing both E and A to evolve, one can study
the evolution of modularity and evolvability under, for ex¬
ample, fluctuations in F.
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Fig. 1. The probability distribution of the value of PK as a function of the number of zero elements in the kth row of the 8X8 ternary
matrix A, £. Here n (= 8) and every value of £ (= 0, 2, 4, 6, 8) are even, so the values of PK are restricted to the set of even integers.
This is not to say that modularity is not under selection.
It is possible that modularity confers robustness of fitness in
response to the form of environmental change investigated
by Lipson et al. When matrices are highly modular, such that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between environmental
characteristic and phenotypic trait, alteration of only one as¬
pect of the environment will perturb the phenotype in one
dimension only. Matrices that are less modular have envi¬
ronmental components each affecting more than one trait,
and more than one trait being affected by several environ¬
mental components. They are therefore perturbed in multiple
dimensions whenever a single aspect of the environment is
altered. Because Lipson et al. change the sign of only one
element of E at each environmental alteration, it is conceiv¬
able that selection for fitness robustness has given rise to an






















quite a different pressure than the supposed selection for
enhanced evolvability.
In summary, Lipson et al. have presented an exciting and
novel formalism that may yield quantitative, as well as qual¬
itative insights into the evolution of evolvability and other
problems. However, in their application of the model they
have: (1) failed to demonstrate selection for modularity per
se; and (2) not clearly established a link between modularity
and evolvability. We suggest that enhanced evolvability can
be neither a cause nor an outcome of the increase in their
correlate of modularity.
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Appendix
The Distribution of PK
A is a nxn ternary matrix (element values are —1, 0, and +1)
and E is a n-element column vector with element values +1 and
— 1. The product of the premultiplication of E by A gives the phe-
notype vector P. The k"1 element of P is given by PK = A„.E = 2;
AKi.E,- = (.0 + m.(+i) + (« — £ — m).(-l) where £ is the number
of zero elements in A„ and m ~ Bin(n - £, 1/2) is the number of
same-sign pairs of Ak/ and E,- (i.e., those pairs of elements multi¬
plying to give + 1). Rearranging, the probability distribution of PK
is found to be
P[P« = x]
'
n - £ '
n — £ — x 2£" (Al)
for n = 8, the distribution of PK as a function of £ is shown in
Figure 1.
E[rJ as a function of £
Lipson et al. define fitness as a decreasing function of the (scalar)
distance between realized phenotype P and an arbitrary optimum
F. The residual in the k"1 dimension is rK = |Fk — PJ where FK
takes value +1 or -1 with equal probability. The probability density
function of r. is then
P[rK = y] = ^P[|PJ - 1 .y] + |p[|pJ + 1 = y]
(p[|p.l = ?+!]+ P[|P„I = y - 1]). (A2)
Because PK is symmetrical about the origin, P[PK = z] = P[PK =
-z] and so for z > 0, P[|PK| = z] = 2 P[PK = z], that is, for y
>1,
P[rK = y] = P[P„ = y + 1] + P[P„ = y - 1], (A3)
For y < 1;
P[rK = 1] = P[PK = —2]P[Fk = -1] + P[PK = +2]P[Fk = +1]
+ P[PK = 0] = P[PK = +2] + P[PK = 0]
P[rK = 0] = P[PK = -1]P[Fk = -1] + P[PK = +1]P[Fk = +1]
= P[PK=+l], (A4)
Because rK - PK ± 1, and PK is restricted to values of the same
parity as n - £, is only evaluated for those integers with parity
opposite to n — (. For n = 8, the mean of rK is revealed as a function
of £ in Figure 2.
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Abstract
Language acquisition is a special kind of learning problem because
the outcome of learning of one generation is the input for the next.
That makes it possible for languages to adapt to the particularities
of the learner. In this paper, I show that this type of language
change has important consequences for models of the evolution and
acquisition of syntax.
1 The Language Acquisition Problem
For both artificial systems and non-human animals, learning the syntax of natural
languages is a notoriously hard problem. All healthy human infants, in contrast,
learn any of the approximately 6000 human languages rapidly, accurately and spon¬
taneously. Any explanation of how they accomplish this difficult task must specify
the (innate) inductive bias that human infants bring to bear, and the input data
that is available to them. Traditionally, the inductive bias is termed - somewhat un¬
fortunately - "Universal Grammar", and the input data "primary linguistic data".
Over the last 30 years or so, a view on the acquisition of the syntax of natural
language has become popular that has put much emphasis on the innate machinery.
In this view, that one can call the "Principles and Parameters" model, the Universal
Grammar specifies most aspects of syntax in great detail [e.g. 1], The role of
experience is reduced to setting a limited number (30 or so) of parameters. The main
argument for this view is the argument from the poverty of the stimulus [2]. This
argument states that children have insufficient evidence in the primary linguistic
data to induce the grammar of their native language.
Mark Gold [3] provides the most well-known formal basis to this argument. Gold
introduced the criterion "identification in the limit" for evaluating the success of a
learning algorithm: with an infinite number of training samples all hypotheses of
the algorithm should be identical, and equivalent to the target. Gold showed that
the class of context-free grammars is not learnable in this sense by any algorithm
from positive samples alone (and neither are other super-finite classes). This proof
is based on the fact that no matter how many samples from an infinite language a
learning algorithm has seen, the algorithm can not decide with certainty that the
samples are drawn from the infinite language or from a finite language that con¬
tains all samples. Because natural languages are thought to be at least as complex
as context-free grammars, and negative feedback is assumed to be absent in the
primary linguistic data, Gold's analysis, and subsequent work in learnability theory
[1], is usually interpreted as strong support for the argument from the poverty of the
stimulus, and, in the extreme, for the view that grammar induction is fundamentally
impossible (a claim that Gold would not subscribe to).
Critics of this "nativist" approach [e.g. 4, 5] have argued for different assumptions
on the appropriate grammar formalism (e.g. stochastic context-free grammars), the
available primary data (e.g. semantic information) or the appropriate learnability
criterion. In this paper I will take a different approach. I will present a model that
induces context-free grammars without a-priori restrictions on the search space, se¬
mantic information or negative evidence. Gold's negative results thus apply. Never¬
theless, acquisition of grammar is successful in my model, because another process
is taken into account as well: the cultural evolution of language.
2 The Language Evolution Problem
Whereas in language acquisition research the central question is how a child acquires
an existing language, in language evolution research the central question is how this
language and its properties have emerged in the first place. Within the nativist
paradigm, some have suggested that the answer to this question is that Universal
Grammar is the product of evolution under selection pressures for communication
[e.g. 6]. Recently, several formal models have been presented to evaluate this view.
For this paper, the most relevant of those is the model of Nowak et al. [7].
In that model it is assumed that there is a finite number of grammars, that new¬
comers (infants) learn their grammar from the population, that more successful
grammars have a higher probability of being learned and that mistakes are made in
learning. The system can thus be described in terms of the changes in the relative
frequencies of each grammar type i in the population. The first result that Nowak
et al. obtain is a "coherence threshold". This threshold is the necessary condition
for grammatical coherence in a population, i.e. for a majority of individuals to use
the same grammar. They show that this coherence depends on the chances that a
child has to correctly acquire its parents' grammar. This probability is described
with the parameter q. Nowak et al. show analytically that there is a minimum value
for q to keep coherence in the population. If q is lower than this value, all possible
grammar types are equally frequent in the population and the communicative suc¬
cess in minimal. If q is higher than this value, one grammar type is dominant; the
communicative success is much higher than before and reaches 100% if q = 1.
The second result relates this required fidelity (called qi) to a lower bound (bc)
on the number of sample sentences that a child needs. Nowak et al. make the
crucial assumption that all languages are equally expressive and equally different
from each other. With that assumption they can show that bc is proportional to
the total number of possible grammars N. Of course, the actual number of sample
sentences b is finite; Nowak et al. conclude that only if N is relatively small can
a stable grammar emerge in a population. I.e. the population dynamics require a
restrictive Universal Grammar.
The models of Gold and Nowak et al. have in common that they implicitly assume
that every possible grammar is equally likely to become the target grammar for
learning. If even the best possible learning algorithm cannot learn such a grammar,
the set of allowed grammars must be restricted. There is, however, reason to believe
that this assumption is not the most useful for language learning. Language learning
is a very particular type of learning problem, because the outcome of the learning
process at one generation is the input for the next. The samples from which a child
learns with its learning procedure, are therefore biased by the learning of previous
generations that used the same procedure[8].
In [9] and other papers, Kirby, Hurford and students have developed a framework
to study the consequences of that fact. In this framework, called the "Iterated
Learning Model" (ILM), a population of individuals is modeled that can each pro¬
duce and interpret sentences, and have a language acquisition procedure to learn
grammar from each other. In the ILM one individual (the parent) presents a rela¬
tively small number of examples of form-meaning pairs to the next individual (the
child). The child then uses these examples to induce his own grammar. In the next
iteration the child becomes the parent, and a new individual becomes the child.
This process is repeated many times. Interestingly, Kirby and Hurford have found
that in these iterated transmission steps the language becomes easier and easier to
learn, because the language adapts to the learning algorithm by becoming more
and more structured. The structure of language in these models thus emerges from
the iteration of learning. The role of biological evolution, in this view, is to shape
the learning algorithms, such that the complex results of the iterated learning is
biologically adaptive [10]. In this paper I will show that if one adopts this view on
the interactions between learning, cultural evolution and biological evolution, the
models such as those of Gold [3] and Nowak et al. [7] can no longer be taken as
evidence for an extensive, innate pre-specification of human language.
3 A Simple Model of Grammar Induction
To study the interactions between language adaptation and language acquisition, I
have first designed a grammar induction algorithm that is simple, but can never¬
theless deal with some non-trivial induction problems. The model uses context-free
grammars to represent linguistic abilities. In particular, the representation is lim¬
ited to grammars G where all rules are of one of the following forms: (1) A >—> t, (2)
A i—► BC, (3) A e-> Bt. The nonterminals A,B,C are elements of the non-terminal
alphabet Vntr which includes the start symbol S. t is a string of terminal sym¬
bols from the terminal alphabet V)1. For determining the language L of a certain
grammar G I use simple depth-first exhaustive search of the derivation tree. For
computational reasons, the depth of the search is limited to a certain depth d, and
the string length is limited to length I. The set of sentences (L' C L) used in train¬
ing and in communication is therefore finite (and strictly speaking not context-free,
but regular); in production, strings are drawn from a uniform distribution over L'.
The grammar induction algorithm learns from a set of sample strings (sentences)
that are provided by a teacher. The design of the learning algorithm is originally
inspired by [11] and is similar to the algorithm in [12]. The algorithm fits within a
tradition of algorithms that search for compact descriptions of the input data [e.g.
13, 14, 15]. It consists of three operations:
Incorporation: extend the language, such that it includes the encountered string',
if string s is not already part of the language, add a rule S >—> s to the
grammar.
1Note that the restrictions on the rule-types above do not limit the scope of languages
that can be represented (they are essentially equivalent to Chomsky Normal Form). They
are, however, relevant for the language acquisition algorithm.
Compression: substitute frequent and long substrings with a nonterminal, such
that the grammar becomes smaller and the language remains unchanged;
for every valid substring z of the right-hand sides of all rules, calculate the
compression effect v(z) of substituting z with a nonterminal A; replace all
valid occurrences of the substring z' = argmaxzv(z) with A if v(z') > 0, and
add a rule A >—> z' to the grammar. "Valid substrings" are those substrings
which can be replaced while keeping all rules of the forms 1-3 described
above. The compression effect is measured as the difference between the
number of symbols in the grammar before and after the substitution. The
compression step is repeated until the grammar does not change anymore.
Generalization: equate two nonterminals, such that the grammar becomes smaller
and the language larger-, for every combination of two nonterminals A and
B (B / S), calculate the compression effect v of equating A and B. Equate
the combination (A',B') = argmaxA bv(A,B) if v(A',B') > 0; i.e. replace
all occurrences of B with A. The compression effect is measured as the
difference between the number of symbols before and after replacing and
deleting redundant rules. The generalization step is repeated until the
grammar does not change anymore.
4 Learnable and Unlearnable Classes
The algorithm described above is implemented in C++ and tested on a variety of
target grammars2. I will not present a detailed analysis of the learning behavior
here, but limit myself to a simple example that shows that the algorithm can learn
some (recursive) grammars, while it can not learn others. The induction algorithm
receives three sentences (abed, abeabed, abcabcabcd). The incorporation, com¬
pression (repeated twice) and generalization steps yield subsequently the following
grammars:
(a) Incorporation (b) Compression (c) Generalization
S ►-> abed S 1—> Yd S Xd
S i—> abeabed S 1—> Xd S Xabcd
S >—> abcabcabcd S 1—> Xabcd X i- XX
X 1—> YY X H-> abc
Y 1—» abc
In (b) the substrings "abcabc" and "abc" are subsequently replaced by the non-
terminals X and Y. In (c) the non-terminals X and Y are equated, which leads to
the deletion of the second rule in (b). One can check that the total size of the
grammar reduces from 24, to 19 and further down to 16 characters.
From this example it is also clear that learning is not always successful. Any of the
three grammars above ((a) and (b) are equivalent) could have generated the train¬
ing data, but with these three input strings the algorithm always yields grammar
(c). Consistent with Gold's general proof [3], many target grammars will never be
learned correctly, no matter how many input strings are generated. In practice,
each finite set of randomly generated strings from some target grammar, might
yield a different result. Thus, for some number of input strings T, some set of tar¬
get grammars are always acquired, some are never acquired, and some are some of
the time acquired. If we can enumerate all possible grammars, we can describe this
with a matrix Q, where each entry Qij describes the probability that the algorithm
learning from sample strings from a target grammar i, will end up with grammar
2The source code is available at http://wvw.ling.ed.ac.uk/~jelle
of type j. Qu is the probability that the algorithm finds the target grammar. To
make learning successful, the target grammars that are presented to the algorithm
have to be biased. The following section will show that for this we need nothing
more than to assume that the output of one learner is the input for the next.
5 Iterated Learning: the Emergence of Learnability
To study the effects of iterated learning, we extend the model with a population
structure. In the new version of the model individuals (agents, that each represent
a generation) are placed in a chain. The first agent induces its grammar from a
number E of randomly generated strings. Every subsequent agent (the child) learns
its grammar from T sample sentences that are generated by the previous one (the
parent). To avoid insufficient expressiveness, we also extend the generalization step
with a check if the number Eq of different strings the grammar G can recognize is
larger than or equal to E. If not, E — Eq random new strings are generated and
incorporated in the grammar. Using the matrix Q from the previous section, we can
formalize this iterated learning model with the following general equation, where Xj
is the probability that grammar i is the grammar of the current generation:
In simulations such as the one of figure 1 communicative success between child and
parent - a measure for the learnability of a grammar - rises steadily from a low
value (here 0.65) to a high value (here 1.0). In the initial stage the grammar shows
no structure, and consequently almost every string that the grammar produces
is idiosyncratic. A child in this stage typically hears strings like "ada", "ddac",
"adba", "bcbd", or "cdca" from its parent. It can not discover many regularities in
these strings. The child therefore can not do much better than simply reproduce the
strings it heard (i.e. T random draws from at least E different strings), and generate
random new strings, if necessary to make sure its language obeys the minimum
number (E) of strings. However, in these randomly generated strings, sometimes
regularities appear. I.e., a parent may use the randomly generated strings "dcac",
"bcac", "caac" and "daac". When this happens the child tends to analyze these
strings as different combinations with the building block "ac". Thus, typically,
the learning algorithm generates a grammar with the rules S i—» dcX, S i—> bcX,
S i—> caX, S i—> daX, and X i—> ac. When this happens to another set of strings as
well, say with a new rule Y >-+ b, the generalization procedure can decide to equate
the non-terminals X and Y. The resulting grammar can then generalize from the
observed strings, to the unobserved strings "deb", "beb", "cab" and "dab". The
child still needs to generate random new strings to reach the minimum E, but fewer
than in the case considered above.
The interesting aspect of this becomes clear when we consider the next step in the
simulation, when the child becomes itself the parent of a new child. This child
is now presented with a language with more regularities than before, and has a
fair chance of correctly generalizing to unseen examples. If, for instance, it only
sees the strings "dcac", "bcac", "caac", "beb", "cab" and "dab", it can, through
the same procedure as above, infer that "daac" and "deb" are also part of the
target language. This means that (i) the child shares more strings with its parent
than just the ones it observes and consequently shows a higher between generation
communicative success, and (ii) regularities that appear in the language by chance,
have a fair chance to remain in the language. In the process of iterated learning,
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Figure 1: Iterated Learning: although initially the target language is unstructured
and difficult to learn, over the course of 20 generations (a) the learnability (the frac¬
tion of successful communications with the parent) steadily increases, (b) the num¬
ber of rules steadily decreases (combinatorial and recursive stategies are used), and
(c) after a initial phase of overgeneralization, the expressiveness remains close to its
minimally required level. Parameters: Vt — {a,b,c,d}, Vnt = {S, X,Y,Z,A,B,C},
T=30, E=20, Io=3. Shown are the average values of 2 simulations.
Similar results with different formalisms were already reported before [e.g. 11, 16],
but here I have used context-free grammars and the results are therefore directly
relevant for the interpretation of Gold's proof [3]. Whereas in the usual interpre¬
tation of that proof [e.g. 1] it is assumed that we need innate constraints on the
search space in addition to a smart learning procedure, here I show that even a
simple learning procedure can lead to successful acquisition, because restrictions
on the search space automatically emerge in the iteration of learning. If one con¬
siders learnability a binary feature - as is common in generative linguistics - this
is a rather trivial phenomenon: languages that are not learnable will not occur in
the next generation. However, if there are gradations in learnability, the cultural
evolution of language can be an intricate process where languages get shaped over
many generations.
6 Language Adaptation and the Coherence Threshold
When we study this effect in a version of the model where selection does play a
role, it is also relevant for the analysis in [7]. The model is therefore extended such
that at every generation there is a population of agents, agents of one generation
communicate with each other and the expected number of offspring of an agent (the
fitness) is determined by the number of successful interactions it had. Children still
acquire their grammar from sample strings produced by their parent. Adapting
equation 1, this system can now be described with the following equation, where
Xi is now the relative fraction of grammar i in the population (assuming an infinite
population size):
Here, fi is the relative fitness (quality) of grammars of type i and equals fi =
where Fa is the expected communicative success from an interaction
between an individual of type i and an individual of type j. The relative fitness / of a




dependent. $ is the average fitness in the population and equals 4> = Y^ixifi- This
term is needed to keep the sum of all fractions at 1. This equation is essentially the
model of Nowak et al. [7]. Recall that the main result of that paper is a "coherence
threshold": a minimum value for the learning accuracy q to keep coherence in the
population. In previous work [unpublished] I have reproduced this result and shown
that it is robust against variations in the Q-matrix, as long as the value of q (i.e.
the diagonal values) remains equal for all grammars.
Figure 2: Results from a run under fitness proportional selection. This figure shows
that there are regions of grammar space where the dynamics are apparently under
the "coherence threshold" [7], while there are other regions where the dynamics are
above this threshold. The parameters, including the number of sample sentences T,
are still the same, but the language has adapted itself to the bias of the learning
algorithm. Parameters are: Vt = {0,1, 2,3}, Vnt = {5, a, 6, c, d, e, /}, P=20, T=100,
E=100, lo=12. Shown are the average values of 20 agents.
Figure 2, however, shows results from a simulation with the grammar induction
algorithm described above, where this condition is violated. Whereas in the simu¬
lations of figure 1 the target languages have been relatively easy (the initial string
length is short, i.e. 6), here the learning problem is very difficult (initial string
length is long, i.e. 12). For a long period the learning is therefore not very suc¬
cessful, but around generation 70 the success suddenly rises. With always the same
T (number of sample sentences), and with always the same grammar space, there
are regions where the dynamics are apparently under the "coherence threshold",
while there are other regions where the dynamics are above this threshold. The
language has adapted to the learning algorithm, and, consequently, the coherence
in the population does not satisfy the prediction of Nowak et al.
7 Conclusions
I believe that these results have some important consequences for our thinking
about language acquisition. In particular, they offer a different perspective on the
argument from the poverty of the stimulus, and thus on one of the most central
"problems" of language acquisition research: the logical problem of language acqui¬
sition. My results indicate that in iterated learning it is not necessary to put the
(whole) explanatory burden on the representation bias. Although the details of the
grammatical formalism (context-free grammars) and the population structure are
deliberately close to [3] and [7] respectively, I do observe successful acquisition of
grammars from a class that is unlearnable by Gold's criterion. Further, I observe
grammatical coherence even though many more grammars are allowed in principle
than Nowak et al. calculate as an upper bound. The reason for these surprising
results is that language acquisition is a very particular type of learning problem:
it is a problem where the target of the learning process is itself the outcome of a
learning process. That opens up the possibility of language itself to adapt to the
language acquisition procedure of children. In such iterated learning situations [11],
learners are only presented with targets that other learners have been able to learn.
Isn't this the traditional Universal Grammar in disguise? Learnability is - consistent
with the undisputed proof of [3] - still achieved by constraining the set of targets.
However, unlike in usual interpretations of this proof, these constraints are not
strict (some grammars are better learnable than others, allowing for an infinite
"Grammar Universe"), and they are not a-priori: they are the outcome of iterated
learning. The poverty of the stimulus is now no longer a problem; instead, the
ancestors' poverty is the solution for the child's.
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The relation between Language Acquisition, Language Change and Language Typology is a fasci¬
nating topic, but also one that is difficult to model. I focus in this paper on the question how theories
of language acquisition constrain theories of language change and typology. In the generative tradition
and "Learnability Theory" this problem is approached by assuming that all linguistic variation can be
described in terms of a relatively small number of parameters of a universal, innate core, the Universal
Grammar. In this view, language acquisition is parameter setting, and language change is parameter
change. I review some simple acquisition models and their consequences for language change, and dis¬
cuss some problems with this approach. I will then discuss an alternative approach that is based on
"Explicit Induction" algorithms for grammatical formalisms. I discuss which approach is most useful
for which problems.
1 Language acquisition, change and typology
Every healthy human infant is capable of acquiring any one of a dazzling variety of human languages. This
simple fact poses two fundamental challenges for linguistics: (1) understanding how children are so ex¬
tremely successful at this apparently complex task, and (2) understanding how, although all humans have
such similar linguistic abilities, such a wide variety of languages has emerged. These challenges are intri¬
cately linked: the languages that we observe today, are the result of thousands of years of cultural trans¬
mission, where every generation has acquired its language from the observed use by previous generations.
That makes the acquisition of language a rather unique learning problem for learning theory, because what
is being learned is itself the result of a learning process. Conversely, the structure of a language (say modern
English) at any one time (say, 2003) is the result of perhaps millions of individuals learning from examples
from a language with a very similar structure (say, the English of the 1960s).
This so-called circular causality (Steels, 1999) makes the relation between Language Acquisition, Lan¬
guage Change and Language Typology a fascinating topic, but also one that is difficult to model. I will
focus here on the question how theories of language acquisition constrain theories of language change and
typology. In the generative tradition and "Learnability Theory" this problem is approached by assuming
that all linguistic variation can be described in terms of a relatively small number of parameters of a uni¬
versal, innate core, the Universal Grammar. In this view, language acquisition is parameter setting, and
language change is parameter change. In the following I will review some simple acquisition models and
their consequences for language change, and discuss some problems with this approach. I will then discuss
an alternative approach from the emerging field of computational modeling of the evolution of language
(Kirby, 2002b), that is based on "Explicit Induction" algorithms for grammatical formalisms. I will argue
that the differences between the two approaches have been exaggerated, and will discuss for which sort of
problems which sort of approach is most useful.
1
2 Parameter models
The "Parameter change" approach to this problem is based on parameterizing linguistic structure, such that
we can characterize all differences between possible human languages by a vector of a small number of
parameters. E.g., in the Principles and Parameters approach (Chomsky, 1981; Bertolo, 2001), language
acquisition is described in terms of parameter settings for a universal core, the Universal Grammar. With
such a description of language in hand, we can reformulate the challenges as follows: (1) how can learning,
given primary linguistic data that conforms to any particular set of parameters, find that set of parameters?
(2) given a set of learning procedures that are capable of finding the correct parameters, which ones predict
the type of language change and statistical distributions (universals tendencies, Kirby 1999) that we can
actually observe?
2.1 Parameter setting
In the "parameter setting" models of language acquisition, one assumes a finite number N of possible
grammars. If all variation can be described by n different, Boolean and independent parameters, such that
the total number of possible grammars is N = 2". Such parameters determine, for instance, whether or
not an object precedes the main verb in a sentence, or whether or not the subject can be left out. Typically,
although the number of parameters is estimated at around 30, concrete examples are only worked out for
the 2 or 3 least controversial proposed parameters. A lot of work in parameter setting works with rather
simplified models that can be studied analytically, and that depend only on the finiteness of N. Examples
of such models are "memory-less learning", "batch learning" (e.g. Nowak et al., 2001) and "learning by
enumeration" (Gold, 1967). It is useful to look in a bit more detail at these models.
Memory-less learning (Niyogi, 1998) is arguably the simplest language acquisition model. The algo¬
rithm works by choosing a random grammar from the set of possible grammars each time the input data
shows that the present hypothesis is wrong. The algorithm obviously is not very efficient, because it can
arrive at hypotheses it has already rejected before; i.e. each time it randomly chooses a new grammar, it
forgets what it has learned from all data it has received before. This algorithm is only of interest because it
is simple and provides a lower bound on the performance of any reasonable algorithm (Nowak et al., 2001).
The batch learner, in contrast, memorizes all received sentences and finds all grammars from the set of
possible ones that are consistent with these sentences. Equivalently, it keeps track of all possible grammars
that are still consistent with the received data. In any case, for any reasonably large set of possible grammars,
the batch learner has monstrous memory and processing requirements. Its value lies in the fact that it is
simple, and provides an upper bound on the performance of any reasonable learning algorithm, as long as
there is no a-priori reason to prefer one grammar that is consistent with the data over another.
As exemplified by appendix A, we can, with a bit of effort, derive explicit formulas that describe the
probability of success q as a function of the number of input sentences for both the memory-less and the
batch learner. Under the assumption that every wrong grammar is equally similar to the right grammar
(described with a similarity parameter a), we can in fact give a complete transition matrix T, where all
diagonal values are qmemoryless and all off-diagonal values arg (1 - qmemoryiess)/(N - 1). This transition
matrix plays an important role in models of language change described in the next section.
It is important to realize that these algorithms only work because a finite (and in fact, relatively small)
number of possible grammars is assumed. Moreover, calculations such as in appendix A are relatively easy
due to some important assumptions: (1) that the algorithms are not biased at all to favor certain possible
grammars over others; (2) that (in the case of the memory-less learner) the probability of jumping to a
wrong or right grammar remains constant throughout the learning process; and (3) that all grammars are
equally similar to each other. Without thesqrassumptions, similar calculations quickly get rather complex.
For instance, learning by enumeration (Gold, 1967), as the name suggests, proceeds by enumerating one
at a time, and in prespecified order all possible grammars. Only if a grammar is inconsistent with incoming
data ("text"), does the algorithm move on to the next grammar. The procedure is of interest, because it can
be used as a criterion for learnability (Gold, 1967)1. Calculating q is more difficult than before, because the
probably of changing to a wrong grammar decreases over time.
The trigger learning algorithm (Wexler & Culicover, 1980) is a popular model that is of (slightly)
more practical interest. Rather than picking a random new grammar, as the memory-less learner does, or
enumerating grammars in a random order, as in learning by enumeration, it changes a random parameter
when it finds an input sentence that is inconsistent with the present hypothesis. If with the new parameter
setting the sentence can be parsed, the change is kept, otherwise it is reverted. The trigger learning algorithm
thus implements a kind of hill-climbing (gradient ascent), by keeping parameters that do well and only
making a small change when it improves performance. The probability of the trigger algorithm to give the
right grammar after b sentences is even more tricky to calculate, because the probability to reject a wrong
hypotheses decreases as more and more parameters get correctly set.
Many other parameter setting models exists. E.g. Briscoe (2002a) develops a variant of the trigger
learning algorithm, where parameters are no longer independent, but fall into linguistically motivated in¬
heritance hierarchies. Further, rather than choosing a single parameter at random and changing it, as in the
TLA, Briscoe's algorithm selects several random parameters and keeps track of their most likely setting in
a Bayesian, statistical fashion. Yang (2000) argues that language acquisition is best viewed as a selectionist
process, where many different parameter sets are considered in parallel. Niyogi & Berwick (1995) and Yang
(2000) consider the further complication that children learn from input sentences that are drawn from dif¬
ferent languages, and explore the expectations on what grammar settings they will end up with. In all these
models, calculating the probabilities of the outcome of learning gets very complex and results are typically
obtained by using computer simulations.
2.2 Parameter change
Niyogi & Berwick (1995), as well as neural network modelers Hare & Elman (1995), argue that a theory
of language acquisition - and the mistakes children make when confronted with insufficient or ambiguous
input - implies a theory of language change. Similarly, Kirby (1999) explores the idea that a theory on
language use and processing - which alter the primary linguistic data - leads to specific expectations on
language change and the resulting linguistic variation. Hence, by working out the consequences for language
change and comparing them to empirical data, theories on language use, processing and acquisition can be
'Learning by enumeration can, within finite time, find the target grammar from a class of grammars if the following conditions
hold: (1) the class of grammars is finite (enumerable), (2) for every two grammars in the class, there exists a sentence that distin¬
guishes between two grammars (i.e. that is grammatical according to one, and ungrammatical according to the other), and (3) the
distinguishing sentence will occur within a finite amount of time in the the text, generated by the target grammar. It follows that
the class of grammars is then learnable from text. It can be shown that superfinite classes of grammars, such as the context-free or
context-sensitive grammars, are not learnable in this sense (Gold, 1967). Principles & Parameters-models, in contrast, are learnable
(Wexler & Culicover, 1980) and so are many other classes (Angluin, 1980).
tested. Formally, a class of grammars Q, a learning algorithm A and a model of the primary linguistic data (a
probability distribution Vl over the possible sentences of language i) together constitute the main ingredients
of a dynamical system that describes the change in numbers of speakers of each language2.
Several general results have been obtained. For instance, Niyogi & Berwick (1995) and Yang (2000) find
that with different choices for {Q, A,V}, the change in the number of speakers of a particular language tends
to follow an S-shaped curve, consistent with observed patterns in historical data. More interestingly, Nowak
et al. (2001) derive a coherence threshold. In their model, natural selection selecting for more frequent
grammars, helps a population to converge on a specific grammar. Mistakes in learning, on the other hand,
lead to divergence, because it essentially randomizes the choice of grammars. Nowak et al. find that if the
accuracy in learning is below a precise threshold, all coherence in the population is lost and all languages
are spoken with equal probability3.
Niyogi and Berwick apply their methodology to a number of case studies. For instance, they look at a
simple 3-parameter system where the parameters determine whether or not specifiers (1) and complements
(2) come before the head of a phrase, and whether or not the verb is obligatorily in second position (3). In
this system, there are 8 different possible grammars (languages). By making assumptions on the frequency
with which triggers for each of the parameters are available to the child, they can estimate the probability
a specific learning algorithm can learn each language. They numerically determine the probabilities of
transitions between each of the 8 language over 30 generations with 128 triggers per generation. They find
that languages with the third parameter set to "0" (V2-) are extremely unstable and that the V2+ parameter
therefore quickly gets fixed in all simulations. This observation is contrary to observed trends in historical
data, where V2+ is typically lost. Niyogi and Berwick argue that this falsifies their preliminary model, and
thus illustrates the feasibility of testing the diachronic accuracy of the assumptions on {Q, A, V}.
2.3 Some features of parameter change models
Several other parameter change models have been studied. They have in common the emphasis on the uni¬
formity of languages, i.e. all possible languages (grammars) are of equal quality. Hence, children acquiring
a language do not go from a simple grammar to a more complex one, but rather jump from one grammar
to an equally complex alternative. Not the quality of the language, but the uncertainty about which is the
correct one changes over time.
Moreover, in all these models the acquisition of syntax is studied independently from the acquisition
of phonology, semantics, pragmatics and the lexicon, and, usually, independent from the particularities of
the child's parsing algorithm. The training data are "triggers", i.e. strings of grammatical categories. The
problems of learning the syntactic categories of words and their meaning, and learning to recognize the
phonological form and the boundaries between words are all ignored.
Further, the models fit into a tradition that is much mathematically oriented. Although many results are
obtained through numerical simulations, the models are formulated at a rather abstract level. Generations
are typically discrete, the number of parameters small (2, 3, 5), number of training samples and the number
of individuals in a population very small or, alternatively, infinite.
The models are valuable, because they give a general insight in how linguistic conventions can change
and spread in a population. However, the problem with this approach is that its potential for explain¬
ing specific aspects of language acquisition and language typology depends completely on the successful
parametrization of linguistic descriptions. That dependence has advantages, because it makes the relation
with other linguistic theories very clear, but it has some major disadvantages as well.
2In addition to the triple {Q,A, V} (Niyogi & Berwick, 1995), one needs assumptions on population and generation structure
and the number of training sentences the algorithm receives.
Presumably, a similar mechanism explains the lack of coherence in the simulations of Niyogi & Berwick (1995).
First, there is, as for now, no such parametrization available. If efficient parametrization (i.e. with 20
or 30 parameters) turns out to be impossible, models that depend on them will be inadequate. Second, even
if it is possible in principle, without a complete theory available on what each parameter means, solutions
in terms of these parameters give little insight on why children learn certain things with more ease than
others, or why languages tend to show certain patterns more often than others. Finally, parameter-models
might give an adequate description of the variation in languages in a quasi-stable state, but that does not
necessarily mean that they also give an adequate description of language variety when languages are chang¬
ing. In particular, observed trends in language change regarding the interaction between phonology, syntax,
semantics and pragmatics seem hard to capture in available parameter models.
3 Explicit Induction
3.1 Grammar Induction: impossible and irrelevant?
Grammar Induction algorithms are usually based on the intuition that the frequency of occurrence of sub¬
string in the training sentences, and the contexts in which they appear, contain information on what the
underlying constituents and the rules of combination of the target grammar are. E.g. Zellig Harris, in de¬
scribing the methods linguists use to infer the grammar of an unknown language, defines the crucial concept
of "substitutability" as follows: "If our informant accepts DA'F as a repetition of DEF, and if we are simi¬
larly able to obtain E'BC as equivalent to ABC, then we say that A and E are mutually substitutable" (Zellig
Harris, 1951, quoted in van Zaanen 2001).
It is possible to design induction algorithms that, just like Harris's linguist, use observed patterns in
training sentences to induce the underlying grammar. However, due to initial negative results on the theoret¬
ical possibility of learning a grammar from positive data (Gold, 1967) and developments in linguistic theory
(e.g. Chomsky, 1965), the induction of grammar has been widely viewed as both impossible and irrelevant.
The supposed impossibility of grammar induction is based on a widespread misinterpretation of negative
learnability results. Gold (1967) showed that e.g. the class of context-sensitive languages is not identifiable
in the limit. Even we if accept identification in the limit as the appropriate criterion for learnability, Gold's
results mean nothing more than, in his own words:
"The class of possible natural languages is much smaller than one would expect from our
present models of syntax. That is, even if English is context-sensitive, it is not true that any
context-sensitive language can occur naturally. Equivalently, we may say that the child starts
out with more information than that the language it will be presented is context-sensitive. In
particular, the results on learnability from text imply the following: The class ofpossible natural
languages if it contains languages of infinite cardinality, cannot contain all languages of finite
cardinality." (Gold, 1967)
In other words, a class of context-sensitive grammars needs to be constrained to make it learnable.
Angluin (1980) has shown that very non-trivial classes of formal languages are learnable. Nothing in the
formal results, however, proves that the necessary restrictions are due to an extensive, innate, language-
specific Universal Grammar; they could be simply generic properties of the human brain4.
The supposed irrelevance of grammar induction algorithms is based on the fact that the dominant linguis¬
tic theories of the last decades assume extensive innate knowledge. If children don't do grammar induction,
why design computer programs that do? Evidence for this view comes - in addition to the learnability
4Although it is of course true that learnability is a valid test for judging the validity of a (grammatical) theory, and that few
proposed theories other than those from the nativist tradition pass it. However, one can argue that nativist theories, rather than
solving the learnability problem, simply shift it to the domains of evolutionary theory and cognitive neuroscience.
results - from empirical observations in child language acquisition. Typically, such arguments have the
form: the child correctly uses construction X very early in life, even though the primary linguistic data it
has received up to that point does not provide enough evidence to choose between X and several alternative
logical possibilities. Thus, it is concluded, the child must have prior (innate) knowledge of X.
More and more it is now recognized that this "knowledge of X" might be an emergent result of the
interaction between not necessarily language-specific cognitive and learning abilities, and the structure,
meaning and pragmatics of the linguistic data the child received (MacWhinney, 1999). Consequently, the
need to postulate language-specific adaptations might be limited (Jackendoff, 2002; Hauser et al., 2002).
3.2 Induction Algorithms
Wolff (1982), and similarly Stolcke (1994), Langley & Stromsten (2000) and Zuidema (2003), presents
a model based on the idea that a grammar is a compressed representation of a possibly infinite language
(string set). These algorithms all use context-free grammars as the grammar formalism, learn from text and
run through three phases that can be termed "incorporation", "compression" and "generalization". I will
refer to these algorithms as "compression-based induction".
In the incorporation phase, input sentences s are stored as idiosyncratic rewrite rules S t—> s. In the
compression phase (or "syntagmatic merging"), the most frequent substrings 2 in the right-hand sides of
the stored rules are replaced by a unique non-terminal symbol N. Rules of the form N h-> z are added
to the grammar. In the generalization phase (or "paradigmatic merging"), two nonterminals N and N'
are considered substitutable if they occur in the same context; all occurrences of N' are then replaced by
N. Different variants of the basic algorithm differ in how greedy they are, and in whether or not they are
incremental. Kirby (2000), and later papers, uses a algorithm were the context-free grammars are enriched
with a predicate-logic based semantics.
A related framework based on substitutability is developed by van Zaanen (2001) and termed "Alignment
Based Learning" (ABL). Van Zaanen develops a number of algorithms for the two phases of the ABL
framework: Alignment learning and selection learning. In the alignment learning phase input sentences are
compared, aligned and common substrings are identified. The unequal parts z and z' of the two sentences
are labeled with a non-terminal. The non-terminal is unique if neither z nor z' was labeled already, but
the algorithm reuses the existing label if available, and equates the two non-terminals if both z and z' were
labeled already. In the latter two conditions a form of generalization occurs. Each labeling is a hypothesis
on a possible constituent of the target language, and very many such hypotheses are generated.
In the selection learning phase, a subset of the generated hypotheses is selected. That subset is chosen
such that it is concise (each hypothesis can be used to analyze many sentences), and that it is internally
consistent (hypotheses do not overlap). The ABL algorithm yields a tree-bank: an annotated version of the
input corpus (it thus implements automated tagging). From the tree-bank, context-free grammars can be
trivially induced.
3.3 Language Evolution
In the "Explicit Induction" approach to modeling language change and evolution, language change is studied
based on similar induction algorithms, i.e. learning algorithms that produce an explicit grammar based on
training sentences (see Hurford, 2002, for a review). Such an approach avoids the problems of parameter
models, because they can incorporate any available linguistic formalism. However, they have two major
disadvantages as well: (1) language induction is very challenging problem that is far from solved, even
for simplified and well understood grammar formalisms; (2) models that incorporate a full-blown linguistic
formalism, including procedures for language production and interpretation, quickly get very complex.
Two recent models by Kirby (2002a) and Batali (2002) show that there is reason for optimism for
progress on bl problems. Kirby presents a model that is very clear in its set-up. It uses first-order predi¬
cate logic with a small set of entities and predicates to represent semantics, and a extension of context-free
grammars to represent syntax and the syntax-semantics mapping. The model thus uses well-understood and
conventional linguistic formalisms and a simple learning procedure. However, by using the output of one
learning cycle as input for the next Kirby was able to get some unconventional results: the spontaneous
emergence of a recursive, infinite but learnable language. However, the learning algorithm used is very brit¬
tle, and it's difficult to extend the model to domains with more diverse semantics and a more heterogeneous
syntax.
In contrast, Batali's model is very difficult to understand. It also uses a form of predicate logic to
represent semantics, but it uses "exemplars" as the basic representation of the grammar, and "argument
maps" to guide the combination of exemplars into meaningful sentences. The results show the emergence
of a complex language, with properties similar to case marking and subordinate clause marking in natural
languages. The emergent languages are essentially infinite but nevertheless learnable (from meaning-form
pairs). The learning algorithm is successful and robust in this complex domain presumably because of the
redundancy it allows.
3.4 Some features of explicit induction models
Several other explicit induction models have been studied. They have in common that no uniformity of
languages are assumed. Typically, individuals in these models start with an empty grammar and empty
lexicon, and gradually add new rules and lexical items based on the received sentences and observed patterns.
Individuals are, however, equipped with an invention procedure, such that they can generate new sentences
when required.
Further, in these models learning is typically from form-meaning pairs and a lexicon is built-up in
parallel with the grammar. The recognition of phonemes and the pragmatics of dialogs are built-in as
assumptions of the models.
The models are all implemented as computer programs. Typically, the models are rather concrete:
they consist of a population of individuals, with procedures for production, invention, interpretation and
induction, and a set of possible message to communicate. The languages studied in these models are still
relatively simple, and exhibit just some basic word orders or morphological markers for the semantic roles
of agents, patients and action. Empirical data from historical linguistics has so far played no role in these
studies.
4 Discussion
I have reviewed some models of language acquisition and language change from two different traditions.
The crucial question - which approach is best? - is still largely open to discussion. The following issues are
important in comparing both approaches:
Learnability - Theoretical arguments. From the field of learnability theory it has sometimes been argued
that grammar induction is impossible. In section 3.1 I have argued that this position is based on a mis¬
understanding of the negative learnability results. Learnability, however, is an important test for the
validity of a grammar formalisms and induction algorithms. The challenge is to find a combination of
a formalism that is as expressive as human languages are (i.e. mildly context-sensitive), and a learning
algorithm that can induce it from the available primary linguistic data. In my view, parameter setting
models meet this challenge, but only by making unsatisfactory assumptions on the prior knowledge
the algorithms start with. Explicit induction models, on the other hand, present considerable progress
(i.e. most work with context-free grammars), but more work still needs to be done.
Learnability - Empirical arguments. From the field of psycholinguistics it has been argued that children
have prior knowledge of syntactic constructions, because they choose, from apparently many logical
possibilities that are consistent with the received evidence, the correct, seemingly arbitrary option.
Grammar induction models, in this view, are - if not impossible - irrelevant, because children do not
do induction. I believe that explicit induction algorithms have already shown that the logic of this
argument is false. There is no need for assuming explicit prior knowledge, because the outcome of
the interaction between learning biases and training data is subtle and often unexpected. Moreover,
because languages are transmitted culturally from generation to generation, seeming arbitrary choices
are likely to be the correct ones, because previous generations have used the same arbitrary learning
algorithm to learn their language (Deacon, 1997; Kirby, 2000; Briscoe, 2002a; Zuidema, 2003).
Equivalence More subtly, it has been suggested that explicit induction models might in some sense be
equivalent to parameter setting models. If the space of grammars that induction algorithms explore
is finite, then that space could in principle be parametrized and hence described by a finite num¬
ber of parameters. The induction algorithm can then be described, albeit possibly in a clumsy and
complicated way, as a parameter setting procedure. If this is true - and it presumably is for the
context-free grammar and finite-state machine inducers - the crucial issue is parsimony and clarity.
Presumably, for some purposes the representation in terms of parameters is more useful, but for com¬
parison with psycholinguistic, neurological and historical data the explicit grammar representation
seems more appropriate. Further, the parameterized representation leads naturally to the uniformity
assumptions, whereas the explicit grammar representation leads naturally to the view that grammars
grows over time. Finally, stochastic grammar formalisms can not be parametrized in the concise way
that parameter setting models usually assume. Worse, lexicalized, exemplar-based models can not be
parametrized because there are infinitely many probability distributions that can be assigned to the
string set (Bod, 1998).
In conclusion, the two approaches to modeling of language change are rooted in different theoretical
positions on the nature of language and language acquisition. If one adopts the Principles and Parame¬
ters framework, the parameter change approach is the appropriate way to conceptualize language change.
However, this approach requires more work to make explicit how each parameter is to be interpreted, which
triggers for each parameter are available, how the child learns her lexicon and recognizes syntactic categories
in the sentences it receives, how parameters depend on each other, etc. Moreover, it requires a satisfactory
explanation for the evolution and development of the Universal Grammar in the child's brain. However,
some Explicit Induction models might, even if one adopts this approach, still be useful as an equivalent
representations that can be more easily compared to empirical data.
If one rejects the Uniformity Hypothesis and conceptualizes grammar acquisition as the gradual built-up
of a grammar in the mind of the child, explicit induction models are the appropriate approach. Parameter
change models are still useful as simple, but mathematically sophisticated models of how conventions spread
in a population.
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A Memory-less learner and batch learner
To estimate the probability that memory-less learning finds the correct grammar after a certain number (6)
of sample sentences, we need to consider the inverse: the probability that the algorithm still has a wrong
hypothesis after b sample sentence.
P(right grammar after b samples) = 1 — P(wrong grammar after b samples) (1)
The probability that the learner still has the wrong hypothesis, depends on the probability that it initially
chose the wrong hypothesis (simply (N — 1 )/2V) times the probability that it remained for all b sentences
at a wrong hypothesis. If it makes no essential difference which wrong grammar is the present hypothesis
and how long it has held it as the hypothesis5, the probability that the algorithm remain for b sentences at a
wrong hypothesis is simply P{remain)b. Hence,
P{wrong grammar after b samples) — -— ^ (P(remain))b (2)
The probability to remain at a wrong grammar for each random input sentence is given by the probability
that that input sentence happens to be consistent with the present (wrong) grammar, plus the probability that
the algorithm jumps to another wrong grammar:
P(remain) — P{consistent) + P{another wrong grammar) (3)
The probability that a sentence is consistent with a wrong grammar is simply the similarity parameter
a in Nowak et al. (2001). The probability that the algorithm jumps to another wrong grammar is given by
the probability that the input sentence is inconsistent (1 - a) times the fraction of other wrong grammars
((AT- 2)/N).
Putting all this together, the probability (q) that the memory-less learner has found the correct grammar
after b input sentences is given by (Komarova et al., 2001)6:
i (N-l) (_ , (iV — 2) (1 — a)\b
Qmemoryless — -L I & ~t~ N 1 /
= <4,
N\N
The probability that the batch learner has found the correct grammar after b input sentences is found by
Nowak et al. (2001) to be
qtatch = 777m (5)(Nab
sThat is the case, for the memory-less learner, under the assumption of Nowak et al. (2001) that all grammars are equally
similar to each other. In contrast, in a Principles & Parameters model, we can calculate the expected similarity based on estimates
of how many parameters are revealed in a single sentence. Under the assumption-that every sentence reveals m parameters, that all
parameters are Boolean and that all parameters are revealed with equal probability: a as ■ a ~ (2) a's 'hen an expected
value rather than a constant, and equation (2) needs to be adapted. For simplicity, we will here follow the assumption of Nowak et
al.
6Note that there is an error in this equation in Nowak et al. (2004) that'tstorrected in Komarova et al. (2001)
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Human languages are universally phonemically coded, whereas many animal signal systems
are not. A number of theories and models have been developed to explain this evolutionary tran¬
sition, but some major problems remain. We present a simulation to investigate the hypothesis
that phonemic coding is an side effect of optimizing signal systems for success in imitation. Cru¬
cially, signals in our model are trajectories in an (abstract) acoustic space. Hence, both holistic
and phonemically coded signals have a temporal structure. Using both qualitative inspection of
emerged systems of trajectories and a statistical analysis of a measure of phonemicity, we find that
phonemically coded systems are indeed preferred. The model thus provides a new explanations
for the evolutionary pathway to the emergence of phonemic coding.
1 Introduction
One of the universal properties of human language is the fact that it is phonemically coded. Linguistic
utterances can be split into units that can be recombined into new linguistic utterances. For instance,
the words "we", "me", "why" and "my" as pronounced in standard British English are built-up from
the units "w", "m", "e" and "y", which can all be used in many different combinations.
There is some controversy about the exact level at which combination takes place. In the tradi¬
tional view the atomic units are phonemes: minimal speech sounds that can make a distinction in
meaning. An increasingly popular alternative view is that the atoms are syllables, or the possible on¬
sets, codas and nuclei of syllables. Nevertheless, there is general agreement that in natural languages,
atomic units are combined into larger wholes. For the purposes of this paper, we do not need to take
sides in the debate about the exact nature of the combinatorial elements of human language. Instead,
we study signals that occur in an abstract acoustic space, and address the question of why and how
phonemically coded sets of signals have emerged.
The combinatorial nature of human speech is in contrast with many animal calls and non-linguistic
human utterances, which generally cannot be split into smaller units. The songs of some songbirds
and whales, however, do seem to have combinatorial structure. The fact that in evolutionary unrelated
lineages combinatorial systems have emerged indicates that such systems can be considered as evo¬
lutionary attractors. Recombination apparently has major evolutionary advantages. Two views on the
advantages that recombination offers are:
1. It makes it possible to transmit an infinite number of messages over a noisy channel (the "noisy
coding argument", an argument from information theory, e.g. Nowak & Krakauer 1999).
2. It makes it possible to create an infinitely extensible set of signals with a limited number of
building blocks. Such productivity provides a solution for memory limitations, because signals
can be encoded more efficiently, and for generalization, because new signals can be created
by combining existing building blocks (the "productivity argument", a point often made in the
generative syntax tradition, e.g. Jackendoff 2002);
These advantages are a good starting point for answering the questions of why combinatorial
coding would emerge, and how initially holistic systems (which seem to be the default for smaller
repertoires of calls) can change into phonemically coded systems. In this paper we will address both
questions. In the following we will discuss some existing formal models of phonemic coding, discuss
which open problems remain and then develop a model of our own that addresses some of these
problems.
2 Previous work
2.1 Natural selection for combinatorial phonology
Several mathematical and computational models have shown that under noisy transmission, digital,
combinatorial coding is more efficient than continuous coding. Nowak & Krakauer (1999) apply
this insight in the context of the evolution of language, and derive an expression for the "fitness of a
language". Imagine a population of individuals that all agree on which signals to use for which objects
or events. The fitness of a language is now given by the expected success of a random individual to
communicate about a random object or event with a random other individual. Nowak et al. show that
when communication is noisy and when just a single sound is used for every meaning, the fitness is
limited by an "error limit": only a limited number of sounds can be used — and thus a limited of
meanings be expressed — because by using more sounds the successful recognition of the current
signals would be impeded. Nowak et al. further show that in such noisy conditions, fitness is higher
when (meaningless) sounds are combined into longer words. When the environment is combinatorial
(i.e. objects and actions occur in many combinations) the fitness is highest when meaningful words
are combined into longer sentences.
These results are essentially particular instantiations of Shannon's more general results on "noisy
coding" (Shannon, 1948), as is explored in a later paper by the same group (Plotkin & Nowak, 2000).
More interesting is the question how natural selection could favor a linguistic innovation in a popula¬
tion where that innovation is still very rare. Nowak & Krakauer (1999) do a game theoretic analysis of
"compositionality". They consider all mixed strategies where both holistic and compositional signals
are used, and show that strategies that use more compositionality can invade strategies that use less.
This means that the adaptive dynamics of languages under natural selection should lead to composi¬
tionality. For combinatorial phonology a similar analysis can be given.
Although this model is a useful formalization of the problem and gives some important insights,
as an explanation for the evolution of phonemic coding and compositionality it is still insufficient.
The main problem is that the model only considers the advantages of combinatorial strategies, and
ignores two obvious disadvantages: (1) by having a "mixed strategy" individuals have essentially two
languages in parallel, which one should expect to be costly because of memory and learning demands
and additional confusion; (2) combinatorial signals that consist of two or more sounds take longer to
utter and are thus more costly. A fairer comparison would be between holistic signals of a certain
duration (where repetition of the same sound decreases the effect of noise) and combinatorial signals
of the same duration (where the digital coding decreases the effect of noise). This is the approach we
take in this paper.
2.2 Crystallization in the perception-imitation cycle
A completely different approach to phonemic coding is based on "categorical perception". Cate¬
gorical perception (Harnad, 1987) is the phenomenon that categorization influences the perception
of stimuli in such a way that differences between categories are perceived as larger and differences
within categories as smaller that they really are (according to an "objective" similarity metric). For
instance, infants already perceive phonemes as closer to the closest prototype phoneme from their
native language than it is according to an "objective" (cross-linguistic) acoustical metric (Kuhl et al.,
1992). Flence, when presented vowels as stimuli ranging from /o/ to /a/ in fixed increments, British
subjects will hear the first stimuli as o's or almost o's, and the last as a's or almost a's. Apparently,
the frequency and position of acoustic stimuli gives rise to particular phoneme prototypes, and the
prototypes in turn distort the perception.
Oudeyer (2002) studies a model that yields such a perceptual distortion. In this model, signals are
modeled as points in an acoustic space, and are thus instantaneous. Oudeyer considers that signals
survive from generation to generation because they are perceived and imitated. Oudeyer shows that
categorical perception shapes a signal repertoire such that it conforms more and more to the prototype
phonemes. Thus, emitted signals shape perception, and distorted perception shapes the repertoire of
signals in the cycle from emission to perception to emission (the perception-imitation cycle; see also
Westermann 2001 for a model of sensori-motor integration and its relevance for imitation and categor¬
ical perception). Oudeyer calls the collapse of signals in a small number of clusters "crystallization".
Oudeyer's model is fascinating, because it gives a completely non-adaptive mechanism for the
emergence of phonemic coding. However, it is not clear how well it would work if signals have a
time structure rather than being instantaneous1. Moreover, even if the mechanism works also in these
conditions, it remains an important question whether phonemic coding increases the functionality of
the language, and thus the fitness of the individual that uses it. If not, one would expect selection to
work against it. In particular, in Oudeyer's model, where signals are instantaneous, a large repertoire
of signals is collapsed into a small number of clusters. A functional pressure to maintain the number of
distinct signals would thus have to either reverse the crystallization, or combine signals from different
clusters. This aspect, which seems the core issue in understanding the origins of phonemic coding, is
1
Oudeyer has also tested the model for sequences of sounds (Oudeyer, p.c.), but, as far as we know, not for continuous
trajectories. It seems that in this version of the model the "combinatorial" aspects of phonemic coding is imposed and only
the "categorical" (see section 2.3) aspect is emergent, such that our criticism still holds.
not modeled by Oudeyer. In our model, we ensure that the number of distinct signals remains at least
at the same level; i.e. the functionality increases rather than decreases.
2.3 Aspects of phonemic coding
Other models of phonemic coding assume the sequencing of phonetic atoms into longer strings as
given. They concentrate rather on the structure of the emerged systems (Lindblom et al., 1984;
de Boer, 2001; Redford et al, 2001) or on how conventions on specific combinatorial signal sys¬
tems can become established in a population through cultural transmission (Steels & Oudeyer, 2000).
These models are interesting, and, importantly, bridge the gap with empirical evidence on how phone¬
mic coding is implemented in the languages of the world.
It appears from this discussion that there are 4 related, but distinct aspects to phonemic coding:
1. Phonemically coded systems are categorical, in that they allow only a small number of basic
sounds and not all feasible sounds in between;
2. they are also superficially combinatorial, in that all parts of each signal overlap with parts of
other signals;
3. they are also productively combinatorial, in that the cognitive mechanism that produces and
interprets signals uses the common parts of signals as building blocks that can be combined in
all sorts of combinations;
4. the possible sets of categories and combinatorial rules show particular (cross-linguistic) con¬
straints.
These aspects form a hierarchy, where the aspects further down the list imply the aspect above it.
Oudeyer (2002) shows a non-adaptive mechanism that can yield aspect 1 (and gives a starting point
for 4), but does not explain how the other aspects come about and how the functionality of the signal
system is preserved. Nowak & Krakauer (1999) show how natural selection could favor 2, but ignore
the temporal aspects of holistic signals. Zuidema & Hogeweg (2000) and Zuidema (2003) can be
viewed as assuming aspects 1 and 2, and addressing the emergence of aspect 3 under natural selection
and cultural evolution respectively (but the models are not discussed in these terms). Lindblom et al.
(1984); de Boer (2001); Redford et al. (2001); Steels & Oudeyer (2000) all address aspect 4.
The question thus remains open as to under what circumstances a system of holistically coded
signals with finite duration would change into a phonemically coded system of signals. In the paper
we study a single mechanism that can yield aspects 1 and 2.
3 The model
In our model, we do not assume combinatorial structure, but rather study the gradual emergence of
phonemic coding from initially holistic signals. We do take into account the temporal structure of
both holistic and phonemically coded signals. We view signals as continuous movements ("gestures",
"trajectories") through an abstract acoustic space. We assume that signals can be confused, and that
the probability of confusion is higher if signals are more similar, i.e. closer to each other in the
acoustic space according to some distance metric. We further assume that a functional pressure on
distinctiveness maximizes the distance between trajectories.-
3.1 Representing trajectories
The model is based on part-wise linear trajectories in a bounded 2-D continuous space (of size 15.0 x
15.0 in all simulations reported here). Trajectories are sequences of points with fixed length (here:
20). Each point has a fixed distance of 1.0 to the immediately preceding and following points in the
sequence. The following and preceding points to a point can lay anywhere on a circle of radius one
with that point at the center. Trajectories always stay within the bounds of the defined acoustic space.
Signals in the real world are continuous trajectories, but in the model we need to discretize the
trajectories. However, to ensure that we do not impose the phonemic structure we are interested in,
we discretize at a much finer scale than the phonemic patterns that will emerge. Hence, the points on
a trajectory are not meant to model atomic units in a complex utterance.
3.2 Measuring distances
The distance between two trajectories t and r is defined as the sum of the distances between all
corresponding points in the best possible alignment of the two trajectories. In finding the best possible
alignment, one point from t can be mapped on several neighboring points in r and vice versa. In this
way trajectories that resemble each other in shape, but that do not align perfectly still are considered
close. This models the way humans perceive signals. The distances are calculated using "dynamic
time warping", an efficient method that before the advent of statistical models, has been used with
reasonable success in computer speech recognition (e.g. Sakoe & Chiba, 1978).
3.3 Maximizing the total mutual distance
In the first set-up of the model, we consider an idealized single repertoire of trajectories that, in a
sense, repel each other. That is, the total distance between trajectories is optimized using a simple
hill-climbing algorithm. The model goes through a large number of iterations. At every iteration, the
sum of all mutual distances is calculated. Then a random change is applied to a random trajectory t,
and the total distance is measured again. If this second measurement is larger than the first, the change
is kept. If not, the change is reverted.
Random changes always respect the constraints on well-formed trajectories. Hence, a random
point, tx, is moved to a new random position (from a Gaussian distribution around the old position,
provided it falls within the boundaries of the acoustic space). The two points on both sides of the
moved point, tx+i and tx-1, are moved closer or further away such that the distance to tx is again 1.
The direction from tx to tx+\ or tx_i remains the same, unless the point would cross the boundary
of the space, in which case it is rotated to the closest point within the boundary at distance 1 from
tx. The same procedure is applied recursively to the neighbors of tx+1 and tx_i until the ends of the
trajectory are reached.
In the second set-up of the model, we investigate what kind of repertoires of trajectories emerge
in a population of agents that try to imitate each other in noisy conditions. The model is very similar,
but now each agent in the population has its own repertoire, and it tries to optimize its own success in
imitating and being imitated by other agents of the population.
This version of the model is like the imitation games of de Boer (2000). These only modeled
holistic signals (vowels) and did not investigate phonemic coding. The game implemented here is a
slight simplification of the original imitation game. First, all agents in the population are initialized
with a random set of a fixed number of trajectQfigg. Tfisjj for each game, a speaker is randomly
selected from the population. This speaker selects a trajectory, and makes a random modification to it.
Then it plays a number of imitation games (50 in all simulations reported here) with all other agents in
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the population. In these games, the initiator utters the modified trajectory with additional noise. The
imitator finds the closest trajectory in its repertoire and utters it with noise. Games are successful if
the imitator's signals is closest to the modified trajectory in the initiator's repertoire. If it turns out that
the modified trajectory has better imitation success than the original trajectory, the modified trajectory
is kept, otherwise the original one is restored.
4 Results
4.1 Optimizing a single repertoire
We ran the model under the single repertoire condition with a number of different parameters. In all
simulations the initial trajectories are random sequences of positions, where the only constraints are
that neighboring points are at distance 1 from each other and that all points are within the permitted
space.
In simulations with few trajectories (up to 4), we find that the trajectories "bunch-up" and remain
within a very small area at maximum distance from the areas used by the other trajectories. Each of
these signals is thus a holistic signal, but the signals are "categorical".
Figure 1: Comparison of optimized systems of 5, 6 and 10 trajectories. Note the reuse of start- and
endpoints (squares indicate start points).
In simulations with 5 trajectories, 4 occupy the corners areas of the acoustic space in the same
way as in simulations with 4 trajectories. However, the fifth trajectory stretches from one corner to
another, and thus shares the areas for its begin and end points with two different other trajectories (see
fig. 1, leftmost panel). This can be interpreted as a rudimentary phonemic code.
With more trajectories, the reuse of beginning and end points becomes more pronounced. In the
simulation with 6 trajectories, the first 5 are similarly organized, but the sixth is essentially the inverse
of the fifth. In the simulation with 10 trajectories, 3 trajectories are still bunched up in a small area of
the acoustic space, but the other 7 are stretched out, sharing begin and end points with one another.
Frequently one can find trajectories that are more or less the inverse of another trajectory.
In order to perform a statistical analysis, a numerical measure of the extent to which emerged
systems were phonemically coded had to be defined. This measure, called the phonemicity V, is
defined as the ratio between the average distance between the start and end points of all trajectories
and the average distance between all other corresponding points of all trajectories. Corresponding
points are defined as points that are an equal number of steps away from either a start or an end point
(i.e., two points that are at position 3 are corresponding points, but so are a point at position 3 and
position L-2). The details for this measure are in the appendix.
In a phonemically coded system of trajectories, start and end points are expected to be closer
together than the other points on a trajectory, while in a holistically coded system of trajectories, the
average distance is expected to be approximately equal. Therefore, the measure should give lower
values for phonemically coded systems. It is quite likely that better measures of phonemicity can
be defined, but this measure does make a distinction between holistically and phonemically coded
systems, and was therefore adopted for the analysis.
phonemicity distribution (square space)
Figure 2: Distributions of phonemicity of random systems (right peak) and optimized systems (left
peak). Note that the phonemicity measure for optimized systems is lower, indicating that the optimized
systems are more phonemically coded than random systems.
Two conditions were compared. In both conditions the systems of trajectories were initialized
randomly; only in the second condition were systems of trajectories optimized for distance first using
30,000 optimization steps. The results were measured for systems of many different sizes, but are
presented for systems of 12, 18, 24 and 30 trajectories in figure 2. 10,000 random systems were
evaluated, but for computational reasons only 100 optimized systems, as the amount of computation
needed for optimization precluded larger numbers of systems to be evaluated. Note that the horizontal
axis (showing the phonemicity) is logarithmic. This has the advantage of both making the peaks more
distinct and making the distributions more similar to the normal distribution. When using the t-test,
on both the phonemicity and its logarithm, it turns out the difference between the distribution of the
random systems and the optimized systems is significant with p < 0.05 (the t-test is less appropriate
for the non-log measure, because of the highly skewed distribution).
This result indicates that optimization for acoustic time-warped distance between trajectories re¬
sults in more phonemically coded systems.
4.2 Optimizing repertoires in a population
For vowel systems, it has been shown that optimizing a single repertoire leads to similar systems as a
population-optimization system (compare de Boer, 2000; Liljencrants & Lindblom, 1972). It can be
shown that for trajectories the same is tfue, under the condition that noisy distortions of trajectories
do not distort the shape of these trajectories too much. This is illustrated in figure 3.
Figure 3: From left to right: emerged system with five trajectories in a population of ten agents (four
agents shown), emerged system with five trajectories and uncorrelated noise, and optimized system of
five trajectories. Small squares indicate the starting point of trajectories.
In this figure the left frame shows the system of five trajectories that resulted from playing imi¬
tation games in a population, using form-preserving noise. The right frame shows a system of five
trajectories that resulted from optimizing distance. It can be observed that in both cases, the corners
are populated by four trajectories, which are bunched up. The fifth trajectory, in contrast, follows
the diagonal. As before, an analysis in terms of phonemes suggests itself: the four corners are basic
phonemes, while the fifth trajectory uses one as the corners as a starting phoneme and the opposite
corner as the ending phoneme. Both models result in similar systems of trajectories.
The middle frame, on the other hand, shows that when noise does not preserve shape of trajecto¬
ries, a system results in which all trajectories are bunched up and an analysis in terms of phonemes
is therefore not possible. As noise in real signals is band limited, it follows that shape will always be
preserved to some extent. Therefore the shape-preserving model is indeed the correct model. Instead
of investigating computationally extremely costly population models, it is therefore possible to inves¬
tigate emergence of phonemic coding using the optimization model. For computational reasons, we
have not performed simulations in the population condition with more than 5 trajectories.
5 Conclusion
We have investigated whether systems of trajectories that are used for imitation in a population would
tend toward phonemic coding when agents tried to maximize their imitation success. It was found that
running simulations of populations directly was too time-consuming. However, it was also found that
direct optimization of time-warped distance between trajectories resulted in systems of trajectories
that were similar to those found in preliminary experiments with imitation in a population. For this
to be true, it was necessary to assume that in the population case, shape of trajectories was preserved
under noise. This is a realistic assumption, as it turns out to be true for all noise that is band-limited,
i.e. for which the energy of higher frequencies tends to zero. This is the case for all real-world noise.
When systems of trajectories were optimized for time-warped distance, it turned out that start- and
endpoints were reused and that there were no trajectories (at least for limited numbers of trajectories)
that had the same start- and endpoint and that only differed in the shape of the trajectory in between.
This is indicative of phonemic coding. A measure of phonemicity was defined and it was found that
optimized systems had significant lower values for this measure than random systems, indicating that
they were more phonemically coded.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that systems of complex articulations (trajectories) that
have maximum distance to each other tend to show aspects of phonemic coding. Systems that have
trajectories that are maximally distant from each other are most robust to noise. This means that op¬
timizing systems of large numbers of complex articulations for robustness to noise, which is likely to
happen when they are used for communication in a population, would result in systems of trajectories
that can be analyzed in terms of phonemes.
The relevance for the evolution of speech is clear. When populations of agents start to communi¬
cate using small numbers of signals, it is unlikely that they would use phonemic coding, or be able to
use it if it occurred. However, when extending the number of signals, the most robust systems would
be the ones that can be analyzed as phonemically coded. Agents that have adaptations to detect and
use this property would have an evolutionary advantage, as they would be able to learn faster, and
probably to communicate more accurately as well. This provides a cultural beginning of a possible
biological adaptation for using phonemically coded signals. This adaptation in the area of speech
could later be exapted for use in combining words, in other words, for syntax.
6 Future work
The results described in this paper are preliminary, and need to be extended in several ways. Firstly,
the model, especially in the population condition, should be tested with larger number of trajectories,
and with trajectories of longer length. Presumably, the "phonemic coding" would then not just apply
to the start and end points of the trajectories. Consequently, another measure of phonemicity needs to
be defined.
Further, the model can be altered such that it allows trajectories of varying length in a single
repertoire, and perhaps varying distances between the points of a trajectory.
Finally, and most ambitiously, the model should be extended to incorporate the aspects of phone¬
mic coding that are currently not addressed: productive combinatorics and realistic constraints on the
categories and rules of combination.
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Appendix: Measuring phonemicity
The average distance £ between the extreme points (start and end points) is given by:
^ N N
(D(h,ji) +D(i1,jL) + D(iL,ji) + D (iL,jL)) (1)
' i=0 j=i+1
where N is the number of trajectories and L is the length of each trajectory. The function D is a measure
of distance between points and will be explained below. The average distance between all other corresponding
points is given by:
^ N N L—l
^=
N(N T)(L 2) ^ ^ ^2{D(ik,jk) + D(iL-k+i,jk)) (2)v A ' i=0 j=i+l k=2
The phonemicity V is then simply:
p = 5 (3»
The distance function D(ia,jf) is the inverse, squared Euclidean distance between point a of trajectory i
and point b of trajectory j:
D ifa, jb) = —7 777 TTrjy (4)e + \Pa(t) - Pb(j)\2
where pa(i) is the position of point a of trajectory i. The term e (e = 0.01 throughout this paper) is added
to avoid division by zero. Note that this is a different distance function than was used in the optimization of the
distances between trajectories.
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Human languages exhibit a combination of computational features that
make them unique systems of communication in nature: large and learned
lexicons, combinatorial phonology, compositional semantics, and
hierarchical phrase structure. In the field of evolution of language
controversies have often focused on the complexity of these
computational mechanisms. These controversies include debates about
innateness, whether or not language was exapted, if it is the result
of a few or many mutations and if it increased in complexity over
evolutionary time (see e.g. Pinker & Bloom, 1990, and the many peer
commentaries and the authors' response in the same issue). We analyze
these debates and find that at their core they rely in varying degrees
on two implicit assumptions: (i) that complexity in the computational
machinery for processing language is difficult for evolution to
achieve and/or that (ii) that complexity is itself a trait which can
be selected for or against.
Out of the many possible ways of studying computational complexity,
formal linguistics has primarily been concerned with situating natural
language processes and formalisms on various computational
hierarchies. By far the most studied of these is the (extended)
Chomsky Hierarchy. We ask the questions: how do the two assumptions
outlined above fare when analyzed under this notion of complexity, and
how does this apply to the debates in the field? Such a formal
definition would potentially resolve conflicting intuitions about
complexity (exemplified e.g. in Lewontin's and Piatelli-Palmarini's
commentaries on Pinker & Bloom, 1990).
We argue that complexity in the automata theoretic sense is in fact
very common in natural systems. We find it plausible that genes can
code for systems with small numbers of elements interacting with
simple rules. There is increasing evidence that these sorts of systems
are in fact often computationally universal (e.g. Wolfram, 2003).
Furthermore, certain classes of neural network models have been shown
to be Turing equivalent (Siegelmann & Sontag, 1991), and capable of
efficiently encoding phenomena such as hierarchical phrase structure
(Pollack 1988) . We suspect that the reality is that brains in many
kinds of animals are already implementing algorithms and computations
which are sufficiently complex to represent and process language in
the strict automata theoretic sense.
Furthermore, we go on to argue that these grammars and automata are
not well suited to be used as phenotypes in biological models. They
do, of course, expose interesting differences in grammatical classes
on the hierarchy. For instance, the word recognition, or parsing
problem increases in time complexity as one makes certain moves up the
hierarchy. Likewise, differences in the hierarchy can be understood in
terms of increasing relaxation of memory limitations, e.g. finite to
stack based to stack based with less restrictive push procedures, etc.
But it is difficult to see how these differences satisfy various
evolutionary constraints or can affect fitness. We argue that instead
of looking at these formalisms in .tgjrms their place on the
hierarchy we must look deeper at the-properties of language that they
are meant to abstract.
We summarise that it is not the physical constraints of the general
neural architecture that restrict natural language to a specific
complexity class. Rather, the requirements of learnability and
population coherence as well as the interface conditions of
interpretability and producability under realistic time and noise
constraints choose specific classes of computational mechanisms. These
mechanisms restrict any language that is to survive either cultural or
genetic transmission. We discuss the implications of this for the
debates outlined in the introduction and reach some general
conclusions. For instance, is it theoretically useful to describe the
evolution of language as climbing the Chomsky hierarchy? (as do,
e.g. Hashimoto & Ikegami, 1996). Finally, we conclude that while the
Chomsky hierarchy is a bad model of phenotypic complexity, it is a
very good model of language. This suggests a way of rescuing it as a
tool for evolutionary theory.
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